Caucasian Republics Research Articles

The difference of food consumption in Russia’s regions

Nutrition is an important indicator of quality of life, an element of national security. The article reviews the formation of the food consumption geography. The differences in food consumption among Russia’s regions are shown in the dynamics from 1990 to 2013. They are caused by the influence on food patterns of such factors as natural conditions, level of regional socioeconomic development, local traditions associated with the agricultural profile of an area, living standards, ethnic nutrition traditions, etc. The well-being of regions with higher food consumption levels depends mainly on economic conditions or on favorable natural living conditions. The following trends have been identified: an increase in consumption of vegetables in most regions; a decrease in consumption of dairy products in Russia in general, and especially in regions with traditional dairy farming; and a significant increase in consumption of potatoes and bread in the North Caucasian republics. The paper represents the results of a food pattern cluster analysis of Russia’s regions in 1990 and 2013.

Исламский фактор гражданского общества в политических системах республик Северного Кавказа

Исламский фактор гражданского общества в политических системах республик Северного Кавказа

The General Features and Particular Characteristics of the Political Development of Abkhazia, Adygea, Dagestan and Chechnya in 1989-2000

The issues related to the political developments in the period of 1989-2000 of government entities located in the Caucasus, is in the focus of today’s historians, political scientists, sociologists, social scientists, and other scholars. The main objective of this study is to identify the general and particular features in the development of the political system of four Caucasian republics - Abkhazia, Adygea, Dagestan and Chechnya in the last decade of the XX century. The following material is based on an extensive review of the scientific literature, archival sources, legislation of the studied regions, periodicals, and the data from the Internet. Analysis of the data has enabled to give a general description and demonstrate the special features of both the political process, and the state structure in them. The revealed the reasons that contributed to the choice made by the studied regions in years 1989-2000 of the tactics and strategy of further political developments in the transformation of their social order. The study identified the main lines of development, and also shown the charactering features that emerged in each of the subjects, different ways of reaching an increase in public status and moved on to building a civil society based on democratic principles. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6s7p123

Влияние различных стратегий управления на характер регулирования конфликтов и развития северокавказских республик

Влияние различных стратегий управления на характер регулирования конфликтов и развития северокавказских республик

Electoral Cleavage Map of Russia: Based on an Analysis of the 2011 State Duma Election and the Regional Elections of 2012–14

The article presents a methodology for the research of cleavage structure in post-Soviet Russia on the regional level (municipalities as cases). This methodology is applied to the results both of the 2011 Duma election and elections to regional legislatures over the period 2012–14. The electoral cleavage map of today's Russia is constructed on the basis of the 2011 election results. All Russian regions are divided into five groups by the degree of their political competitiveness: (1) the least competitive group of six North Caucasian republics; (2) the group of four regions with the single ‘authorities versus community’ electoral cleavage (Mordovia, Mari El, Tatarstan and Tyumen oblast); (3) the ‘under-competitive’ cluster of 19 regions (including Adygea, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, Tuva, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kemerovo, Orel, Tambov and Ulyanovsk oblasts); (4) the ‘average’ cluster of 31 regions (including Moscow) and (5) the most competitive cluster of 20 regions (including Saint-Petersburg). It also concludes that the 2012 ‘party reform’ led to the ‘entropy’ of electoral preferences, an augmentation of political space dimensions and indirectly, a growth in the number of electoral cleavages in elections to regional legislatures (2012–14). It is recognized that in some regions the level of political competition has really increased, but the reason was not the appearance of new participants, but relaxation of administrative pressure on the strata depending on the state support. In these regions, especially in ethnic republics, not so much a liberalization of the electoral process but inter-clan conflicts took place.

DESCRIPTION OF A NEW WATER MITE SPECIES OF THE GENUS MONATRACTIDES K. VIETS (ACARI: HYDRACHNIDIA, TORRENTICOLIDAE) FROM RUSSIA

A description of a new water mite species, Monatractides rarus (female) from running waters of North Caucasus (Republic Adygheya) is given.

Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and its Effects on Regional Security Approach

Considering the geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic characteristics of Caucasus region, it has been prone for conflict, tension and competition by regional and trans-regional powers from a long time ago. On one hand, the existence of a mosaic of ethnics and cultures in this region has always been a factor for attracting tribunal, social and political conflicts. The collapse of the Soviet Union, divided Caucasus into two parts of North and South. The states of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were located in the South Caucasus and the other ones were located within the boundaries of Russia and called North Caucasus. South Caucasian republics made a lot of effort to achieve a new position in the region and regulate their foreign (political) bonds after independence according to their historical background and the emergence of a new political atmosphere in the region and the world. The fire of conflicts and tensions in the South Caucasus, the imbalance in the region, the frustration of some countries during the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia, resulted in a gradual divergence of Russia's Caucasian republics. In this condition, the way was paved for the presence of new players especially the United States of America and NATO. In this paper, the history of the Caucasus crisis and its impact on the security and geopolitical condition of neighboring countries and particularly Iran and the future conditions of the region is analyzed.

HIV epidemic in Russia and neighbouring countries.

Reports of HIV/AIDS cases attributed to sexual transmission from foreigners were published in the USSR in the mid of 80s. In the initial decade of the epidemic, the subtype B was found in men who have sex with men (MSM) population and several non-B subtypes were identified in heterosexual persons. The first case of HIV infection in intravenous drug users (IVDU) was reported in 1993 and since then a specific subtype A and its recombinants invaded the intravenous drug users (IVDU) populations of the region with the highest rate in Estonia, Russia and Ukraine. The concentrated HIV epidemic in IVDUs is still the main problem in the Eastern Europe; however, the rate of heterosexual transmission is increasing and many evidences of HIV prevalence rise in MSM are published. UNAIDS estimations for the number of HIV-positive persons living in the region range from 980,000 to 1,300,000 but distribution of HIV-cases is uneven and the prevalence rate of HIV infection in separate regions is over 1%. Mass seasonal labour migration from Central Asia and Caucasian republics to Russia transmits HIV to these countries. Prevention programs in the region are limited, and ART coverage is not more than 20% of the total HIV-positive population. The lack of concern about the epidemic, absence of effective national strategies and limited allocated resources are the main barriers to prevention and care in many countries. Local conflicts, rising religiosity and discrimination are adverse factors. The near-term forecast for the epidemic in the region is pessimistic and further international advocacy is needed to improve the situation.

Islam na obszarze postradzieckim – Kaukaz

Islam is seen as a homogeneous religion. It is a common belief that the synonymous of Muslim is Arab. Meanwhile, according to statistics of 2013, Muslims constitute over a 28% of the world population. The followers are spread all over the globe and can be found in every country. Thus, speaking about homogeneity and identification of all believers with the Arab world is a serious mistake. Islam in the post-Soviet area, has a characteristic dimension. Caucasian republics, initially conquered by Muslim Empires in the majority submitted to Islamisation. The Soviet reign and atheistic propaganda weakened religion, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Central Asia experienced the revival of Islam. Today Georgia is a Christian country with a Muslim minority, Dagestan is the most Islamized Caucasian republic with Sunni majority while in Azerbaijan Sunnis are a minority compared with Shiites. Therefore, how much similar and how much different is Islam in Azerbaijan, Dagestan and Georgia?

Analysis of Russian-Armenian Relations and its Influence on the Political - Security Future of the Caucasus after September 11 Attacks

The Caucasus, from the distant past, whether as part of a land or as the sphere of influence has always attracted Russia’s attention. Regarding that it cannot remove all its rivals from the Political arena of Central Asia particularly the Caucasus in these new conditions, Moscow’s policy and influencing has been directed towards the path in through which has established strong relations with countries such as Armenia in the Caucasus region. Also, regarding this issue, this country is trying to use its own superior economic, political and military position in the region in order to control the conducts and foreign policies of Caucasian republics in line with fading the existence of factors which are incompatible with Russian interest and national security, hereby it can delay or prevent the convergence of countries of the region having western political and security structures. Armenia, because of strategic objectives like removing economic siege, being out of geopolitical isolation, responding to the local crisis and achieving regional security, tend to improve the relation with Russia. Such changes could alter the balance of power in the region. The changes of geopolitical components in the Caucasus include changes in regional alliances and the emergence of new regional order, evolution of mechanisms and security arrangements, influence on Karabakh conflict and particularly the economy of energy, and energy security as well as economic cooperation in the region.

Formation of the military security of Аzerbaijan and its military organization in post-soviet period

The article analyses the historical experience of one of the Caucasian republics, the Republic of Azerbaijan, in the period after the collapse of theSoviet Union, on the establishment of the national system of military security. Considered it a military-political.

