Causal Reductionism Research Articles

Integrated Information is not Causation: Why Integrated Information Theory’s Causal Structures do not Beat Causal Reductionism

In a recent work (Grasso et al., 2021), practitioners of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim to have overcome the weaknesses of causal reductionism in producing a coherent account of causation, as causal reductionism would blatantly conflate causation with prediction and could not answer the question of ‘what caused what.’ In this paper, I reject such a dismissal of causal reductionism since IIT anti-reductionists misunderstand the reductionist stance. The reductionists can still invoke a causal account stemming from the causal power of the universe’s basic units and interactions that, eventually, may lead to structures supporting integrated information. Additionally, I claim that the IIT-inspired misunderstanding of causal reductionism originates from the former’s metaphysical deficit, conflating information with causation. However, as a possible way out, if IIT is complemented with a deeper metaphysical ground, such as nested hylomorphism, an improved argument against causal reductionism can be made to work by invoking formal causality as the ultimate cause of integration in natural systems.

Epistemic Limits of Empirical Finance: Causal Reductionism and Self-Reference

Epistemic Limits of Empirical Finance: Causal Reductionism and Self-Reference

Causal reductionism and causal structures.

Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of 'what caused what'. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures.

The Multi-Institutional Substructure-Superstructure Model of Understanding Causal Relations among Social Structures

Students of sociology first encounter an analysis of relations among social structures in the introductory sociology class where they learn that social realities are the products of social structures. And, throughout their academic journey in the acquisition of knowledge in the discipline, sociology students are expected to develop a deep understanding of the nature of the relationships among social structures and the consequences of such relationships to human realities. In this endeavor, students learn the causal relations of substructures and superstructures proffered by Karl Max (deterministic economic infrastructure) and Max Weber (deterministic ideological infrastructure). In both economic and ideological determinisms, one particular social structure is determinant of all other social structures and human social realities. In this study, the ideas of both Marx and Weber are critiqued for causal reductionism or the fallacy of a single cause which is antithetical to sociological reasoning of multi-factor causality. For a better understanding of causal relations among social structures and social realities, this study offers the Multi-Institutional Substructure-Superstructure Model (MISSMOD) as a more comprehensive causal explanation of society’s infrastructure and superstructure relations, which nullifies the distinction (claimed by Marx and Weber) between the infrastructure and the superstructure.

Dewey on Organisation

In some of his later contributions Dewey places particular emphasis on the category of organisation. Organisation features prominently both in his later metaphysical writings and in some of his more substantively focussed contributions. Organisation is also a central category for two contemporary ontological projects, namely Tony Lawson’s perspective on social ontology and the interactivist framework developed by Mark Bickhard and his collaborators. In these modern naturalist perspectives, the thorough theorisation of organisation is seen as crucial in accounting for emergent phenomena, resisting ontological and causal reductionism and resolving ambiguities associated with certain formulations of downward causality. This paper compares Dewey’s remarks on organisation in his later writings with these contemporary treatments of organisation and argues that Dewey anticipates some of the insights that have been systematically set out in these modern programmes of research.

"How to Keep the Non-Reductive in Nonreductive Physicalism?" by Nancey Murphy: An Appreciative Response

"How to Keep the Non-Reductive in Nonreductive Physicalism?" by Nancey Murphy:An Appreciative Response Robert John Russell It is a rare privilege to respond to my colleague and friend of nearly four decades, Nancey Murphy. It is especially wonderful given the nature of this paper, with its inclusion of such diverse areas as biblical and theological anthropology, atomism versus dynamical systems, and a response to the problem of reductionism through an appeal to emergence and downward causality in complex dynamical systems. In this response I will first summarize the second part of Nancey's paper and then raise three questions about it. In the second part of her paper, Murphy begins with the new atomism in classical physics and with it the "inevitability" of causal reductionism. Under the shadow of Thomas Hobbes's reductionist theory of human nature and society the "defeat" of causal reductionism became crucial. A vital step was taken through the articulation of downward causation by Robert Van Gulick. While a system is composed of its parts, the causal powers of a system include both those of its parts and their organization. In the latter case, the system "at least partially determines what contributions are made by its parts."1 An additional step in the defeat of causal reductionism was achieved through the idea of emergence in nature. Murphy cites Terrence Deacon as "providing the best account so far of emergence" and spelled out in terms of three orders of emergence. [End Page 465] Systems with first-order emergence display properties such as the viscosity of liquids, but these properties do not endure. Instead they are dampened out in time, and the reductionist claim is left unthreatened. But in second-order emergence such properties are amplified and have system-wide and long-lasting effects. Finally, third-order emergence arises in biological systems in which second-order systems are selected and constrained by the environment. This complex form of emergence has characteristics which can be called "memory" and give the system a "history." Now she asks a pivotal question: "Do these more sophisticated accounts of emergence and downward causation solve the problem of the reduction of human capacities to biology?" While previously she thought they might, she now raises a point which I find very exciting: How is it not the case that humans are, in a sense, trapped by a combination of downward causation from their environments and the biological factors that do (still) contribute to our behavior? Where is there room for human agency? This is the point at which we must turn to the resources of complex systems theory.2 Here she turns to the work of philosopher of science Alicia Juarrero and her 1999 book, Dynamics in Action. Murphy paraphrases Juarrero in calling for a "shift in ontological emphasis" from "things, with their intrinsic properties, to processes and their relational properties." This shift is warranted by the fact that biological systems are "decoupled" from their atomic components; "if the functional system works, it does not matter what its components are made of."3 Such systems have what philosophers call "internal relations" while elements such as atoms have only "external relations." Hence complex dynamic systems enhance our understanding of causation: Along with routine, efficient causation we now find that constraints are placed on the system by the internal relations between its components and by its relations to the environment which serves as its context. Juarrero also distinguishes between "context-free" and "context-sensitive" constraints. So successive throws of a pair of dice are independent of the results of past throws, but as a card game proceeds, the probability of an "ace" changes by the results of previous draws. This leads Murphy [End Page 466] to recommend that we speak of whole–part "constraints" instead of "downward causation." Here the whole does not exert efficient causality on its parts; instead the whole changes the probabilities of the behavior of its parts. This in turn leads Murphy to set aside the traditional sharp distinction between determinism and indeterminism and adopt the idea of "propensity," a term created by Karl Popper to mean "an irregular or non-necessitating causal disposition of an object or system to produce...

