Choice Blindness Research Articles

PP3 - Validity of Health Preferences Elicited from Children: Comparing Choice Blindness and Stated Preferences between Children and Adults

PP3 - Validity of Health Preferences Elicited from Children: Comparing Choice Blindness and Stated Preferences between Children and Adults

Memory blindness: Altered memory reports lead to distortion in eyewitness memory

Choice blindness refers to the finding that people can often be misled about their own self-reported choices. However, little research has investigated the more long-term effects of choice blindness. We examined whether people would detect alterations to their own memory reports, and whether such alterations could influence participants' memories. Participants viewed slideshows depicting crimes, and then either reported their memories for episodic details of the event (Exp. 1) or identified a suspect from a lineup (Exp. 2). Then we exposed participants to manipulated versions of their memory reports, and later tested their memories a second time. The results indicated that the majority of participants failed to detect the misinformation, and that exposing witnesses to misleading versions of their own memory reports caused their memories to change to be consistent with those reports. These experiments have implications for eyewitness memory.

Can chocolate cure blindness? Investigating the effect of preference strength and incentives on the incidence of Choice Blindness

Choice Blindness occurs when individuals fail to notice a mismatch between their stated preference and the outcome of their choice. While it is prevalent in areas of considerable economic importance, such as consumer choice for non-durables, pension decisions, and risk preferences, little is known about the underlying cause of this apparent cognitive blind spot. We examine whether the CB effect is robust when the stimuli is a product for which participants display a strong overall preference, specifically children's preference for chocolate. First, we demonstrate that Choice Blindness for female faces is a general cognitive blind spot that is robust for a large sample of children aged 8–12. Second, we show that when the stimuli are chocolates, there is a substantial reduction in the incidence of Choice Blindness; only 10–20% of participants failed to notice the choice manipulation. Subjects who reported a greater affinity for chocolate were more likely to detect mismatches. However, we found that the strength of the relative preference ordering within the set of chocolates did not affect the incidence of Choice Blindness. Moreover, incentive compatibility did not increase detection rates; participants were just as likely to notice a mismatch regardless of whether or they actually received the chocolate they chose. We propose that this phenomenon can be viewed as an error resulting from the early stages preference development.

These two are different. Yes, they're the same: Choice blindness for facial identity.

We examined the manipulability of face identity judgements by combining a sorting task for unfamiliar faces with a standard test of choice blindness. In Experiment 1, 50 participants completed a sorting task and then justified grouping specific pairs of photos together or apart. On manipulated trials, the presented pairings were different from those the participants had actually produced. Detection rates for these identity manipulations were strikingly low (∼21%). Moreover, participants readily provided justifications for identity decisions that they had not made, typically referring to specific facial features. Experiment 2 was conducted along similar lines and confirmed that lower task difficulty and higher confidence in one's face identity judgements increase detection rates. We conclude that observers can easily be led to believe that they made identity judgements they did not make. As well as underscoring the fragility of unfamiliar face matching, our findings have implications for identity judgements in legal settings.

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this "selective laziness," we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.

The effect of choice reversals on blindness for identification decisions

ABSTRACTThe present study examined blindness for identification decisions from target-present (TP) and target-absent (TA) lineups using a field study methodology. Eighty pedestrians were exposed to a staged theft. Subsequently, they were asked to identify the thief and the victim from separate, simultaneous six-person lineups. Their identification decision concerning the thief lineup was manipulated such that participants’ selections were exchanged with a previously unidentified lineup member (choice exchange) and lineup rejections were turned into identifications (choice reversal). Participants were 7–10 times less likely to detect choice exchanges (66.7%) compared with choice reversals (11.2%). Furthermore, identification accuracy was not a prerequisite for detection. Thus, rejections and particularly selections made from both TP and TA lineups are susceptible to choice blindness. Finally, our study implies that for blindness in eyewitness identification decisions between-category changes (i.e. choice reversals) are easier to detect than within-category changes (i.e. choice exchanges).

Manipulation detection and preference alterations in a choice blindness paradigm.

ObjectivesIt is commonly believed that individuals make choices based upon their preferences and have access to the reasons for their choices. Recent studies in several areas suggest that this is not always the case. In choice blindness paradigms, two-alternative forced-choice in which chosen-options are later replaced by the unselected option, individuals often fail to notice replacement of their chosen option, confabulate explanations for why they chose the unselected option, and even show increased preferences for the unselected-but-replaced options immediately after choice (seconds). Although choice blindness has been replicated across a variety of domains, there are numerous outstanding questions. Firstly, we sought to investigate how individual- or trial-factors modulated detection of the manipulations. Secondly, we examined the nature and temporal duration (minutes vs. days) of the preference alterations induced by these manipulations.MethodsParticipants performed a computerized choice blindness task, selecting the more attractive face between presented pairs of female faces, and providing a typewritten explanation for their choice on half of the trials. Chosen-face cue manipulations were produced on a subset of trials by presenting the unselected face during the choice explanation as if it had been selected. Following all choice trials, participants rated the attractiveness of each face individually, and rated the similarity of each face pair. After approximately two weeks, participants re-rated the attractiveness of each individual face online.ResultsParticipants detected manipulations on only a small proportion of trials, with detections by fewer than half of participants. Detection rates increased with the number of prior detections, and detection rates subsequent to first detection were modulated by the choice certainty. We show clear short-term modulation of preferences in both manipulated and non-manipulated explanation trials compared to choice-only trials (with opposite directions of effect). Preferences were altered in the direction that subjects were led to believe they selected.