Internal and external dynamics of regional cooperation in Central Asia

Contemporary Central Asia in the process of transformation and facing common security challenges. The stability and security in Central Asia affected the direction of integration, patterns of regional cooperation, and building of institutions. Central Asian republics have been co-founders of regional organizations including Central Asian Cooperation Organizations (CACO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but their effectiveness is different. Central Asian and Caucasus republics, as well as China, Iran. Pakistan, India are involved in the process of organization and harmonization of the transport arteries and communications connecting Europe and Asia, the West and the East. There are many problems among different actors in Central Asia and Afghanistan, including Russia, US, China, the EU, NATO, OSCE and other international organizations, because they different approaches and understanding of the situation. Challenges of the 21-century require a broader partnership and cooperation. Future prospects of multilateral regional and international cooperation in Central Asia will depend on correlations of national, regional and global interests. It is necessary first of all strong dialogs between Central Asian republics itself. Central Asian geopolitical, economic and security challenges are connected and solution could come jointly. Future regional cooperation, strong international partnership would promote more stability, economic reforms and democratization to region and beyond.

Nations in Transition: The Caucasian Republics

Nations in Transition: The Caucasian Republics

Caucasian National Formations of the Red Army during the Defense of the Caucasus in 1942

The article concerns issues in the recruitment of ethnic Caucasians into Red Army units and the military’s use of national (ethnic) units during the defense of the Caucasus (July – December 1942). Particular attention is paid to the political and historical context of Caucasian national divisions as well as to discussions among the country's and the Caucasian national republics' military commanders and political leaders regarding the level of military preparedness and political loyalty of ethnically Caucasian troops. Pipss.org is grateful to Rebecca Gordan who translated this abstract from Russian into English

NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks

In 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson stated that, “for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Caucasus is of no special relevance.” Up until now, this attitude has not changed fundamentally, even though the region obviously attracts the Alliance’s attention more than it did in the 1990s. NATO’s stance toward the South Caucasus has always provoked much more and stronger reactions in Russia than in the political, media, and public realms of the Alliance’s member states. In 1999, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), an Ad Hoc Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus was established, placing primary focus on defense and economics issues, civil and emergency planning, science and environmental cooperation, and information activities. However, to date there is no overall comprehensive format for NATO cooperation with the South Caucasus that would even come close to its “strategic partnership” with the EU, its concept of “special relations” with Russia and Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, or the South East European Initiative. Only in 2004—i.e., a full thirteen years after the dissolution of the USSR, which was closely followed by the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—U.S. diplomat Robert Simmons was appointed as NATO’s first Special Envoy for the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The prospects for joint initiatives with NATO are inevitably negatively influenced by the fact that the armies of all South Caucasian republics are far from meeting NATO standards and requirements, even though especially Georgia and Azerbaijan have been declaring that they hope to introduce and achieve these standards sooner rather than later. This applies to such issues as democratic control of the armed forces, soldiers’ human and civil rights, as well as their social status. At times in these nations, soldiers did not even receive victuals, and their low pay was disbursed with monthlong delays or not at all. This not only led to low morale within the armed forces, massive conscientious objections, and desertions of considerable numbers of troops, but

Diversity of Bacillus anthracis Strains in Georgia and of Vaccine Strains from the Former Soviet Union

Despite the increased number of anthrax outbreaks in Georgia and the other Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union, no data are available on the diversity of the Bacillus anthracis strains involved. There is also little data available on strains from the former Soviet Union, including the strains previously used for vaccine preparation. In this study we used eight-locus variable-number tandem repeat analyses to genotype 18 strains isolated from infected animals and humans at different sites across Georgia, where anthrax outbreaks have occurred in the last 10 years, and 5 strains widely used for preparation of human and veterinary vaccines in the former Soviet Union. Three different genotypes affiliated with the A3.a cluster were detected for the Georgian isolates. Two genotypes were previously shown to include Turkish isolates, indicating that there is a regional strain pattern in the South Caucasian-Turkish region. Four of the vaccine strains were polymorphic, exhibiting three different patterns of the cluster A1.a genotype and the cluster A3.b genotype. The genotype of vaccine strain 71/12, which is considered an attenuated strain in spite of the presence of both of the virulence pXO plasmids, appeared to be a novel genotype in the A1.a cluster.

