Central-local Relations Research Articles

REVIEW ARTICLE: "Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: Evolving Research"

China: An International JournalVol. 03, No. 02, pp. 240-269 (2005) Review ArticleNo AccessREVIEW ARTICLE: "Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: Evolving Research"Yongnian ZHENGYongnian ZHENGThe author is Professor and Head of Research at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. His PhD is in politics from Princeton University. His main research interests include China's domestic political economy and its external relations in the era of reform and openness.https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219747205000142Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Recommended Vol. 03, No. 02 Metrics History PDF download

Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: Evolving Research

Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: Evolving Research

Devolution and Local Government: Evidence from Scotland

Devolution in Scotland has had a major impact upon local government. Local government, at both political and managerial levels, perceives central government in the shape of the Scottish Executive to be closer (geographically and politically) and more open to local government in terms of access to ministers and civil servants. However, Scottish central–local relations continues to be characterised by a sense of mistrust of local government, especially among civil servants and a continuing desire for central control of key policy agendas. Equally, the policy process continues to display features of fragmentation across major policy areas. Moreover, Westminster has not yet departed the scene of Scottish politics in both financial and policy terms but also in the enduring presence of a Westminster ‘political culture’

Intergovernmental Relation (IGR) In Korea and Japan: Phases, Patterns, and Progress Toward Decentralization (Local Autonomy) in A Trans-Pacific Context

Institutional issues and organizational integrity have returned to the center of attention in several fields in the social sciences. Nowhere is this more evident than in the analysis of governmental structures and formal (legal) arrangements. One component of institutional analysis is the manner in which power, authority, tasks, functions, and services are divided (or shared) on an area basis. What are the assigned responsibilities of the central (national) governing entity and what are those of the regional (state/province/local) governmental jjurisdiction? In other words, how is authority divided on an area vs. functional basis? descriptions or definitions of this division of authority on an area basis have employed a variety of terms to guide analysis, interpretations, and advocacy. Examples of such terms or concepts are: Federalism (Elazar, 1987), Intergovernmental Relations (Anderson, 1960; Wright, 1988), Central-Local Relations (Horie and Nagata, 1999) Local Autonomy (Horie and Nishio, 1997) and Multi-Level Governance (Hooge and Marks, 2003).For purposes of this paper we have opted for the concept of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). Among other issues addressed in the paper, the choice of this concept is elaborated and clarified. The central component of the paper, however, is a historical analysis of the phases of IGR in Korea and Japan. This approach to the study of IGR as phases (periods or eras) has established precedents (Elazar, 1990; Wright, 1988, 1997; Koike and Wright, 1998). This serial or sequential approach has also utility in a comparative sense (Koike and Wright, 1998; orie and Nishio, 1997). This paper extends prior analyses to development of IGR in Korea and Japan. Both nations have recently instituted various reforms involving IGR. It is appropriate and pertinent to examine these developments and to place them in a comparative context.

Recentralising while Decentralising: Centre-Local Relations and “CEO” Governors in Thailand

The period since the mid 1990s has coincided with a largely endogenous movement in Thailand to renegotiate centre-local relations ostensibly in favour of increased decentralisation. This article addresses this movement and considers the so-called “CEO” governors introduced by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2003. It argues that Thailand’s decentralisation reforms ironically have created new opportunities for national politicians to renegotiate centre-local relations in favour of a more recentralised system.

Central-Local Relations in an Era of Multi-Level Governance: The Case of Public Participation Policy in England, 1997-2001

The election of a 'New Labour' UK government in 1997 promised a new era of central-local relations facilitated by a programme of local government reform which recognised local government's 'community leadership' role. Other aspects of the agenda supported the development of multi-level governance, for example, the establishment of sub-national institutions such as the Scottish Parliament and the promotion of neighbourhoods as key sites for action. Despite these actions this paper will argue that in England the central state retains considerable influence over the key agents of local governance. Using the example of public participation policy, and drawing on the findings of a recent study in two English cities, the paper will explore how national policy aspirations were reflected locally. It concludes that while local action generally complemented national priorities, there were important points of contrast, and that localities' capacity to act in their own interests is supported by the opportunities presented in a multi-level governance environment.

Local Government: Choice within Constraint

Local government continues to experience significant change in many areas. While these changes impose significant constraints upon the actions of local government, there remains considerable scope for the exercise of discretion and significant choices to be made within such constraints. This scope for choice within constraint is illustrated through five areas: year two of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment, further developments in the new political management structures, regional government and the potential reorganisation of local government, the return of local government finance to the central–local relations debate, and the evolution of e-government. In examining these areas, it is apparent that the opportunities for choice are much greater than is conventionally accepted, especially outside of the government's core priority areas.