On the Argument from Physics and General Relativity

I argue that the best interpretation of the general theory of relativity (GTR) has need of a causal entity (i.e., the gravitational field), and causal structure that is not reducible to light cone structure. I suggest that this causal interpretation of GTR helps defeat a key premise in one of the most popular arguments for causal reductionism, viz., the argument from physics.

Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation

AbstractIn this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non‐causal explanations in philosophy of science. I will first present examples of non‐causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non‐causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism, and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non‐causal explanation. Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non‐causal explanations.

The Emergence and Irreducibility of Scientific Knowledge: A Multi-Synergic-Holism

The world possesses a hierarchical structure and evolves through emergence. Its levels are the result of emergence, and possess unique properties and functions which their components and emergent bases do not. Each of these levels also possesses basic laws or rules which cannot be logically deduced from other levels, and evince downward causation. Therefore, there are non-linear causal networks among the levels of complex systems in which causal reductionism does not hold. The hierarchical structure is formed in accordance with the increasing organized complexity of the objects, so that different levels give birth to different disciplines, and different disciplines have their own theoretical autonomy and independence. Therefore, theories across different levels are essentially irreducible, and any apparent case of reduction may only be so in the sense of a partial reduction. Emergence-evolution-hierarchy ontology and multi-synergic holism is compatible with reductionism even as it transcends it.

THE METAPHYSICS OF DOWNWARD CAUSATION: REDISCOVERING THE FORMAL CAUSE

AbstractThe methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality.

Resemblance-based Resources for Reductive Singularism

At best, he maintained, we can be justified in believing in holding of certain spatiotemporal regularities between events2 of types at issue? hence was born (or in any case suggested) regularity theory of causation.3 Hume's discussion has inspired a multitude of accounts on which causation is a matter of more or less sophisticated patterns of events.4 This influence reflects common acceptance of two theses, traditionally associ ated with Hume. First is broadly empiricist rejection of the efficacy of causes as an irreducible feature of natural reality, such that, for example, (manifestations of) intrinsic powers or irreducibly causal dispositions are rejected as being ground of causal relations; call this Causal reductionism. Second is that Causal reductionism requires Causal generalism, according to which causal relations between events are metaphysically constituted,

Towards complex holism

AbstractThis paper presents an inter‐level causal view of complex systems. It argues the need to go beyond causal reductionism, the limitations of the model of theory reduction in understanding and explaining the behaviour of complex systems, and the incompleteness of individualism methodology in explaining complex social organizational behaviours. It proposes a multi‐level and multi‐dimensional co‐evolutionary ‘complex holism’ to provide a new prospective for understanding organizational evolution and management. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

Some Comments on The Problem of Reductionism in Contemporary Physical Science

Is reductionism simply a methodology that has allowed science to progress to its current state (methodological reductionism), or does this methodology indicate something more, that the material universe is determined in full by its smallest components (ontological or causal reductionism)? Such questions lie at the heart of much of the contemporary religion–science dialogue. In this essay I suggest that the position articulated by philosopher–theologian Bernard Lonergan is particularly suitable for dealing with these questions. For Lonergan, the criterion of the real is simply its verified intelligibility and not its imaginability. Each of the various levels of reality, as studied in sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, and sensitive and rational psychology, consists of an intelligible integration of what on the lower level would be simply random occurrences. The things studied by the various sciences (atoms, molecules, cellular organisms, animals, human persons, and so on) are intelligible unities, and no one level is somehow more real than any other. I argue that such a scheme, while seeming somewhat counterintuitive, is best able to deal with the multilayered reality of the contemporary physical and life sciences and provide an opening to the richness of the social sciences and the achievements of human culture.

An Epistemic Reductio of Causal Reductionism

An Epistemic Reductio of Causal Reductionism