CIA Director Research Articles

Intercivilizational Interaction between the United States and the Non-Western World (The Civilizational Identity of Russia in the Context of S. Huntington’s Concept of the Clash of Civilizations)

The article offers a retrospective analysis of S. Huntington’s concept of the clash of civilizations, examining the scholar’s predictions concerning the development scenarios of Russian-Ukrainian relations of the post-Soviet period in the context of wars along the fault lines between civilizations. It characterizes the structure of civilizations, patterns of intercivilizational interaction, and specifics of the identity crisis manifestations in cleft and torn countries. The paper concludes that the predicted conflicting scenario of Russian-Ukrainian relations caused by the confrontation between Western and Orthodox (in S. Huntington's terminology) civilizations is coming true. In the civilizational context, the article explores approaches to deterring Russia, reflected in the documents of RAND Corporation analysts and a lecture by CIA Director W. Burns, delivered at the Ditchley Foundation. Considering Huntington’s provisions about the core role of the Russian state for the Orthodox civilization, as well as the centuries-old tear of identity and public consciousness of Russia, the author believes that the most important task of the state identity politics is nationalizing the Russian elite, overcoming the ideological gap between the nationally-oriented "deep people" and the Western-centric elite groups.

"Invisible Force" or Diplomatic Powerlessness? (American Diplomacy Through the Eyes of CIA Director William Burns)

The memoirs of William Burns, the American diplomat and director of the Central Intelligence Agency, paint a wide panorama of U.S. foreign policy. These memoirs are particularly relevant because they document the role of the United States in destabilizing the world order that emerged following the Second World War, including its participation in fomenting crises in the post-Soviet space that led to the development of the Ukrainian crisis and the beginning of a special military operation by Russia. The memoirs are not only the testimony of an informed eyewitness but also a valuable source on the modern history of international relations, since they are supplemented with declassified diplomatic documents of the American State Department. These documents, now part of the academic record, clarify both the patterns of American foreign policy behavior and the destructive role of the United States in numerous crises, many of which, according to the documents presented, were predicted by W. Burns as inevitable long before the escalation occurred.

Non-Technical Cyber-Attacks and International Cybersecurity: The Case of Social Engineering

This paper aims to provide an overview of social engineering attacks, and their impacts on cybersecurity, including national and international security, and figures out detection techniques, and major methods for countermeasure. How do social engineering attacks affect national and international security? And why is it so hard to cope with them? Seeking for answers to these questions, this paper applies qualitative research methods particularly literature review and case analysis. While qualitative research methods are predominantly employed, quantitative methods will also be utilized when deemed essential. Social engineering attacks, also referred to as online fraud, are a type of attack that typically necessitates minimal or no technical knowledge. Social engineering attacks, instead benefit from the weaknesses and mistakes of individuals, since the user is accepted as the weakest link in cybersecurity. Many studies have shown that the vast majority of successful cyber-attacks in the digital world are social engineering (SE) because countering them is more difficult than countering technical cyber-attacks. Based on the analysis of some major cyber-attacks such as the intervention in the 2016 US Presidential elections, the hacking of CIA director, John Brennan in 2015, and Stuxnet in 2010, the paper figures out that social engineering attacks have a tremendous impact on cybersecurity on the individual, institutional, societal, national, and international levels. Penetration tests and training for raising awareness are the prolific ways to mitigate social engineering attacks.

