Civilian Targets Research Articles

Overcoming the Cultural Divide

The September 11 attacks on America invoked, among other things, a debate over the quality ofreligious education in Muslim societies. The calls for educational reform oflslamic religious schools have been most recently echoed by well-positioned individuals in the West. Several scholars, jour­nalists, and commentators have concluded that the fanaticism that moti­vated the highjackers who drove civilian airplanes into civilian targets is rooted in an educational system that teaches hate and intolerance. Traditional religious schools in Muslim societies, the argument goes, have become breeding grounds for religious fanatics who are willing to use force and violence to impose their narrow views of the world on the rest of humanity. New advocates of curtailing religious instruction and the strengthening of liberal education would like to see increased pressure on Muslim governments to restructure religious curricula to achieve the desired end. Under this pressure, the Pakistani government has already closed several religious schools.
 The concerns of western critics over traditional .Islamic education, while real, are greatly exaggerated. One reason is that religious fanaticism is still only the outlook and experience of fringe groups operating on the margins of society; another reason is that radical groups are to a great extent the creatures of oppressive regimes that dominate Muslim societies. Evidently, that reliance on state power has strengthened the hands of extremists and undermined the efforts of reformists.
 Still, the realization of the extent to which .Islamic traditionalism is at odds with western modernity is quite significant, because it underscores the need for western analysts and policy-makers to reconsider their current approach to dealing with Islamic resurgence. The universal monologue in which western cultures and norms are elevated to universal standards must give way to a cross-cultural dialogue that aims at finding a middle ground for common humanity, while respecting the cultural individuality of non­western societies ...

Toxins as Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparison and Contrast With Biological-Warfare and Chemical-Warfare Agents

Toxins are toxic chemical compounds synthesized in nature by living organisms. Classifiable by molecular weight, source, preferred targets in the body, and mechanism of action, they include the most potent poisons on the planet, although considerations of production, weaponization, delivery, environmental stability, and host factors place practical limits on their use as WMD. The two most important toxin threats on the battlefield or in bioterrorism are probably botulinum toxin (a series of seven serotypes, of which botulinum toxin A is the most toxic for humans) and SEB, an incapacitating toxin. Ricin and the trichothecene mycotoxins, including T-2 mycotoxin, are of lesser concern but are still potential threats. Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxin, ricin and trichothecene mycotoxins are membrane-damaging proteins, and SEB is a superantigen capable of massive nonspecific activation of the immune system. The clinical intoxications resulting from exposure to and absorption (usually by inhalation) of these agents reflect their underlying pathophysiology. Because of the hybrid nature of toxins, they have sometimes been considered CW agents and sometimes BW agents. The current trend seems to be to emphasize their similarities to living organisms and their differences from CW agents, but examination of all three groups relative to a number of factors reveals both similarities and differences between toxins and each of the other two categories of non-nuclear unconventional WMD. The perspective that groups toxins with BW agents is logical and very useful for research and development and for administrative and treaty applications, but for medical education and casualty assessment, there are real advantages in clinician use of assessment techniques that emphasize the physicochemical behavior of these nonliving, nonreplicating, intransmissible chemical poisons.

Rape as a war crime: putting policy into practice

As wars have changed in nature, so have civilians increasingly become the targets, with warring factions the world over successfully infiltrating entire communities and destroying them both physically and mentally. The international community has responded in part through legislation to make the targeting of civilians a crime. 1 Bruderlein C Leaning J New challenges for humanitarian protection. BMJ. 1999; 319: 430-435 Crossref PubMed Scopus (14) Google Scholar

