Civilian Nuclear Reactors Research Articles

A Closed-form Solution for Source-term Emission of Xenon Isotopes from Underground Nuclear Explosions

Isotopic ratios of radioactive xenons sampled in the subsurface and atmosphere can be used to detect underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) and civilian nuclear reactors. Disparities in the half-lives of the radioactive decay chains are principally responsible for time-dependent concentrations of xenon isotopes. Contrasting timescales, combined with modern detection capabilities, make the xenon isotopic family a desirable surrogate for UNE detection. However, without including the physical details of post-detonation cavity changes that affect radioxenon evolution and subsurface transport, a UNE is treated as an idealized system that is both closed and well mixed for estimating xenon isotopic ratios and their correlations so that the spatially dependent behavior of xenon production, cavity leakage, and transport are overlooked. In this paper, we developed a multi-compartment model with radioactive decay and interactions between compartments. The model does not require the detailed domain geometry and parameterization that is normally needed by high-fidelity computer simulations, but can represent nuclide evolution within a compartment and migration among compartments under certain conditions. The closed-form solution to all nuclides in the series 131–136 is derived using analytical singular-value decomposition. The solution is further used to express xenon ratios as functions of time and compartment position.

Hybrid Zone: Computers and Science at Argonne National Laboratory, 1946–1992 by Charles N. Yood (review)

Reviewed by: Hybrid Zone: Computers and Science at Argonne National Laboratory, 1946–1992 by Charles N. Yood Catherine Westfall (bio) Hybrid Zone: Computers and Science at Argonne National Laboratory, 1946–1992. By Charles N. Yood. Boston: Docent Press, 2013. Pp. xi+275. $17.99. Historians of technology might expect a book on one of the U.S. national laboratories to be about high-energy physics, particle accelerators, nuclear reactors, or bombs, or at the very least about some sort of esoteric, perhaps secret, research. In the face of such expectations, Charles Yood has produced a work of enlightening surprises. Yood uses Argonne National Laboratory as a backdrop to investigate the “social history of the computer,” that is, “the intersection of people, science, and the activity of computing” (p. ix). Although better known as the host for one of the biggest U.S. particle accelerators (the Advanced Photon Source) and the birthplace of multiple advances in civilian nuclear reactors, Argonne also has been at the forefront of computing since the laboratory began in 1946. Yood examines Argonne computing through 1992, asking: “In what ways did computers provide new opportunities for the people who built, programmed, studied, and used them?” (p. ix). In the process, he charts the evolution of computing at Argonne from its beginning as an occasional tool for reactor engineering and physics, through the creation of its own division in 1956, to the elite status it gained with passage of the High Performance Computing Act in the early 1990s, which established computing as a discipline on par with biology, chemistry, and physics. One of the book’s surprises (at least for me) is the distinction Yood draws between computer science and computational science, a distinction that, in fact, is at the heart of his tale. As Yood explains, what he is “interested in is the intersection of science and computing,” an intersection that has two distinct dimensions: “computers are a unique technology in that they have created a new science (computer science) and a new way of doing science (computational science)” (p. 229). I also found fascinating the different professional trajectories of each discipline. As Yood notes, computational [End Page 295] scientists were much more successful in establishing a research agenda (the use of computing techniques to solve fundamental problems in science and engineering) and therefore a disciplinary identity, funding, and status than computer scientists. Yood argues that a central difficulty in defining computer science was that computer scientists saw themselves as working in a “hybrid zone” existing “between scientific problems in the natural sciences and the calculating power of the computer.” This conceptualization ended up consolidating rather than uniting disparate notions of the activities and knowledge in the hybrid zone, which prevented a general, common understanding of what “was appropriate for a discipline focused on computers” (p. 226). As a historian of the U.S. national laboratories, I applaud this successful effort to spotlight a significant contribution to science and technology in a setting that usually escapes notice. But I think this book will be of interest to a wider audience than national laboratories fans such as myself. The subject matter is widely engaging: Yood shows how computers have altered the way that most science and technology is performed, the different ways in which scientists and engineers construct identities and disciplines, and how, along the way, the process of knowledge production is shaped. My only quibble is that the book is a bit repetitive, showing its origins as a Ph.D. dissertation. Overall, though, it is well-written, nicely argued, and organized so that it is easy to follow. I particularly liked the jargon-free, clear exposition, which makes it accessible to a wide audience. In short, this book is intelligent, thought-provoking, and yet a page turner. I therefore recommend it to all those interested in knowledge production, discipline formation, the history of computing, and the development of science and technology after World War II. Catherine Westfall Catherine Westfall is a visiting associate professor at Lyman Briggs College at Michigan State University. She has done scholarship at five U.S. national laboratories, including Argonne. In addition to numerous articles, she has written, with co-authors, a history...

