Outcome Of Civil War Research Articles

Transnational Ethnic Kin and Civil War Outcomes

The literature on the transnational dimension of civil wars points to transnational ethnic kin as an important catalyst that initiates and sustains civil wars. Ethnic ties that transcend national boundaries, these studies argue, intensify the conflict by providing sanctuaries as well as human and material resources to the rebels. In this study, I argue that the same transborder ethnic ties make it more difficult for the government to achieve a decisive victory and contribute to outcomes more favorable to rebels. These networks can help create a more balanced relationship between an ethnic group and a previously antagonistic state by increasing the political, economic, and military costs of repression for the government. An analysis of ethnic civil wars starting and ending between 1950 and 2006 demonstrates that civil wars fought by ethnically mobilized rebel groups are more likely to be negotiated and settled in favor of rebels who have ethnic kin in a neighboring country.

Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Does it matter whether a civil war is fought as a conventional, irregular, or symmetric non-conventional conflict? Put differently, do “technologies of rebellion” impact on a war’s severity, duration, or outcome? We find that irregular conflicts last longer than all other types of conflict, while conventional ones tend to be more severe in terms of battlefield lethality. Irregular conflicts tend to be won by incumbents, while symmetric non-conventional and conventional ones are more likely to end in draws. Substantively, these findings help us make sense of the evolution of civil wars, which are likely to become shorter, more intensely fought, and more challenging for existing governments. Theoretically, our findings support factoring in the technology of rebellion when studying the severity, duration, and outcome of civil wars; they also contribute a better understanding of the historical contribution of irregular war to both state building and social change.

What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes?

Does political science research have something to add to the counterinsurgency strategy debate? Should the discipline even concern itself with debates over military doctrine and strategy? After conducting a thorough review of the extant empirical literature, we argue that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Evaluating the theoretical and empirical findings of the last two decades, we identify three dimensions of civil wars affecting who prevails: (i) state capacity, (ii) the effects of violence against civilians, and (iii) foreign intervention. Domestic armed conflicts are characterized not only by military struggles, but equally importantly by contests of legitimacy between incumbent and rebel visions for the state. We conclude that the analyses of COIN strategy cannot be divorced from assessments of state capacity and the role of external actors in the conflict. We thus see the academic literature as instrumental in adding to practitioners' perspectives by more clearly identifying what COIN strategies can be applied under state capacity and legitimacy constraints to facilitate peace through both population-centered (legitimacy) and insurgent-centered (battlefield effectiveness) strategies. Our analysis identifies points of consensus, but also highlights the gaps in our knowledge, which need attention from both academe and practitioners.

Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset

This paper introduces the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA), which contains detailed information on the state–rebel group dyads included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project Dyadic Dataset. Existing quantitative studies generally focus on characteristics of countries and conflicts to examine the duration, severity, outcome and recurrence of civil wars, in ways that often ignore the actors in civil wars. The NSA data provides additional information on the organizations involved in conflict dynamics. We describe the structure of the NSA data and the variables included, provide descriptive statistics of the indicators, and discuss areas for future research on non-state actors to enhance our understanding of conflict processes.

Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes

The article investigates how rebel interdependencies shape civil war outcomes. The author argues that alliances between rebel groups will have serious repercussions on the management of conflict. By examining civil war outcomes between 1946 and 2008, the author shows that the presence of multiple groups, alliances among rebels, the cumulative capabilities of one’s allies as well as the credibility and the durability of alliances shape war outcomes. Rebels have the means to avoid government defeat and continue conflict when the number of rebel groups the government has to confront simultaneously is high or when these groups cooperate against their common enemy. Findings show that while termination by peace agreement is unlikely for allied rebels, specifically for those that have enduring relationships, rebels with access to high levels of ally capabilities along with those who have credible alliance ties are likely to be the victors of war.

Explaining Peace Duration through Foreign Aid and Civil War Outcome

Explaining Peace Duration through Foreign Aid and Civil War Outcome

Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars

Civil wars are complex events affected by numerous factors. Recent research, however, seems to have concentrated on the rebels and their motivations to the exclusion of how the state can affect the onset and outcome of civil wars. This special issue addresses this lacuna by looking at the role of state capacity. In particular, state capacity is a multi-dimensional concept that encompasses not only the extractive abilities of a state but also economic development and bureaucratic quality. Despite the various ways in which state capacity can be measured, the articles clearly show that strong states have a decreased risk of experiencing a civil war, although there is evidence that civil violence decreases state capacity, implying a reverse causality. In addition, it appears that the capable states that do experience civil violence are more able to credibly commit to a negotiated solution, which increases the possibility of a bargained end to the violence. While these articles do not represent the last word on the subject, they do provide convincing evidence that state capacity plays a critical role in the onset and conduct of civil violence.

Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process

What effect do third parties have on the evolution of civil wars? The authors argue that intervention by third parties is central to the civil war process, a process that is characterized by the duration of hostilities and the type of outcome. The authors examine empirically the effect of third-party intervention into civil wars during the period 1816—1997, using the event history framework of competing risks. From the perspective of competing risks, as a civil war endures, it is at risk of experiencing a transition to one of three civil war outcomes in our sample: military victory by the government, military victory by the opposition group, and negotiated settlement. The competing risks approach provides considerably better leverage on the dynamic qualities of civil wars and, in particular, the influence of interventions by third parties. The analysis suggests that third-party interventions can be decisive in the evolution of civil wars and that third-party interventions have a different effect on the duration than different civil war outcomes. The results show that third-party intervention decreases the time until the supported group achieves military victory. Furthermore, third-party interventions, on both the government and opposition sides, increase the time until a negotiated settlement.

Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post‐Civil‐War Democracy*

Objective. This study explores the effects of civil war outcome on post‐civil‐war democratization. We employ an expected utility model to argue that the attributes of the civil war that lead to balanced power relations between the warring parties lead to higher levels of postconflict democracy.Methods. We estimate a series of OLS regression models with change in the level of democracy (from the prewar level to five and ten years after the conflict ended) as the dependent variable.Results. Civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to experience higher levels of democratization than civil wars that end in military victory by either side. Identity‐based conflicts lead to lower levels of democratization while previous democratic experience seems to decrease post‐civil‐war democratization. We find no support for the argument that high war costs and U.N. peace‐keeping forces produce higher levels of democracy.Conclusions. Civil war may lead to more inclusive polities if it serves to even the balance of power between contending groups in the nation. Power balance is more likely to bring about more democratic polities, especially where power sharing is formalized in a negotiated settlement.

Civil wars, party politics and the consolidation of regimes in twentieth century Europe

The present article explores how winners' and losers' strategies for competition influence the possibility of democratization after civil war. Civil wars have been pivotal events in many states, but there has been little analysis of how they affect democratization. Since most have been won by the political right in twentieth century Europe one expects a correlation between civil war and the imposition of authoritarian solution to political conflicts. However, an analysis of five civil wars shows a wide variety in the patterns of political dominance achieved by the winners, ranging from total clampdown in Spain to the winners relinquishing power, as in Ireland. In between, Finland, Greece and Hungary combined various degrees of open competition with restrictions on the losers. In effect democratization can be as likely an outcome of civil war as regression to authoritarianism. Explaining the variation in outcomes of the five cases is the objective of this article.

Post-Revolutionary State Building in Ethiopia, Iran and Nicaragua: Lessons from Terror

This paper focuses on an earlier theorized critical stage of revolution, the Reign of Terror which is redefined with summary justice as its essence and employed in a comparative analysis of three modern revolutions, Ethiopia, Iran and Nicaragua. The analysis demonstrates the importance of national factors over international factors in explaining post-revolutionary state construction. A reign of terror is an extemporized state; it is not an inevitable stage of revolution. Comparison of Ethiopia and Iran, where terrors occurred, is contrasted with Nicaragua, where a reign of terror was avoided. This reveals the significance for post-revolutionary state construction of the timing and outcome of civil war, of domestic policy choices constrained by circumstances directly encountered and of state control over new, revolutionary, means of coercion.

Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars

What characteristics of a civil war determine whether it will end in a government victory, a rebel victory, or a negotiated settlement? To explore this question we present an expected utility model of the choice rebels and governments face between accepting a settlement or continuing to fight. The model implies that a settlement becomes more likely as (1) estimates of the probability of victory decline; (2) costs of conflict increase; (3) estimates of the time required to win increase; or (4) the utility from a settlement increases relative to that of victory. Factors that (1) increase one party's probability of victory; (2) increase its payoffs from victory; (3) reduce the costs of conflict; and/or (4) reduce the time required to achieve victory increase that party's probability of winning and decrease the likelihood of a settlement. We test these propositions with a multinomial choice model that correctly predicts the outcome in 86 percent of the cases.

Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars

Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars