Central Government Departments Research Articles

Criminal obsessions: crime isn't the only harm

A month before Christmas a close friend was ice-skating with her daughter on an open-air ice rink. She fell and broke her arm in two places after hitting a rough patch on the ice. She was off work for a number of days and spent many hours in hospital. Subsequently, she discovered that five people that week had broken their arms after falling on the same rink. It was obvious that a combination of too many skaters and lack of maintenance were key elements in the ‘accidents’. There is no legal requirement that these falls are ‘notified’ to a central government department and published on a regular basis. They will form part of some set of ‘accident’ statistics but will receive very little media attention when published. Now imagine the uproar if five people had been attacked in a city centre on five separate occasions and all had their arms broken. There would be a public uproar demanding that the Chief Constable do something about it. Moreover, the events would be recorded in the police statistics.

A Decade of Decentralisation? Assessing the Role of the Government Offices for the English Regions

The Government Offices for the English regions were established in 1994 to coordinate the regional activities of three central government departments. A decade on, regional government in England is greatly expanded, and two other institutions of regional governance, the Regional Development Agencies and the Regional Assemblies, have also been created. In 2002 the Labour government proposed that this ‘triad’ of regional governance should be further reformed and strengthened, in some places being brought to democratic account. In this paper, we argue that academic research on the English regions has generally focused on the Regional Development Agencies and to a lesser extent the Regional Assemblies, to the exclusion of the Government Offices. This focus has led some to overstate the extent to which regional government represents the real decentralisation of power. Focusing on the role of the Government Offices, we argue that central government retains a great deal of power over the ‘triad’ institutions, which in their current form may be unable to challenge the structure of power in the English state.

Partnership Overload in North West Birmingham

The possible adverse consequences of many regeneration partnerships in a single area was raised by Peck and Tickell in 1994 and the Audit Commission in 1998 and again in 2005. This paper illustrates some of the issues through a study of four regeneration partnerships active in North West Birmingham. They operate in an area which has some of the highest unemployment in Britain, and has participated in almost every government-funded regeneration initiative since the 1980s. They work in the context also of the Birmingham Strategic Partnership charged with co-ordinating activity across the whole city, and the City Council's decentralisation to Districts, Wards and Neighbourhood Forums, with its own political and partnership structures. This article compares and contrasts the four partnerships, showing how each is the result of a separate central government initiative. In theory the resources available to the different partnerships could be pooled, and then reallocated so that there was only one regeneration partnership in each area, on a scale much smaller than those of the Regeneration Zones, Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder, or SRB6 project considered in this paper The outcome would be more on the scale of the Aston Pride New Deal for Communities. For this to happen, the Treasury would have to force central government departments to let go far more than hitherto. It is more likely that the present overlaps will continue.

The Implementation of Resource Accounting in UK Central Government

At the end of a long process of transition from cash accounting, UK central government departments discharged their public accountability in 2001–02 by presenting Departmental Resource Accounts (DRAs) to Parliament. This article assesses the implementation of Resource Accounting, focusing on timeliness (measured by certification lags) and accounts quality (measured by the property of not being qualified). The descriptive statistics indicate substantial variation in certification lag. The estimated OLS regression model has strong explanatory power. Explanatory variables include those that can be regarded as enduring and those that are attributable to the transition process. The enduring variables are: new DRA, consolidation, audit qualification and pension scheme (whose statistically significant positive coefficients show that these are associated with longer certification lags) and percentage of Appropriations-in-Aid (statistically significant negative coefficient). The transitional variables are Executive Agency and a dummy for 2001–02 (whose statistically significant negative coefficients show that these are associated with shorter certification lags). Potential for shorter certification lags is identified, as are administrative deficiencies that delay the arrival of some certified DRAs into the public domain. Accounts quality improved during the transition period, though problems still occur in some departments that are important in terms of expenditure and assets.

