Catch Shares Research Articles

Development and Use of a Bioeconomic Model for Management of Mussel Fisheries under Different Nutrient Regimes in the Temperate Estuary of the Limfjord, Denmark

Coastal ecosystems worldwide are under pressure from human-induced nutrient inputs, fishing activities, mariculture, construction work, and climate change. Integrated management instruments handling one or more of these problems in combination with socioeconomic issues are therefore necessary to secure a sustainable use of resources. In the Limfjord, a temperate eutrophic estuary in Denmark, nutrient load reductions are necessary to fulfill EU regulations such as the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The expected outcome of these load reductions is an improved water quality, but also reduced production of the abundant stock of filter-feeding blue mussels, Mytilus edulis. This is expected to have significant economic consequences for the million-euro mussel fishing industry taking place in the Limfjord today. We developed a bioeconomic model that can be used to explore the consequences of load reductions for mussel fishery as practiced today, as well as potential management options, to obtain an economically and ecologically sustainable mussel fishery. Model simulations clearly demonstrate a substantial decrease in mussel production after the nutrient load reductions necessary to obtain the targets in the WFD. With today's practice, the mussel fishery in the Limfjord will not be profitable in a future, less eutrophic estuary. However, model simulations also revealed that mussel fishery can be profitable after implementation of the WFD with a reduction in the total fishing quota, fewer fishing vessels, and a higher fishing quota per vessel.

Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?

Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?

Catch share programs in the Western Pacific—A solution in search of a problem?

The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.

Corrigendum to “Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature” [J. Mar. Policy 2012;36 (6),1242–1254

Corrigendum to “Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature” [J. Mar. Policy 2012;36 (6),1242–1254

On solving a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming model for analyzing fisheries policies: Fishermen behavior and optimal fish quota

Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) is a useful tool for analyzing policy questions in fisheries management. In order to understand and reproduce solution procedures such as value function iteration, an analytic elaboration of the problem and model characteristics is required. Because of the increased use of numerical techniques, our aim is to improve the understanding of mathematical properties of the solution procedure and to give more insight into their practical implementation by means of a specific case that uses value function iteration. We provide an analytic description of model characteristics and analyze the solution procedure of a bi-level SDP model to study fisheries policies. At the first level, a policy maker decides on the fish quota to be imposed, keeping in mind fish stock dynamics, capital stock dynamics, long-term resource rents and anticipating fishermen behavior. At the second level, fishermen reveal short-term behavior by reacting on this quota and on current states of fish stock and capital stock by deciding on their investments and fishing effort. An analysis of the behavior of the model is given and a method is elaborated to obtain optimum strategies based on value function iteration. Bi-level decision making enables us to present the model in an understandable manner, and serves as a basis for extension to more complex settings.

Making an environmental market, unmaking adaptive capacity: Species commodification in the New England groundfishery

This article demonstrates how market-focused natural resource management can reduce adaptive capacity to environmental change. It describes attempts to standardize socio-ecological phenomena in the New England groundfishery for purposes of legal accountability and the development of environmental markets. Industry flexibility across harvested species has supported a range of informal social networks for the exchange of information and other goods and services. Federal catch share policy, associated species population assessments, and transferable harvest quotas neglect social and ecological diversity that figure centrally in adaptation strategies. New quota markets generate a cascade of impacts, including intensified capital investment, threats of industry consolidation, increased reliance on limited capabilities of fisheries science, more acute regulatory uncertainties, narrowing of species options, smaller and less predictable profit margins, shifts in industry expectations for the future, and changes in fishing practice. Presumed market incentives for resource conservation are weakened. State and non-profit interventions to protect marine resources and local fishing-dependent collectivities may have limited immediate impact, but still play important roles in the longer term. Permit banks, alternative seafood marketing, and reformist regulatory proposals maintain institutional diversity and invigorate informal social relations capable of decentralized information sharing and collective action, which are essential to more adaptive environmental governance.

How have catch shares been allocated?

A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe.

Sharing the catch or catching the shares: Catch shares for the western Pacific region?

The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.

Catch shares and the main Hawaiian Islands bottomfish fishery: Linking fishery conditions and fisher perceptions

To address overfishing concerns, a total allowable catch (TAC) management program was instituted in the main Hawaiian Islands (MHI) bottomfish fishery during 2007. Using results from a recent survey of bottomfish fishermen, this paper details behavioral and social aspects of bottomfish fishing in Hawaii and explores fisher perceptions towards current fishery conditions and future management alternatives. The paper further discusses the applicability of potential catch share management for this fishery. Bottomfish fishermen expressed uncertainty towards catch share programs and appear to be reluctant about any movement towards catch share management. This paper describes many preexisting conditions in the fishery that suggest a catch share program may not be practical at this time.

