Chinese Communist Research Articles

Willingness to Boycott Russian Goods in China: How Political Ideology Shapes Consumer Preferences in an Authoritarian Context

ABSTRACT Who is likely to engage in Anti-Russian boycotts in China? While existing literature focuses on ethnocentrism and nationalism as drivers of political consumerism, this article explores political boycotts that contradict the dominant discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Drawing on original survey data, the article uses two ideological dimensions—social authoritarianism and attitudes to economic organisation – to delineate three distinct ideological leanings in China: liberalism, the New Left and neo-authoritarianism. The article demonstrates that liberals are more likely than others to support the boycott of Russian products. Additionally, all three groups are more willing to boycott Russian goods if they hold egalitarian attitudes. The findings shed light on the causes of anti-Russian sentiment in China and its likely implications for the Russian economy.

Propaganda and thought work in the Mao era: Absoluteness, sharp transitions, and political instability

AbstractThis paper elucidates the reasons behind Deng Xiaoping's initiation of political reform from a propaganda perspective by examining the features of Mao's propaganda and thought work and their implications for the Chinese Communist Party, analyzing cases such as the “Two‐Hundred Policy,” the “Anti‐Rightist Campaign,” propaganda campaigns related to the USSR, and the transformation of Lin Biao's image. It argues that Mao's propaganda and thought work, characterized by their absoluteness and sharp transitions, were detrimental to the stability of the communist regime. These characteristics led to widespread indifference, distrust, and even resistance toward the Chinese Communist Party among the Chinese populace since the late Mao era. China had entered a post‐trust era, marked by a growing tendency among the populace to preemptively view official messages as untrustworthy. To restore the party's credibility, Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in propaganda and thought work to address these shortcomings.

From Tourism to Propaganda Tactics: Unveiling the PRC’s Influence on Palau’s Electoral Landscape

This article argues that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging a combination of economic influence, political coercion, and disinformation tactics to sway the outcome of Palau’s 2024 presidential election. With the currently favored candidate reportedly being tied to Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-linked individuals and publicly promoting PRC narratives, it is critical to highlight the PRC’s influence tactics—such as propaganda, censorship, international partnerships, and financial pressures—that are being employed to achieve its goals. The article first offers a brief overview of the PRC’s actions and aims in the Indo-Pacific region, highlighting Palau’s significance to the PRC and the United States. Next, the author summarizes the PRC’s multiple forms of economic influence in the region, such as monopolizing tourism, buying land, engaging in bribery, encouraging illegal activities, and exploiting U.S. missteps. Then, after introducing Palau’s presidential candidates, the article delves into PRC information operations and tactics. It also examines key findings of PRC interference in other recent regional elections, such as in Taiwan and the Philippines, and analyzes what tactics were used, if they were effective, and how these tactics could be adapted to be successfully implemented in Palau. The article concludes with predictive analysis of the PRC’s potential actions in Palau, such as information operations, including amplifying local conflicts, using local media as proxies, and creating artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content, as well as listing potential countermeasures that could be implemented in Palau to combat PRC information advances, such as education programs for students and journalists, misinformation debunking campaigns, and implementing legislation to counter misinformation campaigns.

The Clash between China’s High-Tech Industry versus the Chinese Government

China is experiencing a severe clash between its central government, the Chinese Communist Party, and its high-tech industry. While the Chinese government needs to expand and diversify its economy, it is attempting to impose stifling controls on the industry that could bring this to fruition. There are political, social, and economic reasons for this clash. But, most importantly, the clash between the Chinese government and the high-tech industry will most definitely affect the country’s economic future at a time when such factors as its gross domestic product and employment situation cannot afford a serious contraction. The aim and purpose of this article is to examine the numerous implications of China’s clash between its government and its high-tech industry.

The KMT versus the CCP: Dueling Chinese Nationalisms and the Politics of Colonial Rule During Hong Kong’s 1956 Riots

During October 10–12, 1956, British Hong Kong was engulfed in a downward spiral of violence that pitted Kuomintang (KMT) supporters against men and women affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), forcing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Great Britain to engage in a series of tense diplomatic exchanges that could have escalated into a wider geopolitical conflict. The actions of KMT supporters precipitated the 1956 riots, thereby granting opportunities to the PRC to repeatedly and strongly criticize the colonial government for allegedly failing to protect Chinese who were loyal to Beijing. While the PRC did not intervene militarily to protect its supporters, the 1956 riots revealed to London the precarious nature of colonial rule and underscored the fact that the colony’s very existence was dependent upon the acquiescence of Beijing.

