Choice Blindness Research Articles

Exploring the clinical utility of choice blindness: Generalization of effects and necessity of deception.

Exploring the clinical utility of choice blindness: Generalization of effects and necessity of deception.

Effects of different cognitive processing on the occurrence of Choice Blindness in multi-alternative decision making

Effects of different cognitive processing on the occurrence of Choice Blindness in multi-alternative decision making

The influence of confabulations about the reasons for the choice on the formation of false memories

The article examines the causes of the choice blindness aftereffect on the formation of false memories. Several studies have shown that when individuals provide reasons for a choice they did not actually make, their memories shift towards the invented justifications (confabulations). The aim of this study is to contrast the explanation of the mnemonic aftereffect of choice blindness in terms of cognitive dissonance theory with explanations in terms of recency and verbalization effects. In the experiment, we compared two situations: one where participants justified evaluations contradicting their initial opinions, and another where they justified evaluations but attributed them to their partners’ opinions. It was hypothesized that if self-justification induces cognitive dissonance, participants who confabulated reasons for choices believed to be their own would exhibit more false memories regarding the original choice compared to those who believed they justified their partner’s opinion. The first stage involved participants evaluating the IQ of women based on their photos. In the second stage they had to explain the reasons for the evaluations (either considering it their own choice or partner’s). Half of the evaluations submitted for explanations contradicted the previously issued ones (low evaluations changed to high ones and vice versa). In the third stage, the participants had to remember the original evaluation. A change in the pole of perceived IQ judgments was measured. The results confirmed the presence of the choice blindness effect. The effect of false memories was found only in the group that considered the presented evaluations to be their own opinions.

The magician's choice: Providing illusory choice and sense of agency with the equivoque forcing technique.

Forcing techniques allow magicians to subtly influence spectators' choices and the outcome of their actions, and they provide powerful tools to study decision-making and the illusory sense of agency and freedom over choices we make. We investigated the equivoque force, a technique that exploits semantic ambiguities and people's failure to notice inconsistencies, to ensure that a spectator ends up with a predetermined outcome. Similar to choice blindness paradigms, the equivoque forces participants to end up with an item they did not choose in the first place. However, here, the subterfuge is accomplished in full view. In 3 experiments, we showed that the equivoque is highly effective in providing participants an illusory sense of agency over the outcome of their actions, even after 2 repetitions of the trick (Experiment 2) and using items for which preexisting preferences can be present (Experiment 3). Across all experiments, participants were oblivious to inconsistencies in the procedure used to guide their decisions, and they were genuinely surprised by the experimenter's matching prediction. Contrary to our prediction, the equivoque force did not significantly change participants' preference for the chosen item. We discuss the results with regard to other illusions of agency (e.g., forcing, choice blindness), failures in noticing semantic inconsistencies (e.g., Moses illusion), and issues surrounding choice-induced-preference literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

People confabulate with high confidence when their decisions are supported by weak internal variables.

People can introspect on their internal state and report the reasons driving their decisions but choice blindness (CB) experiments suggest that this ability can sometimes be a retrospective illusion. Indeed, when presented with deceptive cues, people justify choices they did not make in the first place, suggesting that external cues largely contribute to introspective processes. Yet, it remains unclear what are the respective contributions of external cues and internal decision variables in forming introspective report. Here, using a brain–computer interface, we show that internal variables continue to be monitored but are less impactful than deceptive external cues during CB episodes. Moreover, we show that deceptive cues overturn the classical relationship between confidence and accuracy: introspective failures are associated with higher confidence than genuine introspective reports. We tracked back the origin of these overconfident confabulations by revealing their prominence when internal decision evidence is weak and variable. Thus, introspection is neither a direct reading of internal variables nor a mere retrospective illusion, but rather reflects the integration of internal decision evidence and external cues, with CB being a special instance where internal evidence is inconsistent.

Choice Blindness for the attractiveness of paintings: verbal reports

Choice Blindness for the attractiveness of paintings: verbal reports

Subtly encouraging more deliberate decisions: using a forcing technique and population stereotype to investigate free will

Magicians’ forcing techniques allow them to covertly influence spectators’ choices. We used a type of force (Position Force) to investigate whether explicitly informing people that they are making a decision results in more deliberate decisions. The magician placed four face-down cards on the table in a horizontal row, after which the spectator was asked to select a card by pushing it forward. According to magicians and position effects literature, people should be more likely to choose a card in the third position from their left, because it can be easily reached. We manipulated whether participants were reminded that they were making a decision (explicit choice) or not (implicit choice) when asked to select one of the cards. Two experiments confirmed the efficiency of the Position Force—52% of participants chose the target card. Explicitly informing participants of the decision impairs the success of the force, leading to a more deliberate choice. A range of awareness measures illustrates that participants were unaware of their stereotypical behaviours. Participants who chose the target card significantly underestimated the number of people who would have chosen the same card, and felt as free as the participants who chose another card. Finally, we tested an embodied-cognition idea, but our data suggest that different ways of holding an object do not affect the level of self-control they have over their actions. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications regarding free will, Wegner’s apparent mental causation, choice blindness and reachability effects.

