Centre-right Coalition Research Articles

The Governance of the Center-Right Coalition

The Governance of the Center-Right Coalition

System Changes, Export-oriented Growth and Women in Hungary

DURING THE PERIOD OF STATE SOCIALISM Hungary was often called the 'happiest barrack' of the Soviet bloc, thanks to the relative flexibility of the political regime and comparatively high standard of living. A series of cautious economic and political reforms introduced from the 1960s made the system less rigid than most of its Eastern European counterparts. Political life was relatively open and in the economy there was a space for private initiatives and contacts with non-socialist economies as well. In the late 1980s a rather disorganised and 'watered-down' version of state socialism gave way to sweeping political changes. In principle Hungary's chances for a smooth transformation were rather good. The systemic changes, however, were followed by a major economic recession and political insecurities. After decades of political stability cemented by a rigid one-party system, free parliamentary elections led to a new government each time, each with rather different ideological and political backgrounds. In 1990 a centre-right conservative coalition took power, led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). After the 1994 elections the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, the reformed successor of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), and its former opposition, the Party of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), formed a socialist-liberal coalition. In 1998 the Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP), in coalition with the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) and the vestiges of the MDF, created a new right-wing coalition.

Financiamento da educação no Brasil: um balanço do Governo FHC (1995-2002)

O artigo busca fazer uma análise das principais medidas tomadas no Governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso com reflexos no financiamento da educação. Constata-se que, no período, aproveitando-se da hegemonia obtida no Congresso pela coalizão de centro-direita por ele articulada, foram aprovadas várias leis com forte impacto no financiamento da educação, tais como a LDB (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional), o FUNDEF (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério) e o Plano Nacional de Educação. Entende-se que a diretriz mestra adotada por este governo para o setor foi a de que os recursos já existentes são suficientes, cabendo apenas otimizar a sua utilização. Conclui-se afirmando que este governo será lembrado como aquele que gastou 4% do PIB com ensino e 8% do PIB com juros e encargos da dívida pública.

The Italian General Election of 13 May 2001: Democratic Alternation or False Step?

On 13 May 2001, Italy Elected To Power A Centre-Right Coalition headed by the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi. Forza Italia, the political party founded by Berlusconi in 1994 when he first decided to enter politics, became the most widely supported political force in the country with almost 30 per cent of the popular vote. Forza Italia's success was partly a result of its ability to ‘cannibalize’ the votes of two of its smaller coalition partners, the Biancofiore, an electoral coalition between the Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and the United Christian Democrats (CDU), and the Northern League (Lega Nord), both of whom saw their share of the vote fall sharply. The other party in Berlusconi's ‘House of Freedoms’ coalition, the National Alliance (AN), the formerly neo-fascist party that now sees itself as a pillar of the democratic right, held steady in electoral terms but remains very much a junior partner in the coalition.

On a hiding to nothing? Assessing the corporate governance of hospital and health services in New Zealand 1993-1998.

In New Zealand the governance of public sector hospital and health services has changed significantly over the past decade. For most of the century hospitals had been funded by central government grants but run by locally elected boards. In 1989 a reforming Labour government restructured health services along managerialist lines, including changing governance structures so that some area health board members were government appointments, with the balance elected by the community. More market oriented reform under a new National government abolished this arrangement and introduced (1993) a corporate approach to the management of hospitals and related services. The hospitals were established as limited liability companies under the Companies Act. This was an explicitly corporate model and, although there was some modification of arrangements following the election of a more politically moderate centre-right coalition government in 1996, the corporate model was largely retained. Although significant changes occurred again after the election of a Labour government in 1999, the corporate governance experience in New Zealand health services is one from which lessons can, nevertheless, be learnt. This paper examines aspects of the performance and process of corporate governance arrangements for public sector health services in New Zealand, 1993-1998.

