Channel Members Research Articles

Green degree decision and pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chains

With the prevalence of green supply chains, the government has basic requirements for companies’ green investments and outcomes while consumers increasingly favor green products. Thus, green degree decision has garnered significant attention from manufacturers. This paper incorporates green degree decisions into a dual-channel supply chain and adopts a Stackelberg model to analyze the green degree and pricing strategies under centralized and decentralized decisions. We find that, when the manufacturer only decides on price, dual-channel choice is always the optimal strategy under centralized decision-making; however, under decentralized decision-making, the dual-channel choice will be chosen only when the wholesale price is low. Considering green degree decision, both direct and indirect channel prices increase with the green degree, and the indirect channel price is more sensitive to changes in the green degree under centralized decision-making; and higher green degrees are always advantageous for the retailer, but the manufacturer’s profit initially decreases and then increases as the green degree rises under decentralized decision-making. Moreover, the wholesale price is used as a strategic tool for the manufacturer to control the distribution channel, particularly when the green degree is not introduced, the manufacturer can always ensure the introduction of dual channels. Besides, higher consumers’ environmental awareness is always beneficial to channel members, as it promotes channel prices and green degree. This study provides strategic insights for optimizing pricing and green degree decisions in dual-channel supply chains to achieve better economic and environmental outcomes.

The green product investment policy of carbon emission reduction on a competition duopoly and dual-channel supply chain

Considering the increasing emphasis on sustainable development, global warming effects have received attention for properly managing enterprise activities such as manufacturing, energy utilisation, resource consumption, and carbon emissions. The effect of greenhouse gases generated by carbon emissions is the most significant. This study develops a dual-channel supply chain system that consists of duopoly manufacturers and two common retailers and investigates the effects of the pricing policy, the decision-maker’s mental accounting, and carbon emission reduction investments on the channel members’ decisions. We conduct a numerical experiment, demonstrating that investments in carbon emissions reduction decrease carbon emissions while enhancing market competitiveness and profitability. This is primarily because customers prefer green products and exhibit higher brand loyalty, which makes them willing to pay premium prices for environmentally friendly products. Additionally, the leader-follower model shows the dominant role of leaders in pricing and investment decisions, while the multichannel structure highlights the importance of channel synergy. This study contributes to the field by examining intra- and inter-channel competition issues among leader-follower channel members within a multi-channel structure. This analysis facilitates practical profit-maximisation decision-making.

Behavior-based pricing and wholesale contracting in competing supply chains with informative advertising

The development of e-commerce has enhanced the ability of firms to identify existing and potential customers and set targeted prices accordingly, which is known as behavior-based pricing (BBP). This study investigates the effect of manufacturers’ informative advertising on the strategic interaction between wholesale price contracts (long-term or short-term) and downstream pricing mechanisms (BBP or not). We consider two horizontal differentiated supply chains in which firms not only compete in prices but also in informative advertising which is used to generate awareness of products. We find that the impact of BBP on channel members’ advertising, pricing and profits is the tradeoff of multiple effects. With BBP, manufacturers will advertise less and both retailers and manufacturers prefer short-term wholesale contracts. Moreover, BBP eases the price competition in the first period but intensifies it in the second period, especially for short-term wholesale contracts. In equilibrium, BBP is adopted by retailers only when the advertising cost is low, and manufacturers choose short-term wholesale contracts. Furthermore, BBP always hurts the consumer surplus and social welfare which means that targeted measures are needed to regulate firms’ price discrimination.

Bending response of cover-plated CFS built-up sections: Testing, numerical parametric analysis and design

This study investigates the bending response of cover-plated cold-formed steel (CPCFS) built-up sections comprising of plain channel members under pure bending achieved through four-point loading, both experimentally and numerically. Channels were appropriately spaced back-to-back and screw-fastened at the flanges using cover-plates on the tension and compression sides. This novel design for the CPCFS built-up section combines the benefits of box-profile (closed sections) and I-profile (open sections), including high strength-to-weight ratio, simplified fabrication, and enhanced torsional rigidity. Eight CPCFS built-up sections with different cross-sectional aspect ratios were tested for bending about the major axis under simply supported end conditions. Flexural strengths, failure modes, and moment-curvature plots were discussed. Subsequently, a finite element model was developed in ABAQUS and validated against the test response obtained. Afterwards, an extensive parametric analysis was conducted to assess the variational effect of aspect ratios, cross-sectional slenderness, and plate slenderness on the ultimate moment capacity of the CPCFS built-up beams. Finally, the adequacy of the codified Continuous Strength Method (CSM) and Direct Strength Method (DSM) for CPCFS built-up beams was evaluated. Generally, it was observed that the flexural strengths predicted by the codified CSM and DSM for CPCFS built-up beams were unconservative and conservative, respectively. Suitable modifications were proposed to both DSM and CSM to accurately predict the flexural strength of CPCFS built-up beams, which were eventually verified through a reliability analysis.