Choice awareness and manipulation blindness: A cognitive semiotic exploration of choice-making

Within cognitive science, “blindness” to choice is commonly treated as typical of human cognition, implying unreliable agents who essentially lack any awareness of their own choices (e.g. Johansson et al., 2005, 2008; Hall et al., 2010, 2013). Within cognitive semiotics, however, choice awareness is seen as a continuous phenomenon, which is susceptible to the influence of a variety of factors. Manipulation blindness is proposed as a more adequate term for what is known in the literature as “choice blindness”, referring to participants’ tendency to accept a choice as if it were their own. This suggests that “blindness” is strictly limited to the level of detection (of the switch of the preferred choice to a non-chosen one), and not to the level of choice.
 Using a cognitive-semiotic framework, I examine manipulation blindness as an “indicator” of choice awareness by employing the factors of memory, consequence, and affectivity, and introduce a two-level hierarchy of choice-making. 43 participants were assigned two tasks combining choices with a) two degrees of consequence (more/less) – based on task instructions, and b) two degrees of affectivity (high/low) – based on stimuli with different degrees of abstractness. Participants were first asked to state their preference for one of two alternatives (choice) . After that they were shown chosen as well as non-chosen pictures and asked to confirm whether the picture presented was the one of their choice (memory). Lastly, they were asked to justify their choice, although some of the trials had been manipulated (i.e. the chosen card was switched with the non-chosen one) (manipulation) . Half of the manipulations were detected, and 75% of these detections occurred for the choices participants remembered correctly. While the consequential impact of the choice did not seem to influence detection, affectivity did. Unlike other experiments that investigate “choice blindness”, the results indicate that manipulation blindness is subject to memory and affectivity, suggesting that we are aware of our choices and that we have, to various degrees, access to our intentional acts.

Choice Blindness, Confabulatory Introspection, and Obsessive–Compulsive Symptoms: Investigation in a Clinical Sample

The content of obsessions in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) often run contrary to the actual self of the individual experiencing them. The ego-dystonic nature of obsessions has led some researchers to propose that individuals with OCD form these false beliefs about themselves due to limited introspective access. The current study therefore aimed to extend on recent findings from non-clinical samples, which suggest the relevance of confabulatory introspection on OCD symptoms, in a clinical population. Participants were community participants diagnosed with OCD (n = 54) or another anxiety or mood disorder (n = 28), as well as healthy individuals (n = 110). Groups completed the Choice Blindness Paradigm, an experimental task designed to have participants confabulate outside of their awareness. Contrary to predictions, the OCD group did not have a greater proportion of individuals who confabulated on this task. Furthermore, only within healthy participants was the occurrence of confabulation associated with elevated OCD symptoms. We speculate that confabulatory introspection may be an important precursor to the development of clinical obsessions and its early detection could inform the prevention of obsessive–compulsive and related disorders.

Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?

When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error interpretation, when the agent gives reasons she is in fact wrong about what her choice is. On the choice change interpretation, when the agent gives reasons she is right about what her choice is, but she does not realise that her choice has changed. In this paper, we spell out the implications of the two interpretations of the choice-blindness effect for self-ignorance claims and offer some reasons to prefer choice change to choice error.

Misremembering pain: A memory blindness approach to adding a better end.

How people remember feeling in the past informs future decisions; however, memory for past emotion is subject to a number of biases. Previous research on choice blindness has shown that people often fail to notice when they are exposed to misinformation about their own decisions, preferences, and memories. This type of misinformation can influence how they later remember past events. In the present study, we examined the memory blindness effect in a new domain: memory for pain. Participants (N = 269) underwent a cold-pressor task and rated how much pain, distress, and positive and negative affect they had experienced. Later, participants were shown their pain ratings and asked to explain them. Some of the participants were shown lower pain ratings than they had actually made. In a second session, participants recalled how painful the task had been and how much distress and positive and negative affect they remembered experiencing. The results indicated that the majority of participants who were exposed to misinformation failed to detect the manipulation, and subsequently remembered the task as being less painful. The participants in the misinformation condition were not overall more willing to repeat the study tasks, but the participants who recalled less distress, less negative affect, and more positive affect were more willing to repeat the study tasks again in a future experiment. These results demonstrate the malleability of memory for painful experiences and that willingness to repeat aversive experiences may depend more on memory for affective reactions to the original experience than on memory for the physical pain itself.

