This article extends my previous work on price adjustment in long-term coal contracts to cover a period in which the nominal market prices for coal were below the prices specified in the preexisting long-term contracts. Two related sets of questions are explored. First, did actual transactions prices for coal delivered pursuant to old contracts follow contractual pricing formulas, leading to higher rather than lower prices, or did they adapt quickly to changing market conditions? Second, what were the relative roles offormal contractual provisions, voluntary renegotiation, and breach of contractual promises in determining actual transactions prices, quantities, and the durability of contractual relations. It appears that actual transactions prices for coal delivered pursuant to old contracts were rigid downward, following written contractual provisions rather than changes in current market values. Changing economic conditions led to an increase in renegotiation, breach, and litigation, but the vast majority of existing long-term contracts endured through the market downturn without major changes in prices or quantities from those previously agreed to by contract. The threat of legal sanctions appears to have played an important role in sustaining contractual promises.