Civil War Peace Agreements Research Articles

Mapping disability in war-to-peace transitions: global patterns and the Lebanese experience

The inclusion of people with disabilities can facilitate sustainable peace after civil war. To shed a novel light on the relationship between war-to-peace transitions and disability, we map approaches to impairments in 286 worldwide intra-state political agreements, before considering the experience of Lebanon. Through a rigorous mixed methods research design, we show that war-to-peace transitions entrench the marginalisation of people with disabilities. Political agreements reproduce oversimplified understandings of disability; emphasise war-related physical impairments over non-physical and congenital ones; and prioritise support for former combatants. In Lebanon, disability-related legislation suffers from similar blind spots and remains unimplemented because of lack of financial resources, of weak capacity and cooperation among responsible local and international agencies, and of the features of the local political settlement. We discuss some significant implications for the lives of people with disabilities and their families, before providing recommendations to promote inclusive war-to-peace transitions. POINTS OF INTEREST Peace processes provide a crucial window of opportunity to build more inclusive societies. At a global level, civil war peace agreements overlook people with disabilities. Even when they mention impairments, peace accords adopt over­simplified understandings of disability, prioritise war-related physical impairments over non-physical and congenital ones, and emphasise interventions in support of former combatants. In Lebanon, lack of financial resources, weak capacity and cooperation among responsible local and international agencies, and local political dynamics further constrain the implementation of disability-focused policies. Globally, discourses on transition between civil war and a peaceful and just future, remain ableist and disempowering.

Government ideology and the implementation of civil war peace agreements

ABSTRACT How does government ideology, measured by the ideology of the chief executive and the ideology of the largest government party, influence the implementation of civil war peace agreements? In this study, I address this research question by analysing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) dataset that covers 34 comprehensive peace agreements of 31 countries from 1989 to 2015. The results of feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions demonstrate that the likelihood of implementing peace agreements increases when chief executives and the largest government parties of the left-wing are in office. In contrast, the likelihood of implementing peace agreements decreases when chief executives and the largest government parties of the right-wing stay in power. Consistent with the party-policy literature and the hawkish-dovish assumptions, I find that left-wing governments positively impact the implementation of peace agreements more than right-wing governments, indicating the statistically significant relationship between the government ideology and the implementation of peace agreements.

Are Non-Inclusive Peace Agreements Effective Counter-Insurgency Strategies?

ABSTRACT Civil wars are complex in ways that challenge effective resolution. Civil war actors tend to be dynamic in nature and often splinter then coalesce over time potentially evolving into multiple dyads pitted against their government. Previous work has demonstrated that when multiple rebel factions emerge, civil wars tend to be longer in duration as satisfying multiple factions tends to be more challenging. However, governments may choose to pursue dyadic agreements hoping to end the conflict either through subsequent dyadic negotiations or through more targeted military tactics focusing intently on the remaining faction(s). This study suggests that which dyads will be excluded from the peace is predictable, but also seeks to better understand what happens to those excluded factions that hedge their bets to continue the fight. Propositions are tested on all civil war peace agreements between 1945-2013. Key findings indicate the importance of political power-sharing provision and third-party assistance in bringing excluded groups into the fold.

Sisters Are Doing It for Themselves: How Female Combatants Help Generate Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreements in Civil Wars

This article examines the effect rebel women have on the shape of civil war peace agreements, paying particular attention to the specific gender-inclusive provisions female rebels advocate for. I argue that, through conflict experiences and socialization, rebel women develop group identities that foster collective demands. Their identities as fighters and women from marginalized groups encourage rebel women to lobby for provisions that address the grievances of women from these societal groups. Using data on women’s participation in conflict and the terms written into contemporary peace agreements, I find support for this contention. Greater participation of female combatants is associated with an increased likelihood of observing gender-inclusive agreement provisions calling for the inclusion of women from marginalized groups and addressing the specific post-conflict needs of female ex-combatants. This study is one of the first to show that women’s participation in rebellion matters for the shape of post-conflict peace.

Leadership Changes and Civil War Peace Agreements: Does Who Comes to Power Influence the Implementation?

