Physical Causation Research Articles

Making Inferences: Comprehension of Physical Causality, Intentionality, and Emotions in Discourse by High-Functioning Older Children, Adolescents, and Adults with Autism.

Studies investigating inferential reasoning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have focused on the ability to make socially-related inferences or inferences more generally. Important variables for intervention planning such as whether inferences depend on physical experiences or the nature of social information have received less consideration. A measure of bridging inferences of physical causation, mental states, and emotional states was administered to older children, adolescents, and adults with and without ASD. The ASD group had more difficulty making inferences, particularly related to emotional understanding. Results suggest that individuals with ASD may not have the stored experiential knowledge that specific inferences depend upon or have difficulties accessing relevant experiences due to linguistic limitations. Further research is needed to tease these elements apart.

Neuroreductionism about Sex and Love.

"Neuroreductionism" is the tendency to reduce complex mental phenomena to brain states, confusing correlation for physical causation. In this paper, we illustrate the dangers of this popular neuro-fallacy, by looking at an example drawn from the media: a story about "hypoactive sexual desire disorder" in women. We discuss the role of folk dualism in perpetuating such a confusion, and draw some conclusions about the role of "brain scans" in our understanding of romantic love.

Design of Optimal Attack-Angle for RLV Reentry Based on Quantum Particle Swarm Optimization

The attack-angle optimization is a key problem for reentry trajectory design of a gliding type reusable launch vehicle (RLV). In order to solve such a problem, the equations of motion are derived first. A physical programming (PP) method is briefly presented and the preference function is reflected in mathematical representation. The attack-angle optimization problem with four criteria (i.e., downrange, total heat, heat rate, and trajectory oscillation) is converted into a single-objective optimization problem based on the PP method. A winged gliding reentry RLV is chosen as a simulation example and the transformed single-objective problem is solved by the quantum-behaved particle swarm optimization (QPSO) algorithm based on two types of preference structures, longer range preference and smaller total heat preference. The constraints of maximizing heating rate, normal load factor, and dynamic pressure and minimizing terminal velocity are handled by a penalty function method. The simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of these methods. The physical causation of the optimal solution and the typical profiles are presented, which reflect the designer's preference. At last, the feasibility and advantages of QPSO are revealed by comparison with the results of genetic algorithm (GA) and standard particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm on this optimization problem.

Hypocrisy: What counts?

Hypocrisy is a multi-faceted concept that has been studied empirically by psychologists and discussed logically by philosophers. In this study, we pose various behavioral scenarios to research participants and ask them to indicate whether the actor in the scenario behaved hypocritically. We assess many of the components that have been considered to be necessary for hypocrisy (e.g., the intent to deceive, self-deception), factors that may or may not be distinguished from hypocrisy (e.g., weakness of will), and factors that may moderate hypocrisy (e.g., the degree of discrepancy between the attitude and behavior, whether the attitude is stated publicly, and the nature and severity of the behavioral consequences). Our findings indicate that lay conceptions of hypocrisy are often at odds with philosophical speculation. We argue that a complete understanding of the criteria for hypocrisy requires consideration of how ordinary people construe the concept. In contrast to some concepts (e.g., physical causation), for which lay conceptions, while interesting, are largely irrelevant, hypocrisy is an essential component of social judgment. One could argue, therefore, that folk wisdom is the ultimate arbiter of what hypocrisy entails. We note limitations of our methodology and suggest avenues for future research. Mark Alicke is Professor of Psychology at Ohio University. Ellen Gordon is a graduate student at Ohio University. David Rose is a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon University.

Physical Causal Closure and Non-Coincidental Mental Causation

In his book Personal Agency, E. J. Lowe has argued that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with “a fairly strong principle of physical causal closure” and, moreover, that it “has the potential to strengthen our causal explanations of certain physical events.” If Lowe’s reasoning were sound, it would undermine the most common arguments for reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism of the mental. For it would show not only that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with a widely held scientific principle, but also that there is some positive reason for accepting the theory. However, I argue that Lowe’s reasoning is unsound, for it requires that causation both is, and is not, transitive: a contradiction. I conclude that if Lowe succeeds in proving that a dualist theory is consistent with physical causal closure, he fails to show that it serves an explanatory purpose.

