Central Bank Preferences Research Articles

Taylorovo pravidlo a HMU - stanovení preferencí monetární politiky ECB

The aim of the article is to evaluate the preferences of the ECB in monetary policy and to compare them with preferences of the central banks of new EU member countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The ECB's responsibility for the primary objective (price stability) often contrasts with the requirement for economic growth stabilization policy from the national governments. There are doubts if the current members of Eurozone constitute an optimum currency area (the Eurozone 12 is recently the combination of rapidly growing and slow-growing - low inflationary countries). The differences between the countries will even expand during the European monetary union enlargement by new EU member countries. Consequently the probability of asymmetric shocks will increase. The main question is the ability of ECB to fulfill the needs of all EMU member countries in terms of optimal monetary policy. In the first part the authors analyze differences between the preferences of the ECB and national authorities (governments). The negative experiences of Ireland, Italy and other EMU members with current status quo help us to understand fear of future member countries from possible impact of common monetary policy on their national economies. The second part of the paper deals with interest rates determination by ECB and compares it with expectations (requirements) from EMU member and EMU candidate countries. The main contribution of the article may be seen in central bank's preferences analyses – the preferences are defined as the parameters in Taylor rule (the weights given by ECB and national authorities to the price stability and economic growth stimulation). The hypothesis is defined as following: are the preferences of ECB in line with the preferences of national central banks of EMU candidate countries? The empirical analysis is based on the Taylor rule decomposition. The hypothesis is tested by regression analysis. Time series regression model uses relations between the inflation target, potential output, current macroeconomic situation on the one side and current monetary policy strategy, represented by interest rates, on the other side. A range of empirical studies refers to differences between the desired interest rates of member and future member countries of EMU. The level of desired interest rates changes continuously according to the current economic situation of individual national economies. The differences are given by dissimilarities in financial systems, transmission mechanisms, and historical context of monetary arrangements. The authors suppose that the national authorities' and central banks' preferences are constant in the short time or identical before and after enlargement. The main idea of the article is that the traditional approach, which compares desired interest rates by national central banks, is irrelevant before full membership in EMU. The center of the problem is the mutual agreement on preferences of common monetary policy. The answer to the question: how to evaluate real impact of common monetary policy on real economy of EMU candidate countries after their entrance to Eurozone, is expected result of the article.

Monetary Regime Switches and Central Bank Preferences

Monetary policy objectives and targets are not necessarily constant over time. The regime-switching literature has typically analyzed and interpreted changes in policymakers' behavior through simple interest rate rules. This paper analyzes policy regime switches by explicitly modeling policymakers' behavior and objectives. We show that changes in the parameters of simple rules do not necessarily correspond to changes in policymakers' preferences. In fact, capturing and interpreting regime changes in preferences through interest rate rules can lead to misleading results.

Identificando as preferências do banco central do Brasil (2002-2013)

Este trabalho estima os parâmetros de preferência do Banco Central do Brasil para o período compreendido entre 2002 e 2013. Para isso, analisamos um problema de otimização do Banco Central em uma economia aberta. A equação de Euler que soluciona tal problema permite utilizar o método generalizado dos momentos (GMM) para estimação eficiente dos parâmetros. Tal abordagem separa os parâmetros de preferência daqueles relacionados às condições estruturais da economia brasileira, ao contrário do que ocorre na estimação direta de uma regra de política monetária. Os resultados encontrados indicam grau relativamente elevado de flexibilidade do regime de metas de inflação no Brasil, sugerindo que a estabilização do produto em torno de seu potencial constitui objetivo relevante nas decisões de política monetária, em detrimento ao controle inflacionário estrito. A flexibilidade do regime parece ter sido aprofundada na gestão de Alexandre Tombini à frente do Banco Central do Brasil.

The Balance Sheet Channel

In this paper, we study the role of the credit channel of monetary policy in the context of a DSGE model. Through the use of a regulated banking sector subject to a regulatory capital constraint on lending, we provide alternative interpretations that can potentially explain differences in the implementation of monetary policy without appealing to ad-hoc central bank preferences. This is accomplished through the characterization of the external finance premium as a function of bank leverage and systemic aggregate risk.