Dynamic game research of food agricultural products supply chain based on blockchain traceability technology

PurposeFood quality and safety issues have always been imperative topics discussed by people. The anti-tampering of blockchain technology and the transparency of information make it possible to improve food traceability and safety quality. How to effectively apply blockchain traceability technology to food safety has great research significance for improving food safety and consumer quality trust.Design/methodology/approachThe paper aims to analyze the differences in product quality levels and market participants’ profits before and after the use of blockchain-driven traceability technology in the food agricultural product supply chain (SC) in the dynamic game frameworks of supplier-led and retailer-led modes, respectively, and explores the willingness, social welfare and consumer surplus of each member of the agricultural product SC to participate in the blockchain. Besides, We investigate the SC performance improvement with the mechanism of central centralized decision-making and revenue-sharing contract, compared to the SC performance in dynamic games.FindingsThe results are obtained as follow: The adoption of blockchain traceability technology can help improve the quality of food agricultural products, consumer surplus and social welfare, but the application and popularization of technology is hindered by traceability technology installment costs. Compared with the supplier leadership model, retailer-led food quality level, customer surplus and social welfare are higher.Research limitations/implicationsHow to effectively apply blockchain traceability technology to food safety has great research significance for improving food safety and consumer quality trust.Practical implicationsFood quality and safety issues have always been hot topics discussed by people. The anti-tampering of blockchain technology and the transparency of information make it possible to improve food traceability and safety quality.Social implicationsThe research results enrich the theories related to food safety and quality, and provide a valuable reference for food enterprises involved in the decision-making exploration of blockchain technology.Originality/valueBased on the characteristics of blockchain technology, the demand function is adjusted and the product loss risk of channel members is transferred through a Stackelberg game SC composed of agricultural products suppliers and retailers.Highlights:•We introduce two features of blockchain: quality trust and product information tracking.•The willingness of each member of the supply chain to use blockchain for product traceability was explored.•The overall traceability effect of the retailer-led blockchain is better than that of the manufacturer-led blockchain.•The cost of blockchain technology is a barrier to its adoption.•Blockchain brings higher consumer surplus and social welfare.

Pricing and collection decisions of a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing under reciprocal preferences

This paper examines the effects of reciprocal preferences on the performances of a closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) with remanufacturing. Specifically, we incorporate reciprocal preferences into a two-echelon CLSC in which the manufacturer collects used products and then remanufactures the other parts except for key components as well as producing new products, and must purchase such key components from the supplier. Using a supplier-led Stackelberg game framework, the models are constructed with and without reciprocity, and then the effects of reciprocity on channel efficiency, consumers, environment and society are examined. We show that, (i) if the supplier reciprocates, the collection rate, the CLSC’s total profit, the channel efficiency and the consumer surplus enhance. Additionally, if only the manufacturer reciprocates, the CLSC’s profit remains constant; (ii) under certain conditions, the reciprocal preferences of both channel members aggravate environmental impact, while benefit social welfare; (iii) Pareto improvement can be achieved if the reciprocity parameters of both channel members are relatively high, and a simple procurement price contract can conditionally coordinate the CLSC. Finally, two extensions are studied by considering consumer heterogeneity and solving a two-period game problem, and the results characterize how reciprocal behaviors drive the performances of channel members.