Cooperatives, concessions, and co-management on the Pacific coast of Mexico

Ten fishery cooperatives of the Pacific coast of Mexico were studied to examine reasons for successful community-based management of the fishery commons. The cooperatives hold exclusive rights to ‘concession’ territories for major fisheries and are linked by geographic adjacency and through a federation. The case study underscores the role of factors such as smallness of scale; the productivity, visibility and legibility of the resources and fisheries involved; clarity of social and territorial boundaries; adjacency and linkages among territorial units; a strong sense of community. The cooperatives also made considerable investments in attaining high levels of knowledge, leadership, transparent and democratic decision-making, and “vigilance,” or enforcement of the rules and the running of the organization. The study also shows the workings of windows of opportunity and experience with environmental change in the development of strong and adaptive capacities for co-management between local organizations and government agencies. Although particular histories and larger legal, political, and cultural contexts matter, the Mexican case supports arguments for greater community-level engagement in “catch share” and territorial management throughout the Pacific.

Economic characteristics and management challenges of the Hawaii pelagic longline fisheries: Will a catch share program help?

To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery.

Measuring the social and economic performance of catch share programs: Definition of metrics and application to the U.S. Northeast Region groundfish fishery

In May 2010 the New England Fishery Management Council introduced a catch share, program in the Northeast Multispecies (groundfish) Fishery. Amendment 16 of the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan allocated quota to 17 self organized groups of permit holders based on their collective catch history. These groups are commonly referred to as Sectors and are similar to harvest cooperatives. Sectors represented a significant shift from previous management approaches reliant on limits to days at sea and other input controls. Given the potential for significant social and economic effects of catch shares and other management programs, social and economic performance measures were developed from 2009 to 2010 by Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) social scientists. Previous social and economic monitoring of management outcomes had been ad hoc and provided minimal opportunity for inter-fishery comparison. This paper describes the process of identifying performance measures and associated indicators to serve as the foundation of monitoring social and economic outcomes for all federal fisheries in the U.S. Northeast Region, and for planning NEFSC social and economic research priorities. It then presents how these performance measures were applied to assess the first year of the Amendment 16 Sector program. Challenges and limitations of this process are presented along with a description of efforts underway to broaden the use of these social and economic metrics to other fisheries.

Fluctuating quota and management costs under multiannual adjustment of fish quota

North Sea fisheries are managed by the European Union (EU) through a system of annual quota. Due to uncertainty about future fish stocks, yearly revisions of these policies lead to fluctuation in quota, which in turn affects harvest and investment decisions of fishermen. Determination of quota requires high management costs in terms of obtaining information and negotiations between experts and policy makers. To reduce both quota fluctuation and management costs, the EU has proposed a system of multiannual quota. In this paper we study the effect of multiannual quota on quota volatility and resource rents, while accounting for management costs. We develop a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming model, where at level one, the EU determines the quota that maximizes resource rents. At level two, fishermen decide myopically on their harvest and investment levels, subject to the quota. Results show that policy makers can reduce quota volatility and improve resource rents from the fishery with multiannual quota. Important trade-offs are involved in the accomplishment of these objectives: fish stock and investments become more volatile, which leads to more overcapacity.

Zonal attachment of fish stocks and management cooperation

This paper studies the incentive-compatibility of distributing fish quotas on the basis of zonal attachment of stocks. Two countries sharing two fish stocks are studied, with the zonal attachment of both stocks varying randomly. The base case is one of symmetric stocks, where one country is the dominant player for one stock. While each country has weak or no incentive to cooperative on the stock in which it holds only a minor share, both countries would have incentives to cooperate on both stocks if they are jointly managed. If one country is the major player with respect to both stocks, the minor player has weak or no incentive to cooperate. The incentive to cooperate is not any stronger if the variations in the zonal attachment of the two stocks are negatively correlated.

