Causal Asymmetry Research Articles

Assimetria causal: um estudo

Neste artigo, examinamos o aspecto assimétrico da relação causal, confrontando-o com o ponto de vista humiano e neo-humiano. Seguindo Hausman e Ehring, favorecemos uma abordagem situacional para a assimetria causal. Nós exploramos a análise do famoso exemplo do mastro (Flagpole), esclarecendo as conexões entre causação e explicação. Nosso diagnóstico geral é que a tradição neo-humiana supõe, equivocadamente, que as relações nômicas, com exceção de pequenos detalhes, exaurem as relações causais.

Causal Asymmetries

Causal Asymmetries

Becoming and the Arrow of Causation

The conceptual relation between objective becoming and the direction of time is explored by discussing an ontologically asymmetric notion of causation. It is claimed that such a notion, in terms of which Stein defined objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime, has either a purely metaphysical status or is reducible to physical concepts. In the former case, it is adequate for Stein's purpose but irrelevant to physical theories. In the latter, the causal asymmetry can be related to irreversible physical processes only in an extrinsic way. This dilemma creates additional difficulties both to a unified theory of the direction of time and to the project of making room for becoming in the physical world.

Causal Asymmetries

Causal Asymmetries

Probabilistic causation, preemption and counterfactuals

Counterfactual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts and anti-catalysts, and show how my account needs to be adjusted to deliver the right verdicts in these cases. The net result is a particular conception of a cause that I try to spell out in the closing section of the paper. In that section, I also briefly discuss causal asymmetry and the purpose behind providing a counterfactual theory of causation.

Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past

In his paper ‘Some Comments on Fatalism’, The Philosophical Quartery, 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question-begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere appeal to the direction of causation will suffice to explain this asymmetry, whereas in fact the causal asymmetry is the same as the temporal asymmetry, and so cannot ground it. I finish by drawing a connection between the power asymmetry (our ability to affect the future but not the past) and the memory/intention asymmetry.

Discussion. Backward causation and the direction of causal processes: reply to Dowe

Dowe (1996) argues that the success of the backward causation hypothesis in quantum mechanics would provide strong support for a version of Reichenbach's account of the direction of causal processes, which takes the direction of causation to rest on the fork asymmetry. He also criticises my perspectival account of the direction of causation, which takes causal asymmetry to be a projection of our own temporal asymmetry as agents. In this reply I take issue with Dowe's argument at three main points: his claim that the backward causation hypothesis in QM is incompatible with my perspectival approach to the direction of causation; his defence of the fork asymmetry approach against a general criticism of mine based on the time-symmetry of microphysics; and his application of his preferred account of the direction of causal processes to the relevant cases in QM.

What's right and what's wrong with transference theories

This paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (Dowe 1992c), and it is shown that that account embodies the modifications that the transference theory needs to adopt.

Post hoc ergo propter once more an evaluation of ‘does monetary policy matter?’ in the spirit of James Tobin

Christina and David Romer's paper ‘Does Monetary Policy Matter?’ advocates the so-called ‘narrative’ approach to causal inference. We demonstrate that this method will not sustain causal inference. First, it is impossible to distinguish monetary shocks from oil shocks as causes of recessions. Second, a world in which the Fed only announces intentions to act cannot be distinguished from one in which it in fact acts. Third, the techniques of dynamic simulation used in the Romers' study are inappropriate and quantitatively misleading. And, finally, their approach provides no basis for establishing causal asymmetry.

A Neglected Route to Realism about Quantum Mechanics

Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables are not influenced by future measurement settings. The assumption has sometimes been questioned, but the suggestion has been thought outlandish, even by the taxed standards of the discipline. (Bell thought that it led to fatalism.) The case for this reaction turns out to be surprisingly weak, however. We show that QM easily evades the standard objections to advanced action. And the approach has striking advantages, especially in avoiding the apparent conflict between Bell's Theorem and special relativity. The second part of the paper considers the broader question as to why advanced action seems so counterintuitive. We investigate the origins of our ordinary intuitions about causal asymmetry. It is argued that the view that the past does not depend on the future is largely anthropocentric, a kind of projection of our own temporal asymmetry. Many physicists have also reached this conclusion, but have thought that if causation has no objective direction, there is no objective content to an advanced action interpretation of QM. This turns out to be a mistake. From the ordinary subjective perspective, we can distinguish two sorts of objective world: one "looks as if" it contains only forward causation, the other ``looks as if'' it involves a mix of backward and forward causation. This clarifies the objective core of an advanced action interpretation of QM, and shows that there is an independent symmetry argument in favour of the approach.

