This paper explores the implications of endogenous fertility for inter-and intragenerational equity and for intergenerational efficiency. Considering equity requires social welfare criteria. With respect to the issue of intragenerational equity 2 possible criteria in relation to the laissez faire solution are 1) total utility across generations and 2) average or per capita utility. When population size is not fixed the 2 are not the same. When fertility is not endogenous it is possible to consider noncoercive policies for achieving socially optimal population size or rate growth; in general child allowances (or taxes) and subsidies to future consumption are sufficient to achieve the desired outcome. With respect to within-generation income distribution a system of child allowances and tax exemptions designed to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality may actually worsen the situation when both fertility and labor supply are endogenous. Discussing the issue of efficiency for members of the current generation does not require a social welfare function. Neither diminishing returns nor the existence of public goods unless financed by distortionary taxes leads to market failure from this point of view; but the inability of parents to enforce transfers among their offspring or to bargain with the families of the potential spouses of their children may indeed lead to market failure. Finally the paper examines the implications for fertility of the inefficiency in an economy resulting from the absence of a capital market for transferring from present to future consumption. In this case the welfare-improving introduction of a capital market may increase the rate of growth of population when parents value children for themselves as well as a means of providing sustenance in old age.
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