The Ethics of Computer Network Attack

Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nonetheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by the situation. Thucydides, Speech of the Athenians [1] have the power, the capability, sitting in my home with my computer and my modem--if I only understood how to do it--to wage war. That is a very different environment than anything that we have experienced in the past. James Adams [2] Today we are on the verge of technological advances that will redefine how we wage war and, in many cases, blur the current line between economic competition and warfare. The technology which holds the most promise, as well as the most unknown danger, is the world of computer networks--cyberspace. With the proliferation of computers and ever-increasing computing power available to nearly every private citizen in developed countries, microprocessors have changed the lives of countless millions of people. The ubiquity of computing within business, finance, educational, and military institutions has raised concerns about the security of the data and tools upon which we have become increasingly dependent. [3] Many authors have expressed increasing concerns with our computer security. Some have speculated that an against the United States could disrupt electricity supplies and telephone service, interfere with air traffic control, cause leaks or explosions at chemical plants or refineries, and cause economic damage ranging into billions of dollars. [4] Likewise, other nations and transnational groups may have similar vulnerabilities the United States could exploit. Therefore, some people reason the United States should develop its own capabilities in the realm of computer network attack. In many articles and books, authors highlight the supposed elegance of bringing an enemy to his knees without firing a shot, instead rendering him defenseless and harmless by defeating his information infrastructure via surgical attacks. [5] The weapons of computer network include chipping [6] (inserting malevolent code into hardware during manufacturing), programming back doors to allow external control of a computer, and disseminating computer viruses. On the surface, these weapons appear to be nonlethal in nature, but they may have disruptive or deadly higher-order effects. Technologically capable nations are, perhaps by necessity, contemplating the addition of computer to their arsenals. During the Kosovo intervention, the United States attempted limited electronic attacks on Serbian computers containing banking records of Serbian leaders. [7] The United States is not alone, however. In 1995, the National Security Agency and Department of Energy estimated that more than 120 nations already had some sort of computer capability. [8] The People's Republic of China reportedly is studying numerous types of dirty war--asymmetric attack in today's military parlance --which include using computer viruses to pitch China's technologically advanced enemies into political and economic crisis. [9] The potential for such a crisis makes the application of computer network a very different sort of combat power than the kinetic weapons it may someday supplement or replace. Like kinetic weapons, a computer network can destroy both military and civilian targets. Unlike kinetic weapons, however, a computer network can reach across the world at the speed of light, invisibly transiting many international borders en route to its target. Like chemical and biological weapons, cyber weapons can target large masses of people in both military and civilian communities. Unlike biological and chemical weapons, however, they affect humans indirectly rather than directly. Cyber weapons thus share some similarities with weapons of yesterday, yet they occupy a completely new niche by their nature. …

The Irresolution of Rome

RUTH WEDGWOOD [*] I INTRODUCTION--THE U.S. SIGNATURE AND ITS AFTERMATH President Clinton's signature of the Rome treaty in the twilight of his Administration has punctuated the long impasse American participation in the International Criminal Court (the ICC). [1] Signing on December 31, 2000 (the last day possible for a signature without ratification), the President proclaimed his strong support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. [2] A properly constituted and structured criminal court, said the President, could make a profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide. [3] The signing was unusual, for the President foreswore any intention of ratifying the treaty in the foreseeable future. He would send the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, nor recommend that his successor do so, until and unless fundamental concerns could be resolved. The United States preferred to observe and assess the functioning of the time, said the President, adverting to the need to protect U.S. officials from unfounded charges. This is a legal realist's vantage--a jurisdictional statute, the elements of crimes, and the specification of procedures do suffice to show how a court will operate, what the culture of a prosecutor's office will be, or how a court will read its mission. Watching the court in action is a far more rigorous test. But why sign at all, if ratification is purely hypothetical? With signature, said the President, the United States could better influence the evolution of the Court, and, in particular, address the court's misplaced temptation to assert third-party jurisdiction over personnel of states that have not ratified. This, of course, was an independent reason to eschew ratification. If a country is willing to accept direct responsibility for its nationals' actions (as a treaty party), it has no occasion to worry that there may be an alternative avenue of liability. But the literary grace of the President's signing statement is the point. Rather, the emphasis on third-party liability is a measure of U.S. anxiety that the court might ultimately choose to criminalize good faith debates in military doctrine. When and how to use force is hardly a settled matter in foreign policy or even in the law. The ICC is asked to interpret and apply norms that are bright-line rules, including questions such as proport ionality, and the nature of a military versus civilian target. These are hotly debated among responsible militaries, and must in practice be informed by military expertise and battlefield alternatives, as well as by political and ethical judgment. The United States has understandably feared that good faith operational questions could be precipitously removed from their usual place of debate in alliance headquarters and military manuals, and be recast in a courtroom's criminal rhetoric. Should one disable dual use electrical systems that support antiaircraft as well as hospitals? Does an adversary's perfidy in misusing civilian sites to launch attacks then change the eligibility of those sites as targets? The standards for war-fighting are often more akin to open-textured principles, rather than self-executing rules--depending on acute judgments of facts and alternatives, in a fluid situation where lives are at stake and one hardly has time to make a record for litigation later. It is surprising that the review of all battlefield decisions by civilians without military experience might worry a professional military operator, at least in countries where the military actually deploys on duty in combat missions. The President's treaty signature may advance the international debate the American request for a fair chance to watch the court in action. A unilateral diplomatic gesture can be risky, since there is no guarantee of reciprocity. …