The South Caucasus: Problems of Stability and Regional Security

Abstract: The establishment of irrevocable democracy, the rule of law, free market economic relations, and the protection of fundamental human rights have not yet assumed key significance in the South Caucasus countries. Consequently, all pressing problems of the region continue to intensify, keeping the region politically and economically unstable. Given contending geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, the region may develop into a center of clashes jeopardizing the currently manageable political instability. The focus of this article is to highlight the main threats to regional security and stability. Key words: Nagorno-Karabakh, NATO, South Caucasus Opposing Foreign Policy Vectors Division lines separating Armenia from the region became particularly pronounced in 1999, when the other Caucasus republics, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, walked out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty (CST), declaring their intentions to instead integrate with Euro-Atlantic security structures. In 2003, the CST was reorganized into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), formed as a counter to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the eastward expansion of European influence. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus whose foreign policy serves the goals of the CSTO, and Armenian authorities see it as the only international framework ensuring the country's national security. On the other hand, Georgia and Azerbaijan are striving to minimize threats to their security by seeking the development of relations with NATO. Armenia's only relations with NATO, through its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), have been a part of Moscow's attempt to initiate cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. Armenian authorities state that the country's defense system stems from the assumption of NATO-CSTO dialogue. It is obvious that Armenia also hopes for the implementation of a June 18, 2004, decision of the CSTO's Collective Security Council, the core of which is a structural transformation of a one-level individual partnership, effective under the frameworks of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) into the format of a two-level individual-collective partnership with NATO. This is because every CSTO member country is also a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (CEAP), whereas Armenia is the only CSTO member developing an IPAP with NATO. There is little doubt that regional stability will be possible in the South Caucasus when the three states of the region belong to the same international security system. The harmonization, synchronization, and coordination of the foreign policy priorities of the three states can prevent the South Caucasus from developing into a hotbed of geopolitical clashes. This means that Armenia should revise its foreign policy. Armenia's IPAR however, is not sufficient, and the country should declare its intention to join NATO. While doing this, Armenia should continue to develop its place in and relationships with international and regional organizations, which in the future may take on key security functions. Under these conditions, Armenia's membership in GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) would indicate Yerevan's desire to take up a realistic foreign policy. If Armenia continues to remain isolated from the regional integration processes, the divergences in the interests of the three states will continue to deepen, and the line that separates confronting geopolitical blocs and security systems will run along Armenia's borders. Unfortunately, the authoritarian regime presently in power in Armenia has reduced its foreign policy to tighten its grip. As a result, Armenia has become the main conduit of Russian policy in the region, thus restricting its foreign policy to the bounds of the Kremlin's interests. The recent redeployment of Russian military forces and hardware from Georgia to Armenia reflects Armenia's continuing economic and political isolation, and is evidence of the growing polarization in the region. …

Recent Russian Federal Elections in Dagestan: Implications for Proposed Electoral Reform

THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA ELECTION, on 7 December 2003, and the presidential election, on 14 March 2004, both showed particularly high levels of voter turnout and support in North Caucasian republics for the party of power. How should these results be interpreted? Dagestan's election results provide an interesting study, and suggest possible consequences of President Putin's proposed electoral changes. The Russian State Duma consists of 450 representatives. Half of these are currently elected in single-mandate territorial districts. The other half of the Duma representatives are chosen from electoral lists of federal political parties registered by the Justice Ministry of the Russian Federation and certified by the Central Electoral Commission for participation in the election. On 13 September 2004 President Putin proposed that all Duma representatives should be subsequently selected from party lists. According to the Central Electoral Commission, there are presently more than 108 million voters in Russia, or approximately 482,300 voters per territorial district.1 Each territorial electoral district should approximate this number, while not breaching the boundaries that separate the 89 administrative subjects of the Russian Federation. From the first Duma election, in December 1993, Dagestan was divided into two single-mandate territorial districts with approximately 550,000 voters in each. These were the Buinaksky electoral district, No. 10, and the Makhachkalinsky electoral district, No. 11, together giving Dagestan two seats in the lower chamber of the legislative organ. Prior to the 2003 Duma election, however, Dagestani leaders persuaded the Central Electoral Commission to add one district in Dagestan. The addition was justified in terms of a significant increase in Dagestan's population in the interval since the 1989 census. Designated as the Derbentsky district, No. 12, Dagestan's third electoral territory was established at the expense of other regions of Russia with declining populations.2 The addition of this third district offered improved prospects for the attainment of balanced ethnic representation, which is the perennial aim of Dagestani leaders. With this in view, Dagestan's internal raiony were redistributed among the three districts in order to create three electoral units with approximately the same number of voters. The new Derbentsky electoral district established in the southern regions of the Republic includes somewhat greater numbers of ethnic Lezgin than ethnic Dargin

Reliability of statistics on violent death and suicide in the former USSR, 1970-1990.