Comportamento da função do Banco Central do Brasil: Uma análise para o período do sistema de metas de inflação

: The reaction function of the Central bank expresses the preferences of the monetary authority with respect of deviations of his inflation target and the output gap. This paper evaluates the Brazilian Central Bank’s preferences and its changes during the inflation targeting period. The model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) is employed in a forward looking version. Time series econometrics is the statistical tool. Results show that the preferences of the Brazilian Central Bank are asymmetrical with respect to its goals. The monetary policymaker is more sensitive to price stability, but also takes output in account and smooth´s the interest rate over time. The monetary authority reacted stronger to controlled prices while Arminio Fraga and Henrique Meirelles were incumbent and to free prices during the Alexandre Tombini period. During financial instability periods the weight of price stability grows. There are signs that monetary policy power is increasing during the inflation targeting period, as also finds the Brazilian Central Bank.

Measuring the Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy in Indonesia

This study measured the time inconsistency of monetary policy in Indonesia using the asymmetric preference parameter in linear exponential loss function of the central bank. Asymmetric central bank preference becomes an important issue since many of the results on the time inconsistency problem under symmetric preferences may no longer hold under asymmetric preferences. Using two sub-samples, i.e. before and after the implementation of central bank independence act, the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the output gap were estimated and then proceed to estimate the reduced form of the model. The results showed the existence of an asymmetric preference parameter before the Bank Indonesia independence act, which indicated the presence of a time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This finding implies Bank Indonesia put a negative weight instead of positive weight on the output gap prior to its independency. However, after the implementation of central bank independence, the monetary policy of Bank Indonesia has been consistent with symmetric policy preference over price stability and output. Keywords: Time inconsistency, discretionary, monetary policy, asymmetric central bank preference, output gap, inflation bias.JEL Classification : E52, E58

MENGUKUR TIME INCONSISTENCY KEBIJAKAN MONETER DI INDONESIA

This study measured the time inconsistency of monetary policy in Indonesia using the asymmetric preference parameter in linear exponential loss function of the central bank. Asymmetric central bank preference becomes an important issue since many of the results on the time inconsistency problem under symmetric preferences may no longer hold under asymmetric preferences. Using two sub-samples, i.e. before and after the implementation of central bank independence act, the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the output gap were estimated and then proceed to estimate the reduced form of the model. The results showed the existence of an asymmetric preference parameter before the Bank Indonesia independence act, which indicated the presence of a time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This finding implies Bank Indonesia put a negative weight instead of positive weight on the output gap prior to its independency. However, after the implementation of central bank independence, the monetary policy of Bank Indonesia has been consistent with symmetric policy preference over price stability and output. Keywords: Time inconsistency, discretionary, monetary policy, asymmetric central bank preference, output gap, inflation bias.JEL Classification : E52, E58

A DSGE Model for a SOE with Systematic Interest and Foreign Exchange Policies in Which Policymakers Exploit the Risk Premium for Stabilization Purposes

Abstract This paper builds a DSGE model for a small open economy (SOE) in which the central bank intervenes the domestic currency bond and FX markets using two policy rules: a Taylortype rule and a rule that determines the rate of nominal depreciation. The 2 ‘corner’ regimes, in which only one policy rule is used, are particular cases. The model is calibrated and implemented in Dynare for simple and optimal simple policy rules, and optimal policy under commitment. Numerical losses are obtained for ad-hoc loss functions for different sets of central bank preferences. The results show that the losses are lower when both policy rules are used. This is due to the central bank’s enhanced ability, when it uses the two policy rules, to influence private capital flows through the effects of its actions on the endogenous risk premium in the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity equation.