‘This Is the Person You Selected’: Eyewitnesses' Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions

SummaryThe aim of the current research was to identify conditions under which choice blindness in facial recognition decisions occurs. In five experiments, participants watched four mock‐crime videos and made choices that were either evaluative (Experiment 1) or absolute in nature (Experiments 2a–c and 3). When participants were subsequently asked to motivate their choice, they were sometimes presented with choices they had not made. For evaluative decisions, concurrent (27%) and retrospective blindness rates (21%) were relatively low compared with previous studies. For absolute decisions, choice‐blindness rates varied, depending on when exposure to the manipulated outcome took place (immediate: concurrent 32–35%, retrospective 0–6% [Experiments 2a–c]; 48 hours' delay: concurrent 68%, retrospective 39% [Experiment 3]). We argue that blindness for facial recognition decisions is more likely for evaluative decisions and for longer intervals between decision and manipulation and also for conditions of increased task complexity, which we interpret in terms of ambiguity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Self-relevance does not moderate choice blindness in adolescents and children.

In two experiments we tested the choice blindness phenomenon in adolescents aged 11–16 years (Experiment 1, N = 87) and children aged 7–10 years (Experiment 2, N = 117) for the first time. Analogous to previously reported findings with adult participants, we expected to replicate the robust effect in these age groups. Furthermore, we investigated the hypothesis that self-relevance of choices, defined as the extent to which the self is implicated in a choice, moderates the choice blindness effect in adolescents and children. To this end, we directly compared high and low self-relevance conditions. As expected, the choice blindness effect was robust across age groups. Little support was found for the idea that self-relevance moderates the choice blindness effect. Specifically, no effect of self-relevance on choice blindness was found in adolescents, while the findings in the child sample were inconsistent. Different possible interpretations of the results as well as the possible role of ambiguity for the choice blindness effect are discussed.

Choice Blindness, Confabulatory Introspection, and Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms: A New Area of Investigation

The current study is the first to investigate confabulatory introspection in relation to clinical psychological symptoms utilizing the Choice Blindness Paradigm (CBP). It was hypothesized that those with obsessive-compulsive symptoms are more likely to confabulate mental states. To test this hypothesis, an experimental choice blindness task was administered in two nonclinical samples (n = 47; n = 76). Results showed that a confabulatory introspection is significantly related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. There was evidence for its specificity to symptoms of OCD depending on the obsessional theme addressed in the choice blindness task. However, confabulatory introspection was also found to be relevant to other symptoms, including depression and schizotypy. The results highlight a potentially fruitful new area of clinical investigation in the area of insight and self-knowledge, not limited to OCD alone, but potentially other disorders as well.

Memory impairment is not sufficient for choice blindness to occur.

Choice blindness refers to the phenomenon that people can be easily misled about the choices they made in the recent past. The aim of this study was to explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying choice blindness. Specifically, we tested whether memory impairment may account for choice blindness. A total of N = 88 participants provided sympathy ratings on 10-point scales for 20 female faces. Subsequently, participants motivated some of their ratings. However, on three trials, they were presented with sympathy ratings that deviated from their original ratings by three full scale points. On nearly 41% of the trials, participants failed to detect (i.e., were blind) the manipulation. After a short interval, participants were informed that some trials had been manipulated and were asked to recall their original ratings. Participants adopted the manipulated outcome in only 3% of the trials. Furthermore, the extent to which the original ratings were accurately remembered was not higher for detected as compared with non-detected trials. From a theoretical point of view our findings indicate that memory impairment does not fully account for blindness phenomena.

Choice blindness in financial decision making

AbstractChoice Blindness is an experimental paradigm that examines the interplay between individuals’ preferences, decisions, and expectations by manipulating the relationship between intention and choice. This paper expands upon the existing Choice Blindness framework by investigating the presence of the effect in an economically significant decision context, specifically that of pension choice. In addition, it investigates a number of secondary factors hypothesized to modulate Choice Blindness, including reaction time, risk preference, and decision complexity, as well as analysing the verbal reports of non-detecting participants. The experiment was administered to 100 participants of mixed age and educational attainment. The principal finding was that no more than 37.2% of manipulated trials were detected over all conditions, a result consistent with previous Choice Blindness research. Analysis of secondary factors found that reaction time, financial sophistication and decision complexity were significant predictors of Choice Blindness detection, while content analysis of non-detecting participant responses found that 20% implied significant preference changes and 62% adhered to initial preferences. Implications of the Choice Blindness effect in the context of behavioural economics are discussed, and an agenda for further investigation of the paradigm in this context is outlined.

Witnesses' Blindness for their Own Facial Recognition Decisions: A Field Study

In a field study, we examined choice blindness for eyewitnesses' facial recognition decisions. Seventy-one pedestrians were engaged in a conversation by two experimenters who pretended to be tourists in the center of a European city. After a short interval, pedestrians were asked to identify the two experimenters from separate simultaneous six-person photo lineups. Following each of the two forced-choice recognition decisions, they were confronted with their selection and asked to motivate their decision. However, for one of the recognition decisions, the chosen lineup member was exchanged with a previously unidentified member. Blindness for this identity manipulation occurred at the rate of 40.8%. Furthermore, the detection rate varied as a function of similarity (high vs. low) between the original choice and the manipulated outcome. Finally, choice manipulations undermined the confidence-accuracy relation for detectors to a greater degree than for blind participants. Stimulus ambiguity is discussed as a moderator of choice blindness.

Blindness in the Interrogation Room: A review article about the potential role of choice blindness during suspect interrogations

Research indicates that humans display a phenomenon called choice blindness. When we choose between alternatives, we are sometimes blind to the mismatch between our original choice and its outcome. Taking the initial findings about choice blindness as a starting point, this article explores whether choice blindness could also play a relevant role in interrogation situations. The explorations revolve around a hypothetical scenario: An innocent suspect is faced with an interrogation situation in which the investigator manipulates the testimony and thus introduces a mismatch between the original testimony and the manipulated one. Could this mismatch go unnoticed by the suspect due to choice blindness? Recent experimental evidence with a focus on this question is reviewed. It is generally concluded that the role of choice blindness in eliciting outright false confessions to extreme allegations is limited; however, it can still pose a threat to innocent suspects by leading them to give contradictory testimony in interrogations. Suggestions for future research are made and advice on the practice of law enforcement is given.

Guilty or innocent? About the role of choice blindness and own-race bias in eyewitness identifications

Most of us would say that we would notice if the ice-cream seller gave us strawberry ice-cream, when we actually asked for chocolate. However, several studies indicate that people do not always notice changes in the outcome of their decisions. This phenomenon is called choice blindness and occurs in a wide variety of domains. Apparently, it is even possible that eyewitnesses do not notice that the person they identified from a lineup earlier is not identical with a person presented to them later. If this already occurs in own-race cases, what should we expect if an eyewitness has to identify a person from another race? Due to the own-race bias, people have more difficulty in recognizing faces from another race than from their own race. Do people also have more difficulty in noticing a switch in the outcome of their identification decision when they have to identify other-race faces compared to own-race faces? The present article, we examine the role of choice blindness and the own-race bias in the performance of eyewitnesses.

Interactively guided introspection is getting science closer to an effective consciousness meter

The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported (Sperling, 1960), and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made (Johansson, Hall, Silkström, & Olsson, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, and Carter-Thomas (2013) could resolve this dilemma. They showed that subjects can be interactively guided to become better aware of their past experience, thereby overturning the "choice blindness" results of Johansson et al. (2005). Although some more fine-tuning of the experimental protocol is needed, interactively guided introspection may well become the most reliable and exhaustive measure of consciousness.

How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions

Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our participants to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question indicated that as many as 48% (±9.2%) were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change.

“Yes, I Have Sometimes Stolen Bikes”: Blindness for Norm‐Violating Behaviors and Implications for Suspect Interrogations

Across two experiments, we studied a phenomenon akin to choice blindness in the context of participants' accounts of their own history of norm-violating behaviors. In Experiment 1, N = 67 participants filled in an 18-item questionnaire about their history of norm-violating behaviors (QHNVB). Subsequently, they were questioned about four of their answers, two of which had covertly been manipulated by the experimenter. Of the 134 manipulations, 20 (14.9%) remained undetected concurrently and 13 were accepted in retrospect (9.7%). In Experiment 2 (N = 37), we inserted a one-week interval between questionnaire and interview. Twenty-seven (36.5%) of the 74 manipulations remained undetected concurrently and three were accepted in retrospect (8.1%). Data obtained in a four-week follow-up indicated that our manipulations may have long-term effects on participants' perception of their own history of norm-violating behaviors. Implications for the occurrence of false confessions during the course of an interrogation are discussed.

Haptic Choice Blindness

Choice blindness is the failure to notice a mismatch between intention and outcome when making decisions. It is unknown whether choice blindness occurs when participants have extended interaction with real objects. Here, we examined the case when objects could be touched but not seen. Participants examined pairs of common, everyday objects inside a specially constructed box where a silent turntable was used to switch objects between initial choice and later justification. For similar pairs of objects, we found detection rates of around 22%, consistent with previous studies of choice blindness. For pairs consisting of more distinctive exemplars, the detection rate rose to 70%. Our results indicate that choice blindness does occur after haptic interaction with real objects, but is strongly modulated by similarity.

Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey

Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This survey used a magic trick to expose participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change.