Freedom or coercion?: NPM incentives in New Zealand central government departments

Incentives have a major presence in the language of new public management (NPM) which seeks to apply agency theory concepts and market sector practices to government. This article examines the experience of New Zealand central government departments with a series of financial management incentives built on an accrual accounting base centred on outputs. These incentives included a capital charge, the treatment of departmental surpluses and interest earned on cash balances, and performance-based rewards for chief executives. How well these operated is examined in light of avowed principles of managerial freedom and competition with alternative providers. The incentives, and the rules accompanying them, are found to have been developed in a fashion that has eroded the resources of departments, and their ability to deliver services over the longer term, and constrains managerial freedom. Accordingly, claims about the applicability of private sector models, managerial freedom and transparency needed to be treated with caution.

Freedom or coercion?NPM incentives in New Zealand central government departments

Abstract Incentives have a major presence in the language of new public management (NPM) which seeks to apply agency theory concepts and market sector practices to government. This article examines the experience of New Zealand central government departments with a series of financial management incentives built on an accrual accounting base centred on outputs. These incentives included a capital charge, the treatment of departmental surpluses and interest earned on cash balances, and performance-based rewards for chief executives. How well these operated is examined in light of avowed principles of managerial freedom and competition with alternative providers. The incentives, and the rules accompanying them, are found to have been developed in a fashion that has eroded the resources of departments, and their ability to deliver services over the longer term, and constrains managerial freedom. Accordingly, claims about the applicability of private sector models, managerial freedom and transparency needed to be treated with caution.

Big Windows and Little Windows: Implementation in the ‘Congested State’

This paper argues for the need to re‐assess models of policy implementation in the ‘congested state’. This re‐appraisal focuses on two main directions. The first involves locating implementation in the context of wider models of the policy process. We fuse three models, those of Kingdon, Wolman, and Challis et al., to form a new ‘policy streams’ approach. The second examines implementation in multi‐level governance. In the UK and elsewhere, much of the focus of traditional implementation studies has been on the link between one central government department and a local agency. However, this vertical (central‐local) dimension fails to give sufficient stress to the other horizontal dimensions of ‘central‐central’ and ‘local‐local’. Paraphrasing Kingdon's terms, implementation models also need to incorporate the ‘little windows’ at local level as well as the ‘big’ windows at national level. Using evidence relating to the implementation of UK policy towards health inequalities, this paper argues successful implementation is more likely when the three policy streams are linked across the three dimensions. The model is thought to be applicable to other areas of the public sectors and complex issues facing all governments.

The disclosure of key performance indicators in the public sector

This article investigates the disclosure of key performance indicators in the annual reports of Irish public sector organizations. It begins by discussing the two main driving forces behind public sector bodies disclosing performance information in their annual reports for the first time as well as looking at other contributing factors. The present situation with regard to the disclosure of key performance indicators in the whole of Ireland is then analysed. A number of annual reports from central government departments or agencies, local government bodies, other public sector entities and, in the case of the Republic of Ireland, semi-state organizations are examined to see whether such information is being disclosed and, more importantly, whether performance indicators are being linked to predetermined objectives and targets.

An Incremental Odyssey: The Structural Europeanisation of Government Bureaucracy

For over a quarter of a century departments of central government in the United Kingdom have faced a number of challenges stemming from UK membership of the European Union (EU), previously the European Community (EC). In effect, UK government bureaucracy, as with that of other member states, has undergone adaptation processes of various sorts as it has sought to accommodate demands springing from an essentially supranational body. Thus, as the UK plays a role in EC/EU policy and decision-making, so various parts of Whitehall have undergone Europeanising processes whereby the structure, working practices and policy-related functions of departments are impacted upon as they seek to accommodate and assimilate the ever-encroaching effects of the European