The stability of the relationship between trends of violent deaths as a whole, suicides and death from undetermined causes was assessed by quantitative methods for the whole former USSR in the years 1970-1990 and for each of the 15 republics in the former USSR for the years 1984-1990. Semi-structured interviews during 1989-1996 were performed with 12 professionals involved in the diagnosis and coding of causes of death in the Baltic states and Russia. The quantitative analyses showed that mortality data were reliable for the Slavic (Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus) and Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) republics, and also for Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Moldova. The Central Asian and Caucasian republics showed greater variation in trends and ratios, indicating a need for further investigations of the reliability of suicide statistics in these regions. It emerged from the interviews that no instructions to falsify data were given. The only instructions given were to treat the data on suicide and murder as 'top secret'. None the less, certain classification errors might arise in the statistics. The diagnosis 'undetermined cause of death' was permissible only as a preliminary diagnosis for 14 days, and there was a risk of criticism for poor-quality work if too many deaths were classified as being due to undetermined causes. Misclassifications could also occur in cases where there was a wish to conceal murder. Negative attitudes towards suicide, especially in Muslim regions, where suicide is taboo, might also have contributed to under-reporting of suicide.

Burden of the Third Rome: The threat of Russian orthodox fundamentalism and Muslim eurasia

For contemporary Muslim public opinion, anxious to comprehend the revival of Orthodoxy and nostalgia for starina (old times), the growing radical Orthodox fundamentalism seems to indicate the return of anti‐Islamic Pan‐Slavism. The Neo‐Soviet National Liberals and National Communists are both opposed to the self‐determination of Muslims in Tatarstan, Boshkirstan, Chechnya, Crimea and Daghestan. They are also hostile to the Islamic revival ( al‐sahwa al‐islamiyya) in Central Asian Turkestan and Tajikistan. Their misconception of Islam is shaped by the long tradition of Russian messianism which is rejuvenated after every cyclical decline of Russian political authority. The success of Russian messianic nationalism lies neither in its selective historiosophy nor in its dialectic politics, but in the charismatic reasoning of the old geopolitical threats to the existence of Russians, demonized as the Islamic reconquest of Idel‐Ural (Musulmanskiye dvizheny na Volgu) initiated by the restoration of Pan‐Turkic Islamistan and the Muslim Commonwealth in Central Asia. Like other Russian philosophies of the past, modern Russian nationalism draws on a host of European thinkers and their ideas, but its context is governed by the fundamental notion of ‘Holy Mother Russia’ (Sviataya Matushka Rassieya) and its Byzantine paradigm of ‘the True Holy Church of Constantinople’. Influenced by the militant anti‐Islamic and anti‐Western traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, modem All‐Russian nationalism has become a new and dangerous chimera of economically and politically frustrated Russians. Revitalized Russian Orthodox fundamentalism is a real threat to the newly emancipated Islamic East, because the fall of Communist atheist tyranny did not eliminate the old threat of Russian Orthodox hegemony in the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasian independent republics. Invasion, occupation and military interventions in the Chechen Republic of Itchek‐eria, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan, as well as the prospect of armed rebellions by the Russian separatist minorities in Kazakhstan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Crimea and Tatarstan, explicitly demonstrate the nature of All‐Russian hegemonism at the end of the post‐postmodernist age. The geopolitical and cultural continuity of the Tsarist‐Soviet empire, regardless of the political and economic regime in Moscow, still determines Russian Islamophobia and animates an obsession with ‘national security’ among the rulers of the Kremlin, who attempt to improve Russia's strategic status by a re‐annexation of the so‐called ‘near abroad’ ( blizhnee zarubezhye) countries into the Russian‐dominated confederation of Independent States.