Income diversification and risk for fishermen

Catches and prices from many fisheries exhibit high interannual variability, leading to variability in the income derived by fishery participants. The economic risk posed by this may be mitigated in some cases if individuals participate in several different fisheries, particularly if revenues from those fisheries are uncorrelated or vary asynchronously. We construct indices of gross income diversification from fisheries at the level of individual vessels and find that the income of the current fleet of vessels on the US West Coast and in Alaska is less diverse than at any point in the past 30 y. We also find a dome-shaped relationship between the variability of individuals' income and income diversification, which implies that a small amount of diversification does not reduce income risk but that higher levels of diversification can substantially reduce the variability of income from fishing. Moving from a single fishery strategy to a 50-25-25 split in revenues reduces the expected coefficient of variation of gross revenues between 24% and 65% for the vessels included in this study. The increasing access restrictions in many marine fisheries through license reductions and moratoriums have the potential to limit fishermen's ability to diversify their income risk across multiple fisheries. Catch share programs often result in consolidation initially and may reduce diversification. However, catch share programs also make it feasible for fishermen to build a portfolio of harvest privileges and potentially reduce their income risk. Therefore, catch share programs create both threats and opportunities for fishermen wishing to maintain diversified fishing strategies.

Development and implementation of allocation arrangements for recreational and commercial fishing sectors in Western Australia

AbstractThis paper examines why Western Australia's Integrated Fisheries Management (IFM) policy was adopted, its development, achievements, lessons learned and future directions. Adopted in 2004, IFM aims to achieve and maintain fish resource sustainability through optimal catch share arrangements between competing users. It involves setting an allowable harvest level for each resource, using an independent allocation committee process to allocate explicit catch shares for commercial, recreational and customary sectors, and monitoring sectoral catch. IFM provides guidance for managing each sector within its catch share, providing access to that share, and developing reallocation mechanisms to transfer sectoral catch shares. The three most important multi‐sector resources, western rock lobster, Panulirus cygnus George, metropolitan Roe's abalone, Haliotis roei Grey, and west coast demersal scalefish, have undergone the allocation process. The first two are operational while the third is almost complete. Allocation outcomes demonstrate the need to account for each sector's catch, with credible scientific data to underpin decision‐making, independent transparent allocation processes, robust sectoral representation, workable reallocation mechanisms and management arrangements to ensure that all sectors can access their allocated share. IFM generates fair decisions for optimal resource use to reduce intersectoral conflict and provide better community outcomes, with wide applicability across other jurisdictions.

Why International Catch Shares Won't Save Ocean Biodiversity

Skepticism about the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory approaches has produced a wave of enthusiasm for market-based strategies for dealing with environmental conflicts. In the fisheries context, the most prominent of these strategies is the use of “catch shares,” which assign specific proportions of the total allowable catch to individuals who are then free to trade them with others. Catch shares are now in wide use domestically within many nations, and there are increasing calls for implementation of internationally tradable catch shares. Based on a review of theory, empirical evidence, and two contexts in which catch shares have been proposed, this Article explains why international catch shares are not likely to arrest the decline of ocean biodiversity. Catch shares were developed to promote greater economic efficiency and profitability in the fishing industry. They have proven capable of doing so at the domestic level, although their effects on wealth distribution have frequently been controversial. Theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that catch shares promote conservation, especially of non-target resources, is thinner. Furthermore, in the international context catch shares face special challenges. Catch shares cannot resolve the value differences that underlie the most intractable disagreements about international fisheries management. They are less likely to reduce conflicts over total allowable catch in the international than in the domestic context, because distrust of managers and competitors runs deeper. Finally, catch share strategies require effective enforcement, which is both institutionally and practically difficult to provide for many international fisheries. In general, catch shares are not a promising route to improving international fisheries management, and pursuing them could distract the international community from more important steps toward improving conservation of global ocean resources.

Learning How to Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fishery Conservation