The interaction between manufacturer’s showroom deployment and online selling formats

Many manufacturers selling through online retail platforms are deploying physical showrooms to facilitate consumers’ learning about their products. To uncover the effects of the manufacturer-deployed showrooms on participants in a platform-based distribution channel, we establish a game-theoretic model wherein a manufacturer sells through an online retailer under either agency selling or wholesale selling, and consumers decide sequentially on showrooming and purchasing. We find that, firstly, despite the merits of showrooms in resolving consumers’ valuation uncertainty, the deployment of showrooms may unexpectedly engender more product returns (i.e., return exacerbation effect), which hurts the retailer under wholesale selling when the consumers’ travel cost is moderate. Second, the manufacturer under each selling format tends to benefit (suffer) from showrooms in the case of low (high) travel cost; in addition, the decrease in commission rate boosts the gain from showroom deployment, making the manufacturer under agency selling more likely to deploy showrooms, especially when the travel cost is moderate. Third, in anticipation of the manufacturer’s (not) deploying showrooms and the corresponding profit impacts, the channel members may adopt varying preferences for the selling format. Notably, they have aligned preferences for agency selling with medium low commission rate, while neither prefers agency selling with relatively high commission rate and travel cost. This study sheds light on the flourishing practice of manufacturer-deployed showrooms, clarifying their impacts on the platform-based distribution channel.

Should the pricing or advertising decision come first in a supply chain with a network externality?

PurposeThis paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents.Design/methodology/approachThis paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer’s advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost.FindingsThis paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer’s share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete.Practical implicationsWhen the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers’ motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest.Originality/valueThe impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions.

Pricing policies for a competitive dual-channel supply chain with green investment and sales effort under revenue-sharing contract

In view of the mushroom development of web-based business and green production, a few organizations have moved to produce ecological friendly items and utilized the online channel to build up the competition. This paper deals with a two-echelon sustainable dual-channel supply chain containing two manufacturers and a single retailer. One manufacturer of the investigated supply chain produces a traditional non-green item, and another one releases a substitutable green item. The demand of both the item at the online and offline channel is a function of the sales price, greenness level, sales effort of the retailer. Furthermore, we have discussed the criteria for optimal pricing and greening strategy of supply chain members and the sales effort level of the retailer under a centralized and decentralized model. To enhance the supply chain performance, a revenue-sharing contract has been proposed, subject to the pareto improvement of each channel member. The numerical result demonstrates that the proposed revenue-sharing contract can enhance the manufacturer’s profit as well as system profit compared to the centralized and decentralized model and ensure higher profit for all the members than the decentralized model. Moreover, the item in the centralized model enjoys the highest green level than all other scenarios. Sensitivity analysis exhibits that a higher value of greening cost reduces the manufacturer’s green level, decreasing the sales price.

Evaluation of the Influence of Bolt Fastener Spacing on the Elastic Critical Load from the Lateral-Torsional Buckling Condition of Built-Up Bending Members.

In an experimental study of two-branched beams bent transversely about the major stiffness axis, the elastic critical load from the lateral-torsional buckling condition was determined. The tests were conducted on simply supported two-branch beam models with a built-up section consisting of two cold-formed channel members (2C) bolted back-to-back. The bolts were located at the mid-height of the built-up cross-section. Five groups of members differing in longitudinal bolt spacing were examined. The models were gravitationally loaded (using ballast) at the centre of the beam span. This approach eliminated the undesirable effect of the lateral support of the beam, e.g., by the actuator head. The critical load, measured by the concentrated transverse force (Pz,cr), was determined using the modified Southwell method. It has been experimentally shown that, in built-up beams, there is an influence of bolt spacing on the elastic critical load from the lateral-torsional buckling condition. The lowest critical load capacity and the most non-linear behaviour of the built-up member were observed in beams bolted with only three bolts (at the supports and in the middle of the span). However, the experimental results obtained in this study show that increasing the number of bolts above a certain level (in the case of the tested models, it was seven bolts) does not result in a further increase in the critical load, which is a surprising result. The obtained values were 15 to 23% lower than the critical load determined numerically by the finite element method (LTBeamN) for an analogous element with a uniform I-section.