Rehabilitating Republican China: Historical Memory, National Identity and Regime Legitimacy in the Post-Mao Era

Abstract Described in the Chinese Communist Party's orthodox historiography as a dark and repressive period and part of the “century of humiliation,” the Republican era has in recent decades undergone a significant reassessment in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In books, newspaper articles, documentaries and dramas, Republican China has sometimes been portrayed as a vibrant society making remarkable progress in modernization in the face of severe external challenges. This article explores the origins of this surprising rehabilitation and examines in detail how the Republican-era economic legacies have been reassessed in the reform era. It finds that while the post-Mao regime continues to use the negative view of China's pre-communist history to maintain its historical legitimacy, it has also been promoting a positive view of aspects of the same period in order to support its post-1978 priorities of modernization and nationalism, a trend that has persisted under Xi Jinping despite his tightened ideological control. The selective revival of Republican legacies, although conducive to the Party's current political objectives, has given rise to revisionist narratives that damage the hegemony of its orthodox historical discourses, on which its legitimacy still relies.

Do CEO Connections to the Chinese Politburo Pay Off and How?

ABSTRACTResearch Question/IssueThis study investigates the effect of connections to the Politburo, the top 25 members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on CEO compensation, pay‐for‐performance sensitivity, and turnover decisions using a comprehensive dataset of 3764 Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2019.Research Findings/InsightsOur findings reveal that CEOs of privately owned listed firms who have connections to the Politburo via shared educational backgrounds receive significantly higher compensation (up to 20% more). However, such connections do not significantly affect CEO compensation in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). CEOs who have connections to the Politburo also exhibit lower turnover rates, and their compensation is less sensitive to performance outcomes. Our measure of connections excludes reverse causality, as we leverage an exogenous shock—the promotion to the Politburo of an individual with whom the CEO is already connected—to investigate the gain associated with a political connection in the absence of CEO turnover in private firms. This event allows us to observe that CEO pay increases significantly in such cases. We also find that elite connections serve as a mechanism for resource allocation, as politically connected CEOs in private firms benefit from higher subsidies and lower tax rates, and politically connected CEOs in SOEs benefit by being appointed to larger SOEs. Additionally, we find that the positive relationship between CEO pay and elite connections is even stronger when the connection is stronger but is negative when the CEO is a CCP member.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study enriches the literature on political connections by introducing a novel proxy for elite connections based on past educational ties to members of the political elite. It disentangles the influence of personal educational connections to the political elite from that of a more generic political membership of the CCP, offering a clearer understanding of their distinct impacts.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur study underscores the necessity of differentiating between private and SOEs in China due to their distinct characteristics and goals. Furthermore, it highlights the critical role of elite political connections in emerging economies such as China in resource allocation, labor market dynamics, and corporate governance.

How Did Chinese Local Media Face Media Convergence? A Case Study of Qianxinan Daily

ABSTRACT Scholars have long examined media convergence, yet little attention has been given to its intersection with local media and main stream Chinese media controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This study addresses this gap by employing focus groups and interviews to conduct a case study of Qianxinan Daily. Furthermore, the primary hypothesis posits that, under the leadership of the Party Committee, Qianxinan Daily has adapted to media convergence amidst the trend of media integration. The findings of this study reveal that Qianxinan Daily, under CCP leadership, benefits from stable resource access and avoids direct market competition pressure. However, this also results in organizational and reporting constraints imposed by the Party Committee’s Publicity Department in Qianxinan. While Qianxinan Daily has established a relatively solid framework, there remains significant room for improvement in manuscript quality and news value in the context of media convergence. This conclusion enriches our understanding of media convergence dynamics and highlights the influence of the CCP on this phenomenon.

