HIS study of the tragic attitude toward value has been undertaken on the assumption that the philosophy of value, if it is to rise above the level of an academic problem, must bridge the gap which now separates it from its chief source of reliable material, the arts which represent feeling. A union between philosophical method and the arts of personal feeling is clearly needed inasmuch as the philosophy of value is itself a revolt against the philosophical tradition which was content to follow only the needs and problems of the impersonal sciences and which, consequently, found in the uniformity of nature and experience only causal sequence, mechanical determination, and logical or mathematical necessity. Blind to all other forms and patterns of experience, this tradition left values, like opinions, in the philosophical limbo ruled by chance, fortune, or caprice. At best, it taught us, as Spinoza did, to love the cold scientific necessity which rules the world and to repress human values, which have their source in illusion. This love of the universal necessity of the world is an advanced position for the philosopher of science, but it is unnecessarily primitive for the philosopher of value, who is by the nature of his enterprise committed, first, to the principle that values are subject to law, and not to chance, fortune, or caprice, and, secondly, to the principle that bare necessity, order, and law, as revealed by the scientific disciplines, take on a new meaning when revealed in terms of values. Since inevitability, or orderliness of values, has always been required of tragedy as a representation, and since the very first tragic poet took his problem to be the interpretation in terms of value of the iron bonds of necessity which rule the