Case For Decentralization Research Articles

6 - Towards Better Management of Public Education in Cameroon: The Case for Decentralisation

This paper conceptualises centralisation and decentralisation and provides evidence that the Cameroon public education system is facing imminent decentralisation. It uses available literature and the author's teaching experience to criticise the centralised education system in Cameroon, especially in resource allocation and management. The author argues that to increase the quantity and quality of education in Cameroon, there is a need to decentralise responsibility for and control of education. He presents the model proposed by government for decentralisation and proposes roles and functions for the various levels of authority in the model.

A Case for Decentralization in Zimbabwe’s local government system: Challenges and Opportunities

The issue of decentralization in Zimbabwe’s local government system has been topical since the colonial era. In the post-independence epoch the expectation was that the new majority government would address the centralization of governance which was motivated by racial imbalances. However, decentralization was not achieved as local government was not recognized in the Lancaster House Constitution adopted at independence in 1980. For years this allowed the central government to control all the local government structures in the country. The relationship between local governments and the central government became bitter and tense after the formation of a formidable opposition, MDC, which has been controlling most urban local authorities since its formation. The 2013 Constitution has not improved things either as the central government has not been willing to implement the new law to its latter and spirit. In all this it is the citizens who have been bearing the brunt as there has been poor service delivery owing to the bad relationship between the center and local structures. The study found out that if decentralization is fully implemented in Zimbabwe it has the potential of bringing efficient and effective service delivery, citizen participation, democracy and accountability in the local government system. The paper also makes recommendations on what needs to be done to achieve decentralization in the country’s local government system.

A Case for Decentralization of Indian Judiciary

A Case for Decentralization of Indian Judiciary

Improving Local Government Efficiency, Systems and Approaches: A Global Review

<em>There is a quite huge body of existing literature both in form of theoretical and empirical evidence on local government administrative efficiency and fiscal sustainability in various studies, discussions and presentations. This literature review is based on the extensive data available on the varied alternative systems strengthening the local government governance, and the theoretical analysis. This paper is concerned with a question of the several systems presented, which is the best in enhancing the functional productivity and economic support of provincial Governments. Therefore, this paper seeks to evaluate the arguments advanced by proponents of decentralization, devolution, consolidations, mergers, cooperate arrangements or shared service arrangements. The analysis used the thematic reviews of literature that are organized around a topic or issue related to alternative systems of local government in 4 main parts; first describing local government structure and case for decentralization; second part for the case of other alternative models; third approaches to other alternatives, fourth new local government framework and fifth the summary and conclusion of the review.</em>

An Application of Subgroup Discovery Algorithm on the Case of Decentralization and Quality of Governance in EU

This paper analyses a statistical relationship between the decentralization of the EU countries and the quality of their governance. The degree of decentralization is measured from a fiscal and political point of view, and the quality of governance by multiple indicators and citizen opinions. The paper presents a subgroup discovery algorithm which is capable of analysing two sets of several variables, and uses it for the analysis of EU countries. The paper is one of the first to use the data mining methods from the social sciences domain. The used algorithm has discovered some interesting patterns which show a desired relationship. We have discovered that the proportion of public sector employees is one of the most important indicators, which strongly correlates with the degree of trust in the European and national institutions, the government effectiveness and the perception of corruption.

Vergleich von 4 MICS-Intraokularlinsen im Hinblick auf ihre Neodym:YAG-Laser-Kapsulotomieraten

