Indo-US Nuclear Deal Research Articles

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for Pakistan

Indo-US nuclear deal a critical understanding between America and India, was signed in 2008. Even though India wasn’t a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this agreement granted essential autonomy to India for obtaining nuclear technology and fuel for peaceful reasons. The development of India's nuclear capabilities has dramatically enhanced the nation's energy security and permitted the use of atomic energy in various industries, including agriculture, healthcare, and power production. The Indo-U.S.nuclear deal significantly impacted the worldwide non-nuclear regime. The pact's unintended message was feared to weaken the non-proliferation system. This article examines the present alliance between the United States and India and their cooperation in nuclear technologies. Furthermore, this research is based on qualitative data; this article will discuss how the Indo-US strategic collaboration directly impacts Pakistan and other global nuclear regimes.

Legal Aspect of Uranium Mining in India: Issues and Concerns

A large number of nuclear energy power plants being set up across India with 22 nuclear power plants working produce 2.8% of the total electricity generated across the country. Also, there are 6 under construction and 31 under a proposal for construction have the basic fuel requirement as the radioactive minerals like uranium isotopes, plutonium, and thorium. The demand for the fuel is going to increase with time and there is a need to either import or to excavate out the ores of radioactive substances like the Uraninite ore deposits found across the states of Jharkhand, Telangana, Meghalaya, etc. that fulfill the requirement. The ore is excavated out by the Uranium Corporation of India Limited which is controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy and the mining and processing of the same is regulated by the Atomic Energy Act 1962. In the research paper, the author has acknowledged the issue of contradiction between the mining grants given to Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the environment protection laws like Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 which declared the area as restricted area for any human activity. The scope of powers given to UCIL under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 for the mining of uranium and the restrictions that can be put on the same by the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 is also critically analyzed. India's ratification of the International Atomic Energy Association's Additional protocols and the UCIL's way of dealing with the sustainable goal of IAEA, in line with its Atoms for peace and development set out in the United Nations Agenda (2030) for Sustainable Development is also examined. In its conclusion, the author has said that there was a violation of the Article 19 (1) (d) and (e) and Article 21 in the Jaduguda mining project and non-compliance with the procedures mentioned under the various environmental laws in the uranium mining projects in Nalgonda like Environment Protection Strategy (EPS) 2002, Wildlife (Protection) Amendment Act 2006 and Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006. It is also concluded that the best stand of government could be to import uranium from the other nations by complying with the IAEA guidelines and by bilateral treaties like the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2007 thus surpassing the restrictions placed on the country for not being the signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not being the member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Civil Nuclear Deal with the US: Prospects for Pakistan

Pakistan has emerged as a responsible nuclear weapon state by developing strong credentials in the fields of nuclear safety, security, stability, and has developed a stringent strategic export control system. Pakistan has not only fulfilled its national obligation of safeguarding its national security objectives vis-à-vis India, but it has been also fulfilling its international obligations, to win the trust of the international community. To strengthen its nuclear credentials further, Pakistan wanted to become an effective part of the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR). The international community, including the US, appreciates Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security standards. One of the important aspects of Pakistan’s credentials is its safe-operational experience of handling peaceful nuclear technology for over 40 years. According to its Energy Vision 2050, Pakistan has established an ambitious plan to develop 40,000 MWe through nuclear power. For that purpose it has been seeking international support and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology to meet its growing energy demands. Like the Indo-US nuclear deal, Pakistan has also been looking for a similar deal with the US. It has also been seeking a non-discriminatory and criteria-based membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to do a legitimate verifiable peaceful nuclear trade with the advanced nuclear states. With this premise, this research paper is aimed at exploring the questions that why a Pak-US civil nuclear deal is significant for Pakistan? How the US has, so far, responded to the Pakistan’s demand of a nuclear deal? And what are the prospects of a Pak-US civil nuclear deal.

Multilateral Export Control Regimes State-of-Affairs and Prospects

This article endeavours to analyse the existing effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs). The states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are not party to these regimes but had managed to attain their nuclear weapons capabilities by exploiting the weak links of MECRs. Conceptually, this sets the stage for an interesting debate to overcome some of the loopholes in MECRs, and to demonstrate that effective and realistic cooperation can go a long way in yielding constructive outcomes. To fill the cracks in the MECRs, it is essential to consider the non-NPT nuclear weapon states' issue with a view to construct reliable and effective MECRs. The MTCR membership criteria, Indo-US nuclear deal and India-specific waiver by the NSG states have raised some pertinent and challenging questions concerning the credibility and effectiveness of NPT and other MECRs. The paper argues that India and Pakistan both should be accorded an equal chance to join the MECRs - as both are declared de jure NWS. Their independent status is distinct from the NPT's January 1, 1967, cut-off date principle to qualify for a de jure NWS position, ipso facto is not applicable on them.

