Chief Of State Research Articles

The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications

Relations between Turkey and Russia have taken significant turns for the better in the past several years, culminating in the visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow in December 2004, and followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's reciprocal trip to Ankara in January 2005. This was the first time a Russian chief of state had paid an official visit to Turkey.1 The latter meeting was timed, perhaps not coincidentally, to occur just before the European Union summit meeting in Brussels, which included the perennial matter of membership on its agenda. Although those visits are significant in their own right, they are emblematic of a larger significant shift in each country's disposition to the other, and in some respects are symptomatic of shifting political orientations in their domestic and international politics. As Shireen T. Hunter asserts, Turkish and Russian officials increasingly refer to their respective countries as two great Eurasian powers, indicating that the and Russian versions of Eurasianism need not be competitive. Rather, they can be complementary.2 This article explores the contours of this changing landscape with an eye toward identifying and critically analyzing alternative interpretations of the reasons for the emergence of a more cooperative set of relations between Turkey and Russia. It also does so from the perspective of the implications for democracy in each of these countries and the region more generally.This remarkable turn toward greater cooperation between Russia and Turkey calls for commentary on several grounds, not least of which is the long history of suspicion, studied alienation, and overt military conflict between the two countries. As Lesser notes, [djespite the fact that Turkey no longer shares a border with Russia, Ankara still continues to view Russia with concern. A long tradition of Russo-Turkish competition contributes to unease, and reinforces more modern worries about Moscow as a geopolitical competitor and a source of regional risk.3 That unease, however, appears to be giving way to substantial change. Improved relations between these two significant powers will certainly shape the contours of domestic and foreign politics in Eurasia well beyond each country's current regime.4 This is already evident in terms of rapidly expanding trade (from an estimated $4 billion in 2002 to approximately $10 billion in 2004, and projections of $25 billion by 2007),5 something akin to a military detente (if not rapprochement), an increasing measure of regional cooperation in attempted conflict resolution, and perhaps most demonstrably, diplomatic exchange. The last is perhaps most significant in that it may set the stage for expanded cooperation in economic and military domains as well as open doors in other aspects of bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation.Historically, relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires were never particularly good or close, and were punctuated by armed conflict.6 Chronic conflict between the Ottoman Empire and a continually expanding Muscovy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was capped by Peter the Great's victory in capturing the fortress of Azov in 1696.In 1715, Peter renamed Muscovy the Russian Empire, but with that redesignation came no change in long-term relations with the Ottoman neighbor to the south. There were wars fought in 1710, 1736, 1768-74, 1787, 1806-12,1828-29, 1854-56, and 1877-78. During World I, Russian imperial forces occupied eastern portions of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. This, along with the postwar occupation of western Anatolia by Allied forces, led the founders of the modern Republic to dub the confusing mass of conflicts during and after World I as Turkey's War of Independence (Kurtulus Savas). Although the early regime of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk has been interpreted as having sought to base its principles on the ideals of both the American and Russian Bolshevik revolutions,7 Turkey took a decisively pro-Western and anti-Soviet orientation after World II. …

O discurso político monarquiano e a recepção do conceito de poder moderador no Brasil (1822-1824)

This article revisits the founding moment of Brazilian political institutions in order to highlight the penetration of French monarchical discourse among statesmen connected to the Brazilian Crown. The concept of a moderating power was thus mobilized strategically by these statesmen to safeguard the Crown's prerogatives from the growing interference of the 1823 Constitutional Congress. The objective was to justify the preeminence of the Prince over Parliament as representative of the nation's sovereignty. This justification introduced new semantic meanings into the concept, such as those of active neutrality, discretionarity, and centralization, which came to be identified with the state itself during the state-building process. The result was that the legal text allowed a monarchical reading of the Chief of State as an axis for government activity, but also another, ultraliberal reading in which he appeared merely as arbiter of the Constitutional system.

The Rise and Fall of the Dependency Movement: Does It Inform Underdevelopment Today?