Foreword

Foreword Tamara Sonn (bio) The articles in this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs focus on civil society discourse and its implications for international affairs. The academic field of International Relations, reflecting its modernist origins, is state-centered; it focuses primarily on relations between political and military entities, with economic interests always a central focus and non-governmental institutions at the margins. Civil society discourse—whether expressed through the arts, religious, or secular organizations—have yet to find a place in the standard IR curriculum, leaving students ill-equipped to recognize social discontent and its potential political impacts. Clear examples of the analytic weakness of the traditional approach can be seen in the failure of the foreign policy establishment to recognize the long-standing social grievances that resulted in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, and the 2010–11 Arab Spring. These weaknesses have been noticed. CIA Director Stansfield Turner wrote in 1991 of the failure to foresee that the United States would have to intervene militarily in Iran, Libya, Grenada, Panama, Lebanon and Kuwait during the previous decade.1 Regarding the Arab democracy uprisings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2011, "We're facing an Arab awakening that nobody could have imagined and few predicted just a few years ago."2 Michael Walzer reflects on the secular bias of IR and therefore incomprehension of the rise of political Islam in his 2015 The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions. Yet portents of these and many other developments over the past century were clearly evident in the discourse of religious and other civil society actors and in the works of poets, fiction writers, playwrights, and musicians. Students trained to analyze the popular sentiments expressed in these discourses could contribute to more comprehensive intelligence gathering. They might even recognize that traditional foreign policy strategies actually contribute to destabilizing social unrest. For example, according to emeritus Georgetown Professor of Government and International Affairs Robert Lieber, "maintaining a secure supply of oil from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf" is essential to our national interest—even if it means compromising our commitment to democracy.3 Georgetown Distinguished Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy Dennis Ross recently argued in support of strengthening U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia despite the state-sanctioned murder of journalist Jamal [End Page 145] Khashoggi "and other human rights violations." In order to secure the free flow of "Saudi oil," we need to "do what we have always done:… balance values and interests."4 This approach is what drove the United States to participate in the overthrow of Iran's developing democracy in 1953, contributing to the anti-Americanism that drove the 1979 revolution and remains a potent threat today. Given the vested interests, it is unlikely that U.S. foreign policy training will change significantly in the near term. But the articles in this volume provide good examples of the kinds of analyses that would help inform more comprehensive understandings of international affairs. They include studies of the manipulation of religious conservatism by rightwing politicians in Brazil, and the political exploitation of disaffected young males radicalized online in South Korea; and the weaknesses (and, by implication, inconsistencies) of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in China; and the potential strengths of civil society activism in Yemen. Other articles deal with national issues that have important transnational resonances, such as the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on indigenous communities in Latin America. Tamara Sonn Tamara Sonn is Professor Emerita at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Her most recent books include Islam and Democracy After the Arab Spring (with John L. Esposito and John O. Voll; Oxford, 2016), Islam: History, Religion, and Politics (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), and Is Islam an Enemy of the West? (Polity, 2016). She has published over one hundred chapters and articles, and her works have been translated into Arabic, Bengali, German, Portuguese, Korean, and Russian. She has lectured in North America, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Her research has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies, Fulbright, and the U.S. Department of State...

The Tug-of-War over Drone Strike Oversight: Congress and the Politics of Drone Warfare during the Obama Presidency

Despite the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in counter-terror operations, executive-legislative relations, intelligence oversight, and war powers regarding drone strikes have received scarce scholarly interest. Our article contributes to filling this gap and focuses on the politics of congressional oversight of drone warfare—in particular those operations conducted by the CIA (Title 50 operations) during the Obama administration. We apply the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to conduct an interpretive case study and shed light on our central research question: How can we explain the timing and limited extent of changes with regard to congressional oversight of drone strikes during the Obama presidency? While this policy area is traditionally depicted as one of executive dominance and legislative acquiescence, we analyze how congressional entrepreneurs used a policy window in the wake of John Brennan’s confirmation hearings for CIA Director in 2013 to set the agenda on congressional oversight of drone strikes, and thereby contest executive policy-making. Congress enacted limited changes to drone strike oversight and pressured President Obama to increase transparency. At the same time, further limitations, most notably to consolidate drone strike oversight by ending the CIA drone program, were defeated by senior leaders in Congress. Our study thus contends that congressional entrepreneurs played a key role for both change and continuity regarding drone warfare oversight.