On the Limits of Transparency: The Role of Imperfect Central Bank Knowledge

AbstractThis paper studies the link between how much a central bank knows and reveals to the public. We focus on the central bank's attitude towards the evolving trade‐off in its preferences between inflation and output. These preferences may shift depending on the economic structure and the composition of the monetary policy committee, making the central bank reluctant to commit to a specific trade‐off between inflation and output. The quality of the information disclosed to the public is higher the more the central bank knows about how its preferences may evolve. The public forms inflation expectations reacting to the information it receives about central bank preferences, but also taking into account the worst possible inflation outcome. Macroeconomic stability is at its highest when the central bank reveals all the information it possesses about its preferences, regardless of how much the central bank knows about them. The quality of the information revealed to the public may also enhance macroeconomic stability.

Testing asymmetries in Central Bank preferences in a small open economy: A study for Brazil

Abstract In this paper, we extend Surico's (2007a) model to an open economy and test if the Brazilian Central Bank's loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate from its target. Furthermore, we use tests for structural breaks to investigate changes in the conduct of policy and monetary authority's preferences. The results revealed that the Central Bank reacted more strongly to deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap after 2003. With regard to the monetary authority's preferences, estimates indicate only an asymmetric preference over an above-target inflation rate until mid-2003. After this period, the evidence obtained by estimating the reaction function with inflation expectations showed that the Central Bank has been more averse to positive deviations of inflation from its target.

Fiscal indiscipline and monetary policy in EMU: Is there any need for a fiscal policy concerned ECB?

In this article we study the conduct of monetary policy by adopting a monetary union model in which we assume that, departing form the dominant literature, the central bank is directly concerned also about the national fiscal policies. The novelty of our analysis lies in fact that, on the basis of this assumption about the central bank's preferences, we evaluate its stabilisation effort under different scenarios of fiscal policy discipline and coordination in the union. We find that the level of conservativeness of the central bank decreases, while the presence of institutions and tools for the control and the coordination enforcement of fiscal policies are still required. Governments' lack of coordination reduces the fiscal policies stabilisation effort of the central bank, but it increases the monetary authority's reaction to supply shocks.

Robust monetary policy under model uncertainty and inflation persistence

In this paper, we examine the inflation persistence puzzle by applying the robust control approach of Hansen and Sargent (2008). In line with the literature suggesting that inflation persistence may be affected by the monetary policy design and its institutional characteristics, we find that inflation persistence is positively related to the central bank's preference for model robustness. In effect, model uncertainty and robust decision making may be considered as a mechanism generating inflation persistence, for a given non-zero degree of autocorrelation in supply-side shocks. Further, the policy implication is that the central bank's monetary policy under model uncertainty renders, in terms of the sacrifice ratio, the output-cost of inflation stabilization more important.

Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and Discretion

This paper explains U.S. macroeconomic outcomes with an empirical New Keynesian model in which monetary policy minimizes the central bank’s loss function. The presence of expectations in the model forms a well‐known distinction between two modes of optimization, termed commitment and discretion. The model is estimated separately under each policy using maximum likelihood over the Volcker–Greenspan–Bernanke period. Comparisons of fit reveal that the data favor the specification with discretionary policy. Estimates of the loss function weights point to an excessive concern for interest rate smoothing in the commitment model but a more balanced concern relative to inflation and output stability in the discretionary model.

A NOTE ON MONETARY POLICY, ASSET PRICES, AND MODEL UNCERTAINTY

Using a macroeconomic model with asset prices, we analyze how optimal monetary policy and macroeconomic dynamics and performance are affected by a central bank's desire to be robust against model misspecifications. We show that a higher central bank preference for robustness implies a more aggressive reaction of the nominal interest rate to the expected future inflation rate and inflation shocks. The dynamic stability of the equilibrium is not modified for a sufficiently high preference for robustness. However, the speed of dynamic convergence is lower under robust control compared to a benchmark case without it and implies supplementary economic costs. Finally, an increase in the preference for robustness comes at the cost of higher macroeconomic and financial volatility in the presence of inflation shocks. It has no effect on the reaction of inflation, output gap, and asset price gap to shocks affecting goods and financial markets.

The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.

