Casualty Figures Research Articles

Guerrillas and bandits in the Serranía de Ronda, 1810–1812

The Spanish Guerrilla (1808–1812) which has given its name to ideologically motivated insurgencies is usually portrayed as a patriotic uprising against the French occupation forces of Napoleon. It was that, in part, but also many other things besides. This case study illustrates its overlap and convergence with banditry but also with social unrest turned into uprisings directed by poor Spaniards against their creditors, as in the storming of Ronda by insurgents in 1810. From the propaganda of the day to the subsequent Spanish patriotic historiography, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the amplitude of events and also the damage that was done to the French forces and the casualty figures inflicted on them.

The Great Exaggeration: Death and the Civil War

What did the U.S. Civil War death tolls mean to those who lived through the war? We are now told that wartime deaths were unprecedented, overwhelming, and constituted one of the fundamental experiences for the wartime generation. But is this really true? In recent years, statistical descriptions have been used by historians--including such renowned scholars as James McPherson, Eric Foner, and Drew Gilpin Faust but also celebrated filmmakers Ken and Rik Burns, among many--to drive home a characterization of the war based on the scale of death. They may be found across the range of media regarding the war, in films, museums, popular histories, scholarly treatises, and lectures. One such statistic is that the number of soldiers' deaths in the Civil War was greater than the total number suffered in all other American wars combined. A second point makes use of the first figure: if one calculates the proportion of the total population that died while in military service during the war and applies this percentage to present-day population figures, the equivalent number of deaths for Americans in the twenty-first century would reach above 7 million. This is a staggering figure that suggests that the Civil War generation made almost inconceivable sacrifices. We are shocked at these numbers, however, because we interpret them from a modern point of view. The present essay argues that while factually correct, the statistics work to exaggerate the war's impact. At its essence, the use of these statistics is designed to provide perspective, a laudatory goal. It is supposed to allow those of us looking back on the war to get a clear sense of the emotional texture of the time. The great problem in this instance, however, is that it violates one of the central codes of historical analysis--that of avoiding presentism. Instead of putting us in the minds of those who experienced the Civil War, it conjures up significance by facilely equating wildly disparate eras. In addition, implicit in the use of the overall casualty figure is the notion that matters--that is, that in certain circumstances, the volume of death itself is enough to make an argument for the significance of an event, or to make a case that a social equilibrium has been disturbed. However, to be convincing, this mode of argument has to establish that the scale has indeed changed dramatically for those experiencing it; historians should not simply extrapolate meaning from the present back into the past. To question the size matters argument, one must at least temporarily accept the notion that comparative statistics of death are meaningful, but only in the context of appropriate comparisons. In the bigger picture, however, it is not enough simply to speak about numbers. To understand how deaths affect a culture, it is essential to examine the meaning ascribed to them beyond the statistics. In one way, this is obvious: compared with the tens of thousands of traffic deaths per year in the United States, for example, the relatively small number of people killed on September 11, 2001, had an enormous impact, influencing the nation's psyche, and, ultimately, domestic and international politics and culture. To be convincing when making a point about death, therefore, we must find evidence for the transformative power of the meaning of military mortality, and place any statistics in their contemporary context, before making claims about significance. In the case of the Civil War, historians have not adequately taken into account the context of death and dying. Solid scholarly work exists on the central importance of death in antebellum America and the ordinary experience of death during the war, but Civil War historians have tended to sidestep this in order to claim the war years as exceptional. They have also underplayed the significance of the demographic realities Americans faced before, during, and after the war. These reveal a society constantly coping with large-scale mortality. If we start to take more seriously the antebellum circumstances, we can reexamine the statistical realities of Civil War deaths and put them into a more reasonable perspective. Language: en

How do “numbers” construct social reality in disaster-stricken areas?: a case of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, China

This article focuses on the dynamics of using numbers to construct an image of social reality in disaster areas. Numbers are neither objective nor value-neutral but are rather generated, transmitted and shared with social signification. In other words, numbers can be thought of as simply socially constructed information. Statistics and other numbers usually work in positive ways. However, it is also possible that using numbers in the media can lead to unintended messages that could produce negative consequences. We conducted field studies in disaster-stricken areas of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China and compared findings to the case of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan in order to examine how numbers—in terms of the amount of donations, the timeline of reconstruction projects and casualty figures—construct social reality and cause a variety of social dysfunctions.