“选择盲”现象在改变大学生自杀态度中的作用——基于情绪Stroop效应的研究

“选择盲”现象在改变大学生自杀态度中的作用——基于情绪Stroop效应的研究

False beliefs and confabulation can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes.

In times of increasing polarization and political acrimony, fueled by distrust of government and media disinformation, it is ever more important to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind political attitude change. In two experiments, we present evidence that false beliefs about one's own prior attitudes and confabulatory reasoning can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes. In Experiment 1 (N = 140), participants stated their opinions about salient political issues, and using the Choice Blindness Paradigm we covertly altered some of their responses to indicate an opposite position. In the first condition, we asked the participants to immediately verify the manipulated responses, and in the second, we also asked them to provide underlying arguments behind their attitudes. Only half of the manipulations were corrected by the participants. To measure lasting attitude change, we asked the participants to rate the same issues again later in the experiment, as well as one week after the first session. Participants in both conditions exhibited lasting shifts in attitudes, but the effect was considerably larger in the group that confabulated supporting arguments. We fully replicated these findings in Experiment 2 (N = 232). In addition, we found that participants' analytical skill correlated with their correction of the manipulation, whereas political involvement did not. This study contributes to the understanding of how confabulatory reasoning and self-perceptive processes can interact in lasting attitude change. It also highlights how political expressions can be both stable in the context of everyday life, yet flexible when argumentative processes are engaged. (PsycINFO Database Record

Warnings to Counter Choice Blindness for Identification Decisions: Warnings Offer an Advantage in Time but Not in Rate of Detection.

Choice blindness for identification decisions refers to the inability of eyewitnesses to detect that an originally recognized target was swapped for a non-identified lineup member. The robustness of the effect calls for measures that can prevent or reduce the negative consequences of choice blindness manipulations. Here, we investigated whether pre- and post-warnings given to participants about the possibility of mistakes reduces choice blindness for identification decisions. Participants (N = 119) were presented with identifications they never made and were asked to justify those decisions. Either before or after the presentation of the manipulated identification outcome, participants were or were not warned about the possibility of mistakes in the identification process. Although warnings were not sufficient to reduce choice blindness for identification decisions they provided a time-related detection advantage. Pre-warned participants questioned the legitimacy of the manipulated outcome sooner (i.e., concurrent detection) than participants in other conditions. Hence, pre-warnings can help detect mistakes in the identification procedure at an earlier stage, before they contaminate the memory of the witness and other pieces of evidence. From a theoretical stance, our findings attest to the strength of self-suggestion and indicate that choice blindness effects are deeply rooted in cognition.

Sad Facial Expressions Increase Choice Blindness.

Previous studies have discovered a fascinating phenomenon known as choice blindness—individuals fail to detect mismatches between the face they choose and the face replaced by the experimenter. Although previous studies have reported a couple of factors that can modulate the magnitude of choice blindness, the potential effect of facial expression on choice blindness has not yet been explored. Using faces with sad and neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and faces with happy and neutral expressions (Experiment 2) in the classic choice blindness paradigm, the present study investigated the effects of facial expressions on choice blindness. The results showed that the detection rate was significantly lower on sad faces than neutral faces, whereas no significant difference was observed between happy faces and neutral faces. The exploratory analysis of verbal reports found that participants who reported less facial features for sad (as compared to neutral) expressions also tended to show a lower detection rate of sad (as compared to neutral) faces. These findings indicated that sad facial expressions increased choice blindness, which might have resulted from inhibition of further processing of the detailed facial features by the less attractive sad expressions (as compared to neutral expressions).

Factors leading to immersion in obsessions

The inference-based approach (IBA) is a cognitive account of the etiology and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). According to the IBA, individuals with OCD confuse an imagined possibility with an actual probability, which leads them to become immersed in their obsessions. To investigate the relationship between OCD and the cognitive factors proposed to add to immersion, we used the Choice Blindness Paradigm (CBP). This paradigm is an experimental reasoning task designed to induce confabulatory reasoning. Undergraduate participants with high levels of OCD symptoms ( n = 29) were compared to those with low levels of OCD symptoms ( n = 32) with respect to their performance on the CBP. Compared to low-OCD participants, the results indicated that high-OCD participants were more certain (one aspect of immersion) when reasoning about falsely occurring events. However, the cognitive factors proposed by the IBA to underpin immersion did not mediate the relationship between OCD status and certainty regarding false events. Replication and refinement of the current study will help to determine the significance of these cognitive factors in obsessions.

