Causal Power Research Articles

Advancing the Role of Social Mechanisms, Mediators, and Moderators in Securitization Theory: Explaining Security Policy Change in Japan

ABSTRACTIn this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15.

Agents, objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes

The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model these two forms of power. Freedom is efficient causation, but in a special form that I explain as involving something that ordinary causation does not – the contingent determination of outcomes. Motivating power is final causation, which Suarez characterizes as the power of a goal or end to move us to attain it through its goodness or desirability. Suarez regards these two forms of power as consistent – we can be moved by the goodness of a goal freely to determine for ourselves that we act in order to attain it. Hobbes denied the existence of all forms of power beyond ordinary causation, the power of one motion in matter to determine another. So he denied the very existence both of freedom and of any form of motivating power beyond the ordinary causal power of desires as materially based psychological states to produce actions. The goodness itself of a goal never moves us, whether to desire the goal in the first place or to act in order to attain it. The paper examines Hobbes’s arguments and their consequence – establishing the foundations for Hume’s scepticism about practical reason.

A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant

AbstractAccording to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.

Aristotle on the Indetermination of Accidental Causes and Chance

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance (and of accidental causes), meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to chance, is best understood as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes.

Are neighbourhoods real?

ABSTRACTCritical realism needs to explain how neighbourhoods – a middle-level social structure that people really use in everyday life – can emerge as real, with the causal power to promote individual and collective flourishing. Using distinctive neighbourhoods of Louisville, Kentucky, as a case study, we can see how neighbourhoods can emerge, develop distinctive projects which use the affordances of local social networks, and exercise downward causation on who comes to live there and how they live. This applies equally to such different kinds of neighbourhoods as the dense, walkable, close-in, mixed-use places favoured by the liberal ‘bourgeois bohemians,’ and to the spread out, large-house, car-based, conservative, gated communities far out in the suburbs.

Policy entrepreneurship in the European Parliament: reconsidering the influence of rapporteurs

ABSTRACTRapporteurs have been widely recognized as influential agents within the European Parliament (EP). But under what conditions are they really able to wield influence? Linking two strands of literature largely isolated from each other, this article considers both formal and informal agenda-setting resources to address this question. Formal agenda-setting stresses the role of institutionally defined prerogatives and constraints. Informal agenda-setting offers a meaningful link to the multiple streams framework (MSF), which attributes causal power to agency, ideas and timing. A case study on the EU chemicals regulation REACH illustrates the interdependence of institutional and ideational factors in policy entrepreneurship.

Exploring Relationships Among Belief in Genetic Determinism, Genetics Knowledge, and Social Factors

Genetic determinism can be described as the attribution of the formation of traits to genes, where genes are ascribed more causal power than what scientific consensus suggests. Belief in genetic determinism is an educational problem because it contradicts scientific knowledge, and is a societal problem because it has the potential to foster intolerant attitudes such as racism and prejudice against sexual orientation. In this article, we begin by investigating the very nature of belief in genetic determinism. Then, we investigate whether knowledge of genetics and genomics is associated with beliefs in genetic determinism. Finally, we explore the extent to which social factors such as gender, education, and religiosity are associated with genetic determinism. Methodologically, we gathered and analyzed data on beliefs in genetic determinism, knowledge of genetics and genomics, and social variables using the “Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics” (PUGGS) instrument. Our analyses of PUGGS responses from a sample of Brazilian university freshmen undergraduates indicated that (1) belief in genetic determinism was best characterized as a construct built up by two dimensions or belief systems: beliefs concerning social traits and beliefs concerning biological traits; (2) levels of belief in genetic determination of social traits were low, which contradicts prior work; (3) associations between knowledge of genetics and genomics and levels of belief in genetic determinism were low; and (4) social factors such as age and religiosity had stronger associations with beliefs in genetic determinism than knowledge. Although our study design precludes causal inferences, our results raise questions about whether enhancing genetic literacy will decrease or prevent beliefs in genetic determinism.

Explanatory Abstractions

Abstract A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent account of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from micro-physical and causal-nomological details. To this end, we distinguish different senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between an explanation's abstractness and its causal power. According to our analysis, abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations. 1Introduction2Three Dimensions of Abstraction3Explanatory Power and Independence4Abstraction in a Counterfactual Framework5Königsberg—Encore!6Conclusion

The causal power of securitisation: an inquiry into the explanatory status of securitisation theory illustrated by the case of Somali piracy

AbstractThis article joins the nascent debate on the causal status of securitisation theory. Relying on critical realist’s efforts to deepen and broaden the concept of cause – defined as ‘causal complex’ – and its insights to integrate discourse and constitutive relations into a non-positivist framework for causal explanation, the article aims to explore the explanatory status of securitisation theory, without downgrading its discursive core. To illustrate this argument, the article uses the securitisation of Somali piracy as an example of how the causal analysis of securitisation can contribute to explain some of the dynamics involved in security governance. From this perspective, securitisation works within a broader empirical framework of security, significantly implicated in causal relations, going beyond the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitisation as a non-causal constitutive theory merely defined as a formal framework for analysis. The article discusses, finally, the relevance and implications of introducing causal analysis in the study of securitisation.

