For a long period of time, it has been maintained that the later part of the history of the Roman Empire was characterized by the progressive rise of imperial absolutism, at the expense of the liberties traditionally enjoyed by the Mediterranean cities. The bleak situation depicted by the Codes regarding taxation and the authoritarian behavior of the imperial bureaucrats reinforced by the depressing testimonies issued by Libanios or Lactantius led classic and modern historiography to use rare and dubious indices — all in all, two Julian’s decrees, one sentence by Ammianus and one by Libanios — to conclude that the central State had destroyed civic autonomy during the reigns of Constantine or Constance II by seizing municipal properties and incorporating them into its own domains. Although cities had lost part of their previous financial capacity by the end of the 4th century, some recent studies have challenged the confiscation scenario. This leads to a contradiction that requires a completely renewed approach of that historiographic hurdle. What most likely happened is a very different set of events. The classical civic model had been relying for centuries on the financial responsibility of landed elites who could seize most of the ancient economies’ surpluses in return for bearing the costs and responsibilities of ruling them. This is why we will be able to prove that civic lands and taxation were across the classical world characterized by a very low yield of return. As Rome turned into an Empire of citizens, increasing internal economic pressure and more efficient external enemies gradually exposed the shortcomings of that system and led the energetic emperors who ruled from Aurelian to Diocletian to undertake a radical overhaul of its financial and political organization, following the 3rd century crisis. As a direct result, the civic structure on which the Empire was still relying entered into a deep and extended crisis as a direct consequence of the Tetrarchy’s fiscal reform as landed provincials’ interests collided with the State financial needs. Surprisingly enough for those who still believe that the Late Empire is essentially the history of a long decline and fall, most of the ancient evidence of those times, including epigraphical testimonies, nonetheless points to a strong economical recovery until well into the 5th century, even in some areas of the West, and actually increasing the stakes of this struggle for wealth control. This conflict eventually reached its climax as Julian tried to restore the traditional civic model, and we will explore how our main scenario is allowing us to get closer to what this emperor’s aspirations might have been and the reasons for his failure. From Diocletian through Theodosius, we will thus demonstrate that the policy shifts we are able to highlight are illustrating the different phases of a continuous competition between cities and Empire for the control of the sources of wealth, which traditionally got mistaken for confiscations and the ruthless imposition of an Imperial power that no Roman emperor was ever able to achieve. Maybe the outcome of that conflict was not what it seemed to traditional historiography: the rise of Imperial bureaucracy and then the apparent theocracy which seems to develop at the end of the 4th century are eventually parallel to an effective devolution of the State’s economic powers under the Theodosian dynasty which ultimately benefited categories of provincial holders of nominally imperial titles, spreading a level of wealth among the landed classes maybe never achieved before. As the old civic autonomy finally died during the course of the 4th century, paradoxically destroyed by the last pagan emperors, powerful new local structures were able to replace it, relying on new financial circuits and supported by the cohesive strength of the new religion. The Christian city was then to become the true heir to the pagan city, linked by an impressive continuity to its Imperial past.
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