La Nostalgie du Moi. Écho dans la littérature européenne (review)

L'Esprit Créateur l'ouvrage de Sylvie Ballestra-Puech la brillante et souple trame d'une constellation mythique profond ément enracinée dans le quotidien de l'individu comme dans la figure du cosmos. Évanghélia Stead Université de Reims William Cloonan. The Writing of War. French and German Fiction and World War II. Gainesville: UP of Florida, 1999. Pp. xi + 188. Cloth, $39.95. Along with the millions of innocent victims of World War II, a certain vision of humanity perished with the discovery of the Holocaust, the use of atomic warfare, and the pummeling of non-strategic, civilian targets. William Cloonan's The Writing of War begins with the premise that the old ways of telling stories, understanding human consciousness, and looking to the future no longer suffice to render the nature of this shattered world. Cloonan attempts to define the nature of what was irrevocably lost and surveys a variety of literary strategies developed in response to these traumas to see what new paths they offer us. In its aim to identify trends spanning several decades of both German and French postwar fiction , Cloonan's study tackles an extremely broad corpus. In addition to chapters on Claude Simon, Christa Wolf, L.-F. Céline, Gunter Grass, Michel Toumier, and Siegfried Lenz, The Writing of War contains three introductory chapters examining authors and movements as diverse as Samuel Beckett, Group 47 in Germany or Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus. One can of course quibble over Cloonan's selections and exclusions, but one of the strengths of this study lies precisely in the breadth of styles, techniques, and ideological stances examined. In the juxtaposition of these different approaches, the quest for new forms and arguments stands out all the more sharply. Cloonan also tracks the repercussions of World War H's tragedies into a broader range of issues than is usually presented. At his most successful, he provides an elegant and thoughtful chapter situating Christa Wolf's Patterns of Childhood in the context of German women's war writing. On occasion, however, aspects of Cloonan's analysis cover ground previously treated elsewhere; Alastair Duncan's Claude Simon. Adventures in Words (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994), for instance, discusses Georges and de Reixach in terms similar to those proposed by Cloonan's Chapter Four on Flanders Road. The most tendentious element of Cloonan's argument is also the most important. Cloonan poses as his thesis the claim that it is the legacy of the Enlightenment tradition that is the primary victim of World War II. Moreover, he is careful to stress (cf. 59-60) that he is speaking specifically of the eighteenth century and its investment in reason, as distinct from Renaissance humanism or the industrial age's positivist philosophy. The stakes are intriguing given that the Enlightenment tradition is one developed commonly by French and German minkers, even if the argument is a difficult one to demonstrate in an economic manner. One could argue, for instance, that the attack on the Enlightenment was already largely articulated with the shock of World War I: Dada and Surrealism reject much more than the bankrupt bourgeois social order, setting their sights on the very principles grounding language and reason. It is a question, though, of nuancing his arguments and not of rejecting them. The Writing of War is an eminently readable study whose breadth and directness will be profitable for students and scholars alike. Ralph Schoolcraft University of Oklahoma Véronique Gély-Ghedira. La Nostalgie du Moi. Echo dans la littérature européenne. Paris: PUF, 2000. Pp. 432. 168FF. En présentant dans son avant-propos le recueil poétique que l'humaniste hollandais Johan Van 98 Summer 2000 Book Reviews der Does consacra à Écho en 1603, Véronique Gély-Ghedira montre combien la démarche comparatiste est foncièrement humaniste, dans son désir d'embrasser tous les aspects d'une figure ou d'un motif, afin de révéler leur secrète harmonie. Écho, en tant que figure mythologique mais aussi en tant que phénomène acoustique, effet poétique et même genre littéraire, pourrait bien être par excellence la Muse du compar...

Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future

Aside from his impeachment, President Clinton's most noteworthy impact on the Constitution has been in the area of war powers. President Clinton's air war against Serbian military and civilian targets in spring and summer of 1999, while broader in scale and destructiveness, was only the latest in a pattern set by similar military interventions over the last eight years in places such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Sudan, Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia. In none of these cases did the Clinton administration receive congressional authorization for its decisions to use force abroad. In fact, the President has justified his military interventions more often on the need to uphold our obligations to the United Nations or NATO, than upon congressional approval. President Clinton refused to acknowledge that the War Powers Resolution constrained his discretion to act. This paper discusses the constitutional implications of the Clinton Administration's war power activities. First, it will explain that President Clinton's claim of unilateral executive war power, while at times rhetorically overbroad, can find support in the Constitution's text and original understanding. In creating a flexible system of war powers, the Constitution allows the President to exercise significant initiative in war matters, while providing Congress with the ample authority to check presidential adventurism by refusing to fund military operations. Second, this Essay examines the increasingly multilateral nature of the American use of force. Kosovo and other Clinton-era operations, in which American military forces participate as part of multinational forces under international mandate, may prove to be the model for the future. This Essay addresses whether the Constitution imposes any limitations on the President's ability to send American troops to serve under international command. It then will turn to two other questions raised by Kosovo: whether the President gains any constitutional authority vis-a-vis Congress when using force pursuant to treaty, and whether the President may violate international law in the course of ordering the military to intervene abroad. Kosovo shows, I conclude, that the President is free to pursue the goals of multilateral organizations, even to the point of waging war without congressional authorization or of violating international law. Nonetheless, the Constitution places limits on the federal government's ability to cooperate with international organizations, particularly in its restrictions on delegating authority under federal law to non-U.S. officers, and in Congress's discretion to use the legislative power to block presidential foreign policy.

Pakistan's Jihad Culture

This spring the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has replaced the Middle East as the leading locus of terrorism in the world. Although much has been written about religious militants in the Middle East and Afghanistan, little is known in the West about those in Pakistan?perhaps because they operate mainly in Kashmir and, for now at least, do not threaten security outside South Asia. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, calls them freedom fighters and admonishes the West not to confuse jihad with terrorism. Musharraf is right about the distinction?the jihad doctrine delineates acceptable behavior and explicitly outlaws terrorism?but he is wrong about the militant groups' activities. Both sides of the in Kashmir?the Indian army and the Pakistani mujahideen?are targeting and killing thousands of civilians, violating both the Islamic just war tradition and international law. Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called mujahideen. First, the Pakistani military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting separatism in what was once East Pakistan and in 1971 became Bangladesh. Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in population, economic strength, and military might. In 1998 India spent about two percent of its $469 billion gdp on defense, including an active armed force of more than 1.1 million personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five percent of its $61 billion gdp on defense, yielding an active armed force only half the size of India's. The U.S. government

Response to missile attacks on civilian targets in patients with panic disorder.