Unravelling Control Freakery: Redefining Central-Local Government Relations

Central-local relations have been of particular interest since the Labour government came to power in 1997. Both academics and practitioners have pointed to tensions within the Labour government's reform agenda—between a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach; between a drive for national standards and the encouragement of local learning and innovation; and between strengthening executive leadership and enhancing public participation. It is argued that while Labour's modernisation strategy has clear elements of a top-down approach (legislation, inspectorates, white papers, etc) there is also a significant bottom-up dimension (a variety of zones, experiments and pilots, albeit with different degrees of freedom). This article utilises a multi-level governance framework of analysis and argues that, while much of the research using such frameworks has hitherto focused on the EU, recent developments in governance at neighbourhood, local authority, sub-regional and regional levels facilitate its application within a nation state. The central thesis is that, while there is extensive interaction between actors at sub-national level, this should not be seen as a proxy for policy influence. The local political arena is characterised less by multi-level governance than by multi-level dialogue. Sub-national actors participate but they are rarely major players in shaping policy outcomes: the plurality which characterises sub-central governance does not reflect a pluralist power structure.

On Governmental Reform in China: Two Suggestions from Japanese Experiences

This paper explores the, as yet unresolved, crucial question of how best to conduct reforms aimed at controlling government size and improving relations between central and local governments. It suggests two ideas widely promoted and practiced in Japan, the ceiling control system and the fusion system of central-local relations. I argue that China could set up a ceiling control system to fix the total number of governmental departments and commissions and the maximum number of staff, and establish an institutionalized “fusion system” to promote decentralization. The paper demonstrates how these can be implemented to revise current reform practices.

The challenges of implementing decentralisation: recent experiences in Uganda

AbstractDecentralisation, which began in Uganda in 1993, has increased opportunities for citizens to democratically determine how they should be governed and to make choices regarding the type and quality of public services they want. Citizens are now empowered to elect on a periodic basis persons whom they think can serve their interests on local councils. These changes have caused a major realignment in central–local relations. Some of the most important reforms have been led by the District Development Programme and the Local Government Development Programme, which are a focus of this article. Since the process began, numerous achievements have been realised in terms of improving governance and service delivery through democratic participation and community involvement. Despite these achievements, Uganda still faces a number of major challenges in deepening and institutionalising decentralisation. These challenges include, among others, technical capacity deficiencies in local governments and tensions among key stakeholders competing to maximise their role in decentralisation. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local–central relations

AbstractDecentralisation advocates argue that decentralised governments are more responsive to the needs of the poor than central governments and thus are more likely to conceive and implement pro‐poor policies. Recent evidence from a selected group of sub‐Saharan African countries is reviewed in a comparative framework that highlights factors associated with success in poverty reduction. It is argued that the degree of responsiveness to the poor and the extent to which there is an impact on poverty are determined primarily by the politics of local–central relations and the general regime context—particularly the ideological commitment of central political authorities to poverty reduction. In most of the cases, ‘elite capture’ of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the countryside. Popular perceptions of the logic of patronage politics, combined with weak accountability mechanisms, have reinforced this outcome. The conclusion from these African cases is that decentralisation has not empowered challenges to local elites who are resistant or indifferent to pro‐poor policies. Thus, decentralisation is unlikely to lead to more pro‐poor outcomes without a serious effort to strengthen and broaden accountability mechanisms at both local and national levels. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The multiple strategies of the Local Government Association: partner, player and think-tank?

English The Local Government Association (LGA) is the national association for English local government. This article draws some conclusions about contemporary English central-local relations from the strategies and structures of the LGA. We test three models. The ‘partner’ model implies that the LGA is, or ought to be, in a trusting and equal relationship with the centre. The ‘bargaining’ model envisages a centre dependent on local government’s considerable resources and resigned to the necessity for negotiation and compromise. The ‘strong centre’ approach posits a central government with the autonomy to impose its policies without the need to enter into meaningful negotiations.

Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland Post-Devolution

Central-local relations in Scotland pre-devolution were different to a degree, but the overall substance and rationale behind them tended to be very similar to those in England. This article outlines post-devolution developments in Scotland. As in England, 'partnership' has dominated the rhetoric of central politicians and policy-makers. This has masked significant differences in approach to central-local relations. The Scottish Executive has focused on central-local relations as a topic in its own right, regulatory oversight arrangements are less heavy-handed and the new parliament has increased transparency. Despite its more 'light touch' approach, the executive has successfully imposed its agenda on Scottish local government. Attention is however beginning to focus on 'delivery'. Given the non-executant nature of the executive, this will increase its focus on local councils. Failure to deliver will impose serious strains on the much-hyped central-local partnership.