ABSTRACT Why is the implementation of civil war peace agreements comparatively higher in some countries than in other countries? In this study, I address this puzzle by investigating the effects of insider-outsider leader turnover on the execution of peace agreements. The idea is that leaders should be the fundamental units of analysis to explain the implementation of peace agreements due to more frequent leadership changes than state-level variables, such as the level of democracy, political system, military capability, and GDP per capita. Besides, leader turnover poses a commitment problem in peace processes if outsider leaders differ in their resolve and revise inherited agreements. I test this hypothesis quantitatively using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regressions to analyze the panel dataset of this research that covers 34 comprehensive peace agreements of 31 countries from 1989 to 2015. The findings of this study demonstrate the positive impacts of insider leader turnover and the adverse effects of outsider leader turnover on the execution of peace agreements. Hence, whether the implementation of peace agreements will continue depends on who comes to power.

Civil War Peace Agreements and Gender Inclusion

ABSTRACT In 2000, The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 actively promoted the inclusion of women and their perspectives in peace processes, as well as promoted a gender perspective in post-conflict recovery and institution building. The number of gender provisions in civil war peace agreements has increased since 2001 as a result, but not all such provisions serve the same purpose. In this study, we present a provision typology that divides gender provisions into those that seek to empower women and compare them to those that address conflict victimization. We suggest that the context under which the peace agreement takes place, and conditions of the conflict itself, should influence where empowerment and victimization provisions are employed if they are to have the type of impact sought by the UNSC and improve post-conflict outcomes. We test our propositions on all civil war peace agreements occurring between 1990-2018. Findings indicate that gender provisions designed to empower women are unlikely to emerge in societies where they are perhaps most needed. Comparatively, it appears there is less resistance to gender provisions aimed at addressing conflict-related victimization.

A Faulty Prescription? Critiquing Joint Security Units after Peace Agreements in Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic

ABSTRACT This article critiques the prescription of joint security units called for by civil war peace agreements as a means to integrate armed forces previously in conflict. Drawing on cases from Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, this article offers a comparative assessment of the joint security units attempted in each country. As negotiators and mediators often employ templates from other contexts, the deficits exemplified by these cases call for rethinking the practice of establishing joint units in the doctrine of military integration, as well as in the wider practice of negotiating security arrangements in peace processes.

Cheap talk or costly commitment? Leader statements and the implementation of civil war peace agreements

This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.

Peace agreements and women’s political rights following civil war

Approximately one-quarter of civil war peace agreements contain some reference to gender, prompting the question of whether or not gender provisions within peace agreements are effective tools for improving women’s rights following conflict. As calls by the United Nations and the international community place increasing emphasis on women’s involvement in peace processes, this article generates insight into whether peace agreements, a key component of peace processes, help to spur greater political rights for women. The theoretical expectations of the article posit that peace agreements generate legal frameworks for post-conflict states. Specifically, peace agreements have the potential to tie actors’ hands to new policies and generate shifts in societal norms and practices; the direction of new policies and practices, however, is dependent on the contents of agreements. When agreements are gender-inclusive, they increase the likelihood of improvements in women’s political rights. The expectations are quantitatively tested using civil war peace agreements signed between 1981 and 2011. The findings indicate that the content of agreements matters; gender-inclusive agreements lay the foundations for improvements in women’s political rights following conflict. The article demonstrates that peace agreements, when crafted to include gender provisions, are meaningful tools that international and domestic actors can harness to strengthen women’s rights after civil war.

Selling Out or Standing Firm? Explaining the Design of Civil War Peace Agreements

AbstractWhen do rebel leaders “sell out” their constituents in the terms of peace by signing agreements that benefit group elites over the rebel constituency, and when do they instead “stand firm,” pushing for settlement terms that benefit the public they claim to represent? This article examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant on and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend on civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of all final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group's level of reliance on civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for nonrandom selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for our hypothesis.

The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups

How do militaries respond to peace after civil war? The literature gives us a good understanding of how peace agreements affect the chances of civil war recurrence. However, it misses another aspec...