India as Global Security Actor

Thanks to sustained economic growth and key investments in military capabilities, India will face growing demands from within and the international community to seek and play a greater role in global security affairs. The values and interests likely to guide India’s future behavior will be a mixture of old and new, eastern and western. India’s international aspirations have an important pre-history, covered in this chapter’s first section where non-alignment, as idea and practice, is explored for its enduring significance. India’s relevance as a security actor is assessed in terms of its activities and capacity to influence developments within two security zones of major contemporary importance: Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. Finally, a section on the constraints and challenges examines India’s ability to navigate a multi-polar world, the fallout and gains of nuclearization, the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, as well as ‘the weaknesses from within’ in terms of human security.

The US–India Nuclear Agreement: Revisiting the Debate

The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India. Using David Mutimer's constructivist analysis, it is argued that this divergence is due to their contrasting perspectives on nuclear technology as regards ‘proliferation’ and ‘disarmament-development’.

Africa–India nuclear cooperation: Pragmatism, principle, post-colonialism and the Pelindaba Treaty

The United States–India nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step in the process to normalise India's international nuclear relations despite the fact that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards Africa–India nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still open for interpretation. Africa and India's shared post-colonial consciousness, manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and South–South cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating Africa–India nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.

India and Iran's Nuclear Issue: The Three Policy Determinants

Three broad policy determinants can be discerned in Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear issue. These include: ‘strategic autonomy’ as it relates to Indian foreign policy decision making; concerns regarding ‘regional strategic stability’ as it relates to events in its ‘proximate neighbourhood’; and ‘national security’ implications on account of operative clandestine proliferation networks. Issues relating to the role of the US in influencing Indian policy positions at international forums and vis-à-vis domestic policy were prominent as regards the first determinant. Threats and ‘advice’ by American policy makers and law makers on specific issues like the Indo-US nuclear deal and the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline gave further grist to critics. However, an analysis of India's concerns regarding the other two policy considerations, i.e., strategic stability and national security were ‘real and present’ and also dominated public discourse as well. With India having become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from January 2011, it should be the task of Indian diplomacy, at the UNSC as well as at other bilateral and multilateral settings, to help expand the space for the application of ‘satisfactory strategies’ and reduce the range of ‘unsatisfactory strategies’ (the latter being the then Foreign Secretary Menon's term to describe America's options vis-à-vis the issue as revealed in a WikiLeaks cable)

Taking the Arms Control Debate Forward: The Hague Code of Conduct and India

This article evaluates the opportunities associated with The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) for India. HCoC is a stand-alone agreement against ballistic missile proliferation. Since the 1974 Pokharan nuclear tests it has been tricky for India to get into the non-proliferation mainstream. The success of the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal is a first step towards global acceptability of India's non-proliferation and disarmament policies. Now, it is important for India to start supporting the international norms which do not affect their strategic programmes. This article argues that by signing the HCoC India could demonstrate its commitment towards the global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.

Nuclear energy option for energy security and sustainable development in India

India is facing great challenges in its economic development due to the impact on climate change. Energy is the important driver of economy. At present Indian energy sector is dominated by fossil fuel. Due to international pressure for green house gas reduction in atmosphere there is a need of clean energy supply for energy security and sustainable development. The nuclear energy is a sustainable solution in this context to overcome the environmental problem due to fossil fuel electricity generation. This paper examines the implications of penetration of nuclear energy in Indian power sector. Four scenarios, including base case scenario, have been developed using MARKAL energy modeling software for Indian power sector. The least-cost solution of energy mix has been measured. The result shows that more than 50% of the electricity market will be captured by nuclear energy in the year 2045. This ambitious goal can be expected to be achieved due to Indo-US nuclear deal. The advanced nuclear energy with conservation potential scenario shows that huge amounts of CO 2 can be reduced in the year 2045 with respect to the business as usual scenario.

The Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement What's the Big Deal?