Project Eagle: Polscy wywiadowcy w raportach i dokumentach wojennych amerykańskiego Biura Służb Strategicznych [Project Eagle: Polish Agents in the Reports and Wartime Documents of the American Office of Strategic Services

<i>Project Eagle: Polscy wywiadowcy w raportach i dokumentach wojennych amerykańskiego Biura Służb Strategicznych</i> [Project Eagle: Polish Agents in the Reports and Wartime Documents of the American Office of Strategic Services

Carl Wilhelm Sem-Jacobsen: Aerospace Neurophysiology and Deep Brain Stimulation Pioneer.

The Norwegian physician Carl Wilhelm Sem-Jacobsen (1912–1991) was a pioneer in deep brain stimulation and aerospace neurophysiology, but for several reasons, his story has remained untold. During WW2, he collaborated with a renowned military underground resistance group against the Nazi occupants and then had to flee to neutral Sweden. He returned to participate in the liberation of Northern Norway as a Captain in the US Special Forces also working with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services—precursor for CIA) and received a citation from General Eisenhower for his contributions. Sem-Jacobsen then spent several years in the US training in psychiatry and clinical neurophysiology at the Mayo Clinic. He constructed his own medical technical devices, was among the first to develop deep brain stimulation, and made the smallest EEG and EKG recording systems yet produced, also used by the American astronauts walking on the Moon. But he was more an inventor than a researcher, and few of his observations were published in peer-reviewed medical journals. He built his own neurophysiologic institute for neurosurgery, deep brain recordings, and deep brain stimulation in Oslo's main psychiatric hospital, but was sponsored by US military forces and NASA. He knew CIA Director William E. Colby personally, and rumors soon flourished that Sem-Jacobsen conducted secret mind control experiments for American authorities and the CIA. These accusations were investigated, and long after his death, he was officially absolved by a Hearing Committee appointed by the Norwegian Government. Nevertheless, all his personal files were burnt by his family who was still harassed by investigative journalists. Sem-Jacobsen also documented some of his work on film, but the whereabouts of these films have remained unknown. I searched for them for several years and recently discovered numerous films and photographs in an old barn in rural Norway. These films and photographs document in-action neurophysiology recordings in divers, pilots, and astronauts, and they show how Sem-Jacobsen in collaboration with experienced neurosurgeons in Oslo conducted the very first trials with deep brain stimulation in patients with Parkinson disease. He apparently even tried subthalamic stimulation as early as in the 1950s.

The secret life of Ian Fleming: spies, lies and social ties

ABSTRACT This article explores the fascinating interactions and experiences of James Bond creator, Ian Fleming, with the real world of intelligence. It has long been known that Fleming worked in Naval Intelligence during the Second World War. However, accounts of his time there tend to portray him as a lowly and slightly eccentric administrator. Drawing on newly discovered archival materials, plus memoirs and histories, it is argued here that Fleming was a respected and influential figure in the great game of espionage for some three decades. During the war, he was a central cog in the machinery of naval intelligence, planning operations, working with partners in American intelligence and liaising with secret Whitehall departments, including the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. Before and after the war, he was involved in a range of intelligence networks, often using journalistic cover to hide his clandestine connections. Throughout his life, his social circle was a ‘who’s who’ of spies and saboteurs, including CIA Director Allen Dulles. In short, he straddled the state-private divide. Taken together, these dealings with real intelligence paved the way for and gave veracity to his fiction, which continues to shape public perceptions of intelligence to this day.

Hippocratic Diplomacy

“Hippocratic Diplomacy”—first, do no harm—is not the title of Jeffrey A. Engel’s masterful account of President George H. W. Bush’s conduct of foreign policy, but it could have been. Drawing on his vast knowledge of national security policy, as well as a treasure trove of recently released documents that he and other scholars have plumbed in the United States, Russia, Germany, Hungary, and several other countries, Engel has written the best book about the administration that adroitly oversaw the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the reunification of Germany, and the thwarting of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s military campaign for regional domination. Bush took office in January 1989, after a political career heavy in domestic politics dating back to his two terms in Congress in the late 1960s, as well as in foreign policy as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, emissary to China, and CIA director. As the two-term vice president to Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989, Bush was active in both domains, campaigning extensively for Republican candidates while making more diplomatic trips than any vice president in history. But diplomacy was his first love. To Bush, politics was the price he had to pay to do foreign policy.