From Guided Democracy to Multi-Level Governance: Trends in Central-Local Relations in the Nordic Countries

(2002). From Guided Democracy to Multi-Level Governance: Trends in Central-Local Relations in the Nordic Countries. Local Government Studies: Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 74-90.

Central-Local Financial Relations in South Africa

Central-Local Financial Relations in South Africa

Competition in Local Services: Solid Waste Management

This document (of 196 pages) comprises the proceedings of an OECD roundtable on promoting competition in local services with a special focus on competition in handling solid waste. Many natural monopolies are not under the authority of central or federal government, but are the responsibility of local or municipal governments. Do local governments have incentives to ensure competition and efficiency in the provision of services under their authority? The answer may depend on central-local government relations and factors such as the size of transfers of funds from central to local government. In most cities, one such natural monopoly is the collection of solid waste from households and small business. How should the collection of solid waste be organised? Because the level of sunk investment in providing these services is limited, they can be purchased through competition for-the-market in the form of competitive tendering. Experience in many cities shows that competitive tendering can yield greater efficeincy and lower prices than either self-provision or regulated monopoly. However, competitive tendering is far from straightforward. Close attention must be paid to promoting competition in the bidding process, to the prevention of hold-up problems and to maintaining the incentives for investment, quality and efficient adjustment of prices over the life of the contract. How might competition in the bidding process be enhanced? What is the proper role of competition law enforcement? What is the best way to ensure that quality is maintained over the life of the contract? This document consists of a background paper by the Secretariat, country submissions from 9 OECD countries and a summary of the oral discussion.

Community governance and the new central–local relationship

Decentralisation used to be a top–down process with the state “granting” some more local autonomy. Today decentralisation drives in most developed countries also go bottom–up. This is happening because large areas of domestic policy–making in these countries have become intergovernmental in nature. In the process the cities and agglomerations have acquired increased bargaining power, the higher levels of government depending on them as implementers of their legislation and programmes. The local authorities have also stepped up their endogenous problem solving and “community governance” capacity by mustering local support, building partnerships and modernising their bureaucracies. As a result a readjusted central–local balance based on a philosophy of “cooperative dualism” seems to be evolving. However, consistent legislative support and a proactive strategy of the local authorities taking due account of the basic interests of the state are needed to fully exploit the modernisation potential of the new central–local balance.

Values and Purpose in Government: Central‐local Relations in Regulatory Perspective

This paper explores the relationship between theories of regulation and governmentality, showing how a synthesis of the two approaches may be used in the analysis of central‐local relations. The basis of the current trend towards greater partnership and cooperation in the regulation of local by central government is argued to lie in the linking of increasingly selective imperium and dominium controls with ‘responsibilization’ strategies involving techniques of accounting, audit, and contracting. Following Nonet and Selznick, the substantive and purposive nature of state action is placed at the centre of the analysis. In this perspective, the ideal of responsive regulation implies not just technical effectiveness, but the harnessing of regulatory forces and ‘governmental’ resources in endeavours to achieve legitimate regulatory objectives. While New Labour's regulatory style is more likely to prove effective than that of the Conservatives, it may be criticized for a similar failure to implement fundamental values of openness and participation in the determination of regulatory purposes.

Central-Local Government Relations in Transition: The Case of Swedish Child Care

The provision of subsidized child care has grown to become asizeable economic activity in Sweden during recent decades.This paper examines the changed financial relation betweencentral and local governments and the impact of child-caregrants on local government behaviour. We find that during anearlier regime, with a system of matching grants, localgovernments responded strongly to the incentives of the rules.This resulted in both intended and unintended outcomes, aswell as a distortion of information to the central government.Experiences from a recent transition of regime towards a kindof closed block grant system, illustrates new types ofadaptive behaviour but also the problem of finding a formulafor a fair allocation of resources among local governments.When designing a block grant system a distinction must be madebetween expenditures and resource needs; cost expenditure datado not necessarily reflect resource needs in cases where thereare national categorical equity goals related to socialservices of a merit-want character.

Room for Manoeuvre? An Actor-network Study of Central-Local Relations in Development Plan Making

This article explores some of the connections and tensions between central and local government as exhibited in the British plan-making process. Research into this topic draws on case studies of the plan-writing process in two locales and analyses these from an actor-network perspective. In particular, the processes of constituting both ‘central government’ and more ‘local’ networks are explored through comparing the two cases. Whilst it was found that a ‘central government’ network ordered much of the plan-writing activities in both cases, significant room for manoeuvre was created for ‘councils’ and ‘planning officers’ in particular. It is concluded, however, that this room for manoeuvre was not fully explored by these groups, and instead established procedures were replicated.