Nuclear test criterion by inert gas xenon

It is an important approach to preventing nuclear proliferation that comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is reached. How to judge whether a nuclear test has happened is a key point. In this paper we investigate a method to distinguish between a nuclear test and leakage from civilian nuclear reactor by measuring inert gas xenon nuclides 133mXe, 133Xe, 135Xe, and 131mXe. The distinction between the nuclear test and the reactor leakage is found by analyzing the variation of nuclide quantity with time in a complex decay chain. Two suspicious events in North Korea are measured and analyzed. In order to verify the theoretical results, an experiment of imitating plutonium irradiated by thermal neutron is designed.

A different view on US-India nuclear pact

The item “US–India Nuclear Pact Gets Mixed Reaction” (Physics Today, February 2007, page 24) makes for amusing reading. I am dismayed at the one-sided and unbalanced coverage. I strongly disagree with the contention of Matthew Bunn from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University that the US stands to gain “between not very much and nothing” from this pact. That India has opened 14 of its civilian nuclear reactors to International Atomic Energy Agency oversight is surely a step in the right direction; before the deal the reactors were all off bounds. Mohamed El Baradei, the IAEA’s director general, welcomed the pact enthusiastically. Surely, if the leader of the United Nations body whose mission is to prevent global nuclear proliferation endorses the agreement, it can’t really be the death knell of nonproliferation. ElBaradei speaks with much credibility, which the writer of the article blissfully ignored, instead giving free rein to obscure think tankers. Michael Krepon’s good guys–bad guys argument essentially echoes the chorus of the nonproliferation pundits who rule the numerous moribund think tanks of Washington, DC, and the Democratic party. Where is the comparison between India, a responsible non-proliferating democracy whose nuclear weapons are under civilian (not military) oversight, and Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea? Having nuclear weapons and yet not proliferating weapons or the associated technology is not “bad behavior” on the part of India. Unfortunately, “bad guys” such as Pakistan—thanks to nuclear scientist Abdul Q. Khan—have exported nuclear weapons development technology and rocket design to North Korea and possibly Iran. It’s a no-brainer, then, that the Bush administration has categorically refused a similar nuclear deal with Pakistan.Most important, the article utterly ignores the geostrategic and geopolitical ground realities in both South Asia and East Asia. India’s strategic attack-preparedness planning is concerned with China, not Pakistan. Current Indianmilitary readiness can ensure that India can take a first strike from Pakistan, its neighbor to the west, and retaliate massively. India can never realistically sign the nonproliferation treaty until it first has a bilateral treaty with China to cap that country’s nuclear weapons production and perhaps dismantle existing warheads.For nonproliferation, the world badly needs a better framework than the NPT, which has been dying a steady and slow death thanks to Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Nonproliferation, as it has been enforced, has not worked, and it is time to think of new approaches. Rogue states such as Iran and North Korea should not be allowed to enrich uranium and plutonium. They should be given nuclear fuel for supervised use in civilian reactors under the strict supervision of the IAEA, with all spent fuel taken back promptly by the suppliers so that it cannot be enriched for weapons production. The appropriate response for bad behavior is not knee-jerk economic sanctions that hurt only the general populace and not the governments, but the freezing of all assets held by those countries in foreign banks. Without foreign exchange, nefarious proliferation activities become much more difficult.© 2007 American Institute of Physics.

The Participation of Sahaptin-Speaking Native Americans in the Hanford Site Cultural Resource Management Plan

This paper describes the role of the Sahaptin-speaking Native Americans in the Cultural Resources Management Plan (CRMP) at the Department of Energy's famous Hanford Site in the State of Washington. The Site contains federal and civilian nuclear reactors, nuclear waste sites and other facilities. It was used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons in World War II. I will also describe the reasons for and ways in which Native American history, prehistory and beliefs were integrated into CRMP. The Native Americans in question are three tribes and one band in the Hanford area-the Yakima Indian Nation, the Wanapum Band, the Umatilla Indian Tribe and the Nez Perce Tribe, all of whom are speakers of languages belonging to the Sahaptin language family of the upper Columbia River Basin. These ethnic groups ceded portions of their ancient aboriginal lands to the United States government in the mid-1800s when they signed treaties. However in doing so, the Sahaptins retained access rights to ceded lands for hunting, collecting and conducting important spiritual practices. Another object of this paper is to briefly describe the major federal legislation bearing on cultural resource preservation and some of the ethnohistorical techniques used to reconstruct and interpret past uses of the Site by Native Americans. These reconstructions and interpretations have become part of the CRMP.