While dependency theory as a conscious, explicit approach to development can be considered a thing of the past, its legacy is very much with us. The impact that dependency ideas held in Latin American centers of academia was pervasive, while also gaining many adherents in Europe and the United States. Perhaps more importantly, this impact went beyond scholarly circles. As Falcoff (1980, 797) observed, "dependency explanations…are no longer confined to academic sanctuaries; they are now the common currency of a growing body of generals bishops, editors, chiefs of state, even Latin American businessmen." What gave the dependency perspective particular allure is that, unlike other previous paradigms, it was held to be a distinctively Latin American analysis of Latin American development. Its legacy can be discerned from the pronouncements of Latin American scholars, policymakers and politicians who choose to put the emphasis on the structural conditions of the world economy that work against the prospects of the region's economies. Understanding the dependency movement is important, not least because it is a consequential episode in the history of social thought in Latin America. It also marks one of those rare instances in which ideas produced in the Third World come to influence the thinking of scholars in the developed world. Indeed, the supply of underdevelopment theory (principally structuralism and dependency) has been regarded as "Latin America's major contribution to the social sciences."

Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias

This article discusses the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches in Brazil with regard to the issuing of Provisional Measures (PMs) by the former. The article contends that the legal ability of the Brazilian Chief of State to issue decrees with the force of law and taking force immediately (i.e., PMs) does not imply that members of Congress have abdicated from their legislative prerogatives in favor of the Executive Branch, as proposed by some authors analyzing the issue. After presenting the most important analyses of the dynamics in the Executive-Legislative relationship, the article aligns itself with the interpretation emphasizing the process of mutual delegation and control between the two powers, contending that the formation of a solid coalition government generates incentives for the Executive to issue PMs that meet the interests of the legislative majorities, and that Congress is also capable of inferring whether such measures meet its interests, by way of an indirect supervisory mechanism known as the fire alarm. The article proposes that it is possible to view PMs as part of a complex and changing context of delegation within Brazilian Presidentialism, involving neither usurpation nor abdication.

El poder moderador

El artículo aborda el tema de la institución real desde la perspectiva de la definición de la Jefatura del Estado. El autor recupera las olvidadas ideas del teórico francés, Benjamín Constant, para explicar la naturaleza de la monarquía, discutiendo la legitimidad monárquica tradicional aniquilada por la historia y planteando un problema de estructuración en la organización jurídica del Estado, al que forzosamente había que ofrecer soluciones más coherentes y adecuadas que las que podían derivar de las erróneas interpretaciones en el ámbito jurídico del conflicto político de legitimidades. Para otorgar una vertebración jurídica coherente a la democracia constitucional, el poder del monarca, como jefe del Estado, no puede ser entendido en ningún caso como un poder constituyente y soberano, sino moderador.

The cover-up of president Urho Kekkonen's dementia and its impact on the political life of Finland-a personal account.

Urho Kekkonen, born in 1900, was elected President of Finland in 1956. He stayed in office for 25 years, the longest term for any democratically elected chief of state, until his resignation in 1981. Since he was always a model of good health, news of his cognitive decline while still in office came as a surprise to the whole nation. The impact was aggravated by an attempted cover-up of his dementia. The attempt failed and the health of presidential candidates became, suddenly, a topic of intense public discussion. No special team of presidential doctors was established but Kekkonen's successor initiated a practice of reporting annually on his health. The ethical dilemma involving mass media was, and still is, its duty to inform people versus its right to self-censorship, which was practised in Kekkonen's case. The physicians face the question of when, how and whom to inform when they notice that the president or some other powerful leader suffers from cognitive decline or other neuropsychological or mental disability. These are universal problems whose solution depends on the degree of democracy and freedom of expression in each country. Kekkonen died in complete privacy in 1986. Until now, no scientific report of his cognitive decline has been published.