The viability of civil war peace agreements

Civil war peace agreements are prone to collapse. While some research suggests that multiple layers of power-sharing provisions lead to more viable agreements, others have suggested that negotiated settlements are not only more likely to return to violence, but that those cases will be more deadly as a result. We suggest here that previous research has failed to address the various ways that peace agreements emerge and that this context is crucial in explaining peace agreement viability. In some situations, rebels are likely to earn those concessions through battlefield success. Governments may feel compelled to address underlying grievances in order to stop the bloodshed and ultimately maintain some political clout in the postwar regime. In other cases, however, governments may feel pressure to engage in discussions and to provide concessions by outside actors, whether in the form of diplomatic intervention, economic, or foreign military intervention. Hypotheses are tested on all civil war peace agreements identified by the UCDP Peace Agreement Data-set for 1975–2011. Findings from logit and hazard models suggest that agreements brought about in the aftermath of military intervention on behalf of rebels are more likely to endure while those earned on the battlefield (i.e., stronger rebels) do not. In addition, mediation enhances peace agreement viability, while interventions on behalf of governments tend to undermine it.

Mediation, Peacekeeping And Civil War Peace Agreements

The post-civil war agreement phase is vulnerable to credible commitment problems, a lack of government capacity to implement, and/or mutual vulnerability to retribution from violating the agreement. This study’s main contribution is to demonstrate the combined utility of mediation and UN peacekeeping. Mediation builds trust and confidence and works with the parties to design an efficacious agreement conducive to, among other features, tamping down post-agreement violence. Peacekeeping stems violence and facilitates the implementation of the agreement. Agreements that are mediated and followed by UN peacekeeping are expected to be more robust in terms of staving off violence. We report the effects of the mediation–peacekeeping interaction using a method correcting for a common misinterpretation of interaction terms. We test logit and hazard models using a sample of full and partial civil war peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011. Controlling for agreement design, democracy, and income per capita, the results indicate mediation and its interaction with peacekeeping reduce the probability of renewed/continuing violence and have a positive impact on agreement duration. We also report brief case study evidence from the 1990s peace process in Guatemala.

Does Spoiling Work? Assessing the Impact of Spoilers on Civil War Peace Agreements

Scholars and policymakers argue that violent actors – termed ‘spoilers’ – pose a significant threat to civil war peace agreements. Yet existing research, which is overly reliant on single-case studies, has not effectively determined how prevalent spoiling is, or thoroughly examined what its ultimate effects are on peace agreements. This article draws on a newly constructed cross-national dataset of spoiling following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era to analyze spoiling. It finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not as common as typically assumed, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements. Moreover, most actors who resort to this strategy typically fail in their goals and the agreement is not at risk, despite the high publicity and attention given to these threats. Yet particular types of actors, most notably paramilitaries and state security forces excluded from the agreement, can pose a significant threat to peace.

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential.Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.

Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity

Negotiated civil war terminations differ from their interstate war counterparts in that one side must disarm and cease to exist as a fighting entity. While termination through military victory provides a relatively more enduring peace, many civil wars end with peace agreements signed after negotiations. However, research has shown that the implementation of civil war peace agreements is difficult and prone to collapse. Often these failures are followed by recurrence of the conflict. In some cases, the agreements break down before key provisions are implemented. This article adds to this topic by focusing on the role of state capacity in peace agreement success. We argue that peace agreements and state capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for sustainable peace. The article employs a case study approach to explore the importance of state capacity in implementing civil war peace agreements. The role of third-party interventions is also considered. The cases (United Kingdom—Northern Ireland, Indonesia—Aceh, Burundi, Mali, and Somalia) include 14 peace agreements that vary by war type (secessionist or control over government), type of agreement (comprehensive or partial), levels of state capacity (high or low), and peace success (success, partial or failure), and each experienced third-party involvement in the peace process.