‘An act of insanity and national humiliation’: the Ford Administration, Congressional inquiries and the ban on assassination

ABSTRACTThe US government’s increasing reliance on targeted killings has revived debates on the role of assassination in US foreign policy. The scholarship tends to ignore the significance of the role of the Ford Administration’s ban on assassination in setting the stage for future debates. Based largely on archival material and elite interviews, this article provides the first in-depth account of the Ford Administration’s approach to assassination and the decision-making processes that led to the inclusion of a ban on assassination in Executive Order 11905. The article argues that discussions within the Ford Administration, the language adopted in presenting the Order, and the ban itself actually did not close assassination off completely as an option but left it in a status of ‘strategic ambiguity’ that could be exploited by future presidents. The article will also challenge two resilient myths: first, the apparently ‘imperilled’ nature of the Ford Presidency and second CIA Director William Colby’s alleged supine cooperation with Congress. The article shows that, from the start, the administration and the CIA made a concerted and successful effort to obstruct intelligence inquiries, to restore the powers and reputation of the CIA, and to fend off Congressional assaults on the presidency.

Access Denied: The Continuing Challenge to Environmental Sciences in the Trump Era

Access Denied: The Continuing Challenge to Environmental Sciences in the Trump Era

Nixon's Axe Man: CIA Director James R. Schlesinger

This article sheds light on the stormy few months that James Schlesinger was CIA director. Schlesinger ranks as the least popular director in CIA history; indeed, he had to install a CCTV camera opposite his official portrait at Langley headquarters because of concerns it would be vandalized by disgruntled staff. Conventional wisdom dictates that he was disliked because he commissioned the “Family Jewels,” the notorious list of CIA dirty tricks which, when leaked in the mid-1970s, led to unprecedented public scrutiny of the agency. Using interviews with retired intelligence officers, spy memoirs, and recently declassified records, including Schlesinger's private papers, this article argues that the hatred went much deeper. A Nixon loyalist, Schlesinger was unpopular because he challenged the culture of the CIA and attempted to make the agency more of an obedient instrument of presidential power and policy. The so-called “Schlesinger Purge” – the controversial decision to fire nearly 7 percent of the CIA's workforce, especially from the Directorate of Operations – underscored this cultural attack. The speed and brutality of the change programme resulted in organizational miasma, leaving staff demoralized and with no means to fight back. The article also examines the consequences of the dislike toward him.

On the Cusp: The Yale College Class of 1960 and a World on the Verge of Change by Daniel Horowitz