Elite Solidarity, Communal Support, and the 1999 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Modeled after the U.S. presidency, the office of the president of Nigeria is easily the most powerful position in the land. The president is both the chief of state and the head of government. The authority of the nation’s chief executive expanded greatly during the patrimonial regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Indeed, not only was power concentrated in the hands of these despots, its exercise was also marked by massive corruption, brazen nepotism, and sustained brutality. Against this background, it was perhaps natural that the presidential election of February 27, 1999, would excite keen interest among the Nigerian populace, elite groups, ethnoregional blocs, and the international community. This article highlights some of the ethnoregional forces and elite interests that influenced the election and examines their possible implications for the sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

Elite Solidarity, Communal Support, and the 1999 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Modeled after the U.S. presidency, the office of the president of Nigeria is easily the most powerful position in the land. The president is both the chief of state and the head of government. The authority of the nation’s chief executive expanded greatly during the patrimonial regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Indeed, not only was power concentrated in the hands of these despots, its exercise was also marked by massive corruption, brazen nepotism, and sustained brutality. Against this background, it was perhaps natural that the presidential election of February 27, 1999, would excite keen interest among the Nigerian populace, elite groups, ethnoregional blocs, and the international community. This article highlights some of the ethnoregional forces and elite interests that influenced the election and examines their possible implications for the sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

Leadership in the UN, 1997: The Secretary-General and the U.S. — A Symbiotic Relationship under Stress

THE SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP As Kofi Annan settles into office as the seventh secretary-general of the United Nations, the challenge he faces is not merely to cope with 'the most impossible job' -- which is how Trygve Lie, the first secretary-general, described his position nearly fifty years ago -- but to keep the United Nations from becoming irrelevant. His predicament does not reflect on him personally, but on the state of the United Nations in 1997 and on its relationship to the United States which occupies a unique position vis-a-vis the world body. As the sole superpower, the United States fills the role in the United Nations that exists within all multilateral organizations that of the catalytic dominant power that provides the leadership which is 'necessary for the institution to function. This leadership, referred to in the literature as hegemonic, calls for a moral commitment supported by significant human and financial resources.(f.1) In the United Nations, the United States has occupied this role from the beginning. Although other nations were involved in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences which produced the United Nations Charter, the primary inspiration came from Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'four freedoms -- of speech, of religion, from want, and from fear' -- infused with American ideals and organizational principles. It was not only a reaffirmation of Wilsonian internationalism, but it carried Roosevelt's New Deal into the international arena by broadening the idea of collective security to include the 'promotion of social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.'(f.2) Trygve Lie did not explain why he thought his position was 'the most impossible job in the world,' but over the years his judgement has been shared by most of his successors. The secretary-general's task has become increasingly difficult as the office is called upon to deal with increasingly complex issues: reconciling disparate and conflicting views among the member sovereign states whose number has grown from 511 to 185; balancing East-West and North-South divisions; managing an unwieldy bureaucracy under the inhibiting recruitment principles of state sovereignty and equitable geographic distribution; undertaking operations under vague mandates; promoting and defending multilateralism in a resistant world; and maintaining United Nations impartiality.(f.3) Any one of these problems is vexing enough; how much more so when a number of them have to be dealt with simultaneously. For the last two secretaries-general, Javier Perez de Ceullar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the impossibility of the secretary-generalship was compounded by the gnawing financial crisis brought on primarily by the failure of the United States to live up to its treaty obligations to pay its dues and clear up its arrears. This remains the new secretary general's most formidable challenge. To lead the United Nations in its multifaceted activities -- conflict management, peacekeeping, economic development, promotion of human rights, humanitarian assistance, environmental protection, and so on -- a wide range of financial and human resources is required. The secretary-general does not command such resources. He is answerable to the member-states of the organization. They decide the policy direction, and they have to provide the resources. The policies of the member-states, each essentially pursuing its own national interest, 'constrain the development of the United Nations as a much more central organization in international politics.(f.4) The secretary-general may propose but the other principal organs of the United Nations, notably the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council, dispose. Clearly, the leadership capability of the secretary-general is much more circumscribed than that of chief of state or government who is responsible to an elected legislative body. Nor does the secretary-general have a political party or direct access to a public to rally to his side. …

France Announces More Active Role in NATO; Ministers Appoint New Secretary General, Discuss Bosnia and PfP: Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, December 5-6

The summit of July 1994 marked an important stage in the history of the Atlantic alliance. On this occasion, the chiefs of state of our governments defined the principle directions for the Alliance in the coming years: on one hand, that the Alliance should engage itself resolutely in new missions required by the new strategic realities in Europe; on the other, that it should adapt its structures towards the end of bringing its full weight to bear on the development of a European Security and Defense Identity.