A new method for assessing the marketing efficiency of agricultural marketing channels

Purpose. This study aims to introduce a new method for assessing the efficiency of agricultural marketing channels. This innovative method rectifies the deficiencies inherent in earlier methods by encircling all channel participants in evaluating marketing efficiency, thereby delivering a more detailed assessment. Methodology / approach. The present study first identified the shortcomings of the old methods based on a literature review and then attempted to propose a new method for calculating marketing efficiency by overcoming these issues. The efficiency of marketing channels is calculated based on primary data collected from two randomly selected agriculture markets in Delhi, marketing cooperative societies operating in Delhi, and their respective intermediaries, flour mills, and consumers in the channel. The study’s sample size is 179 respondents, including all the channel members. After that, a comparison is made between traditional methods and the proposed method. Results. Results of this study show that the proposed method gives a better idea of the efficiency of marketing channels than the old methods, namely the Acharya’s approach, the Shepard’s method and the input-output approach. These methods ignore the crucial role of producers, focusing on overall margins and costs. They can call a channel efficient even if producers receive minimal benefits, necessitating a revised approach. The proposed method has two parts: (1) the ratio of overall channel benefit to cost, excluding consumers, to avoid misleading results, indicating higher benefits for channel members; (2) the ratio of the net price received by farmers to the price paid by consumers, reflecting farmer earnings. By separating marketing margins and costs, the proposed method simplifies previous complexities. Using the channel benefit-to-cost ratio and the farmer’s price-to-consumer price ratio, this method offers an accurate and comprehensive assessment, addressing flaws in Acharya’s approach. Originality / scientific novelty. The proposed method is the only method that takes care of every channel member rather than just focusing on producers / farmers. This method considers factors such as the price received by farmers (gross and net), marketing margins, marketing costs, and the price paid by consumers. Unlike old methods, this method focuses on adding value per channel, not on the number of intermediaries. Practical value / implications. The proposed method facilitates an effortless comparison of marketing efficiency for all channel members, especially farmers. Its simplicity makes it a valuable tool for policymakers to formulate effective strategies for enhancing overall channel efficiency. Researchers can also use this method in efficiency-focused studies related to agriculture and its products, gaining a comprehensive understanding of agricultural marketing channels.

Effects of Imprecise Cognitive Biases and Free-Riding on the Pricing Decisions of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Members

Nowadays, to cater the increasing green customers, firms have switched to green manufacturing. In a dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC), customers experience products at offline stores and buy them online (free-riding). Often imprecise cognitive biases (“fairness concern” and “overconfidence”) are observed among the supply chain (SC) members. With these facts, this study introduces the free-riding and above cognitive biases in a DCGSC with a manufacturer selling a green product through own online and offline retail channels and examines their effects. A centralized and four decentralized models (for green and nongreen products) are formulated depending upon channel members’ cognitive biases individually and jointly with and without free-riding. The fuzzy objectives and constraints are made deterministic using expectation and possibility measures, respectively. Models are solved and illustrated numerically. The results indicate that free-riding is harmful and beneficial to retailer and manufacturer, respectively. Manufacturer’s overconfidence enhances the retailer’s profit but decreases or increases own profit depending upon the salvage value. Retailer’s fairness concern is catastrophic for manufacturer but beneficial for her. Product greening increases manufacturer’s profit than the carbon tax regulation for lower emissions. In addition to above observations, for maximum profit, management should not go for greening beyond an optimum level.

Game theoretical analysis in two-echelon sustainable supply chains to manage and coordinate strategic decisions

Business firms and consumers are increasingly and rapidly realizing the benefits of adopting environmental responsibility. The business firms stress including it in their supply chain strategy and/or operations. This paper explores the environmental consciousness and quality attentiveness of consumers in a supply chain. Demand for the product depends on its price, eco-friendly level, and quality of the product. Three decentralized models are developed under three different game theoretical settings. A comparative study of the three game-theoretical models reveals several characteristics. It determines conditions under which channel members can decide the policy for the best possible benefit. The present work explores the effect of customer environmental awareness on the optimal decision. Production of eco-friendly items is also the prime consideration of our paper. It reveals that the manufacturer gets the most profit in the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, but the retailer gets the maximum profit from the retailer Stackelberg game model. Although channel members prefer their leading position to make the game theoretical decision-making process, the most decentralized channel profit is obtained from the Nash game model. Thus, consumers will also benefit, and the best channel profit can be obtained if the channel members agree to make decentralized decisions using the Nash game model. The centralized channel profit outperforms all three decentralized channel profits. The paper applies the concepts of sub-game perfect equilibrium and alternating offer bargaining to coordinate the channel and distribute surplus profit. Finally, analytical results are verified using numerical examples.