Bridging the GAAP across the UK public sector

Most of the UK public sector has made the transition to accruals based accounting e.g. central government departments, local government and the National Health Service. All have claimed an adherence to UK GAAP and it is intended to produce Whole of Government Accounts 2005/06 on a GAAP basis. This paper questions whether UK public sector accounting is really converging on GAAP and the extent to which there is comparability between the various parts of the public sector and between the public sector and the private sector. Using illustrations from the MoD, a local authority and a NHS trust, the compliance of public sector accounting practice with the Accounting Standard Board's Statement of Principles and reporting standards is investigated. The reasons for modifications to UK GAAP are then considered. It is concluded that the UK public sector is making unique and ad hoc adaptations to GAAP. These adaptations have been fragmentary and lack uniformity across the public sector. Furthermore, in its extensive use of current values the UK public sector could be argued to be ahead of the private sector rather than in alignment. Much work needs to be undertaken on an underpinning theoretical framework to enable accounting within and between the sectors to be bridged.

Taiwan's new national health insurance program: genesis and experience so far.

In 1995, after a planning effort of about half a decade, the Republic of China (Taiwan) replaced a previous patchwork of separate social health insurance funds with one single-payer, national health insurance scheme that is administered by an agency of the central government's Department of Health. Within a year this bold legislative act brought the health care utilization rates of the 41 percent of Taiwan's hitherto uninsured population up to par with those of the previously insured population. This paper describes the achievements of this policy initiative so far, along with the growing pains it has encountered, and seeks to extract lessons from the experience for health policymakers in other countries.

Subnational Lobbying and Structural Funds: A French–Scottish Comparison

This article examines subnational actors’ engagement with the European Union's structural funds, and whether these actors are significant in this policy sector. It examines this question by comparing one French regional council with one set of Scottish local authorities. It concludes that there are considerable similarities between the subnational actors studied, in spite of differences in their location and the constitutional structure within which they are located. The subnational actors have unilaterally developed a capacity for engaging in the policy sector. In both cases, however, this engagement is not evidence of a ‘by-passing’ of the central government. Instead, the subnational authorities have worked alongside central government departments to achieve their goals.

From Practice to Policy in Environmental Education

This paper briefly describes an experimental environmental education course introduced into the school curriculum in a mountainous, rural area of Uttaranchal state in Northern India. The rationale for this experiment was the perceived need to try alternative approaches to environmental education to those mandated by existing government policy.The course is a joint venture between a local NGO and the central and state government departments of education. Following a 15-year development and testing phase, the course is being incorporated into the curriculum of all government schools in the state since 2002. The implications of the results of this experiment for future environmental education policy are discussed. In essence, the experiment has been a collaborative learning experiment among policy makers, educational administrators, curriculum planners, textbook writers, teachers, children and parents. New ways of thinking and doing have emerged and are owned by all participants. The process involves questioning all our existing assumptions about education, science, history and, in general, the contemporary global cultural model.The paper concludes that at present environmental education policy could most usefully focus on fostering a variety of such experiments with the expectation that they will lead to more effective policies and practices in the long run.

Struggling for supremacy: the case of UK public audit institutions

Abstract In recent years, there has been concern over the diversity of audit practice in the UK public sector. In response to these concerns the four constituent national audit agencies (the National Audit Office (NAO), Audit Commission, Scottish Accounts Commission and the Northern Ireland Audit office) set up a Public Audit Forum to provide a focus for developmental thinking in relation to public audit. The government also established a review (the Sharman review) to examine audit and accountability arrangements for central government departments. The review has recommended that the NAO be given greater access to companies and other bodies in receipt of substantial amounts of public money and that auditors should be responsible for the external validation of performance information. Behind such consultations and recommendations, however, there are a number of major, ongoing “turf-battles between the public audit agencies themselves and between the agencies and central government. Such battles are deserving of more attention, as they highlight some fundamental weaknesses in the public audit function, especially with respect to its capacity to operate in a manner independent of the government.