Explanatory Relations between the Direction of Causation and the Fork Asymmetry

of their conclusion. Horwich also claims to address 'the epistemological question of why we are right [my italics] to hold that causes typically precede their effects' (p. 141). He succeeds in explaining why we are right to hold this only if his explanation provides a defence in the form of reasons justifying the claim. The causal fork asymmetry, then, is defended on the basis of the temporal priority of causes, which is itself defended on the basis of the causal fork asymmetry. This is indeed a circular account.8

Process causality and asymmetry

Process theories of causality seek to explicate causality as a property of individual causal processes. This paper examines the capacity of such theories to account for the asymmetry of causation. Three types of theories of asymmetry are discussed; the subjective, the temporal, and the physical, the third of these being the preferred approach. Asymmetric features of the world, namely the entropic and Kaon arrows, are considered as possible sources of causal asymmetry and a physical theory of asymmetry is subsequently developed with special reference to the questions of objectivity and backwards causation.

Agency and Causal Asymmetry

Agency and Causal Asymmetry

The Direction of Causation: Ramsey's Ultimate Contingency

The paper criticizes the attempt to account for the direction of causation in terms of objective statistical asymmetries, such as those of the fork asymmetry. Following Ramsey, I argue that the most plausible way to account for causal asymmetry is to regard it as "put in by hand", that is as a feature that agents project onto the world. Its temporal orientation stems from that of ourselves as agents. The crucial statistical asymmetry is an anthropocentric one, namely that we take our actions to be statistically independent of everything except (what we come to call) their effects. I argue that this account explains the intuitive plausibility of Reichenbach's principle of the common cause.

Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities?

This paper defends the view that the asymmetry of causation can be explained in terms of probabilistic relationships between event types. Papineau first explores three different versions of the "fork asymmetry", namely (i) David Lewis' asymmetry of overdetermination, (ii) the screening-off property of common causes, and (iii) Spirtes', Glymour's and Scheines' analysis of probabilistic graphs. He then argues that this fork asymmetry is both (i) a genuine phenomenon and (ii) a satisfactory metaphysical reduction of causal asymmetry. In his final section he shows how this reduction can account for the relevance of causal direction to human agency, and in particular for the fact that we can manipulate causes to influence their effects, but not vice versa.

Discussion: Russell Versus Steiner on Physics and Causality

In “Events and Causality” Mark Steiner argues that though Bertrand Russell was right to claim that the laws of physics do not express causal relations, nevertheless, Russell was wrong to suppose that therefore causality plays no role in physics. I argue that Steiner misses the point of Russell's argument for the first of these claims, and because of this Steiner's argument against the second fails to controvert it. Steiner fails to see that Russell's argument against causation, is in fact an argument against the existence of causal directionality or asymmetry. Steiner gives no reason to suppose physical theory requires this asymmetry after all.

Response to Ehring's ‘Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsResponse to Ehring's ‘Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’D. PAPINEAUD. PAPINEAUCambridge, U.K. Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 39, Number 4December 1988 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 3Total views on this site Views: 3Total views on this site Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/39.4.521 Views: 3Total views on this site © 1988 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Causal asymmetry and causal relata: Reply to Lee

Jig-Chuen Lee in a recent paper, 'Causal Connection, Causal Asym metry, and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation', offers a coun terexample to my account of causal asymmetry.1 In this paper I argue that Lee's example is effective only if a certain background assump tion concerning the nature of causal relata is made, an assumption which I previously held but have since abandoned on independent grounds. After outlining my new view of causal relata, I show that Lee's example can be revised to work under this new assumption. I propose a revision of my account of causal asymmetry to handle this case.

Causal condition, causal asymmetry, and the counterfactual analysis of causation

In a recent paper ‘Causal Asymmetry’, Douglas Ehring has proposed an intriguing solution to the vexing problem of causal asymmetry. The aim of this paper is to show that his theory is not satisfactory. Moreover, the examples that I use in showing the defect of Ehring's theory also indicate that the counterfactual analysis of causation has a problem that cannot be remedied by Marshall Swain's suggested refinement of the counterfactual analysis of causation in ‘Causation and Distinct Events’.

Closed Causal Loops, Single Causes, and Asymmetry

Closed Causal Loops, Single Causes, and Asymmetry