중국공산당의 대국민당전략과 실천(1945-1946)

This article sought to reveal whether the Chinese Communist Party at the time truly intended to achieve the communist revolution it hoped for through peace and negotiation through a review of the political negotiation process within China after the victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Communist Party’s preparations for civil war. Mao Zedong’s theory of coalition government was to build a new China by establishing a formal government that included representatives of all parties and factions, as well as independent and non-party factions. The coalition government theory was supported by various political parties and organizations because it went far beyond national-public cooperation in terms of government composition. While Mao Zedong was holding talks in Chongqing at Chiang Kai-shek’s request, the Communist Party leadership in Yan'an was accelerating preparations for civil war. The Chinese Communist Party Army established the strategic policy of “Northward Development and Southern Defense”(向北發展 向南防禦) to disrupt the monopoly of the Nationalist Government Army in the Manchuria region and prevent the Chinese Communist Party Army's individual defeat in the southern Huazhong region. In addition, the units were expanded through the creation of field corps and field forces, and from an operational perspective, an attempt was made to transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. In particular, the reinforcement of 300,000 troops in Manchuria, who were acquired from the Soviet Army and equipped with new Japanese weapons and heavy equipment, immediately raised the military power of the Chinese Communist Party to the next level. In this way, the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated its willingness to negotiate externally by promoting the theory of a coalition government, while internally it was gradually narrowing the gap in military power with the Nationalist government army by strengthening its military power.

Between Politics and Expert: Institutional Transposition and the Admission of Economic Bureaucrats into Party Elite in China

ABSTRACT Red and expert are two differing principles in organizing the political lives of the Chinese government. This study transcends conventional characterizations of the red-expert relationship as either one-sided domination or mere co-existence, exploring its hybrid manifestations and dissecting the nuanced intersections. To this end, this article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s recruitment strategy, particularly focusing on the assimilation of economic experts. Utilizing a dataset featuring high-ranking economic bureaucrats, the study reveals the intriguing mechanism of ‘institutional transposition’ used for reconciling institutional contradictions. This mechanism assesses economic policy professionals based on politically transposed criteria, leading to the promotion of economic bureaucrats with unique career attributes, notably specialists with broad organizational experiences, into key political leadership positions. The deployment of ‘generalist specialists’, this article proposes, bridges gaps within a fragmented bureaucracy and coordinates specialized ministries. This article exemplifies a partial adaptation of the Party and a pragmatic approach towards reconciling conflicting institutional logics.

On the Image of the Chinese Communist Party from the Perspective of American Mainstream Media (1935-1938): Based on Reports from The New York Times

Please refer to the URL that includes this article for the abstract.

More Red but Still Expert: Party-Army Relations Under Xi Jinping

ABSTRACT Xi Jinping has encouraged the People’s Liberation Army to be able to ‘fight and win wars’ while remaining ‘absolutely loyal’ to the Chinese Communist Party. This latter focus was the result of problems of excessive autonomy invested in the PLA under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, which manifested in military secrecy, corruption, and questions of ideological commitment. Xi has attempted to enhance party control (and his own authority as the ‘core’ of the party) through a multifaceted political strategy that includes centralization of power under his control, renewed ideological campaigns, and improved internal control mechanisms. Nevertheless, Xi is unlikely to meet this standard because the military remains fundamentally a self-policing organization with almost no genuine civilian party oversight. This means that the prospects for party-army tensions and even crises remain and could grow in the post-Xi era.

Power and Confidence

Abstract This paper, utilising data from the World Values Survey, presents a pioneering examination of citizens’ confidence in political parties in mainland China spanning a twenty-eight-year period, juxtaposed with global counterparts. The analysis unveils a consistent strengthening of confidence among mainland Chinese citizens in political parties, essentially the Chinese Communist Party, from 1990 to 2018, with a marginal decline around 2012. This heightened confidence secures a noteworthy second-place ranking globally. It exhibits a positive correlation with confidence in government, parliament, civil service, armed forces, police, courts, and the press. Additionally, it aligns positively with perceptions of politics as important in life, national pride, age, trust in people of different religions, willingness to have neighbours of different races, and a sense of a secure neighbourhood. Conversely, it demonstrates a negative association with postmaterialism, educational attainment, support for greater income differences as incentives for economic development, and reliance on TV news for understanding current events.

The Peaks and Ranges of Ecosystem Models

This response to commentaries by Micah Muscolino, Judith Shapiro, Chris Courtney, and Peter Perdue considers whether An Ecological History of Modern China is too political and not ecological enough or too ecological and not political enough; whether it is biased either in favor of or against the Chinese Communist Party regime; whether ecologically based periodization provides a valuable new perspective on the history of the People’s Republic of China; whether ecological change would be better illuminated if viewed at a different scale; and whether valid or useful history can be written primarily using scientific papers available on the internet.