Projections of events and propositions in Japanese: A case study of Koto-nominalized clauses in causal relations

This paper proposes a syntax and semantics of nominalized clauses headed by koto in Japanese. We argue that the koto-nominalized clause can denote either a concrete event or an abstract proposition. Koto serves as a maximality operator for clauses as well as NPs. The sentential koto is syntactically ambiguous depending on the structure with which koto merges. Finally, our analysis also has a strong implication for the linguistic distinction between physical causation and causal judgment.

Magic and the Mind: Mechanisms, Functions, and Development of Magical Thinking and Behavior (review)

Reviewed by: Magic and the Mind: Mechanisms, Functions, and Development of Magical Thinking and Behavior Edward Bever Eugene Subbotsky . Magic and the Mind: Mechanisms, Functions, and Development of Magical Thinking and Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xiv + 202. Most modern Western adults say they don't believe in magic, and undoubtedly believe they don't believe in magic, but in certain circumstances, when the stakes are high or the costs of appearing credulous are low, they act in ways that indicate that at some level they actually do. This disjunction between explicit and implicit convictions about magic is peculiar to modern Western adults. Young children accept magical and physical causation equally readily, and magical thinking plays a positive role in their cognitive development. Similarly, unschooled adults in traditional societies accept magical as well as physical causation and phenomena, and magic plays a prominent role in the folk cultures that organize their lives. Developing and sustaining conscious disbelief requires the deliberate creation and habitual deployment of active psychological defenses, which are instilled and supported by the powerful cultural forces of institutionalized religion and science. Together, these findings suggest that magical thinking is an integral part of human cognition not just in childhood but throughout the life cycle, and is driven from modern Westerners' consciousness not by the natural triumph of our innate rationality but by the concerted pressure of antagonistic cultural traditions. This line of reasoning is, in a nutshell, the core argument developmental psychologist Eugene Subbotsky advances in Magic and the Mind. In the first chapter he sets out key definitions and distinctions, like NIMBs (non-institutional magical beliefs) as opposed to both institutional magical beliefs (religion) and science, "magical thinking" (which in his definition necessarily involves a fantasy world), and "magical beliefs" (which are about the real world). He then proceeds in the next nine chapters to methodically detail the [End Page 215] series of experiments he has conducted over the past thirty years involving young children, older children, modern Western adults, and unschooled third-world adults that form the evidentiary foundation of the book. Each chapter focuses on a different developmental or cognitive issue: different aspects of younger and older children's beliefs and behaviors in regard to "mind-over-matter" magic (Chapters 2-4); adults' beliefs and behaviors concerning the same (Chapters 5-7, including a cross-cultural study in Chapter 6); beliefs and behaviors regarding "mind-over-mind" magic and its relationship to imagination and communications (Chapters 8 and 9); and magical beliefs and psychological defenses (Chapter 10). Throughout these chapters Subbotsky integrates his own research with related work by other psychologists and anthropologists, and in a long penultimate chapter (Chapter 11) draws the different strands he has been tracing together into a broad theoretical overview. In the short last chapter he surveys the role of magical thinking over the course of the life cycle, and in an epilogue he ruminates briefly on the socially and psychologically beneficial functions of magic, like its promotion of confidence in uncertain situations and its emphasis on the organic connection between humans and their environment. As this last topic suggests, Subbotsky's reflections range well beyond his core argument. In an earlier side excursion, for example, he discusses the role of suggestion and indirect persuasion, which he regards as secularized conceptualizations of magical techniques, in modern politics and advertising, while the theoretical chapter ends with a highly technical discussion relating changes in children's thinking about magic to a broader process that he calls "essentialization," which establishes hierarchies of ontological certainty. In both cases Subbotsky's professed goal is to show the connection between magical and mundane cognitive processes, but the excursions detract from rather than bolster his overall presentation. The first draws him into social and political issues he is not equipped to discuss authoritatively, while the second bogs the discussion down in an abstruse topic that, however important it may be to developmental psychologists, seems secondary to the larger issues the book raises. The book is also somewhat weakened by the omission of precise statistical analyses to support statements about the significance of results (although these are contained in the articles the chapters are based on...