Distribution and larval habitats of Anopheles species in northern Gyeonggi Province, Republic of Korea

A total of 180 larval collection sites (e.g., rice paddies, marshes, ground pools, ponds, stream margins, and irrigation and drainage ditches) was surveyed within a 2 km radius from Warrior Base training area, 5 km south of Panmunjeom (Joint Security Area, demilitarized zone), Gyeonggi Province, Republic of Korea (ROK), from May through October, 2007 to characterize larval habitat distributions of members of the Anopheles Hyrcanus Group (An. sinensis, An. lesteri, An. pullus, An. belenrae, An. kleini, and An. sineroides). A total of 5,859 anopheline larvae was collected from 84.4% of the sites surveyed, of which 4,071 were identified to species by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) using the ribosomal DNA internal transcribed spacer 2 (rDNA ITS2). Anopheles sinensis (52.6%) was the most frequently collected, followed by An. kleini (29.4%), An. sineroides (9.8%), An. pullus (6.7%), An. belenrae (1.1%), and An. lesteri (0.5%). Anopheles pullus and An. kleini were collected in greater proportions in May and from May - July, respectively. Few An. sinensis were collected from May - June, but it was the predominant species collected by August, and accounted for >80% of all larvae from September - October. Anopheles kleini was found in all habitats sampled; however, it was collected most frequently in young growth rice paddies, while An. sinensis was collected more frequently in mature and post-harvest paddies. Anopheles pullus was associated with pre-cultivated rice paddies, including water-filled tire ruts left from the previous fall's harvest.

(P1-11) Psychosocial Impact of Russian Invasion of Georgia in 2008

In August 2008, Georgia was subjected to a brutal Russian military invasion and occupation of some its territories. A total of 364 citizens of Georgia were killed, another 2,234 were injured, and 127,589 were internally displaced. This historic military act of a superpower nuclear state invading a small, neighboring country produced population-wide psychological distress and debilitating psychopathology. The key features of the Russian invasion for Georgia were examined, and the consequences of this particular event were defined. Casualty figures, ethnic cleansing facts, numbers of refugees and displaced persons, impact on Georgia's education, damage to cultural heritage, the role of mass media, economic loss, and environmental destruction also were examined. Data suggest that exposure to hazards, loss, change, human causation/culpability, information as a stressor, multiple traumatic events contributed significantly to the mental health outcomes of the population in Georgia. Mental health, psychological trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), resilience, suicide risk, and secondary trauma were highly prevalent among impacted persons. There is an urgent need to focus on the protective nature of preserving and restoring psychosocial and material resources in the prevention and treatment of PTSD and major depressive disorder following traumatic events.

Casualty Reporting and Domestic Support for War: The US Experience during the Korean War

The common argument that public support for war is casualty sensitive ignores the fact that casualty figures are not revealed automatically. While the military decides when, and to whom, to release such information, political elites can question, even condemn, how the government goes about this business. After briefly exploring how the US military operated during the two world wars, this article focuses on American casualty reporting during the Korean War, arguing that the way the figures were revealed often sparked enormous political controversy, which at two crucial moments helped to undermine domestic support for this distant war.

Earthquake Response and Psychosocial Health Outcomes: Applying Lessons From Integrating Systems of Care and Recovery to Haiti

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti, affecting approximately 3.5 million people. As of this writing, information about casualty figures is provisional; however, reports indicate potentially more than 100 000 have died, and an even greater number are homeless with destruction of critical infrastructure, including basic utilities, transportation, communication, and health.1 The psychological consequences of this event will be significant, and perhaps by examining previous disasters we can apply evidence-based interventions to ensure a comprehensive and integrated response to Haiti.