‘Beyond the nation state’: does China’s ‘new era’ education facilitate an international orientation to citizenship education?

ABSTRACT Despite a strong commitment to patriotic education, China has attempted to adopt an international perspective in its education policy for the Xi administration’s ‘new era’. This to some extent echoes China’s traditional culture and the Chinese Communist Party’s embrace of Marxism. Developing students’ international vision is one of the learning objectives of the current administration’s new-era educational campaign, with the aim of cultivating a worldview within the framework of Marxist ideology. Through an analysis of compulsory civics teaching materials supplemented by interviews with a group of youth educators, this study reveals how internationalisation has been envisioned in China’s recent educational campaign to balance commitment to the nation with the development of a worldview.

Unraveling narratives: Chinese official party media’s representation of Inner Mongolia amid reforms

This article examines narrative construction in the Chinese official Party newspaper Inner Mongolia Daily (IMD), analyzing narratives within the context of bilingual education reform among Mongolians. Three key frames emerge: collective development and prosperity under the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership, Inner Mongolia as a model of ethnic unity, and the integration of minority religions into socialist society. This study reveals how IMD portrays Inner Mongolia during education reforms using media framing theory.

Blurring the Boundaries of Governance: China’s Work Teams in Comparative Perspective

A notable feature of Chinese Communist rule, from revolutionary days on, has been the blurred boundaries of its governance mechanisms. The lines separating formal from informal, legal from illegal, and state from societal have – at least until quite recently – proven exceptionally permeable. This paper focuses on an especially fluid and flexible means of Chinese Communist governance: the deployment of mobile task forces, or “work teams,” for both routine and crisis policy implementation. Directed by higher-levels of the party-state to advance a specific mission at the grassroots, work teams mobilize society in a manner that reflects the continuing influence of China’s revolutionary experience. The paper assesses the contributions and costs of this “campaign-style” of governance in comparison to the practices of other Communist and non-Communist systems, past and present.

Enchanted Revolution: Ghosts, Shamans, and Gender Politics in Chinese Communist Propaganda, 1942–1953

Enchanted Revolution: Ghosts, Shamans, and Gender Politics in Chinese Communist Propaganda, 1942–1953

REPRESENTATION OF TIKTOK IN U.S. NEWS AFTER THE NO TIKTOK ON GOVERNMENT DEVICES ACT

TikTok, the most downloaded application in the world for three consecutive years since 2020, has been the target of various bans from governments and organisations. Despite widespread media coverage of such events, the representation of TikTok therein remains underexplored by linguists. This study therefore attempts to examine how TikTok is linguistically represented in U.S. television news after President Joe Biden signed the No TikTok on Government Devices Act into law. The Systemic Functional Linguistics, elaborated in Halliday and Matthiesen (2014), was employed as the analytical framework. The findings revealed that news coverage predominantly uses Material processes, followed by Relational processes. Mental and Verbal processes rank third and fourth, while Existential and Behavioural processes have rather low frequency. Regarding their subtypes, Identifying Relational and Cognitive Mental processes are more prevalent in negative representations, while Attributive Relational and Emotive Mental processes occur more often in positive representations. These transitivity patterns contribute to five main portrayals of TikTok, including “TikTok is a scrutiny and ban target”, “TikTok is a cybersecurity threat”, “TikTok is the Trojan horse of the Chinese Communist Party”, “TikTok is a must-have for many”, and “TikTok is a sales driving force”.

Social brokers in grassroots governance: The new rural gentry in China

One important and interesting aspect of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to revitalize the Chinese countryside in recent years has been the attempt to make use of prominent local people – known as xinxiangxian (新乡贤, meaning ‘new rural meritorious people’). As social brokers, xinxiangxian differ from other agents. The attributes of this new class have yet to be regularized through central government statute, which means that the CCP’s position on the xinxiangxian is still under discussion. From the example of A county, we conclude that xinxiangxian use their abundance of bridging social capital to fulfil two important political functions: lobbying their communities in favour of government policies to strengthen grassroots ruling and serving as local government supervisors to monitor village committee affairs. Compared with other brokers included into the CCP regime, xinxiangxian, as their name suggests, are renowned for their moral values and competencies, allowing them to make a significant contribution to the CCP’s governance of Chinese society.