What's big deal?The year 2008 saw a paradigm shift in US foreign policy. The US signed 123 civilian nuclear agreement (referred to as nuclear deal or simply deal) with India, a country that is not a nuclear nonproliferation treaty signatory, has nuclear weapons, and until recently was a nuclear pariah. It is extremely surprising that even many scholars of US foreign policy, let alone public, have given little attention to this rather historic paradigm shift in US policy on civilian nuclear trade. The US government, on other hand, has passed new Hyde act, which facilitates implementation of civilian nuclear agreement by exempting India from certain requirements of atomic energy act of 1954.1The deal was signed between Indian and US government on 1 October 2008 and cleared by Nuclear Suppliers Group. It gives India access to civilian nuclear technology and is supposed to help country fulfil its energy requirements. At same time, India has placed 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and has agreed to separate its civilian and military reactors, which it has not done before. In return, US companies hope to get a few of pending multibillion-dollar reactor-building contracts. The deal was signed with India even though it is not a signatory to either nonproliferation or comprehensive test ban treaties. The nuclear deal does not require India to give up its nuclear weapons program, but future nuclear testing by India would, as per US law, lead to US stopping nuclear commerce with India. Republican Senator Richard Lugar stated that this deal was a good incentive for India to refrain from nuclear testing in future.2 However, there seems to be some room for contention on this issue. The Indian government has asserted that nuclear deal theoretically does not constrain it from future testing. Furthermore, according to a Council on Foreign Relations publication, the US Senate rejected an amendment that would require US nuclear supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons. The deal does not explicitly impose that condition, though it is part of a 2006 law known as Hyde Act, which gave deal preliminary approval.3While it is yet to be seen how deal is implemented under President Barack Obama's leadership, analysis presented here is based on agreement as it exists on paper. The main goal of article is to address some of major critiques of deal, namely that, first, nuclear deal undermines nonproliferation treaty and weakens nonproliferation efforts; second, that deal sets a precedent for other countries like Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan; third, that it allows India to have biggest nuclear arsenal possible as it frees up its domestic resources of uranium; fourth, that it does not ensure energy security for India and takes away its strategic sovereignty; and fifth, that it will lead to a nuclear arms race in south Asia. The article will review benefits of deal and examine who really benefits from it.The main arguments here are that deal has been result of realization that India will never sign nonproliferation treaty and that sanctions that were imposed on India have not yielded any results; it will lead to a greater transparency in India's nuclear sector, which reduces risks of proliferation, nuclear accidents, and nuclear meltdowns; it is a part of America's anti-China strategy; it provides India with opportunity to reduce its energy deficit and does not compromise India's strategic sovereignty; and, finally, it will not significantly escalate tensions between India and Pakistan. There will be recurring tensions between India and Pakistan irrespective of nuclear deal; intractable issues such as terrorism and Kashmir dispute will continue to be major causes of tension between these two countries. …

India and the NPT: Separating Substantive Facts from Normative Fiction

This article examines the feasibility and advisability of India joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It demonstrates that (a) the non-proliferation regime, which is larger and more varied than the NPT, has received significant cooperation from India in the past; (b) that in order to effectively deal with future challenges from nuclear renaissance, nuclear deterrence, and terrorism, the regime will need to craft creative, non-NPT centric solutions like the US–India nuclear agreement, to co-opt India; and (c) that India's interest will be better served by trying to shape the regime from within rather than remaining a reasoned voice from without.

An Australian Perspective on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

Following its election in 2007, the Labour government imposed a moratorium on export of Australian uranium to India. This article argues that with the Indo-US deal and concomitant agreements now in place, Australia should agree to export uranium to India. It does so on the grounds that the agreements will adequately protect Australian uranium from misuse, will not unduly test the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, could open out opportunities to meet important safety concerns, could help stabilise potentially dangerous vertical and horizontal proliferation and could also mitigate the region's burgeoning production of greenhouse gases. In supporting the agreements through nuclear trade with India, however, Australia should use any influence it is able to garner thereby to ensure that the Indo-US agreement itself is not seen as part of an attempt on the part of the United States (US), or any other power, to harness India as a means of containing China, and thus exacerbating what could become a destabilising tendency in the region.

India in 2008: Domestic Turmoil and External Hopes

The past year saw significant domestic turmoil in India. The country confronted a series of terrorist attacks including the one in Bombay, witnessed ethno-religious violence, dealt with a resurgent Maoist (Naxalite) guerilla movement, and faced agitations from agricultural communities over the acquisition of land for industrialization. On the external front, India managed to consummate a critical civilian nuclear agreement with the U.S., after much domestic debate and contention.

Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?

The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. Both countries' leaderships regard a recent nuclear cooperation agreement as the most important step yet in their emerging “strategic partnership.” But the deal is also deeply controversial—critics see it as a major departure from decades-standing nonproliferation norms—and its approval by the U.S. Congress in 2006 was far from assured. This paper argues that an increasingly professional and well-funded “India lobby” among Indian-Americans was critical in pressing members of Congress to support the nuclear agreement. Moreover, this episode may portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century—if it can sustain momentum for its ambitious long-term goals, such as securing a permanent seat for India on the UN Security Council, through the uncertain near-term future of the nuclear agreement itself.

Why the US–India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal

The March 2006 US–India nuclear accord, which calls for India to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and put the majority of its reactors under international safeguards in exchang...

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A Debate

Understanding the implications of complex techno-political matters becomes necessary when such matters indicate the possibility of affecting the longterm growth prospects while also disturbing the short-term political stability. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal brought the UPA Government almost to the brink. Despite restrictions on the dual use technologies (one which can be used for civilian as well as defence purposes), the Indian space, computer, and atomic energy scientists have served Indian interests quite well. The fact, however, remains that a fuller exploitation of nuclear power for meeting our energy needs would require getting out of the current restrictive regime. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal seems to provide one way (some believe, the only way) out of the current impasse.

Planet India: how the fastest-growing democracy is transforming America and the world

is everywhere: on magazine covers and cinema marquees, at the gym and in the kitchen, in corporate boardrooms and on Capitol Hill. Through incisive reportage and illuminating analysis, Mira Kamdar explores India's astonishing transformation from a developing country into a global powerhouse. She takes us inside India, reporting on the people, companies, and policies defining the new and revealing how it will profoundly affect our future -- financially, culturally, politically.The world's fastest-growing democracy, has the youngest population on the planet, and a middle class as big as the population of the entire United States. Its market has the potential to become the world's largest. As one film producer told Kamdar when they met in New York, Who needs the American audience? There are only 300 million people here. Not only is the ideal market for the next new thing, but with a highly skilled English-speaking workforce, elite educational institutions, and growing foreign investment, is emerging as an innovator of the technology that is driving the next phase of the global economy. While is celebrating its meteoric rise, it is also racing against time to bring the benefits of the twenty-first century to the 800 million Indians who live on less than two dollars per day, to find the sustainable energy to fuel its explosive economic growth, and to navigate international and domestic politics to ensure India's security and its status as a global power. is the world in microcosm: the challenges it faces are universal -- from combating terrorism, poverty, and disease to protecting the environment and creating jobs. The urgency of these challenges for is spurring innovative solutions, which will catapult it to the top of the new world order. If succeeds, it will not only save itself, it will save us all. If it fails, we will all suffer. As goes India, so goes the world. Mira Kamdar tells the dramatic story of a nation in the midst of redefining itself and our world. Provocative, timely, and essential, Planet India is the groundbreaking book that will convince Americans just how high the stakes are -- what there is to lose, and what there is to gain from India's meteoric rise.DID YOU KNOW?-India is the world's fourth-largest economy. -By 2034, will be the most populous country on Earth, with 1.6 billion people.-India's middle class is already larger than the entire population of the United States. -One out of three of the world's malnourished children live in India.-India is home to the biggest youth population on earth: 600 million people are under the age of 25. -72,000,000 cell phones will be sold in in 2007.-India just edged past the United States to become the second-most-preferred destination for foreign direct investment after China.-In 1991, Indians purchased 150,000 automobiles; in 2007, they are expected to purchase 10 million. -By 2008, India's total pool of qualified graduates will be more than twice as large as China's.-By 2015, an estimated 3.5 million white-collar U.S. jobs will be offshored.-India is the largest arms importer in the developing world.-American corporations expect to earn $20 to $40 billion from the civilian nuclear agreement with India. -In 2007, there are 2.2 million Indian Americans, a number expected to double every decade.-Twenty-nine percent of India's population speaks English -- that's 350 million people.