The World as a Theophany and Causality: Ibn ʿArabī, Causes and Freedom

This article offers a way of approaching the question of causality in Ibn ʿ Arabī’s relational and processual metaphysical system. Ibn ʿ Arabī’s metaphysics is relational in the sense that entities are perceived as the totality of their relationships to God. The Divine Names are theological categories denoting these relations. It is processual in that it perceives the world as the multiplicity of the incessant and ever-changing process of the manifestations of the divine qualities. The world is recreated anew at each moment and entities are societies of divine acts or theophanies. In this framework, causal power is attributed to God and causality describes the regularity and predictability of the related theophanic individualities. The article, then, turns to examine how Ibn ʿArabī presents a participatory account of freedom in accordance with his understanding of causality. The paper, first, briefly summarizes different accounts of causality offered by Muslim theologians and philosophers before Ibn ʿArabī. The second section introduces some relevant aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphysics for our discussion and rethinks the question of causality within this larger framework. The third section discusses the question of freedom and responsibility of the moral agents. Finally, the paper offers a comparative examination of Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of causality.

Preemption in Singular Causation Judgments: A Computational Model.

Causal queries about singular cases are ubiquitous, yet the question of how we assess whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause turns out to be difficult to answer. Relying on the causal power framework (Cheng, ), Cheng and Novick () proposed a model of causal attribution intended to help answer this question. We challenge this model, both conceptually and empirically. We argue that the central problem of this model is that it treats causal powers that are probabilistically sufficient to generate the effect on a particular occasion as actual causes of the effect, and thus neglects that sufficient causal powers can be preempted in their efficacy. Also, the model does not take into account that reasoners incorporate uncertainty about the underlying general causal structure and strength of causes when making causal inferences. We propose a new measure of causal attribution and embed it into the structure induction model of singular causation (SISC; Stephan & Waldmann, ). Two experiments support the model.

Transitions of power in multi-actor information system projects

Power and politics play an important role in multi-actor information systems where balancing change and stability can become a goal in itself. To investigate this, the paper looks at a project on the implementation of the electronic system of business registration in Albania, a developing country in transition. The study introduces the concept of Obligatory Passage Channels (OPCs), building on Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the Circuits of Power Model (CPM). An OPC is defined as the mechanism that gives momentum to the flows of power in a multi-actor project network. Findings show that the social circuit of causal power is characterized by OPCs related to need and vision. The systemic circuit of facilitative power is shaped by OPCs related to coordination and capabilities. The episodic circuit of dispositional power is characterized by the interoperability OPC. This study contributes to a better understanding of network politics in multi-actor information system projects.

The Causal Role of Ideas in Taiwan’s Protectionist Agricultural Trade Policy

While embracing trade policies that foster trade liberalization, Taiwan has clear protectionist policies covering its agricultural trade, which combine border measures with domestic support, and are closely modeled on the policies created by the European Union. The idea of multifunctionality of agriculture — and its link to trade policy — has created a normative framework whereby the agricultural markets have to be shielded in order for them to provide non-commodity attributes or public goods. This paper aims to explore the causal power of ideas (liberalization and multifunctionality) in the definition of Taiwan’s agricultural trade policy, by analyzing them from the perspective of historical institutionalism, and taking Taiwan as a case study. It is the institutionalization of the idea of multifunctionality that gives it an explanatory power toward understanding the ideational source of protectionism in agricultural trade.

Epiphenomenal Properties

ABSTRACTWhat is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterization of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal, because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties.

Applying critical realism in spirituality at work research

PurposeThis study aims to demonstrate how critical realism (CR) can be used in spirituality at work (SAW) research and to provide a practical example of CR in SAW research.Design/methodology/approachCR is a philosophical meta-theory that allows the stratification of spirituality into different levels of reality, advocates for research methods matching the ontology of the level investigated and provides complementary methods of exploring this phenomenon’s causal power in social contexts. The authors present a study where CR was used to explain how and why SAW influences ethics in organisational contexts.FindingsThe results demonstrate that CR provides a useful approach to bridging the positivist-interpretivist difference in SAW research. Moreover, a CR approach helped explain the underlying conditions and causal mechanisms that power SAW to influence ethical decision-making and behaviour in the workplace.Originality/valueWhile CR has been applied in the management literature, negligible SAW research has used this approach. That which exists is either conceptual or does not discuss methods of data analysis, or describe how critical realist concepts resulted in their findings. This paper addresses that lacuna. CR also provides value, as an alternative approach to SAW research, in that it allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods as complementary, not confrontational methods while providing a more integrated and deeper view of SAW and its effects.