The complex interaction that exists between biological and cognitive factors determines the reaction of panic-disorder patients to stressors. The current study was conducted to systematically assess the behavioral effects of a real, life-threatening event on panic-disorder patients. Sixty-five panic-disorder patients completed structured telephone interviews during the first 4 weeks of the Persian Gulf War. Evaluation included frequency of panic attacks, anxiety levels, and function levels both during and between air raid alarms. The findings indicate that panic-disorder patients, despite high levels of anxiety, did not demonstrate an increased frequency of panic attacks during the Persian Gulf War. In addition, the majority of patients reported good-to-high levels of functioning during the crisis in both everyday and alarm-related functioning. Grouping of subjects according to proximity to risk or current antipanic treatment did not produce significant differences in the frequency of panic attacks or levels of anxiety. The findings suggest that vulnerability of patients with panic disorder to a "panic-stricken" response does not increase during real-life stressors. The lack of increased frequency of panic attacks observed under these circumstances provides additional support for the opinion that panic and fear are two distinct entities.

Cardiovascular Responses in the Treadmill Stress Exercise in Young Adults of Sarajevo in the Period of the War

his study was designed and performed under very difficult conditions during intensive war activities in Sarajevo. The specific characteristics of this aggressive war were a long lasting. Middle Ages siege of the city with sudden shelling and shooting of civilian targets. It can be expected that these abnormal, stressful conditions caused changes in mental and emotional reactions, as well as in the functioning of numerous organic systems. The aim of this study was to assess whether the long exposure to war conditions influenced the functioning of the cardiovascular system and its response in stress exercise in young adults of Sarajevo.
 Multistage, incremental exercise treadmill testing under the Bruce protocol was performed by 14 male students of Sarajevo University (aged 18-23 years). It was planned for each subject to complete two exercise sessions in a three-month interval. Only 8 persons completed the second session because some of the subjects left Sarajevo, some were wounded, and the rest of them had to complete their duties in the Army.
 The results of the two exercise sessions showed that resting values of the cardiovascular variables (heart rate, arterial blood pressure) were within physiological range. The mean maximal exercise capacity expressed as metabolic units (METS) was 15.40 for the first exercise session and 15.23 for the second one. There were neither significant differences in exercise test duration between the two exercise sessions nor in maximal achieved heart rate.
 It could be concluded that in young men the overall exercise capacity was well preserved but the other results (indirectly calculated maximal oxygen uptake, V02) indicated hyperreactive response. The three-month interval was short to emphasize the differences because the war conditions, under which the testing was performed, were not changed.

Tracking Algorithms for Air Traffic Control Applications

This article presents an analysis of algorithms for central tracking in air traffic control systems. Three algorithms were examined: an adaptive alpha/beta filter representative of systems now in use; an adaptive single model Kalman filter; and an interacting multiple model Kalman filter. The interacting multiple model filter included the turn rate as an additional filter state and estimated it as part of an extended Kalman filter. Average performance for the three filters was evaluated over a collection of scenarios simulating civilian and military targets with single-and two-sensor coverage and a number of ranges and target aspects. Existing radar systems and future Mode-S sensors were modeled. With the exception of straight-line targets, there was a dramatic performance difference between the Kalman filters and the alpha/beta algorithm. In tests that simulated tracking of high speed maneuvering targets with fused Mode-S data from two radar systems, the Kalman filters reduced the root mean square position error by more than an order of magnitude relative to the alpha/beta filter. The greatest difference between the two Kalman filters was in the magnitude of their peak errors during turns. In these cases the interacting multiple model filter typically yielded a 30% reduction in peak error relative to the adaptive single model filter. We also assessed the relative computational complexity of the algorithms. The alpha/beta filter required approximately 700 floating point operations per update. Relative to this, the single model Kalman filter required a two fold increase in computation and the multiple model filter required an eight fold increase. This is easily supported by modern personal computers. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The impact of war on children's health in Mozambique