Spain's Economic Strategy toward the “Nations of Its Historical Community:” The “Reconquest” of Latin America?

From one of the poorest countries in Europe in the late 1950s, Spain emerged as a middle industrial power by the time of the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975. Subsequently, under the leadership of King Juan Carlos I, Franco's successor as chief of state, Spain negotiated a smooth transition from authoritarianism to a parliamentary-monarchy. On the first of January 1986, the Iberian nation acceded to full membership in the European Community (EC). However, prior to this date and independently of the EC (now the European Union), the Spanish state had already set in motion, in 1981, two great undertakings related to Latin America: (1) the commemoration of Columbus' fateful voyage to the New World in 1492 and (2) the formation of an “Iberoamerican Community of Nations.”

Choosing a Healthy President

This article considers the requirement for-but dilemmas in-health screening of presidential candidates. It surveys the experience the United States has had since 1931 with the health of candidates for the presidency, especially those who have been elected. The tripartite role of the president-as chief executive, as party leader, and as national symbol/model-is stressed. Several instances of deception, or at least lack of candor, are described. The dynamics of the process are reviewed, as are the advantages and inherent problems of corrective measures. President Clinton, as chief executive, proposes legislation, carries on foreign affairs, and administers the federal bureaucracy. He is, moreover, leader of the Democratic Party, with responsibility for seeing to it that its candidates are elected and its programs advanced. Of particular importance is his role as chief of state, as the symbolic embodiment of his nation's leadership. Health screening of presidential candidates is profoundly affected by the fact that every president must fill these three sometimes complementary, but often contradictory, roles. Almost every other country separates these functions. No other country combines them with the intensity of the United States. Unlike constitutional monarchies, where the symbolic function of chief of state is vested in the king or queen and is separated from that of the prime minister, who serves as chief of government, this fusion of roles places a special burden on the symbolic function of the president. Americans going to the polls to elect a president are aware of this combination of governmental power, political leadership, and symbolic potency. Issues of candidate health, physical and mental, are evaluated in terms of what the public knows the president will not only have to do, but also have to be.

Presidents on the textbook presidency

Recent research shows that idealized accounts of the presidency still dominate pre-college textbooks on American government. Little attention has been given to presidential presentations of the office and their relationship to the textbook presidency, despite the symbolic significance of the presidency and a president's opportunity to further define or refine the institution through rhetoric. This study compares the presentation of the presidency by three post-Watergate presidents to the textbook presidency. This study finds that while presidents do present a more realistic portrait of a president's economic and legislative leadership, they describe life in the White House, and their roles as Chief of State, Publicly Accountable Leader, and Commander in Chief, in ways that more frequently support than modify the textbook version of the presidency.

The International Political Economy of Bank Nationalization: Mexico in Comparative Perspective

“In the last two or three years, … a group of Mexicans …, supported and advised by the private banks, has stolen more money from our country than the empires that have exploited us since the beginning of history…. They've robbed us …, but they will not rob us again.” With these words, President López Portillo nationalized Mexico's private banks and imposed controls on foreign exchange. Many of those attending this State of the Union address on 1 September 1982 stood to applaud, while the president cried and one banker fainted. Mexico's chief of state continued, “The revolution will speed up; the state will no longer be intimidated by pressure groups.”

How Many People Are Deprived of Work in the USSR?

What did we know about unemployment in our country until very recently? Only that this phenomenon of the world of capital was "eliminated completely and finally" in our country in 1930. It was presented as one of the most important accomplishments of socialism. The very concept of "unemployment" disappeared from economics dictionaries. In 1987 our chief of state declared that we have not known this evil for fifty years already. It was not until 1990 that the International Labor Organization forecast the advent of unemployment in the USSR and named its "magnitude": 600,000 persons.

Romanian Scientists Rush To Condemn Elena Ceausescu

One of the strangest chapters in contemporary science diplomacy involves the celebrated but now apparently fraudulent scientific career of Elena Ceausescu, the wife of Romanian chief of state and Communist Party chairman Nicolae Ceausescu. The deception—credit for published material she never researched and technical degrees granted but never earned—was long-lived, generally known, but unchallenged. Western scientists and their Eastern bloc counterparts, by their silence, maintained her charade in the hope of protecting the careers and the families of Romanian scientists and engineers subject to the regime. The deception was critical to Elena's ego, to the maintenance of her power in the Romanian communist hierarchy, and to Romanian-American relations between 1965 and about 1984. At that time Romania's policy of defiant independence of the Soviet Union was working to the apparent advantage of the western powers. But it turns out, too, that the tilt of Romania toward the West was also a deception. The Ce...

