The past few years have been trying for the financial manager concerned with executive remuneration in his corporation. First, he watched helplessly as the Congress debated a myriad of tax changes that threatened to further scramble his already complex decision environment. Next, he was forced to interpret the product of that debate, a document many believe misnamed as the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Since passage of that measure, a barrage of articles recounted the major provisions of the legislation and speculated as to its likely impact on the composition of the executive pay package. Most observers feel that the stock option, the darling of many corporate compensation programs, has lost a significant portion of its appeal and will comprise an increasingly smaller proportion of the value of future pay packages. This same conclusion, it should be noted, was advanced after the extensive tax changes in 1964; the predicted shifts at that time, however, failed to materialize. As corporate administrators have responded to the changes in the tax code, the business press has continued its assault, changing its emphasis to documentation of the accuracy of its earlier predictions. Frequently lacking in this snowstorm of advice and comment is analysis of the interests of both the executive and his employer corporation. A few exceptions [3, 4, 9, 10] provide figures to back up their conclusions; a thorough analysis of the economic justification for the observed changes has to date been unavailable. This article will provide the analysis to bridge the gap between assertion and underlying economics. The analysis utilizes a cost/benefit methodology within the framework of a simulation. The model isolates the effects of the changes in the tax structure by considering both the relative benefits and relative costs of a variety of compensation vehicles before and after tax reform. The advantage of the simulation technique is that it tests the generality of conclusions by varying parameters.