On a hiding to nothing? assessing the corporate governance of hospital and health services in New Zealand 1993–1998

In New Zealand the governance of public sector hospital and health services has changed significantly over the past decade. For most of the century hospitals had been funded by central government grants but run by locally elected boards. In 1989 a reforming Labour government restructured health services along managerialist lines, including changing governance structures so that some area health board members were government appointments, with the balance elected by the community. More market oriented reform under a new National government abolished this arrangement and introduced (1993) a corporate approach to the management of hospitals and related services. The hospitals were established as limited liability companies under the Companies Act. This was an explicitly corporate model and, although there was some modification of arrangements following the election of a more politically moderate centre-right coalition government in 1996, the corporate model was largely retained. Although significant changes occurred again after the election of a Labour government in 1999, the corporate governance experience in New Zealand health services is one from which lessons can, nevertheless, be learnt. This paper examines aspects of the performance and process of corporate governance arrangements for public sector health services in New Zealand, 1993–1998. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Evolution of the Centre-Right and the State of Scottish Conservatism

This article considers the decline of Scottish Conservatism, 1951–97. The statistical data indicate that 91 percent of the variance in Tory support is accounted for by an underlying negative trend against time, that similar patterns appear when the data is disaggregated by region, and that short-term fluctuations have been more in conformity with English results than is conventionally understood. The process of generational change is seen as a waning of the cultural conditions which produced the centre-right coalition that dominated Scottish politics, 1931–64, and its fragmentation into Conservatism, Liberalism, and Scottish Nationalism. The changed circumstances are not seen as peculiarly Scottish, but the consequences for Scottish Conservatism of an evolution affecting the centre-right across the United Kingdom.

Fin de transition ? Les élections législatives du 13 mai 2001 en Italie

Italian Parliament elections of may 2001 have been the last step of a long political transition. Won by Berlusconi, the richest political man and Italian private entrepreneur, leading a centre-right coalition, these election have led to a strong political majority. This article deals with de social and political components of both coalitions. It then explains the reasons of the center-right coalition success, as well as the failure of center-left coalitions and that of the third way attempt, represented by two little parties which are now marginalized.

How to lose a majority: the competition in single–member districts

Few observers expected that the 1966 elections in Italy would yield a clear-cut outcome. Even fewer people expected that, after the disastrous results of the previous elections, the centre-left coalition would be able to gain a majority of seats in both branches of Parliament. Yet this is precisely what happened on 21 April 1996. This article tries to explain the comeback of the 1994 losers by focusing on three factors which have changed the electoral balance between the two major coalitions in the single-member districts. The first factor was the ability of the centre-left coalition (Ulivo-RC) to broaden its range while its major rival (the Polo) lost key allies. The result has been a more competitive stand of centre-left candidates, particularly in the North. The Polo lost the support of the Lega Nord and suffered the split of the Movimento Sociale on its right. These defections, along with others, led to the loss of a considerable number of seats. Finally, the Polo also suffered from the defection of a considerable number of its voters who voted for one of the parties of the centre-right coalition in the proportional arena, but refused to vote for the Polo candidate in the single-member districts. We conclude by suggesting a number of hypotheses that could explain this split-ticket phenomenon.

Parliamentary Elections of 1994 and the Development of the Bulgarian Party System

In the Bulgarian party system since the first free elections of 1990 the coalition of formations opposed to communism - the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) - was held together by the continuing strength of its opponent, the post-communist Socialist Party, yielding a case of delayed differentiation which sets Bulgaria off from the east-central European countries to its north. The elections of 1994 and their sequel saw the beginning of the end of the UDF's cohesion, but at the same time marked its consolidation as a party. Meanwhile the ideological transformation of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the ascendancy of a new generation of young, pragmatically orientated politicians entrenched the post-communist party in the evolving party system. In the political space between these two poles, a place seems assured for the party of the Turkish minority, whilst a centre-right coalition of the historical Democratic Party with the Agrarians emerged from the elections better placed than its closest rival, centre-left centre-left Democratic Alternative for teh Republic.

