Abstract
This article endeavours to analyse the existing effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs). The states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are not party to these regimes but had managed to attain their nuclear weapons capabilities by exploiting the weak links of MECRs. Conceptually, this sets the stage for an interesting debate to overcome some of the loopholes in MECRs, and to demonstrate that effective and realistic cooperation can go a long way in yielding constructive outcomes. To fill the cracks in the MECRs, it is essential to consider the non-NPT nuclear weapon states' issue with a view to construct reliable and effective MECRs. The MTCR membership criteria, Indo-US nuclear deal and India-specific waiver by the NSG states have raised some pertinent and challenging questions concerning the credibility and effectiveness of NPT and other MECRs. The paper argues that India and Pakistan both should be accorded an equal chance to join the MECRs - as both are declared de jure NWS. Their independent status is distinct from the NPT's January 1, 1967, cut-off date principle to qualify for a de jure NWS position, ipso facto is not applicable on them.
Highlights
The new proliferation risks emanating from the technological advancements are making it imperative for the international community to strengthen mechanisms to effectively contain contemporary nuclear dangers
The states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are not party to these regimes but had managed to attain their nuclear weapons capabilities by exploiting the weak links of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs). This sets the stage for an interesting debate to overcome some of the loopholes in MECRs, and to demonstrate that effective and realistic cooperation can go a long way in yielding constructive outcomes
This paper argues that the non-proliferation and export control norms set out by the NPT and MECRs need synergizing in concordance with the Treaty’s cardinal Article VI, which essentially had divided the states into two categories – NWS and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) – for a period of twenty-five years, only to achieve a compliance with the well-structured MECRs
Summary
The new proliferation risks emanating from the technological advancements are making it imperative for the international community to strengthen mechanisms to effectively contain contemporary nuclear dangers. All these agreements and mechanisms were conceived with the aim to initiate a process of monitoring the supply of conventional arms and the dual-use technologies and goods along with the biological, chemical nuclear weapons and ballistic missile related equipments and materials to NNWS under structured safeguarded regimes These regimes are not part of the formal treaties, but they were formalized as non-proliferation norms and practices, as it defines the comprehensive control lists and principles in vogue to curb unauthorized usage of prohibited items. Due to increased terrorist threats, it is important to strengthen and to universalize the MECRs. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) was announced in January 2002,47 to check the illegal transfer of sensitive materials and dual-use technologies with intention to cap the non-proliferation loopholes and to generate greater transparency in trade and commerce.
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