When considering development and urbanization, a critical question relates to the institutions on the basis of which these ought to be achieved. Formal, private and titled property rights are oft considered as essential in this. However, contrary to the notion that such rights can be exogenously designed and implemented, this paper ascertains that the property rights of Chinese housing stem from endogenous development. The institutional amalgam of contradictory, overlapping and opaque rights points to endogeneity – resultant from actors' multitudinous interactions, bargaining and conflict – rather than the reverse. The housing property rights are analyzed in an evolutionary sense around ownership as an idealized concept. In so doing, the paper describes how the Chinese housing rights' structure developed into its current form; what has been commercialized and what not; and what is formally defined and what not. The analysis covers a half century: the collectivist period since 1962 until the present, with a focus on the time since the 1998 Housing Reforms. The analysis includes the main types of urban and rural housing. In light of the endogenous structure of China's housing, the article cautions against precipitous institutional intervention, and contends that formalization and titling should proceed with great care.