Reviewed by: On the Cusp: The Yale College Class of 1960 and a World on the Verge of Change by Daniel Horowitz Daniel Clark On the Cusp: The Yale College Class of 1960 and a World on the Verge of Change by Daniel Horowitz. Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2015. xxi + 310 pp. Paper $24.95. As a historian with an interest in the history of masculinity and higher education, I came to Daniel Horowitz's On the Cusp with a natural fascination with Yale, both as a preeminent institution and as a special seat in the formation of an ideal manhood that influenced the nation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The continued impact of the ideal "Yale Man" figures prominently in Horowitz's memory as well, if more as a model to rebel against. Horowitz seeks to find some insight into how family, education, and the Yale experience factored into the development of a class sitting in between the staid conformity of the 1950s and the rebellion of the 1960s. Many might first cast a skeptical eye toward yet another retrospective on this generation, and certainly Horowitz's interest centers on trying to understand where the activism and commitment to 1960's style change came from—seemingly more of this generation's self-infatuation. Nevertheless, this is not another study of how great (or horrible) baby boomer movers and shakers were. The book clearly grew out of the Yale class of 1960's fiftieth reunion, its class reunion book, and Horowitz's own self-reflection. While the class produced some incredible leaders (Yale president and Baseball Commissioner Bart Giamatti, Senator Jack Heinz, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, CIA Director Porter Goss, and several CEOs), what captures Horowitz's imagination is how the traditional, hypermasculine world of Yale nurtured the future liberal scholars and activists of the 1960s (and beyond)—how could Yale have birthed champions of the civil rights movement, modern feminism, and partisans of the liberal culture wars? Horowitz expected to find a "seamless connection between the rebellious stirrings" he felt in the 1950s and what happened in ensuing decades. Instead he found only subtle indicators (253). The book weaves together the style of emotional memoir, oral and intellectual history, and social [End Page 441] analysis all in an attempt to identify how this class was truly transitional, with some reflecting a dawning social consciousness. The first two chapters, "Think Yiddish" and "Dress British," cleverly introduce the reader both to Horowitz's personal tale and to the traditional world of Yale in the 1950s. He details the social aspects of the manly Yale world with the above-ground senior societies like Skull and Bones, the fraternities and a cappella groups (like the Whiffinpoofs), and the necessity of wearing the preppy style—a fun if not highly surprising read, all relayed through the eyes of Horowitz's "outsider" Jewish status. The next five chapters, then, explore what for Horowitz form the markers of how at least some of the class of '60 evidenced their "awakening"—an increasing racial consciousness, greater devotion to academics, alternative notions of masculinity in contrast to Yale tradition (more academic and sensitive to women), and a greater political engagement on social issues. His involvement with a year-long series of speakers and discussions called "Challenge" in his senior year sits as the culminating proof of all this increased consciousness raising and academic questioning. Challenge pulled in an impressive array of speakers from Ayn Rand, William F. Buckley, and Senator Barry Goldwater on the right, to Senator Hubert Humphrey, A. Philip Randolph, and several folk singers on the left, discussing such topics as nuclear arms (in the fall semester) and the "challenges of democracy"—racism, labor problems, and socialism—in the spring. This did not seem like Dink Stover's Yale and did foreshadow a dawning political awareness. For people already acquainted with Yale's history and traditions, the book offers little that is new. Most of the chapters center on the author's own experience, although the generous dose of classmates' stories and life experiences proves illuminating. Personally I found the author's forays into intellectual history (professor's classes...

Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba, by Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick

Reviewed by: Robert Waters, Ohio Northern University, rawatersjr@yahoo.com or r-waters@onu.eduPatrice Lumumba's assassination has been the subject of many studies. Economic determinism has been their authors' preferred analytical approach; morality tale has provided their tone. Death in the Congo is not more of the same. It is a model of scholarship, featuring subtle portraiture, historical empathy, and skilled use of social science. Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick are also outstanding historical detectives. They mine Belgian materials, along with the recent Foreign Relations of the United States volume on the Congo, and do an impressive job squeezing the last ounce of information out of the US Senate investigation of CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders. Their meticulous research enables them to track sometimes minute events that broaden and deepen the story of Lumumba's precipitous rise and fall. Of particular note is the authors' focus on the international dimension of domestic politics in Belgium, the United States, and the Congo, as well as the goals and pretensions of United Nations leaders. The result is a persuasive account including many surprising revisionist conclusions.For example, Gerard and Kuklick lay the groundwork for a strong case that Joseph Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko) was--briefly--the first of sub-Saharan Africa's reformer military men. They show that he did not begin life as a corrupt Machiavellian on America's payroll. His first coup came at a time of radical political dysfunction, which he sought to repair by creating a College of Commissioners: young university students and graduates to whom he gave real power. In this first iteration, Mobutu vacillated and hedged, often terrified by his alternatives, even at times seeming to lean toward Lumumba.In like fashion, the authors show that Katanga's Moise Tshombe and other secessionist leaders were not colonialist lackeys; they represented peoples who sought a decentralized state under local control based on tribe and tradition, maintaining close Belgian ties to prevent political and economic collapse. Here, the authors would have done well to consult and possibly confront the work of journalists Arnaud de Borchgrave and Smith Hempstone. De Borchgrave, Newsweek magazine's chief foreign reporter and the American immigrant son of Belgian aristocracy, was the most connected foreign journalist of his time, especially in the Congo. Hempstone's Rebels, Mercenaries and Dividends: The Story (New York: Praeger, 1962) argued that was the sort of multi-racial, capitalist, and comparatively free society that the West purported to support for Africa. Hempstone also covered the US role played by influential senator Thomas Dodd and America's Katanga Lobby, neither of which the authors mention.Gerard and Kuklick also demolish former CIA station chief Larry Devlin's effort to portray himself as the moral exemplar who prevented the United States from killing Lumumba. In a situation where nobody in Washington knew much about the Congo, Devlin's shrill warnings energized the US government against Lumumba. That the United States did not kill Lumumba, the authors surprisingly suggest, was thanks to CIA director Allen Dulles, whom they suggest opposed assassination as US government policy. The authors argue that by 1960 Dulles was a loud but complacent empire builder primarily interested in expanding his bureaucratic power and the CIA's budget. They make a strong case that Dulles amplified Devlin's cries of wolf within the Eisenhower administration, then was surprised by Eisenhower's order to kill Lumumba. …