India and Energy Security

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. For Annual Projection of Energy Demand and Supply World Wide, see http://www.energy.gov/contact/newWebSite.htm. 2. Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security”, Foreign Affairs, 85, 2 (March/April 2006) 70–71. Also see, Girijesh Pant, Paper Presented in a Seminar on “India's Energy Security and The Gulf”, at The School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 19–20 March 2004. 3. The President's address to the nation on the eve of the 59th Independence Day 2005, http://presidentofindia.nic.in/scripts/independencedetail.jsp?id = 6. 4. Ashish Agrawal, “Can India Achieve Growth Targets without Energy?” Economic Times, 22 December 2006. 5. http://www.coal.nic.in/. 6. http://www.asiafinanceblog.com/asiafinanceblog/oil/index.html. 7. “Reliance likely to invest $6–7 bn in KG basin”, Business Line, 12 September 2006. 8. http://www.ongcindia.com/investorcell/prospectus_s.pdf. 9. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), http://www.ongcindia.com/. 10. See Gas Authority of India Limited, http://gail.nic.in/homepage/homenew.htm. 11. See ONGC Videsh, http://www.ongcvidesh.com/ 12. ONGC Videsh, http://www.ongcvidesh.com/op_sudan.asp. 13. For detailed study see Caspian Studies, http://www.caspianstudies.com. 14. Energy Security, http://www.iags.org/n0121043.htm. 15. http://www.indianembassy.ru/ru/ru_hp_win_ms_t022.html. 16. “Sakhalin-I starts oil, gas production”, The Hindu, 2 October 2005. 17. A. Sourie, “Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project and its Economic and Political Impact”, ORF Energy News Monitor, II, 16 (14 October 2005) 3–4. 18. Ambrish K. Diwanji, “Geopolitical Issues Set to Dominate Proposed Gas Pipeline From Iran to India”, The Rediff Business Special, 13 April 2000. 19. S. D. Muni and Girijesh Pant, India's Energy Security Prospects for Cooperation with Extended Neighbourhood. New Delhi: Rupa, 2005. 20. Talmiz Ahmad, “Advantages of Transnational Gas Pipelines”, The Hindu, 24 April 2006. 21. Siddharth Varadarajan, “Myanmar-India Gas Pipeline on Anvil”, The Hindu, 13 January 2005. 22. Talmiz Ahmad, n 20, The Hindu, April 24, 2006. 23. See http://www.oilworks.com/New/i042505.html; http://www.indianembassy.gov.qa/indqat.htm. 24. http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/news147.php; “Gas Import Through Pipelines, Possible Routes”, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2005/01/gas-import-through-pipelines-possible. html-25 k. 25. Mahendra P. Lama, “Integrating Stakeholders in Energy Cooperation”, South Asia Journal, 3, 1 (July–September 2005) pp. 6–20. 26. Yoginder K. Alagh, “Economics of Nuclear Power in India”, Nu-Power International, 11, 1–3 (1997) 22. 27. NucNet News No. 333/03, http://www.industrie.Gouv.fr as quoted in WNA Newsletter (January/February 2004). 28. Manpreet Sethi, “Inputs for a Nuclear Energy Policy for India”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear Power and Non- Proliferation: Conflict or Convergence. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004, pp. 80–101. 29. Gordon Feller, “China's Wind Power”, http://www.ecoworld.com/Home/Articles2.cfm?TID = 390. 30. Ashok Parthasarthy, “Renewable Energy Sources: Situation and Prospects”, World Affairs, 10, 1 (Spring 2006) 112–138. 31. ORF Energy News Monitor, II, 40 (1 April 2006) 23. 32. Prafull Goradia, “Strategic Horizon of Indo-US Nuclear Deal”, Pioneer, 5 April 2006. 33. ORF Energy News Monitor, II, 39 (24 March, 2006) 24. 34. Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, http://www.eia.doe.gov/. 35. Ashok Parthasarthy, “Renewable Energy Sources: Situation and Prospects”, World Affairs, 10, 1 (Spring 2006) 112–138. 36. “Solar Power Plant to be Built in North China”, China Daily, 3 June 2006, 37. Administrative approval of Renewable Energy Programmes, Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources, Govt. of India, http://mnes.nic.in/frame.htm?majorprog.htm. 38. Solar Energy Programmes at a Glance, Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources, Govt. of India, http://mnes.nic.in/frame.htm?majorprog.htm. It is estimated that India has 30 billions tonnes of unexplored hydrocarbon reserves. Additional informationNotes on contributorsAshok SharmaDr. Ashok Sharma did his PhD at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi

Congress Approves Authorizing Legislation for India Nuclear Agreement; President Issues Signing Statement

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