Citizen Suits Research Articles

What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III

Who is entitled to sue the government? What kind of must they show? This essay explores the history and content of the law of It turns out that the modern requirement of an injury in fact does not fit with the original understanding of the constitution, and that it depends on very contemporary ideas, connected to the original attack on the regulatory state and the New Deal. It also raises quite deep conceptual problems. One of the principal goals of the essay is to resolve those problems and to suggest future directions for the law of standing.

Environmental administration, the courts and public policy, 1980-1989

Of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's seven major enabling statutes, six contain citizen suit provisions which reward anti-EPA plaintiffs. This fact, coupled with the agency's increasing use of the courts to bolster its enforcement efforts, yield a multitude of avenues through which courts have affected the policies and administration of the agency. This article discusses how the courts have affected the EPA in the 1980s and then briefly assesses the implications of such court-agency interaction for the successful operation of public agencies in the next decade. ∗

Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits for Relief From Environmental Harm

This Article reviews the evolution of public nuisance law since the 1972 article by Bryson and Macbeth and focuses on two issues: 1) the evolution of the traditional special injury rule into a two-pronged doctrine of standing (injury-in-fact) and proximate cause, and 2) the viability of public nuisance actions in light of existing environmental statutes. The first section of Part I analyzes the reasons why the traditional policies supporting the special injury rule are no longer valid. The second section reviews a number of cases involving actions for damages where the courts, at least implicitly, have not applied the special injury rule to limit standing, then it analyzes how courts have dealt with the rule in equitable and class actions. Part II discusses the relationship between the public nuisance doctrine and state and federal environmental statutes.The Article concludes that, in litigation concerning serious environmental or toxic issues, some courts have accepted public nuisance claims, even though they have not explicitly rejected the special injury rule. It advocates that courts take the final step and reject the special injury rule outright, because private plaintiffs must not be barred at the courthouse door by an outdated special injury rule if public nuisance claims are to fill statutory gaps and help establish standards of reasonable conduct.

Suits Must Be Based on Continuing Violations

The U.S. Supreme Court vacated lower court rulings in a lawsuit over violations of permits issued under the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The Court ruled that the act did not confer federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.

Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties under the Clean Water Act

Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties under the Clean Water Act

Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit

Previous articleNext article No AccessPrivate versus Social Costs in Bringing SuitLouis KaplowLouis Kaplow Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 15, Number 2Jun., 1986 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467817 Views: 10Total views on this site Citations: 34Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Nicolas Lampach, Wessel Wijtvliet, Arthur Dyevre Merchant hubs and spatial disparities in the private enforcement of international trade regimes, International Review of Law and Economics 64 (Dec 2020): 105946.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105946Samantha Bielen, Wim Marneffe, Wim Vereeck Litigation Decision, (Apr 2019): 1352–1360.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_589Keith N. Hylton The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence, (Jan 2018): 165–175.https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315188133-10Yannis Katsoulacos, David Ulph Legal uncertainty, competition law enforcement procedures and optimal penalties, European Journal of Law and Economics 41, no.22 (Jun 2015): 255–282.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9504-1Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi, Georg von Wangenheim Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting, Review of Law & Economics 11, no.22 (Jun 2015): 113–148.https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0027S. Bielen, W. Marneffe, L. Vereeck Litigation Decision, (Feb 2015): 1–10.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_589-1Bruce H. Kobayashi The Law and Economics of Litigation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613145Giovanni Immordino, Michele Polo Antitrust, legal standards and investment, International Review of Law and Economics 40 (Oct 2014): 36–50.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.08.003Pierre Bentata Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 16, no.33 (Nov 2013): 201–228.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-013-0073-7Jan M. Ambrose, Anne M. Carroll, Laureen Regan The Economics of Liability Insurance, (Jul 2013): 315–347.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_12Pierre Bentata Liability as a Complement to Environmental Regulation: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2013).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290945Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?, Public Choice 152, no.1-21-2 (May 2012): 181–201.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9860-5Diego G. Pardow What Should We Expect from the Dodd-Frank Bounty Program?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2115964Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of the Loser-Pays Rule, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144800Thomas J. Miceli Legal change and the social value of lawsuits, International Review of Law and Economics 30, no.33 (Sep 2010): 203–208.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2010.04.002Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1555784Erik Lenntorp On the joint use of licensing and liability, International Review of Law and Economics 29, no.33 (Sep 2009): 244–251.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.02.001Christian Langpap Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation, Environmental and Resource Economics 40, no.44 (Nov 2007): 489–506.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9166-8Christian Langpap Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits, Journal of Regulatory Economics 31, no.11 (Dec 2006): 57–81.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-9010-zSteven Shavell Chapter 2 Liability for Accidents, (Jan 2007): 139–182.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0730(07)01002-XHoward H. Chang, David S. Evans The Optimal Prosecution of Corporate Fraud: An Error Cost Analysis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.943035 Alan O. Sykes Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy Sykes, The Journal of Legal Studies 34, no.22 (Jul 2015): 631–666.https://doi.org/10.1086/431781Alan O. Sykes Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2005).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.671801Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell Economic Analysis of Law, (Jan 2002): 1661–1784.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80029-5Vikramaditya S. Khanna Toward a Functional Understanding of Standing, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2002).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304390Steven Shavell The level of litigation: private versus social optimality of suit and of settlement, International Review of Law and Economics 19, no.11 (Mar 1999): 99–115.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00026-XKeith N. Hylton Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182792Clinton F. Beckner, Avery Katz The incentive effects of litigation fee shifting when legal standards are uncertain, International Review of Law and Economics 15, no.22 (Jun 1995): 205–224.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(95)00007-UKeith N. Hylton The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence, International Review of Law and Economics 10, no.22 (Sep 1990): 161–171.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(90)90021-KJohn Kambhu Direct controls and incentives systems of regulation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 18, no.22 (Mar 1990): S72–S85.https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(90)90040-6John Kambhu Regulatory standards, noncompliance and enforcement, Journal of Regulatory Economics 1, no.22 (Jun 1989): 103–114.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140020 Kathleen Engelmann , and Bradford Cornell Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, The Journal of Legal Studies 17, no.22 (Oct 2015): 377–399.https://doi.org/10.1086/468134 A. Mitchell Polinsky , and Daniel L. Rubinfeld The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, The Journal of Legal Studies 17, no.11 (Oct 2015): 151–164.https://doi.org/10.1086/468125 The Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes, (): 7–63.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1_2

Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical Examination of Government-"Subsidized" Litigation

We think the District Court [in declining to award fees] incorrectly focused its attention on the outcome and practical effect of the litigation, to the exclusion of a more relevant consideration-whether the suit was the type that Congress intended to encourage when it enacted the citizen-suit provision .... The attorneys' fee feature was offered as an inducement to citizen suits, which Congress deemed necessary; and if the hope Congress had for such suits is to become a reality, decisions on fee-allowance cannot make wholesale substitutions of hindsight for the legitimate expectation of citizen plaintiffs.1

Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs

Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs

Law: Citizen Suit Litigation

Law: Citizen Suit Litigation

Emerging Problems of Citizen Participation

Over the last decade and a half the increased activity, involvement, and influence of public interest groups and citizen organizations has become one of the most distinctive features of American administration.' Citizen groups have besieged administrative agencies and courts at every level of government with demands that they be allowed to participate fully in administrative proceedings, that they be given greater access to agency information, and that they be permitted to present any and all evidence in behalf of their interests before appropriate administrative and judicial tribunals. They have skillfully cultivated the press to broaden their appeal to administrative and political officials, established effective, fulltime lobbying organizations, and in some cases have put together sophisticated professional staffs which rival the agencies' own in their ability to grasp the intricacies and complexities of public policy issues. Furthermore, both the participants themselves and knowledgeable observers have predicted that the torrent of citizen suits and public interest activity seen thus far is only a small fraction of the deluge yet to come.2 On the whole, reaction to this surge of citizen participation has been positive. The general assumption is that broadened participation is desirable because it increases the representativeness and responsiveness of our administrative and political institutions, heightens citizens' sense of political efficacy, and acts as an important check on the abuse of administrative discretion. Yet in spite of the proven accomplishments of citizen groups in some policy areas, there is a growing body of data to support the contention that public participation which is automatic, unrestrained, or ill-considered can be dangerously dysfunctional to political and administrative systems. The purpose of this article is to explore the other side of the public participation issue * This article analyzes the problems which have accompanied the growth of the citizen participation and public interest movements. The principle problems identified are the potential shortsightedness of the administrative response to citizen demands, problems of representation and legitimacy, the style and tactics of citizen groups, and the absence of sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of public interest policies and programs. The author suggests that public participation which is not carefully ordered and constrained by administrators can lead to poorly conceived, unrepresentative, and costly policy decisions. Administrators are chiefly responsible for the integrity of the administrative process, and sensitivity to citizen demands is no substitute for independent, carefully reasoned, professional judgments regarding the nature of the public interest in each new administrative situation.

Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington: Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Citizen Suits to Enforce the Clean Air Act

Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington: Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Citizen Suits to Enforce the Clean Air Act

Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act

Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act

Constitutional Law. Separation of Powers. In Citizen Suit, Congressmen Declared Constitutionally Ineligible to Hold Military Reserve Commissions. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D. D. C. 1971), Appeal Docketed, No. 71-1535, D. C. Cir., July 7, 1971

Constitutional Law. Separation of Powers. In Citizen Suit, Congressmen Declared Constitutionally Ineligible to Hold Military Reserve Commissions. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D. D. C. 1971), Appeal Docketed, No. 71-1535, D. C. Cir., July 7, 1971

Federal Courts. Jurisdiction: In General. Court May Decline to Hear Citizen's Suit against Alien Defendant on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens. Stewart v. Godoy-Sayan (S. D. N. Y. 1957)

Federal Courts. Jurisdiction: In General. Court May Decline to Hear Citizen's Suit against Alien Defendant on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens. Stewart v. Godoy-Sayan (S. D. N. Y. 1957)