Choice Blindness and Health-State Choices among Adolescents and Adults.

To assess the feasibility and validity of using a discrete choice experiment format to elicit health preferences in adolescents by comparing illogical choices and choice-blindness rates between adults and adolescents; and to explore the relationship between personality traits and health-state choices. A convenience sample of adults and adolescents (12 to 17 y old) were recruited from around Chicago, USA. A personality inventory was administered, followed by pairwise comparisons of 6 health-state scenarios which asked each candidate to select their preferred choice. Health-state descriptions were based on a simplified 3-dimension version of the EQ-5D (mobility, pain, depression, each with 3 levels). For 2 scenarios, the respondent's preferred choice was switched; if the respondent did not notice the switch they were considered "choice blind". Logistic regression evaluated the association of personality, gender, and age with choice blindness and health-state choice. Ninety-nine respondents were recruited (44% adults). Comparing adolescents to adults, there was no significant difference in the rate of illogical preferences (9% v. 12%) or in preferring dead to the worst health state (56% v. 64%) ( P > 0.05). Choice-blindness rates were significantly higher in adolescents (35%) than adults (9%) ( P < 0.01). The adjusted odds of choice blindness in adolescents was 6.6 (95% CI = 1.8 to 23.8; P = 0.004). Conscientiousness was significantly associated with health-state choice in 3 of the 6 models predicting health-state choice (using P < 0.1 as a threshold). The results of this exploratory study suggest it is feasible to conduct choice experiments in adolescents; however, adolescents are significantly more likely to demonstrate choice blindness. Psychological traits may be noteworthy predictors of health-state choices, with conscientiousness independently associated with several health-state choices.

Self-delivered misinformation - Merging the choice blindness and misinformation effect paradigms.

Choice blindness is the failure to detect a discrepancy between a choice and its outcome. The misinformation effect occurs when the recollection of an event changes because new, misleading information about the event is received. The purpose of this study was to merge the choice blindness and misinformation effect paradigms, and thus examine whether choice blindness can be created for individuals’ recollections of a witnessed event, and whether this will affect their later recollections of the event. Thus, as a way of delivering misinformation the participants ostensibly became their own source of the misleading information. The participants watched a short film and filled out a questionnaire about events shown in the film. Some of their answers were then manipulated using reattachable stickers, which allowed alteration of their original answers. The participants gave justifications for their manipulated choices, and later their recollection of the original event was tested through another questionnaire. Choice blindness was created for a majority of the participants. A majority of the choice blind participants later changed their reported recollection of the event in line with the manipulations, whereas only a small minority of the participants in the control condition changed their recollection. This study provides new information about the misinformation effect, suggesting that this effect also can occur when misinformation is given immediately following presentation of the original stimuli, and about choice blindness and its effects on the recollections of events. The results suggest that memory blindness can be created when people inadvertently supply themselves with misleading information about an event, causing a change in their recollection.

A massive experiment on choice blindness in political decisions: Confidence, confabulation, and unconscious detection of self-deception.

We implemented a Choice Blindness Paradigm containing political statements in Argentina to reveal the existence of categorical ranges of introspective reports, identified by confidence and agreement levels, separating easy from very hard to manipulate decisions. CBP was implemented in both live and web-based forms. Importantly, and contrary to what was observed in Sweden, we did not observe changes in voting intentions. Also, confidence levels in the manipulated replies where significantly lower than in non-manipulated cases even in undetected manipulations. We name this phenomenon unconscious detection of self-deception. Results also show that females are more difficult to manipulate than men.

Is the Emotional Dog Blind to Its Choices?

Previous choice blindness studies showed that people sometimes fail to notice when their choice is changed. Subsequently, they are willing to provide reasons for the manipulated choice which is the opposite of the one they made just seconds ago. In the present study, participants first made binary judgments about the wrongness of described behaviors and then were shown an opposite answer during a second reading of some of the descriptions. Half of the participants saw the answer during the second presentation of the description and the other half saw it only after the presentation. Based on Haidt's Social intuitionist model, we hypothesized that participants in the latter group would be less likely to reconcile their intuition with the presented answer and thus they would be more likely to reject it. However, we found no difference between the groups.