Protestantism in Rural Guatemala, 1872–1954

For eighteen months, between March 1982 and August 1983, Guatemala was ruled by a born-again Christian, General Efrain Ríos Montt. He drew world attention to Guatemala because of his brutally effective suppression of the nation's guerrilla movement and his idiosyncratic style of rule but above all, because of his religion. The idea that a Protestant could serve as the chief of state in a country as staunchly Catholic as Guatemala struck many observers as an anomaly. Closer examination reveals, however, that it was not anomalous for a Protestant to be president of Guatemala. By 1982 nearly 30 percent of the Guatemalan population were Protestants, the result of a quiet wave of conversion that started during the nineteenth century and has accelerated dramatically in the last three decades. The idea that President Ríos Montt's religion would influence his entire administration was even less surprising, for Protestantism has been wed to politics in Guatemala ever since it first arrived in the country. The purpose of this research report is to examine the development of patterns in the relationship between the Guatemalan state and Protestantism as they evolved during the formative years between 1872 and 1954 and to explore the effects of this relationship on Protestant conversion.

An Underdeveloped Peace Movement: The Case of France

Unlike its European counterparts, the peace movement in France is not very strong. The reasons for this are many: The Munich Syndrome, a contempt for pacifism confused with cowardice, a desire for na tional independence in defence, a belief in the global role of France, an absence of genuine defence al ternatives acceptable to the majority of French, the role played by the Communist party, the in capability of groups favouring disarmament to agree among themselves on a minimal platform, poor re lations between trade unions, the relative weakness of religious influence, and the compromises necessary in the race for power. It is difficult to unravel clearly causes from consequences, but it seems that dominant factors are national independence, a wish to avoid conflicts with an army traumatized by decolonization and lost wars, internal dissension among those who favour disarmament, and the ab sence of a real alternative despite the scepticism surrounding the question of effective deterrence stra tegy. The French look to the chief of state for their defence. However, there are discordant voices, al though these do not express themselves in pacifist terms. The last years of the 20th century will be marked by technological, strategic asnd social changes which will redistribute some cards, among them defence. The peace movement could profit by these uncertain developments for its reinforcement.

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Year-book 1985: Vol. 1, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; States of the World's Nations; U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Foreign Service Posts; Background Notes: Afghanistan-Luxembourg; Vol. 2, Macau-Zimbabwe; Foreign Travel; International Treaty Organizations; Climates of the World. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xiv + 1,546. $95.00/set.)

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Year-book 1985: Vol. 1, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; States of the World's Nations; U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Foreign Service Posts; Background Notes: Afghanistan-Luxembourg; Vol. 2, Macau-Zimbabwe; Foreign Travel; International Treaty Organizations; Climates of the World. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xiv + 1,546. $95.00/set.)

The Rule of Agustín de Iturbide: A Reappraisal

After a struggle of eleven years, and the loss, according to the conservative estimate of Carlos María de Bustamante, of 2000,0000 lives, Mexico awoke in September 1821 an independent nation. For months before the culmination of independence there was no doubt who would rule the nation – that is, who was the de facto chief of state, at least for the moment. Agustin de Iturbide, author of the Plan of Iguala, conceiver of the idea of the Three Guarantees that united all factions in favor of independence, chief of the Army of the Three Guarantees, signatory on Mexico's part of the Treaties of Cordoba that granted independence de jure (in Mexico's view), was the undisputed leader. Incorruptible, invincible, wise, Christian, the consummate politician, the salvation of the Church, the Protector of Spaniards in Mexico, the Hero of Iguala, the Liberator, the Father of the Nation, Iturbide had broken the yoke of the Lion of Castile. Mexicans, of all political persuasions, rallied around the demigod in a euphoria of rejoicing and hope that has no equal in the history of the country.