Fighting Traffic

Fighting Traffic Peter D. Norton (bio) and Bruce Epperson (bio) To the Editor I have no wish to question Bruce Epperson’s overall assessment of Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (January 2009, pp. 235–37), but I believe readers of Technology and Culture deserve corrections of three important errors in Mr. Epperson’s review. First, the reviewer alleges that the book attributes the transformation of the city street “to a powerful coalition of industry representatives and elite automobile clubs” which “hijacked a series of urban transportation-safety conferences convened by Commerce secretary Herbert Hoover.” In fact, this very small but important episode, confined in the book to six pages (187–93), describes no hijacking, just perfectly legal interest-group politics of the usual variety. This event was not important enough to merit any mention in the summary of the book’s argument in the introduction. Second, according to the reviewer, “Norton eschews systematic quantification in favor of an anecdotal approach.” The reviewer thereby dismisses substantial research in archival and published primary sources as “anecdotal,” though such research is the foundation of nearly all professional historical monographs. I should note that reviewers who have published books in the field have characterized Fighting Traffic as “exquisitely researched” (Zachary Schrag) and as founded upon “rigorous research” (Gijs Mom). I cannot judge these assessments myself, except to say that as professional historians these reviewers distinguish research from anecdote. The reviewer purports to present nineteenth-century data that refute my claim that traffic casualties in the early 1920s were unprecedented in scale. The data presented, however, do not serve this purpose. Epperson claims that in 1867, 200 New Yorkers were killed by horse traffic. The data originate from Maxwell Lay’s Ways of the World (1992, p. 132), but are in fact figures for London (as reference to Lay’s source will indicate). In fact, in 1925 automobile fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants in New York City were three times higher than the comparable 1867 London fatality rate attributable to horse traffic. Other data the reviewer presents as a refutation of my statement that fatalities rose “fast” merely confirm the data in Fighting Traffic; both show a rise in traffic fatalities that was, by any standard, fast. The reviewer notes [End Page 982] that fatalities in 1920–1930 rose only 2.57 times (in fact a steeper rise than in any decade since). In the four years following World War I, fatalities rose 64 percent, a rate never since approached in any four-year period; hence, by 1923, cars were under attack by the non-motoring majority in cities. The reviewer notes correctly that fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles declined overall in the 1920s. I used casualty data to explain antipathy to cars among the non-motoring majority, however, for whom casualties per 100,000 inhabitants mattered, not fatalities per 100,000 vehicles. The book’s argument has much less to do with actual casualty figures (though these are provided) than with the evolving perceptions of competing street users’ rights of access to streets. The strength of these perceptions is substantiated, as it must be, not by casualty figures but by textual evidence. That there was a prevailing perception (justified or not) circa 1920 that automobiles were dangerous, and that pedestrians were presumed innocent when they were struck by them, is a claim substantiated by overwhelming evidence, and perhaps most convincingly by the well-documented anxiety these perceptions fostered among automotive interest groups. Perceptions (as opposed to accident data) are exceedingly difficult to quantify, but where possible, this has been done. For example, the views of the authors of letters to a newspaper are surveyed (p. 270), police chiefs’ opinions on the causes of accidents are measured (p. 53), and the 42,000 signatures on a speed-governor initiative in Cincinnati (which implicitly blamed automobiles for accidents) are offered as evidence (p. 96). Whether accident data would justify their opinions or not, those who blamed motorists threatened the automobile’s urban future, and this threat led some social groups to organize to extend responsibility for casualties to non-motorists, and to defend motorists’ right to the streets...

Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494‐2007 (3rd edition)

Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494‐2007 (3rd edition)

A review of underground fuel storage events and putting risk into perspective with other areas of the energy supply chain

Abstract The UK became a net importer of gas during 2004 and faces an increasing dependency on imports, yet has very little gas storage capacity. The UKs capacity to import, transport and store gas and liquid natural gas (LNG) has to be improved, requiring greater investment in new gas supply infrastructure. Construction of appropriately sited onshore underground gas storage (UGS) facilities is needed. However, local groups oppose most proposed UGS sites on the grounds of safety, citing the dangers of gas migration and rare fatal events, mostly in America. This paper summarizes 228 reported events of widely varying cause, nature and severity at underground fuel storage (UFS) facilities; the majority at USA SPR facilities. Since UGS was first undertaken in 1915, reports of 13 fatalities, around 72 injured and the evacuation of at least 6700 people are found at UFS sites. Some communities have experienced multiple evacuations. In the context of the danger posed to the general public, three of those killed were staff at two UFS facilities. UGS (including LPG) has led to 10 civilian deaths, 25 injured and c. 1250 evacuated. In other areas of the energy supply chain, casualties are orders of magnitude greater, with at least 1525 dead, 6826 injured and the evacuation of over 7000 at incidents involving above ground fuel storage tanks since 1951. When considering UK UGS applications, the risk of UGS and wider UFS experiences should be put into context. Worldwide, over 90 years experience in UGS now exists, with around 630 facilities of different types currently operational. Technologies used are often those of, or derived from, a well-regulated oil and gas exploration industry. In contrast to public perception, industry and academia recognize that UGS has an excellent health, safety and environmental record. Although it should not be claimed that gas will never be found outside the intended well or storage facility area, UFS casualty figures appear to corroborate claims by supporters of the technologies that salt caverns provide one of the safest answers to the problem of storing large amounts of hydrocarbons and that even in urban areas underground gas storage, oil and gas production can be conducted safely if proper procedures are followed. If gas is found outside the intended system, then after recognition of the problem, mitigation and safe operating procedures can and have been developed.

Actual incidences of road casualties, and their injury severity, modelled from police and hospital data, France

Nation-wide road casualty figures usually come from police data. In France, as in many developed countries, the reporting of fatalities is almost complete but the reporting of non-fatal casualties is rather low. It is moreover strongly biased. Valid estimates are needed. Using the capture-recapture method on police data and on a road trauma registry covering a large county of 1.6 million inhabitants, we estimate police under-reporting correction factors that account for unregistered casualties. These correction factors are then applied to the nation-wide police data, with standardization on under-reporting bias factors. In 2004, whereas the police report 108,727 non-fatally injured, the estimation yields 400,200. Over the 1996-2004 study period, the average annual estimated incidence is 871/100,000 for all injured (3.4 times the police incidence), 232/100,000 for hospitalized, 103/100,000 for seriously injured (2.2 times the police incidence) and 12.6/100,000 for casualties with long-term major impairment. The incidence of seriously injured (NISS 9+) is 11.3/100,000 for pedestrians, 9.5/100,000 for cyclists, 36.3/100,000 for motorized two-wheel users and 42.5/100,000 for car users. The estimated incidences are much higher than the police-based ones. This changes the scale of the road injuries issue. The risk of suffering a major impairment from a road crash is equal to the risk of being killed. Motorized two-wheel users experience a large burden of traffic casualties, much larger than that indicated by police data. The approach used can be reproduced in other countries, if an additional medical registration exists.