Since 1982, South African destabilization of Mozambique has caused children's health to deteriorate. Destabilization has functioned through support of a surrogate movement and economic pressure. Attacks on economic and civilian targets have included the health services, leading to closure of 48% of the primary health care network. The war has caused displacement of over 3,000,000 persons and an estimated 494,000 excess childhood deaths between 1981 and 1988. An estimated 200,000 children have been separated from their families or orphaned; many children have also witnessed atrocities and suffered violence. A deepening economic crisis has been followed by an economic structural adjustment programme. Responses to the war include changes in vaccination strategy and programmes to reunite families and heal psychological trauma.

Stress and Coping in Israel During the Persian Gulf War

Psychological research in Israel on the Gulf War focused on its unique features—nocturnal missile attacks on civilian targets, absence of retaliatory strikes by the Israel Defense Forces, threat of chemical attack, compulsory confinement of family members in close quarters during the missile attacks, and changes in soldier‐civilian and adult‐child roles. The studies summarized here deal with groups who suffered no personal or property loss, and who consequently suffered few intense, chronic adverse reactions. Researchers investigated the conventional variables in the stress and coping paradigm—objective stressors (e.g., proximity to damaged sites), coping strategies, interpersonal and intrapersonal resources, prewar vulnerability, the level of acute stress reactions (affective, cognitive, behavioral, and somatic) at the onset of the war, and the reduction in intensity and frequency of these stress reactions during and after the war. Findings are consistent with the conclusion that the society as a whole coped well with unfamiliar threats, many of which did not materialize. Original contributions from these studies, obtained under the unique “real‐time” conditions of the Gulf War for Israeli society, are discussed. Lay and peer evaluations of the contribution of psychologists to the war are summarized.

View of a war from a pathology department: Croatian experience.

This report presents an analysis of autopsy records from the Department of Pathology and Forensic Medicine, Osijek General Hospital, in the period from 2 May 1991, when 12 Croatian policemen were killed in an ambush in Borovo Selo and the war against Croatia unofficially began, until 15 January 1992, when the last cease-fire agreement between Croatia and Serbia, sponsored by the United Nations, became effective. During that time, 651 war-related autopsies were performed, constituting 42 per cent of all the deaths recorded in eastern Slavonia for that period. This number presents an 11-fold increase in the number of violent deaths in comparison to the same period of the pre-war year 1989 to 90. Forty-four per cent of all deaths were civilian ones. Explosive wounds were the most frequent cause of death: they accounted for 60 per cent of the civilian and 49 per cent of all the deaths. This fact and the extensive destruction of the cities in eastern Slavonia, including their hospitals, indicate that a principal characteristic of this and many modern wars is sudden and unexpected ground and air attacks on civilian targets.

Drawing the Line on Opprobrious Violence

Deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians, most particularly in a non-war environment, is an unjustifiable form of violence that can be defeated most effectively through multilateral efforts, according to Norton, and must not be fathomed as anything but pure and simple terrorism, which is not to be tolerated. The U.S. State Department's definition of terrorism is too ambiguous to allow delineation between what is permissible in time of war and in time of peace, and creates more controversy than consensus: one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. Fortunately, fertile ground for the multilateral combating of terrorist activities and states promoting them (Lybia, Syria, Iran) was laid in 1989 with an unofficial U.S.-USSR agreement to exchange vital information to prevent such acts. The author places great hope in this new dialogue.

Moral Choice and the Iran-Iraq Conflict

In this analysis of the Iran-Iraq war, Sick asserts that two major naturally wealthy regional powers consciously chose to forego diplomatic means to resolve their disputes. Moreover, by blatantly miscalculating and underestimating the damage of armed engagement, the leaders exhibited utter negligence and disobedience of the international code of conduct. With glaring lack of consideration for human anguish in the military attacks, they used children in battle, launched bombing and missile attacks on civilian targets and neutral shipping, and deployed chemical weapons. Implicated as well is the international community, which did little to stem the bloodshed.