The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements*

The focus of this article is civil war peace agreement duration from 1989 to 2005. Recent work by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007) has argued that power-sharing provisions have a cumulative impact. In other words, the more power-sharing provisions there are built into an agreement, the greater the prospects for peace. Our basic theoretical premise is that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to government and more difficult to implement will decrease the life span of the peace agreement because of government motivations to renegotiate and rebel incentive to strike preemptively before the government does or out of frustration because of delays in implementing costly provisions. In other words, governments will abandon the agreement because it concedes too much or rebels will abandon the agreement because of delays in implementation and/or to move preemptively. We look at three forms of power-sharing provisions: military (integration of rebels into army), territorial (autonomy), and political (shared government). Civil war peace agreements can expire after being replaced by a new agreement or if at least one party abandons the agreement. Hazard models are specified controlling for democracy score at time of signing, intensity of war, GDP per capita, and type of agreement.The results indicate that the less costly concessions by government of military integration and autonomy increase the duration of peace agreements, while political power-sharing provisions have a negative though insignificant impact on duration.

Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace

Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace. By Terrence Lyons. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 232p. $49.95.When a peace agreement is negotiated in civil wars today, there is a seemingly reflexive turn toward democratization as a way to move social conflicts from the battlefield to the halls of parliament; such agreements invariably entail a political transition requiring divisive and inherently difficult electoral processes. Terrence Lyons captures the complex and often contradictory dynamics of elections in the wake of civil war peace agreements in his well-designed, thoroughly researched, and coherently argued book. The principal argument of Demilitarizing Politics is that the conduct of war itself creates institutional structures of conflict that linger into the postwar period and that critically inform postwar electoral politics.

Peace as a Process

Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace. By Terrence Lyons. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. 232 pp., $49.94 (ISBN: 1-58826-393-2). Can enemies committed to killing one another during a civil war negotiate an end to the violence and live together in peace? The long and growing list of civil war peace agreements that have only briefly halted hostilities demonstrates that this is a challenging task. Pessimism concerning the viability of peace agreements has led some scholars to suggest that negotiated settlements, at least in some contexts, should be considered a less viable means of conflict management than either outright military victory (Luttwak 1999) or partition (Kaufmann 1996). Yet, the experiences of post-civil war states such as South Africa, Mozambique, and El Salvador demonstrate that peace can endure following a negotiated settlement. Previous research seeking to explain these instances of successful civil war resolution have focused on such factors as the role of peacekeepers (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004) and the creation of settlement provisions that provide for powersharing among the rivals (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Although focusing on different mechanisms, these studies share the optimistic view that it is possible for former combatants to manage their disagreements and avoid a return to armed conflict. Terrence Lyons's Demilitarizing Politics shares the optimism of works emphasizing the potential for civil wars to be decisively ended through peaceful means. What makes this study a unique and important contribution to this …

Fanning the Flames of Peace: The Difficult Role of IOs

Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elisabeth M. Cousens Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 729 pp., $65.00 cloth (ISBN: 1-58826-058-5), $26.95 paper (ISBN: 1-58826-083-6). When a civil war is terminated by a peace agreement, what roles can international actors play in helping the former warring parties carry out their commitments and in preventing a return to war? Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements contributes to the peace and conflict studies literature, and more specifically to the growing body of work on war termination and conflict resolution after intrastate war (Licklider 1993; Darby and Mac Ginty 2000, 2003; Wallensteen 2002; Walter 2002), by seeking to answer these questions. Moreover, the editors—Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens—argue that they need to overcome some of the weaknesses of past research on peace implementation after civil wars, such as unclear prescriptions regarding implementation strategy and a failure to prioritize among different implementation tasks. They set out to achieve this by focusing on the interaction among three key factors: the challenges posed by the implementation environment; the resources brought to the process by international actors; and the choices made about how these resources should be used. The result is a solid research design and an excellent edited book that cumulates and advances theory while it offers policy relevant findings and recommendations. Ending Civil Wars rests on a study of sixteen cases between 1980 and 1997 in which international actors played a prominent role in the implementation of post–civil war peace agreements. In most, but not all, of these cases, the international implementing agency was the United Nations. Four specific questions guide the analysis: What exactly do international actors do to assist the implementation of peace agreements? How do cases differ in the challenges they pose to implementers? What challenges characterize the most difficult environments? What factors determine which cases get adequate resources? The editors use a multimethod approach that combines single-case …