COMMENTS

n a stimulating presentation, Wurman et al. (2007, hereafter W2007) have produced an interesting estimate of the possible effects of violent tornadoes in urban areas by making models of the wind field based on mobile Doppler radar observations. As part of that effort, they have estimated death tolls associated with those modeled wind fields, arriving at estimates from 13,000 up to 63,000 in Chicago, Illinois. Given that the highest death toll in a tornado in U.S. history is 695 in the Tri-State tornado of 1925, and that the last death toll of greater than 100 was in 1953, the validity of these estimates is of some concern. We are certainly in favor of raising the level of awareness of the potential for large casualty figures in future tornadoes. The concentration of our population in urban areas, combined with urban sprawl, has increased the threat of large fatality figures if a large, violent, long-track tornado were to hit a major metropolitan area. Planning for such a catastrophic event requires an estimate of the potential impacts. We fear, however, that the enormity of the fatality estimates in W2007 might discourage emergency managers from planning for such an event, because they would simply be overwhelmed by such a disaster. Two assumptions drive the fatality estimates in W2007. First, W2007 estimate that 10% of occupants within housing subjected to Fujita-scale F4 and greater winds would be killed. Second, W2007 assumes that the maximum intensity and areal extent of high winds are held constant over nearly the entire length of the storm path. Both of these assumptions are open to question and, we believe, represent significant overestimates of the likely highend events. An examination of past tornado events suggests these are simply unrealistic values. W2007’s assumption that 10% of residents in the path of such a catastrophic tornado would be killed is inconsistent with estimates that can be derived from studies of deaths in F4 and F5 tornadoes (Table 1). We infer the percentage of residents killed using the national average household size of 2.7 persons (see 2005 census estimates online at www.census.gov/ popest/states/NST-ann-est.html, and www.census. gov/prod/2006pubs/h150-05.pdf). The 3 May 1999 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (OKC), and 8 April 1998 Birmingham, Alabama, F5 tornadoes struck metropolitan areas and provide the best-available evidence on fatality rates. The estimates in Table 1 are based on varying levels of damage to homes. The first, from D. A. Speheger (2007, personal communication), is based on a count of homes in the OKC tornado that suffered F4 or F5 damage as rated in the postevent damage survey. The fatality rate in such damaged homes in OKC was only 1.9%, and this estimate most closely approximates W2007’s assumption that all residences in the hypothetical tornado face F4 or F5 winds. But, Speheger et al. (2002) found that only 13% of the total path area affected in the OKC tornado was associated with F4 or F5 damage levels, which is typical of the few F5 tornadoes whose paths have been surveyed reasonably thoroughly. Thus, the other estimates that include either destroyed homes or damaged or destroyed homes [i.e., the Oklahoma Department of Emergency Management, which counted destroyed housing, regardless of the F-scale

Quantitative risk‐based analysis for military counterterrorism systems

AbstractThis paper presents a realistic and practical approach to quantitatively assess the risk‐reduction capabilities of military counterterrorism systems in terms of damage cost and casualty figures. The comparison of alternatives is thereby based on absolute quantities rather than an aggregated utility or value provided by multicriteria decision analysis methods. The key elements of the approach are (1) the use of decision‐attack event trees for modeling and analyzing scenarios, (2) a portfolio model approach for analyzing multiple threats, and (3) the quantitative probabilistic risk assessment matrix for communicating the results. Decision‐attack event trees are especially appropriate for modeling and analyzing terrorist attacks where the sequence of events and outcomes are time‐sensitive. The actions of the attackers and the defenders are modeled as decisions and the outcomes are modeled as probabilistic events. The quantitative probabilistic risk assessment matrix provides information about the range of the possible outcomes while retaining the simplicity of the classic safety risk assessment matrix based on Mil‐Std‐882D. It therefore provides a simple and reliable tool for comparing alternatives on the basis of risk including confidence levels rather than single point estimates. This additional valuable information requires minimal additional effort. The proposed approach is illustrated using a simplified but realistic model of a destroyer operating in inland restricted waters. The complex problem of choosing a robust counterterrorism protection system against multiple terrorist threats is analyzed by introducing a surrogate multi‐threat portfolio. The associated risk profile provides a practical approach for assessing the robustness of different counterterrorism systems against plausible terrorist threats. The paper documents the analysis for a hypothetical case of three potential threats. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 10: 273–289, 2007

