In his last annual report on work of United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold contrasted two views on world organization: members would either regard it static conference machinery or dynamic instrument of Governments through which they ... should also try to develop forms of action. (1) Against background of UN involvement in Congo, which had brought unprecedented tasks but also strong political criticism with it, Hammarskjold wanted to convince member states that second view of organization is in their best interest and in line with UN's mission according to charter. Forty-five years later, Hammarskjold's successor, Kofi Annan, in dramatic appeal to General Assembly, said, Our current rules and regulations were designed for an essentially static Secretariat, whose main function was to service conference and meetings of Member States, and whose staff worked mainly at Headquarters. That is not United of today. (2) Echoing words of Hammarskjold, Annan pointed to large increase in quantity and quality of UN action: Since 1990 alone, forty-two new UN missions were established (compared to mere eighteen missions in preceding forty-four years); instead of 20,000 personnel in field missions, number grew to roughly 80,000, with an expenditure of up to US$5 billion instead of $1.25 billion in 1990. In addition to that, mandates today go as far as temporarily taking over executive functions of government, as Annan underlined in his report Investing in United Nations (IUN). (3) This overall need for reform of Secretariat originating from an expansion of its tasks was reinforced by number of obvious failures in way UN operated. The findings of Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) into oil-for-food program revealed stunning information on the politicization of decision-making, managerial weaknesses, ethical lapses (4) that characterized UN administration of program. This negative impression received further support from an internal investigation of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in Democratic Republic of Congo (5) and an internal audit that disclosed serious flaws in UN procurement services. (6) The Outcome Document of UN Summit 2005 therefore stressed need for a culture of organizational accountability, transparency and integrity. (7) However, such superficial concurrence of Secretariat and member state diagnosis did not lead to far-reaching changes in UN's administration. Quite contrary: Secretariat reform became divisive issue that led to spending caps in budget, controversial votes in General Assembly, and lot of personal allegations between main protagonists. Administrative imperatives had turned into political preferences. One reason for that can be found in observation that debate on UN Secretariat reform is characterized by various ironies, notably differences between words and deeds with actions that lead to results contrary to their original aim, and arguments that conceal rather than reveal central aspects of reform issue. Acknowledgment of these ironies may serve to better understand way UN operates. Reform as Modus Operandi The tension between political and administrative work of UN is already planted into consciously ambiguous language of Chapter XV of UN Charter. On one hand, secretary-general is introduced as chief administrative officer according to Article 97; on other hand, Articles 98 and 99, with their vague language (and subject to trust of member states), open up rather remarkable political competences--for example, organizing peacekeeping force, taking stand on various international issues, negotiating for peace, and arguing for allocation of budgetary resources. (8) This context at times leads to situation where much of political criticism aimed at secretary-general inevitably has administrative repercussions, and much of administrative criticism directed at Secretariat has political motivations. …