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE TRAGEDY OF THE OCEAN COMMONS III. THE FAILURE OF FISHERY REGULATION IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS--THE ROAD NOT TAKEN V. CATCH SHARES IN PRACTICE A. Economic Consequences of Catch Shares B. Catch Shares and Conservation C. Social and Economic Consequences of Catch Shares VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS VII. CONCLUSION I. Introduction In a crowded meeting hall in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the New England Fishery Management Council voted this January to recommend drastic new cuts to the catch limits for Atlantic codfish off the New England coast. (1) Over the strenuous objections of local communities and fishermen, the Council proposed 77% reductions in the allowable cod harvest for each of the next three years in the Gulf of Maine, and a 61% cut in next year's cod catch on Georges Bank. (2) The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration approved the proposed catch limits and other emergency measures in May 2013. (3) New England fishermen and other opponents of the plan fear that these restrictions will doom the centuries-old local fishing industry. As one lamented- Right now what we've got is a plan that guarantees the fishermen's extinction and does nothing to ameliorate it. (4) Proponents of the plan, however, counter that these measures are the only way to save the rapidly collapsing Atlantic cod industry. As Council member John Bullard, regional administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, observed, the problem is that there are fewer and fewer codfish in the sea. It's midnight and getting darker when it comes to how many cod there are. There isn't enough cod for people to make a decent living. (5) The dire state of the fishery gave Council members little choice. (6) Unfortunately, even these severe new limits may not be enough to save the New England cod fishery. The Council's most recent steps follow on years of mismanagement, overly optimistic stock estimates, and misguided fishery policies that failed to align the economic interests of the fishing community with the long-term sustainability of the fishery. Reforms adopted for the 2010 season may have been too little too late. (7) As fishery researcher Ray Hilborn has explained, the incentives and policies governing the New England groundfish fishery for many years have made the fishery vulnerable to just this kind of collapse. (8) In the 1990s, for example, the fishery stock assessments indicated that short-term catch limits and fishing effort reductions could rebuild the fishery stock and ultimately lead to higher long-term yields. Nevertheless, local fishermen and their political representatives vehemently opposed any such reductions. (9) It would be easy to attack New England fishermen for being short-sighted. To do so, however, would ignore the incentives they face--incentives created by the existing regulatory structure. Due to a large number of inactive trawling permits, incumbent fishermen have little incentive to agree to catch reductions, as they would be unlikely to capture the full value of the rebuilt stocks. (10) Even if catch reductions today would lead to higher catch limits in the future, a rebuilt stock could encourage inactive trawlers to resume fishing. (11) And although a variety of forces--some beyond human control--likely contributed to the fishery's present crisis, without proper incentives for the fishing community to preserve New England's stocks, overfishing and mismanagement continued, leaving one of North America's oldest fisheries increasingly vulnerable to collapse. The hard choices being made in an effort to save the Atlantic cod fishery today are all too common, as policymakers continue to employ and rely upon failed conservation policies, leaving fisheries the world over poorly managed and under stress. (12) By some measures, a majority of exploited fisheries are depleted or in decline. (13) Even more troubling, new research suggests that those fisheries about which scientists know the least may be in the worst shape. …

연평어장에서 생분해성 꽃게 삼중자망의 어획성능

To study the catching efficiency of biodegradable trammel net for swimming crab (Portunus trituberculatus), three types (biodegradable, monofilament and multifilament) of trammel nets were used in the field test, and the tests were carried out 16 times with two different mesh sizes (105mm and 160mm) in the Yeonpyeong fishing ground of Korea, 2009~2011. The catching efficiency of three type nets was analyzed by catch in number, catch in weight and average weight per individual of small and large size swimming crab by net types and mesh sizes. Statistical T-test was also carried out to verify the efficiency between the three types of nets. The results are as follows. The catch in number of swimming crab was 24,667 and formed about 81.0% of total catch. Of all swimming crab catch, small swimming crabs with less than 64mm in carapace length which is a prohibited landing size by law formed 48.1%, larger swimming crabs with more than 64mm in carapace length which is a landing size formed 51.9%. In 105mm mesh size trammel net test, the catch share in number of small size swimming crab by biodegradable trammel net was 47.5% in comparison with multifilament trammel net and 74.2% in comparison with monofilament trammel net, so biodegradable trammel net has more protective effects on small size swimming crab than other types of trammel nets. The protective effects for small size swimming crab by biodegradable trammel net was 25.8~52.5% in comparison with other types of trammel nets. The catch share in weight of large size swimming crab by biodegradable trammel net was 98.3% in comparison with multifilament trammel net and 92.3% in comparison with monofilament trammel net, so biodegradable trammel net has a similar catch efficiency to multifilament trammel net. The results of 160mm mesh size trammel net test have shown similar results of 105mm mesh size trammel net test. This study shows that biodegradable trammel net is a more useful fishing gear than multifilament and monofilament trammel net because biodegradable trammel net has lower catch rate than other types of nets in small size swimming crab and similar catch rate than multifilament trammel net which is a well used net by fishermen.

From anecdotes to scientific evidence? A review of recent literature on catch share systems in marine fisheries

In response to concerns regarding the global status of living marine resources, there has been a worldwide tightening of fishery access regulations. This has led to growing interest in individual transferable catch share programs, a market‐based allocation approach to distribute fishing rights. However, the economic, ecological, and social benefits of these systems are the subject of continued debate. Here, we review empirical studies of transferable catch share systems published over the past decade. Our results show that, despite some of these systems having been in place for more than 20 years, systematic empirical assessments of their impacts are still rare. Furthermore, methods used to assess the impacts of catch share systems to facilitate comparisons remain under development, making it difficult to derive general conclusions from existing studies.