Making memory makers: Interpellation, norm circles and Holocaust Memorial Day Trust workshops

This article examines the rationale for ordinary people’s involvement with commemoration. Adopting a critical ethnographic approach, and taking myself and my own interpellation as a symptomatic example, I ask what it is about Holocaust Memorial Day that calls to people, motivating them to become involved in localised commemorative activities. Since 2005, the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust has been responsible for organising and promoting Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration and, as part of this, they organise free workshops across the United Kingdom for people interested in organising an activity to mark Holocaust Memorial Day. The data I analyse in this article are drawn from two sites: participant observation of three workshops organised by the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (October–November 2015) and interviews with both the organisers and participants of these three same workshops. My analysis demonstrates that the workshop is orientated to answering two modal questions, which participants (implicitly) ask of themselves: should I commemorate Holocaust Memorial Day, entailing a deontic modality, and can I commemorate Holocaust Memorial Day, entailing an epistemic modality. I argue that Holocaust Memorial Day should be regarded as a norm circle which, through its members, possesses a causal power to produce a tendency in others to also commit to endorsing commemoration as a social norm.

Peter Lombard on God’s Knowledge: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 35-38, as the Basis for Later Theological Discussions

Since the mid-90’s the figure of Peter Lombard and his Book of Sentences has regained the importance in scholarly world and been studied from both historical-theological and historical-philosophical perspectives. But some aspects of his thinking, encapsulated in the written form, which was to become the material basis for the thirteenth- through the fifteenth-century theological projects, remained somewhat insufficiently researched. Therefore this article analyzes the select parts of the Book of Sentences with the purpose of looking at how Peter Lombard handled the issue of God’s knowledge. The article shows that for Peter Lombard God’s knowledge is God’s awareness of everything knowable. It has no causal power which belongs to the divine will. Nevertheless, this knowledge is able to function in two different modes: it can be either a purely cognitive act as awareness alone, or a double cognitive and voluntary act as awareness and simultaneous volition in the form of approbation. Hence, God’s knowledge in general is not causative, but God’s knowledge of the good must be causative because he simultaneously knows and wills what is good. The article reasonably suggests that Lombard’s logic implies the compatibility of God’s (fore)knowledge and voluntary activity, on the one hand, and the contingency of the created order and the rational creatures’ free will, on the other hand. But the details of this conception remain unrevealed as Lombard’s presentation of the problem is to be declared underdeveloped.

Young children’s attributions of causal power to novel invisible entities

In two studies, we investigated the development of children’s reasoning about potent invisible entities. In Study 1, children aged 2.2–5.5years (N=48) were briefly told about a novel invisible substance that could produce a novel outcome—make a novel box turn green. During this introduction, children watched as one container was inverted over a box and the box lit up green, and then another identical container was inverted over the box and the box did not light up. On test trials, the experimenter inserted a spoon in novel (actually empty) containers and inverted the spoon over the box, which turned green in one trial and did not light up in the other trial. For both trials, children were asked whether there was anything in each container. Children across this age range appropriately reported that an invisible substance was present only when the box lit up. In Study 2, children aged 2.4–4.5years (N=48) watched similar demonstrations but were not explicitly provided information about the invisible substance. Children as young as 3years spontaneously inferred that an invisible substance was present when the box lit up and was absent when the box did not light up. A final task tested children’s ability to use their causal knowledge of invisible substances to produce an effect—making the box light up. The youngest children had difficulty with this task, but many children aged 3.5–4.5years performed capably. These results indicate an early-emerging understanding of potent invisible entities that develops rapidly during early childhood.

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers.

Causal specificity and the instructive–permissive distinction

I use some recent formal work on measuring causation to explore a suggestion by James Woodward: that the notion of causal specificity can clarify the distinction in biology between permissive and instructive causes. This distinction arises when a complex developmental process, such as the formation of an entire body part, can be triggered by a simple switch, such as the presence of particular protein. In such cases, the protein is said to merely induce or "permit" the developmental process, whilst the causal "instructions" for guiding that process are already prefigured within the cells. I construct a novel model that expresses in a simple and tractable way the relevant causal structure of biological development and then use a measure of causal specificity to analyse the model. I show that the permissive-instructive distinction cannot be captured by simply contrasting the specificity of two causes as Woodward proposes, and instead introduce an alternative, hierarchical approach to analysing the interaction between two causes. The resulting analysis highlights the importance of focusing on gene regulation, rather than just the coding regions, when analysing the distinctive causal power of genes.