Computation of shear buckling stress of thin-walled sections using constrained spline finite strip method

The direct strength method (DSM) design for shear incorporates the elastic shear buckling stress of the cross-section to evaluate the ultimate shear capacity of thin-walled members. To calculate the shear buckling stress using the finite strip method (FSM), the shape functions for longitudinal interpolation are an issue, while capturing the phase change of displacements along the plate strip. This paper presents a novel constrained spline finite strip method (cSFSM) that eliminates the phase change of displacements. Although constrained buckling analysis for shear stresses is reported in the literature based on FSM, the present study is unique in determining pure buckling stresses for simply supported members subjected to shear edge stress. The formulation also provides an accurate representation of the variation of shear stress along the longitudinal and transverse directions of the plate. Hence, coarse discretization of cross-section is sufficient to obtain the accurate shear buckling stress. The formulation is demonstrated on channel sections with lips subjected to shear edge stresses, and elastic buckling stresses are compared with results available in the literature and also with the finite element method (FEM). Illustrative examples are presented on lipped channel members with different end conditions and longitudinal stiffeners on flanges and webs, to calculate the pure elastic buckling stresses under shear edge stresses. The calculation of buckling stresses for members subjected to longitudinal variation of shear and flexural stresses is also presented to calculate coupled and uncoupled buckling stresses.

Delivery arrangement in online distribution channels under different power structures

Logistics delivery is a critical but costly operation in e-commerce. The e-retailer who sells products online may ask the supplier to ship products to customers, and the supplier responds by accepting or rejecting such a delivery proposal. Motivated by these observations, we consider an online distribution channel with two competing suppliers and one common e-retailer and analytically characterize the equilibrium delivery arrangement based on the nonlinear delivery cost in the E-retailer-Stackelberg, Supplier-Stackelberg, and Vertical-Nash games. Our analysis reveals that the market follower might be more willing to deliver products than the market leader in each Stackelberg game. Counterintuitively, the e-retailer prefers undertaking the delivery when there is a large delivery diseconomy under each power structure but prefers asking both suppliers to deliver products when there is a delivery economy (a small delivery diseconomy) in the E-retailer-Stackelberg and Vertical-Nash games (Supplier-Stackelberg game). The suppliers agree to ship products only when the delivery economy is apparent in the E-retailer-Stackelberg game but reject to do so in the Vertical-Nash game; in the Supplier-Stackelberg game, they accept the delivery proposal even though there is a significant delivery diseconomy. Although both suppliers can benefit from refusing to undertake the delivery when there is fierce competition in each Stackelberg game, interestingly, they still agree to do so and trap themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. In each Stackelberg game, only shifting the delivery responsibility to the suppliers might achieve a triple-win situation for the channel members, consumers, and society; in the Vertical-Nash game, however, this situation never occurs, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are invariant to the delivery arrangement.

Coordinating a platform supply chain with reference promotion effect and Big Data marketing

In this paper, the differential game model is constructed to study the coordination problem of platform supply chain by introducing the impacts of Big Data marketing and reference promotion effect on consumer conversion rate. Firstly, the optimal strategies and the profits under centralized and decentralized modes are given by applying the optimal control theory, and the comparative analyses are carried out. Subsequently, in order to coordinate the platform supply chain, a combined contract including a two-part tariff scheme and a promotion cost sharing scheme is designed. Finally, the effects of system parameters on equilibrium strategies and coordination contract are analyzed. The results show that the respective decisions of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform as well as the total profit of the supply chain are higher under centralized mode. Moreover, within the feasible region, the combined contract not only achieves channel coordination but also improves the economic situations of channel members. It can be also observed that the coordination capacity of the proposed contract reduces with an increase in the memory parameter and improves with an increase in parameters such as the effectiveness of the Big Data marketing and the effectiveness of the reference promotion effect.

Game Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain Based on Different Rights Structure

Based on members' different bargaining power in a dual channels system, this paper discusses the impact ofthree games on channel pricing, demand and members' profits by building Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash game model.The study finds that:(1) When the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of demand is 0, the effects of the three game strategies on the competitive equilibrium solution of the two-channel supply chain are undifferentiated. (2) When the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of demand is not 0, under the Stackelberg game dominated by the retailer (manufacturer), the traditional channel (direct channel) has the highest pricing, and the demand of the traditional channel (direct channel) is the smallest, while the demand of the traditional channel (demand of the direct channel) is the largest in the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer (retailer); both manufacturers and retailers are willing to choose to give up their power and do the Stackelberg game. Both manufacturers and retailers are willing to give up power in favor of being a follower of the Stackelberg game, and the Nash game is always a strict downside for the game participants. Finally, the validity of the conclusions is further tested by case studies.