Evolving Perceptions of Central Bank Credibility: The European Central Bank Experience

What are the preferences of a central bank over inflation and output-gap stabilization objectives, and what is its preferred long-run inflation rate? While statements of priorities and goals are important, the credibility of such statements and the market perception of the policy reaction function of a central bank play a key role in determining economic outcomes. This point, early on described as the “credibility” of central bank policies, is a standard theoretical result with recent interpretation in the New Keynesian paradigms. It is also received wisdom among practitioners. The importance of the market perception of the central bank’s acceptable trade-offs between inflation and output goals as well its specific targets naturally leads to the question of how the market acquires this perception and whether and how it evolves over time. One view is that establishing an appropriate institutional structure is the key element in insulating the monetary authority from political pressure and thereby convincing markets that a central bank has a strong and unvarying aversion to inflation. A second, more dynamic, view focuses on the role that actual policy conduct plays in building the reputation of a central bank. These two different views have distinct implications for the relative importance of the institutional structure of a central bank, as compared to its conduct, for attaining and maintaining its credibility. A survey of the heads of central banks and prominent monetary economists reflects a belief that the credibility of a central bank is based more on its past actions than on institutional structures that afford it independence by insulating it from political concerns, although there is also a consensus that structurematters (Blinder 2000). Empirical research has found that institutional features related to central bank independence are associated with economic performance in cross sections of

The Optimal Width of the Central Bank Standing Facilities Corridor and Banks' Day - to - Day Liquidity Management

Containing short-term volatility of the overnight interest rate is normally considered the main objective of central bank standing facilities. This paper develops a simple stochastic model to show how the width of the central bank standing facilities corridor affects banks’ day-to-day liquidity management and the volatility of the overnight rate. It is shown that the wider the corridor, the greater the interbank turnover, the leaner the central bank’s balance sheet (i.e. the lower the average recourse to standing facilities) and the greater short-term interest rate volatility. The obtained relationships are matched with central bank preferences to obtain an optimal corridor width. The model is tested against euro area and Hungarian daily data encompassing the financial crisis that began in 2007.

The Design of a 'Two-Pillar' Monetary Policy Strategy

In this paper, it is argued that money supply in a narrow sense and repo interest rate are two independent monetary policy instruments when the effect of interest rate policy cannot be efficiently transmitted to the economy through the monetary and financial markets. In this case, the control of money supply is necessary to reduce the discrepancy between the repo interest rate and the interest rates at which private agents lend and borrow. Using a simple macro-economic model, this study shows how a twopillar monetary policy strategy as practiced by the European central bank (ECB) can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. This strategy can be interpreted as a combination of inflation targeting and monetary targeting. Well conceived monetary targeting with a commitment to a long-run money growth rate corresponding to inflation target could reinforce the credibility of central bank announcements and the role of inflation target as strong and credible nominal anchor for private inflation expectations. However, an inflation-targeting regime associated with Friedman’s money supply rule can generate dynamic instability in output, inflation and money demand. Three feedback monetary targeting rules, of which the design depends on economic structure and central bank preferences, are discussed relative to their capability of warranting macroeconomic stability.

Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences

We analyze the effects of imperfectly known central banker’s preferences on optimal linear contracts offered by the government and an interest group. These effects depend on the type of uncertainty faced by the principals. When the central bank’s output target is uncertain the results by Campoy and Negrete (Public Choice 137:197–206, 2008) under perfectly known preferences obtain. Uncertainty about the central banker’s degree of conservatism or about its degree of “selfishness” has a multiplicative impact on the principals’ instruments in the agent’s best response function; this may generate an inflation bias independently of the type of contract offered by the interest group.

Time-varying asymmetries in central bank preferences: The case of the ECB

This paper examines the asymmetric preferences of the European central bank (ECB) as identified by Surico (2007a, 2008). Under asymmetric preferences, a central banker places different weights on the losses associated with positive and negative deviations of economic variables such as inflation or output from their target values. Although asymmetry is conventionally estimated by the generalized method of moments, we use the bias correction Kalman filter suggested by Kim (2006), introducing the concept of time-varying asymmetry in central bank preferences. Estimates of the interest rate reaction functions suggest asymmetries in preferences for both output gap and interest rate. These asymmetries indicate that the ECB increases its interest rate aggressively when there is a surge in output but does not sustain an interest rate above its reference value.