Wykstra's paper, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering," is both conceptually rich and an important advance to our understanding of the evidential argument from evil. Its conceptual richness lies in its analysis of the epistemic notion of "appears" and its advancement of a necessary condition (CORNEA) for being entitled to make the claim: "It appears that p (not-p)." Its advance in our understanding of the evidential argument from evil consists in his application of CORNEA to the very starting point in the justification of the first premise of the deductive argument against theism I presented in the article of which his essay is a critique. My response will assume the conceptual contribution Wykstra has made, focussing mainly on the question of whether he has shown that CORNEA is in fact not satisfied when we make claims such as, "It appears that there are instances of suffering that do not serve outweighing goods otherwise unobtainable by an omnipotent, omniscient being." To this end it is important to begin with a distinction that will play a crucial role in my discussion. Let's call standard theism any view which holds that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being who created the world. Letting "0" abbreviate "an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being," standard theism is any view which holds that 0 exists. Within standard theism, we can distinguish restricted theism and expanded theism. Expanded theism is the view that 0 exists, conjoined with certain other significant religious claims, claims about sin, redemption, a future life, a last judgment, and the like. (Orthodox Christian theism is a version of expanded theism.) Restricted theism is the view that 0 exists, unaccompanied by other, independent religious claims. I will return to this distinction, but at the outset I want to focus on restricted standard theism the view that 0 exists. Consider the following proposition: