Reflections on Revolution and Socialism in Our Times Rebecca E. Karl (bio) As Fidel Castro lay dying in November 2016, the American electoral season was in the process of playing its most recent morbid joke on the world. On the one hand, Castro's death in Cuba seemed to augur the final demise of state alternatives to capitalist democracy—those alternatives historically named "socialism"—even while, on the other hand, Trump's victory in the United States seemed to ring the final death knell of precisely that very capitalist democracy, whose hovering on life support had already been signaled by the inexorable rise of Tea Party Republicans in the United States and of Far Right movements throughout Europe, the Philippines, and Japan, among others. Between the death, the demise, and the life support lurks China, an actually existing one-party Communist-led capitalist state, with nary a fig-leaf vestige of socialism remaining, despite a sometimes historical-sounding rhetoric promising a distantly attainable communist future. In critical global analyses of the past several decades, China often enough has been referred to as a "post-socialist" state,1 joined in that grouping by Russia and the former Eastern Europe bloc, whose post-1989/1991 histories are almost uniformly configured around a paradigm of reaction: all that is done, said, and promised is (but) a reaction against the previous Communist hegemony, as well as, more recently, against the attempts by "the West" (Euro-America) to capture that reaction for profit and the postsovereign politics of "humanitarian" military intervention. The fact that China is still ruled by a Communist Party-State is little hindrance, here, to its inclusion in the normative postsocialist grouping, although caveats of course abound. Given this muddle, I wish to inquire: What today is our "actuality" (as the 1930s Japanese philosopher Tosaka Jun called it)?2 More precisely, does the category "postsocialist" do the work it theoretically [End Page 278] and historically purports to do, so as to shed light on our times? Can postsocialist be a global concept rather than a delimited national or chronological marker? If so, what is its purview? In this brief essay, I argue that postsocialism can work as a global concept, albeit only in the sense that Dai Jinhua has discussed for our present moment. As Dai theorizes, we are in the "post post–Cold War era" (后冷战后时代), where the first "post" must be construed as an "anti" rather than merely a chronological "after." As she has explicated, the conceptual ambit named by the first "post" is the global problem of China-in-the-world after the Cold War and the consequent onset of a global antipolitical—a specifically antisocialist—present. First, then, hers is not the China-in-the-world articulated in the "rise of China" idiom so beloved by Chinese nationalist intellectual ventriloquists and state celebrators in the service of proclaiming that China is regaining its proper place at the center of world history. Or, that is, the dreamy triumphal assertion that China has (finally, rightfully) joined tracks with (jiegui: 接轨) the so-called normative history of capitalist accumulation wedded to culturalist conservatism, a path with Chinese characteristics that had been interrupted by the radicalism of the twentieth-century's revolutionary interregnum.3 Rather, Dai's is a lesser-known immanently critical China-in-the-world conceptualization premised on recuperating the erasure of twentieth-century revolutionary histories, histories that must centrally feature the intertwined revolutionary trajectory of China and the twentieth-century world. Thus, where the normative post post–Cold War China idiom points to a presentist repression of history, in which there is no imaginary of futurity other than the banal statement that "China is the future; the future is Chinese,"4 Dai's version has no use for this antipolitical China-in-the-world. Yet by the same token, as Dai maintains, for the critical version she advocates there are simply no historical or cultural coordinates in the mainland Chinese sphere (Dai 2016). Indeed, as she has noted, the celebratory suppression touted by the state and its many domestic and foreign ventriloquists overlaps with the age of the internet, where history is flattened, is a conjunctural coincidence as well as a...
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