The Economic Development Role of English RDAs: The Need for Greater Discretionary Power

In the late 1990s Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were introduced into the English economic development policy and partnership landscape. Cited as a way in which to improve regional competitiveness and innovation, their task is to build institutional capacity by creating a strategic context for sub-regional organizations and fostering partnerships. This article examines developing inter-institutional relations between RDAs, sub-regional organizations and central government departments in the field of learning and skills, business support and inward investment. It suggests that a lack of discretionary power and resources has undermined RDA ability to pursue their strategic aims and influence other organizations. In response, RDAs have concentrated on particular activities and developed relations with certain partners.

Outcome-focused Management in the United Kingdom

In 1998, the Government of the United Kingdom conducted a Comprehensive Spending Review which examined the resources allocated to each area of spending, and for the first time decided on and published the service improvements and reforms required in return for the resources allocated to departments’ expenditure programmes. These requirements were set out in Public Service Agreements (PSAs) for every central government department published in December 1998. Each PSA sets out the aim and objectives of each department as well as performance targets, including measures of operations and outcomes. The government’s second spending review in 2000 resulted in revised PSAs, and excluded those expenditure programmes for which the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly have executive responsibility following the devolved constitutional arrangements.

Partnerships and public procurement: building social capital through supply relations

As one means of dealing with an increasingly interdependent or shared power ‘noone in charge’ world (Bryson and Crosby 1992) and adapting the public sector to the demands of the global economy, successive administrations in the UK have aimed to develop a more strategic approach to public procurement by emphasizing inter–departmental co–ordination and establishing long–term partnership relations with suppliers. This has proved to be a difficult task, however, as the operating framework and culture of the public sector have hindered the development of interorganizational relationships and trust. By focusing on the co–operative processes and interaction within central government departments and between departments and the private sector, this paper aims to analyse and identify the obstacles to, and opportunities for, implementing long–term supply relations and facilitating departmental co–ordination. While the paper argues that partnership relations can build social capital, it also shows that these resources can have both positive and negative effects for public procurement. To conclude, lessons for developing collaborative arrangements in public procurement are identified.

Should Non‐Financial Performance Information be Audited? The Case ofPublic Service Agreements in UK Government

A growing level of controversy surrounds the right of the UK National Audit Office (NAO) to audit public service agreements (PSAs) – documents which detail the performance, against targets, of central government departments. The NAO has not been granted a statutory role, although an independent official review of accountability and audit in UK central government has recently concluded that the external validation of departmental information systems is a crucial first step towards validation of key published data. In the context of growing academic concern over the scale and achievements of (public) audit, it is pertinent to ask whether such a potential extension in the rights and scope of the NAO's audit work is necessary or likely to enhance public accountability and improve the performance of government departments and audit bodies.

The 1ears of Borough Government: 1986 to 2000

Abolition of the G.L.C. led to a complex web of governmental institutions for London consisting of specific offices within central government departments, various appointed boards, and the boroughs and City of London. The Departments of Environment and Transport both had regional offices governing London. The Government Office for London was perhaps the most important of reforms instituted after 1992. The post 1986 framework for government relied heavily on government appointed or controlled institutions. Fragmentation led to pressures for joint arrangements and inter-borough co-operation, emphasising the need to overcome the fractious behaviour that had characterised relations prior to 1986. Abolition transferred significant powers to the boroughs and these, together with new responsibilities, enhanced their authority. Different forms of partnerships emerged, including city-wide, multi-borough and private-public committees.

The 1ears of Borough Government: 1986 to 2000

Abolition of the G.L.C. led to a complex web of governmental institutions for London consisting of specific offices within central government departments, various appointed boards, and the boroughs and City of London. The Departments of Environment and Transport both had regional offices governing London. The Government Office for London was perhaps the most important of reforms instituted after 1992. The post 1986 framework for government relied heavily on government appointed or controlled institutions. Fragmentation led to pressures for joint arrangements and inter-borough co-operation, emphasising the need to overcome the fractious behaviour that had characterised relations prior to 1986. Abolition transferred significant powers to the boroughs and these, together with new responsibilities, enhanced their authority. Different forms of partnerships emerged, including city-wide, multi-borough and private-public committees.