Planning for Burn Disasters: Lessons Learned From One Hundred Years of History

The terrorist attacks of September 11th have prompted interest in developing plans to manage thousands of burn casualties. There is little actual experience in the United States in managing disasters of this magnitude. As an alternative, lessons may be learned from the historical experiences of previous civilian burn or fire disasters occurring in this country. A review of relevant medical, fire service, and popular literature pertaining to civilian burn or fire disasters occurring in the United States between the years 1900 and 2000 was performed. In the 20th century, 73 major U.S. fire or burn disasters have occurred. With each disaster prompting a strengthening of fire regulations or building codes, the number of fatalities per incident has steadily decreased. Detailed examination of several landmark fires demonstrated that casualty counts were great but that most victims had fatal injuries and died on the scene or within 24 hours. A second large cohort comprised the walking wounded, who required minimal outpatient treatment. Patients requiring inpatient burn care comprise a small percentage of the total casualty figure but consume enormous resources during hospitalization. Burn mass casualty incidents are uncommon. The number of casualties per incident decreased over time. In most fire disasters, the majority of victims either rapidly die or have minimal injuries and can be treated and released. As a result, most disasters produce fewer than 25 to 50 patients requiring inpatient burn care. This would be a rational point to begin burn center preparations for mass casualty incidents. A robust outpatient capability to manage the walking wounded is also desirable.

Spartan Band: Burnett's 13th Texas Cavalry in the Civil War

In Spartan Band (coined from a chaplain’s eulogistic poem) author Thomas Reid traces the Civil War history of the 13th Texas Cavalry, a unit drawn from eleven counties in East Texas. The cavalry regiment organized in the spring of 1862 but was ordered to dismount once in Arkansas. The regiment gradually evolved into a tough, well-trained unit during action at Lake Providence, Fort De Russy, Mansfield, Pleasant Hill, and Jenkins' Ferry, as part of Maj. Gen. John G. Walker's Texas division in the Trans-Mississippi Department. Reid researched letters, documents, and diaries gleaned from more than one hundred descendants of the soldiers, answering many questions relating to their experiences and final resting places. He also includes detailed information on battle casualty figures, equipment issued to each company, slave ownership, wealth of officers, deaths due to disease, and the effects of conscription on the regiment’s composition. “The hard-marching, hard-fighting soldiers of the 13th Texas Cavalry helped make Walker’s Greyhound Division famous, and their story comes to life through Thomas Reid’s exhaustive research and entertaining writing style. This book should serve as a model for Civil War regimental histories.”—Terry L. Jones, author of Lee’s Tigers

Near Earth Object impact simulation tool for supporting the NEO mitigation decision making process

AbstractThis paper describes the development of a computer simulation tool, NEOSim, capable of modelling small NEO impacts and their effect on the global population. The development of the tool draws upon existing models for the atmospheric passage and impact processes. Simulation of the land and ocean impact effects, combined with a population density model, leads to casualty estimation at both a regional and global level. Casualty predictions are based upon the intensity of each impact effect on the local population density, with consideration given to the population inside or outside local infrastructure. Two case studies are presented. The first evaluates the potential threat to the UK, and highlights coastal locations as being at greatest risk. Locations around Cornwall demonstrate an increase in casualties above the local average. The second case study concerns the potential impact of asteroid (99942) Apophis in 2036. Propagation of the possible orbits along the line of variance leads to an extensive path of risk on the Earth. Deflection of the asteroid, by a variety of means, will move the projected impact site along this path. Results generated by NEOSim for the path indicate that South American countries such as Colombia and Venezuela are at a greatest risk with estimated casualty figures in excess of 10 million. Applications of this software to the NEO threat are discussed, along with the next stage of NEO impact simulation development.

The Enola Gay and the Smithsonian Institution

On August 6, 1945, the B-29 Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, which ushered on the end of World War II. For the 50th anniversary of this major event in world history, the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institute produced an exhibit. A controversy erupted, however, over the exhibit's historical authenticity. Nostalgic veterans, for example, complained that the museum displayed a misrepresented version of history that was too politically correct. After concisely covering the background of the Enola Gay and its mission, this study focuses on the controversy surrounding the museum exhibit. Issues covered include casualty figures, ethical questions, and political correctness, among others. The viewpoints of such groups as museum personnel, exhibit organizers, veterans, and historians are covered. Appendices offer information on content analysis of the National Air and Space Museum exhibit script, non-museum materials that were intended to complement the exhibit script, and the importance of full disclosure in research.