Multistage Supply Chain Channel Principal-Agent Model in the Context of e-Commerce With Fairness Preference.

This research aims to investigate information asymmetry in e-commerce supply chain channels and the impact of the fair preference model on the behavior and returns of channel members. Therefore, by contrasting it with the model in the completely rational case, this research establishes a more realistic principal-agent model and incorporates the fair preference model into the e-commerce supply chain channel. According to the model's analysis, the effort level of the retailer at each stage is positively correlated with the e-commerce efficiency coefficient, and the incentive coefficient of manufacturers is positively correlated with the e-commerce efficiency coefficient in the case where all rationality is assumed. Manufacturing companies' anticipated profits are positively correlated with the e-commerce efficiency coefficient. According to the fair preference model, retailers will put forth more effort to sell products when their fixed income from manufacturers is higher and their optimal effort level is positively correlated with that income. When e-commerce's efficiency coefficient is higher than 1, the retailer's revenue and effort exceeded those of traditional channels. Manufacturers and retailers both experience Pareto improvements in their earnings after the fair preference model is introduced.

Buckling behavior of cold-formed steel sigma and lipped channel section beam-columns: Experimental and numerical investigation

In this study, the buckling behavior of cold-formed beam-column members with sigma and lipped channel sections under the combined effect of axial load and biaxial bending moment (P-Mx-My) was compared. A total of 30 specimens (15 with sigma sections and 15 with lipped channel sections), each measuring 1500 mm in length, were tested under monotonic loading. The performances of the specimens under eccentric loading such as strength and energy absorption capacity were investigated experimentally and numerically. The local, distortional and global buckling modes that determine the bearing capacity of the section and the length of the sigma and lipped channel member where all these buckling modes can be seen were determined. Finite element analysis (FEA) was performed with Abaqus software, and the numerical results were verified against experimental results. Using the validated finite element model, a comprehensive parametric study was carried out by performing 2894 FEA on sigma and lipped channel section members with various cross-sectional dimensions and lengths. Experimental results show that there are significant differences in load bearing capacity, energy absorption capacity and buckling modes of sigma and lipped channel section members. In the FEA/ AISI-S100 code comparison made at the end of the parametric study, it was determined that differences occurred according to the lengths, cross-sectional properties and loading points of the members. It was determined that the error rate was safer when the lips were subjected to tensile stresses than when they were subjected to compressive stresses. Finally, it was determined that the FEA/AISI-S100 error rate decreased as the length of the sigma-section members increased.

TRP-CHANNELS IN TENDONS: FIRST INSIGHTS, NOVEL QUESTIONS

Tendinopathy is a disease associated with pain and tendon degeneration, leading to a decreased range of motion and an increased risk of tendon rupture. The etiology of this frequent disease is still unknown. In other musculoskeletal tissues like cartilage and intervertebral discs, transient receptor potential channels (TRP- channels) were shown to play a major role in the progression of degeneration. Due to their responsiveness to a wide range of stimuli like temperature, pH, osmolarity and mechanical load, they are potentially relevant factors in tendon degeneration as well. We therefore hypothesize that TRP- channels are expressed in tendon cells and respond to degeneration inducing stimuli.By immunohistochemistry, qRT-PCR and western blot analyses, we found three TRP channel members, belonging to the vanilloid (TRPV), and ankyrin (TRPA) subfamily, respectively, to be expressed in healthy human tendon tissue as well as in rodent tendon, with expression being located to cells within the dense tendon proper, as well as to endotenon resident cells. In vitro-inflammatory and ex vivo-mechanical stimulation led to a significant upregulation of TRPA1 expression in tendon cells, which correlates well with the fact that TRPA1 is considered as mechanosensitive channel being sensitized by inflammatory mediators.This is the first description of TRP- channels in human and rodent tendon. As these channels are pharmacologically targetable by both agonists and antagonists, they may represent a promising target for novel treatments of tendinopathy.