Export-Led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey

a narrow winning electoral coalition. The latter can be seen as part of the mechanism through which gains from trade are partially redistributed to those owners of factors who are most hurt by trade expansion.' There are a number of assumptions associated with these variables. With respect to public expenditures, they can be seen as of two kinds, those that enhance productivity and exports in a straightforward way and those that maintain the coalition and compensate losers in the new strategy through discretionary funds. These two kinds of public expenditure yield two kinds of discourse, one in which the efficiency of the market is lauded and one in which traditional patronage politics, centered in the government and the governing party, predominates. International creditors and business elites are attuned to the first discourse, while potential and actual voters listen to the second. A second assumption is that Turkey has established an electoral system in which the center-right predominates. Among the heterogeneous elements that make up the center-right, a party or parties can fashion a fairly narrow winning coalition under current electoral law. One segment of this coalition is the large business sector that is undertaking the export drive and making heavy claims on the public budget. But this sector can neither openly align itself with a specific party nor deliver votes commensurate with its financial claims. Therefore, the governing coalition must use large amounts of discretionary funding to keep other allies, richer in votes, in the coalition, as well as to neutralize broad segments of the population that experience a relative loss of income as the new strategy unfolds. Third, the large business sector will tolerate the use of these discretionary funds, which do not have a direct payoff in increased production or efficiency, because they provide the level of political stability necessary to sustain their activities.2 This point needs some elaboration. All of Turkish enterprise is highly leveraged and must walk a tight rope of working at near full capacity and meeting payments on increasingly costly debt. No matter how dynamic the economy, it has the appearance of a house of cards. Widespread default on debt held by the banking system could end the miracle. The loss of a few foreign markets could lead to such a default. If external creditors find their confidence in the export drive flagging, the flow of external credits that have sustained Turkey's high rate of imports, themselves

Sociale verkiezingen 1987 : Kaderleden verzwakken traditionele vakbonden

In 1987 the centre-right coalition was able to break through partially the triopoly of the three trade unions - the christian ACV, the socialist ABVV en the liberal ACLVB - by admitting to the four-yearly social elections separate lists of candidates for the members of the executive staffs.As a result of this, the position of the three unions weakened. The decline was most strongly felt by the ABVV; the socialist union lost 2.6 %. The minor loss of 0.7 % enabled the christian ACV to regain its position as the strongest Belgian union, a position which was taken for the first time in 1979 and was lost again in the elections of 1983.After thë recent social elections, neither the unions (43.7 % ), nor the « independent » National Confederation of the Executive Staff Members (34 .1 %), nor the individual lists of the members of the executive staffs (222 %) can cÏaim io be « the representator » of the members of the executive staffs.Through the analysis of the 1987 results, it is found once more that social elections are little affected by political events. The results of the social elections are in no way correlated to the results of the politicalelections.

New information technologies and development

The article analyses the role of Open Government Data policy as part of the broader public policy agenda of the UK government. A thematic analysis of interview, observational and policy documentation is presented which suggests that since 2010 the Open Government Data agenda has been used strategically by the UK's centre-right coalition government to progress a range of controversial policies, which are aimed at the continuation of the neoliberal form of state through its current crisis. Specifically, the relationship between Open Government Data policy and the neoliberal objectives of the marketisation of public services and privatisation of public assets, the leveraging of financial markets and the pharmaceutical industry, and the embedding of OGD into a broader agenda aimed at rebuilding trust in political elites are analysed. These findings are examined in relation to Braman's (2006, 2011) arguments regarding the strategic implementation of information policy by Governments in the exercising of state power, and the development of the ‘informational state’.

The Changing Party Scene in West Germany and the Consequences for Stable Democracy

In the 1980's the West Germany party system finds itself in a new stage of development which bodes well for the continued long-term development of the second republic. Drawing on research from the comparative historical development of party systems and democratic regimes as well as from analysis of the recent elections, it is suggested that the concentration process in the party system of 1949–1983 has evolved into a more dispersed pattern with predominantly positive consequences for the Bonn democracy. The rise of the Greens, the gradual decline of the SPD, and the center-right coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP are analyzed from the standpoint of their contribution to stable and effective democracy. The nature of the coalition dynamics on both sides of the right-left spectrum are discussed with the conclusion that while West Germany is predominantly a Parteiendemokratie, the new forms of participation, the further development of pluralism, and the increased competition of ideas make it a democracy governed essentially by parliamentary parties yet more responsive to extraparliamentary forces.

European journal of political research: R. J. Johnston, ‘The definition of voting regions in multi-party contests’, 10:3, September 1982, pp. 293–304

Using Italian municipality-level data on national elections and IV estimation strategy, we find that immigration generates a sizable causal increase in votes for the center-right coalition, which has a political platform less favorable to immigrants. Additional findings are: (i) the effect is heterogeneous across municipalities with different sizes; (ii) the gain in votes for the center-right coalition corresponds to a loss of votes for the center and center-left parties, a decrease in voter turnout, and a rise in protest votes; (iii) the relationship between immigration and electoral gains percolates to mayoral election at the municipality level; (iv) cultural diversity, competition in the labor market and for public services, and political competition are the most relevant channels at work.