Ejecta on Pb surface below and above melting pressure

In this paper, Asay-F-window diagnostic technology for high density and large mass ejecta measurement is designed. By Asay-F-window technology, the mass and the density-velocity distribution of ejecta from Pb surface are presented. The difference in ejecta between below and above Pb melting pressure is particularly studied. Moreover, the physical causation inducing the ejecting difference is well explained through theory analysis.

Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making

An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney’s argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making.

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the second of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some prominent contemporary scholars, including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber, have argued that Descartes is an Occasionalist about natural motion. On their reading, Descartes holds that God alone causes the motions that are not caused by the free actions of finite minds. Hatfield and Garber offer similar, but independent arguments that Descartes's views about physics – in particular, his arguments that the laws of nature are grounded in God's immutability – entail Occasionalism about natural motion. In this paper I argue contra Hatfield and Garber that Descartes's natural philosophy does not entail Occasionalism. Descartes holds that God is a direct efficient cause of every natural motion. Yet he does not take this to imply that bodies lack genuine causal powers. According to Descartes, God concurs with bodies to cause natural motion in such a way that both God and bodies are genuine, efficient causes of motion. I conclude by presenting an account of how Descartes's theory of body is compatible with the thesis that bodies have intrinsic active causal powers.

Reinterpretando la brecha y la akrasia a través de la causalidad descendente

We will analyze critically the theory of action of John Searle. Our purpose is to inter-pret the agential causality (agent-action) as a kind of downward causation that allows us to build an explanatory framework that is coherent with the existence of the pheno-mena like the gap and akrasia. The text is developed in three steps. First, we articulate the fundamental concepts that Searle uses to understand the causality of human action: the gap and the ‘substantial’ self. In this section we find inconsistency in his conception on the relationship between mental and physical causation. In the second, we analyze two fundamental problems in the theory of action that seeks to understand the causal link between mind and action in an efficient way; here precisely Searle lies with the greater part of the tradition. Finally, through the third section we develop an emergentist interpretation on agent and mental causation through downward causa-tion. The importance of introducing the concept of downward causation is to resolve the inconsistency that is created between the conception of universal causal laws, and the freedom of agency introduced by the phenomenon of the gap.

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Mechanistic Theories of Causality

This guide accompanies the following article(s): ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 421–432, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00400.x; ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 433–444, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00401.xAuthor’s IntroductionMechanisms are a hot topic in the philosophy of science, with a large number of papers written on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation across the sciences in the last decade. The question naturally arises as to whether mechanisms can shed light on the notion of cause, and, indeed, several authors have suggested that C causes E just in case C and E are connected in the right way by a physical mechanism. The papers accompanied by this guide examine the prospects of mechanistic theories of causality.In the following section, I provide some related readings that would work well with the papers for more detailed discussion of mechanistic theories of causality. The sample syllabus below situates discussion of mechanistic theories of causality in the context of a course on the epistemology and metaphysics of causality.Author Recommends Salmon, Wesley. A New Look at Causality, in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24. A very gentle introduction to process theories of causality. Dowe, Phil. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. A detailed defence of Dowe’s conserved‐quantity process theories of causality. Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25. Perhaps the most influential development of the mechanistic turn in the philosophy of science. Glennan, Stuart. Mechanisms. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 315–25. A recent exposition of Glennan’s complex‐systems theory of causality. Illari, P. M., F. Russo, and J. Williamson. Causality in the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. A collection of papers on causality. The relationship between mechanisms and causality is a major theme running through the book. For example, chapter 24 extends Dowe’s account, while chapter 38 provides a general characterisation of mechanisms.Online Materials Causality in the Sciences conference series: http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/cits.htm The main forum for discussion of theories of causality in relation to scientific method.Sample Syllabus Topic I: Difference‐making theories of causality Reading Paul, L. A. ‘Counterfactual Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 158–84.Williamson, Jon. ‘Probabilistic Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 185–212.Woodward, James. ‘Agency and Interventionist Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 234–62. Topic II: Mechanistic theories of causality Reading Salmon, Wesley. ‘A New Look at Causality,’ in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24.Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25.Williamson, Jon. ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causation Parts I and II.’Philosophy Compass (2011). Topic III: Pluralist theories of causality Reading Hall, Ned. ‘Two Concepts of Causation.’Causation and Counterfactuals. Eds. J. Collins, N. Hall and L. Paul. MIT Press, 2004. 225–76.Godfrey‐Smith, Peter. ‘Causal Pluralism.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation Beebee. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 326–37.Reiss, Julian. ‘Third Time’s a Charm: Causation, Science and Wittgensteinian Pluralism.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 907–27. Philosophica 77.1 – special issue on causal pluralism. Topic IV: The epistemology of causality Reading Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21.2 (2007): 157–70.Gillies, D. A. ‘The Russo‐Williamson Thesis and the Question of whether Smoking Causes Heart Disease.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 110–25.Illari, P. M. ‘Disambiguating the Russo‐Williamson Thesis.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.Weber, E. ‘How Probabilistic Causation can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2009): 277–95.Darby, G. and J. Williamson. ‘Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality.’Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming; doi: 10.1007/s13347‐010‐0010‐7.Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Generic versus Single‐case Causality: The Case of Autopsy.’European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1.1 (2011): 47–69; doi: 10.1007/s13194‐010‐0012‐4.