The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838 (review)

Reviewed by: The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788–1838 George Raudzens The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788–1838. By John Connor. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002. ISBN 0-86840-756-9. Maps. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 175. $24.95. Available in the U.S. from the University of Washington Press in Seattle. John Connor sets out to create the first comprehensive military history of Australia's frontier wars, and he succeeds impressively. He surveys the combats and analyses their military features thoroughly, covering the numerous small-scale fights between specific Aboriginal groups—who also warred among themselves—and British convicts, settlers, and government troops between 1788 and 1828, in all the main regions of colonization. He does this in the middle of a much-publicized, historiographic controversy now raging among the leading writers of Aboriginal history. The more extreme followers of Henry Reynolds insist that the British invaders massacred the indigenous people horribly time and time again, perpetrating what we now call crimes against humanity. Their opponents, led presently by Keith Windshuttle, condemn this "Black Armband" interpretation as gross exaggeration, unsubstantiated by verifiable Aboriginal casualty figures. Left and right wing national politicians are participating vigorously. Indigenous politicians are publicly involved. The latest overview of this debate is the Brian Atwood and S. G. Foster edition, Frontier Conflict: The Australian Experience (Canberra: National Museum of Australia, 2003). John Connor's title appears in one footnote, no. 17, of the introductory chapter by the editors, with no comment about it there or in their text. Connor himself discusses much of the evidence they argue about, and sometimes agrees with some of their factual conclusions. But his focus is on war and militarism rather than apportioning responsibility for massacres and genocides. Connor's frontier wars fit within the general pattern of British Empire wars against indigenous people in all the main colonies. Everywhere the British moved into the lands of indigenous people and in one way or another displaced the original owners. Everywhere the indigenous population densities were lower or much lower than those of the incoming colonists. This was not only the case in the patterns of invasion in the founding of Virginia from 1607 to 1622 and of New England from 1620 to 1676, examples which Connor might have found additionally useful to his own case. Even the foundations of Spanish Hispaniola from 1493 to 1514 and of New France from 1541 to 1665 are probably relevant to these general points. As in Australia later, fights over food (called "food fights" in Virginia), led to frontier wars. Population pressures and displacements led to competition and violence not only between colonists and indigenes but among traditional warring indigenous groups also. Indigenes raided European crops and herds and burned frontier settler houses. But some also made alliances with the colonizers. Settlers set up gangs to attack indigenes and colonial authorities sent European troops and settler militias against indigenous resistance groups but also made alliances and attempted to integrate the original landowners into colonial society. Everywhere numerous colonizing invaders displaced or destroyed [End Page 957] less numerous indigenes even after suffering serious defeats at the hands of indigenous warriors. Connor's main colonization wars in Australia follow these patterns. Up to 1828 there were five Australian foundation colonies. Sydney up to 1791 and the first British efforts in Northern and Western Australia between 1824 and 1834 he calls "beachhead frontiers" where government foundation outposts, even with unruly convict workers, did not press seriously on Aboriginal living resources. Violent British-Aboriginal encounters were small and few. Collaboration became the dominant feature. But as ex-convicts and free settlers began to move into interior river valleys with good soil for corn, wheat, and pasture, they impinged on the important Aboriginal food bases in the Hawksbury-Nepean River areas from 1795 to 1816, the Bathurst and Hunter Valley Districts from 1822 to 1826, in Van Diemen's Land from 1821 to 1831, and the Liverpool Plains and Port Philip districts up to 1838. In these foundation agricultural settlements hungry Aborigines raided settler fields and flocks, settlers shot at raiding Aborigines and formed gangs to attack Aboriginal villages, Aborigines attacked isolated farm houses and settlers...

China's Kashmir Policies

This article analyzes the policies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) toward the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. “Policies” is a plural noun. There are at least six distinct Chines...

Reassessing the Impact of Two Historical Florida Hurricanes

This paper reexamines two historic South Florida hurricanes, the “Miami” Hurricane of 1926, and the “Okeechobee” Hurricane of 1928. These storms are frequently cited for their disastrous impacts, but the casualty figures currently associated with them are low due to underreporting of nonwhite persons and other sociological factors. More accurate information is available, and to put the impact of these storms in a better historical perspective, the casualty figures associated with them should be corrected.