OS CHINESES ESTÃO CHEGANDO! O QUE FAZER COM MEU MARKETING MIX? O CASO DA RAMADHES &amp; CIA LTDA

&lt;p&gt;Este caso descreve, com base em fatos reais, a situação de mercado vivenciada pelo Sr. Rodrigo Ramadhes, diretor da Ramadhes &amp;amp; Cia Ltda., empresa situada no interior de Minas Gerais com mais de 60 anos de história. A empresa é uma das principais produtoras de cintos, mochilas e bolsas da América do Sul. Ao longo dos anos 2000, o grupo Ramadhes &amp;amp; Cia Ltda. desenvolveu, dentro do seu mix de acessórios, a linha de cintos Madhes, principal produto da empresa e seu sucesso era creditado às políticas do composto de Marketing que conseguiram alinhar o preço, o canal de distribuição e um mix de comunicação a uma concepção de marca pautada em atributos e benefícios funcionais. À luz do Marketing mix, o cenário era favorável para os cintos&lt;br /&gt;Madhes, mas o crescimento do pib e dos produtos chineses, entre eles o cinto, incomodava Rodrigo Ramadhes, que chegava a pensar em transferir o parque fabril da Ramadhes &amp;amp; Cia Ltda. de Minas Gerais para a China em busca de uma maior competitividade. Ele refletia diariamente quais as eventuais implicações desta possível transferência para o composto de Marketing da empresa, diante de uma situação presente favorável, sólida e promissora em termos de mercado.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

Geopolitical Islam: Recalculating

ABSTRACT Appraisals of geopolitical Islam within the Western political class are being recalculated constantly. This essay presents two models, each grounded in and illuminating policies now being followed in the United States and Europe. The Obama administration is the point of reference, hence labeled here as “Team A.” The views and alternative policies of its critics both domestically and in Europe are called “Team B.” Special attention is given to President Obama and his chief adviser on counterterrorism, John O. Brennan; former Prime Minister Tony Blair; and a report released in September 2010 by the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC (presented to the public by former CIA director R. James Woolsey). Differences between American and European perceptions reflect their distinctive political cultures.

Mysteries of the Mighty Casey

Baseball history is filled with Caseys, from well remembered-Casey Stengel and Hugh Casey-to obscure: Dennis Casey, a big league fly-chaser in 1884 and 1885, and Bill Casey, who pitched one inning in one game in 1887.But there is only one at Bat.Ernest Lawrence Thayer's poem is, quite simply, one of most enduring and oftrecited in American history. Baseball-wise, its final lines-But there is no joy in Mudville; Mighty Casey has struck out-rank right up alongside Buy me some peanuts and Crackerjack and Who's on first?Once upon a time, facts surrounding poem's creation were cloaked in controversy. One thing is certain, however: at serves to seamlessly blend baseball and American popular culture. Its longevity mirrors appeal of a sport that is as much about failure as hurlers tossing perfect games, batters hitting for cycle, and ninth-inning walk-off heroics. In baseball, of course, a batter may fail seven times out of 10 but still be a .300 hitter, and still make Hall of Fame. Similarly, Mighty Casey, slugging hero of at Bat, is all too human. He seems destined to bash a dinger for his Mudville nine. He always does, doesn't he? This is his calling. This is his fate. But excepting death and taxes, nothing in life is certain. And Mighty Casey, as we learn at poem's finale, does not smash a majestic homer. Instead, he ignominiously strikes out, which makes him all-too-human-and all-too-identifiable to masses. As eminent Yale University professor William Lyon Phelps once observed, psychology of [the poem] is perfect, which is why it rings bell in every mind. We laugh at it, but we know it is honestly no laughing matter.Not long after its publication in 1888, phrase at became part of lexicon. In a May 30, 1895, account of a game between New York and Philadelphia clubs at Polo Grounds, The New York Times reported that, in a clutch situation, Giants' Amos Rusie retired on strikes to disappointment of crowd. It was another case of 'mighty Casey at bat.' On April 24, 1908, paper referred to New York Giants' Mike Donlin as Casey-at-the-bat Donlin. On July 28, 1916, a ninth-inning bases-loaded blast by New York Yankees' Rube against Chicago White Sox was celebrated in Times headline Oldring Proves No Casey at The appellation even transcended baseball. A May 21, 1926, Times theater review of Sean O'Casey's Juno and Paycock was headlined O'Casey at Bat.Casey Stengel biographer Robert W. Creamer reported that, early in his major league career, when Stengel whiffed in clutch situations, fans would yell out, Hey, there's Casey at bat again! Atta boy, Casey! Apparently, future Bronx Bomber skipper was unfazed by such ribbing. His 1962 autobiography was titled at Bat: The Story of My Life in Baseball. Two years later, Stengel himself was credited as author of an introduction to one of myriad published editions of Thayer's poem.More than a century after its creation, title has not lost its shine. In 1980s, numerous newspaper articles spotlighting CIA director William Casey included at in their headlines. On April 24, 1998, Los Angeles Times charted heroics of Cincinnati Reds' Sean Casey in an article headlined Larkin Likes This Casey at On March 22, 2007, paper announced that Casey Kotchman had won Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim first base job with headline Casey's at Bat for Angels Again. Kenneth Turan, Times movie critic, began an April 6, 1996, review of Leonardo DiCaprio film Total Eclipse by quipping that film is the arthouse equivalent of 'Casey at Bat.' Considerable ability has gone into a potential home run scenario, but result is a big whiff all way around.As recently as 2010-April 17, to be exact-The New York Times printed, with Apologies to Ernest Thayer, a Tom Connelly-authored takeoff, [Bobby] Valentine at Bat. …

Business Intelligence – Fundamental Discipline Versus Industrial Espionage: Mutations Occured in Romanian Postintegration Strategic Management

The concept of Business Intelligence (BI ) was introduced in 1989 by the analist Howard Dresner from Gartner Group.The roots of this concept find itself in the '70 in the repport systems of the mainfrems, when the repports were static, bydimenssional and without analytical facilities, the demand for dynamic repporting systems, multi-dimensional, with support for predictive decisions determined the development of BI, that became reallity with the new technologies emergency. BI represents the art of knowing and putting in good use the informations, gaining competitional advantages. BI can offer answers at the essential problems of an organizations, helping he to take decisions for resolving it. The difference between BI and espionage is unclear delimited. For example, Robert Gates, the former director of CIA declared through the analyses of national security we prove the grown importance of international economic business intelligence. Approximately 40% of the new demands are of economic nature.

Burying Culpability: The Killing Fields (1984), Us Foreign Policy, and the Political Limits of Film-Making in Reagan-Era America

Burying Culpability: The Killing Fields (1984), Us Foreign Policy, and the Political Limits of Film-Making in Reagan-Era America

From Space, No One Can Watch You Die

As soon as CIA Director Leon Panetta was appointed to his post earlier this year, he asked President Obama for a significant escalation in the number of armed “drone” flights, utilizing Unmanned Ae...