Belief attribution despite verbal interference

False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverbal paradigm consisting of silent animated cartoons in five closely related conditions, systematically teasing apart different aspects of scene analysis and allowing the assessment of the attribution of beliefs, goals, and physical causation. In order to test the role of language in belief attribution, we used verbal shadowing as a dual task to inhibit inner speech. Data on 58 healthy adults indicate that verbal interference decreases overall performance, but has no specific effect on belief attribution. Participants remained able to attribute beliefs despite heavy concurrent demands on their verbal abilities. Our results are most consistent with the hypothesis that belief attribution is independent from inner speech.

Naturalistic investigations and models of reasoning about complex indeterminate causation

This chapter focuses on reasoning about the causal explanation of events and human activities that are indeterminate and complex. We first consider some classical ideas about physical causation from David Hume and John Stuart Mill, who had significant impact on the psychology of reasoning, and we find in their writings some notions that carry over into modern analyses of cause-effect relations and causal reasoning. We then present the macrocognition paradigm, which is empirically grounded in studies of naturalistic decision making, and approaches the analysis of causal reasoning through investigation of the functional purposes of various forms of causal reasoning. This sets the stage for presentation of our research on how people interpret the causal reasoning that is presented in newspaper articles. Findings include new patterns and models of causal reasoning. We conclude with a discussion of some myths about causation that characterize theories but that do not match well to our research findings.

Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy

Thomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in formulating their explanatory claims. In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of Reid's distinction between efficient and physical causation – a distinction he grounds in his strict understanding of active powers. I consider several possible reasons that Reid may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology and suggest that the underlying rationale for his views is his understanding of the aims of explanation and their connection to the interests of human agents. The ultimate aim of knowing the causes of phenomena is to mollify the natural intellectual curiosity of human inquirers and provide guidance that insures successful action. The discovery of laws governing phenomena fulfills this aim and, as such, it is appropriate for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology.

II-Control Variables and Mental Causation

I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.

Thomas Reid on Physical Causation

Thomas Reid on Physical Causation

Physical Causation and Difference-Making

This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation. 1. Two Pursuits in the Philosophy of Causation 2. Causal Foundationalism and its Rivals 3. Anti-foundationalism: Russell and Field 4. Against the Russell/Field Arguments 5. The Case for Foundationalism 6. Causing and ‘Causing’ 7. An Application: Mental Causation

Il problema mente-corpo nel dibattito contemporaneo

- The mind-body problem is a crucial question to philosophers and cognitive scientists who pursue a program of naturalization of mind while preserving its causal efficacy. Two options seem to be open if we approach the question from a materialistic point of view: either preserve the notion of mental autonomy, by adhering to a nonreductive materialism, or give up that notion by supporting a reductive option. What I propose for discussion here is a neo-reductive perspective which considers mental causation as a sort of physical causation and maintains the mind-body identity.Keywords: Mental causation, Physicalism, Supervenience, Epiphenomenalism, Qualia, Identity theory.Parole chiave: Causalitŕ mentale, Materialismo, Sopravvenienza, Epifenomenalismo, Qualia, Teoria dell'identitŕ psico-fisica.