Bishops and Scholars: The Peace Pastoral Under Siege

Publication of the Peace Pastoral, which has been extensively discussed in journals, has had little effect in persuading scholars or commentators on the ethics of nuclear deterrence. A review of the literature generated by The Challenge of Peace provides a survey of the current state of opinion on this question. The bishops, who seek to apply traditional just war categories to the novel situation of the nuclear era, are opposed by representatives of other traditional positions (the arms control community, which tolerates the targeting of civilians, and the “limited war” school, which eschews civilian targets). Two new approaches, likewise opposed to that of the pastoral, set more radical limits to nuclear targeting. All the critics regard the teaching of the pastoral letter, which condemns all militarily meaningful use of the nuclear arsenal, as an anachronistic exercise in the nuclear era.

Strategists, Philosophers, and the Nuclear Question

What should a symposium on ethics and strategy attempt to do? Should the goal simply be to lay down judgments about which strategies are permissible and which are not? Such an approach to the problem does not seem particularly fruitful: for judgments of this sort always depend on an appeal to some principle, generally rooted in some ancient tradition; but if a policy we believe in is inconsistent with that principle, why are we morally compelled to sacrifice the former instead of the latter? The conclusions reached are binding only on those who share the premises on which they are based; those who are convinced that the policy in question is right can simply reject these premises as the obsolete products of the prenuclear age. The strategists, of course, do not actually come out and say that the concerns of the moral philosophers are irrelevant. But they are aware that their basic assumptions about what makes for in the nuclear age contradict traditional principles about morality in warfare. The term stability has referred, since the late 1950s, to a situation where neither superpower has any incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons; targeting strategic weapons might undermine an enemy's confidence in his ability to ride out a first strike and thus give him an incentive to preempt. To those who look at things from this perspective, it follows that the best of all possible nuclear worlds would be one where only cities were targeted, for in that case there would be no incentive-in fact there would be a tremendous disincentive-for either side to strike first, and thus a nuclear holocaust would be virtually out of the question. Most of the strategists at the conference subscribed to the doctrine in one form or another. Since this theory is not consistent with traditional views about the desirability of aiming at military as opposed to civilian targets, those principles themselves had to be sacrificed. Thus Robert Art, one of the political scientists at Aspen, said in this connection that he was willing to live in sin. What he meant, I think, was that in the context of the theory that he depended on, the principles of the philosophers had no real meaning, no moral salience, for him.

The impact of Israel's reprisals on behavior of the bordering Arab nations directed at Israel

Since the termination of the British Mandate in 1948 the use of force has been a persistent element in the relations between Israel and each of the bordering Arab nations-Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Sporadically the basic chronic level of hostilities has been punctuated by sharp, sometimes severe applications of military force by Israel on the territory of its neighbors. These actions, known as reprisals, have been directed at military and civilian targets in the bordering states, ostensibly in response to acts or omissions on the part of the target governments which Israel perceived to be provocative. More than one hundred such events have occurred since 1948. They range from minor operations by a dozen or fewer men to brigade-size assaults, and include artillery salvos, air strikes, and heliborne commando raids, as well as conventional ground attacks. A complete listing of the reprisals is presented in the appendix.

Civilian Sanctuary and Target Avoidance Policy in Thermonuclear War

Examining traditional concepts of civilian war fare, the author finds that civilians have not normally been con sidered appropriate targets of violence and that civilian productivity and home-front morale are largely irrelevant in conditions of thermonuclear war, in which only forces in being are likely to be used and command and control are separate from the population at large. Under the circumstances, there are thus important moral and practical reasons for adopting "open cities" and sanctuary policies to spare civilians and re duce over-all deaths. Three cases are examined in detail: open cities and sanctuary policies to be enunciated now and at the time of a hypothetical war with the USSR; with respect to the Soviet Union's presumably reluctant Warsaw Pact al lies; and finally in the event of a future war, again hypotheti cal, with mainland China.