The aim of this study was to evaluate the incidence of posterior capsule opacification up to 50 months following 1.7-mm bimanual MICS-cataract surgery. Bimanual MICS cataract surgery was performed in 197 eyes (135 patients) via two 1.7-mm corneal incisions. Four MICS acrylic foldable IOLs were implanted: AcriSmart 48S-5, n = 54 (Acritec GmbH, Hennigsdorf, now AT.Smart 48S Carl-Zeiss-Meditec, AG, Jena, Germany), ThinLens UltraChoice 1.0, n = 53 (Technomed GmbH, Baesweiler, Germany), AcriFlex 46, n = 41 und AcriFlex 48 CSE, n = 7 (Acrimed GmbH, Berlin, now: Lentis L-303, Oculentis GmbH, Berlin, Germany) and CareFlex, n = 43 (w2o Medizintechnik AG, Bruchsal, Germany). Statistical analysis was performed using the Kaplan-Meier technique. High levels of completeness of follow-up rates were: ThinLens 96%, CareFlex 100%, AcriSmart 93%, AcriFlex 92%. The capsulotomy rate was 43.13% for ThinLens within a mean/max. follow-up period of 801/1131 days, 34.88% for CareFlex (565/872 days), 40% for AcriSmart (988/1506 days) and 15.91% for AcriFlex (728/975 days). By limiting the follow-up period to a comparable maximum of 850 days for all four IOLs, our capsulotomy rates were as follows: ThinLens 33.33%, CareFlex 32.56 %, AcriSmart 20.0% and AcriFlex 11.36%. MICS IOLs have higher capsulotomy rates than hydrophobic acrylic lenses and sharp-edged silicone lenses. In literature comparisons MICS-IOLs do not exceed the variance levels of capsulotomy rates of PMMA, hydrophilic acrylic and silicone lenses without sharp edges. Cases of decentration or luxation of MICS-IOLs following Neodym:YAG laser capsulotomy were not detected. Capsulotomy frequency with the CareFlex was statistically significantly higher in comparison to the AcriSmart (Log Rank Mantel Cox Test, p = 0.007) and AcriFlex (log rank Mantel Cox test, p = 0.002). Capsulotomy rates observed varied for the four MICS-IOL-types tested. The posterior capsule opacification frequency of the two best MICS-IOLs (AcriFlex, AcriSmart) did not exceed the higher variance levels of posterior capsule opacification rates of the round-edged "conventional" non-MICS IOLs of PMMA, silicone or hydrophilic acryl material. Sharp-edged silicone or hydrophobic acrylic "conventional" lenses have shown lower posterior capsule opacification rates.

Definitions and Typologies in Public Administration Research: The Case of Decentralization

The field of public administration knows many concepts. By focusing on one such concept, this research shows how definitions can be deceptive, and how typologies unable to capture all dimensions of a concept can blind policy makers and researchers. We concentrate our attention on decentralization. This has been a core concept in the field of public administration for decades. Definitions and typologies of decentralization have flourished. The present study gives an overview. We categorize definitions and analyse their different emphases. Typologies serve to order and compare items, but have themselves become prone to disorder. We provide a meta-analysis of typologies, exposing the wide variety of policy dimensions. Even after aggregation, typologies ignore—and definitions explicitly exclude—certain aspects of decentralization. One such issue is “silent decentralization.” It is characterized by absence of explicit decentralization reform, and thus distinguishes itself mainly by its potential origins: network changes, initiative shifts, policy emphasis developments, or resource availability alterations. Highlighting this particular aspect might well proof useful for other concepts in the field as well.

Elizabeth Brubaker: Greener Pastures: Decentralizing the Regulation of Agricultural Pollution

As researchers in the field of agri-food studies turn their attention to the institutional mechanisms that enable industrial agri-food systems to persist in spite of their ecological contradictions, environmental regulation is likely to become an increasingly important topic (Harrison 2008; Harrison and Wolf 2008). That regulatory systems contribute to the resilience of regulated industries is nowhere more apparent than in the industrial livestock and poultry feeding sectors. State legislatures in the United States have enacted right to farm laws that shield livestock and poultry feeding operations from nuisance lawsuits. State legislatures have also enacted environmental statutes that pre-empt the authority of municipalities to ban feeding operations or regulate them more stringently than they are regulated by state and federal law. By creating a relatively uniform, certain, and predictable regulatory environment for investment capital, state legislatures have attempted to attract and retain the footloose agribusinesses that dominate industrial livestock and poultry feeding. Greener Pastures analyzes how the shift of power from individual litigants and municipalities to higher levels of government has played out in Canada. Focusing on provincial laws that shield agricultural operations from private nuisance lawsuits and municipal regulation, Elizabeth Brubaker, Executive Director of Environment Probe, refers to this shift of power as the ‘‘centralization of control over agricultural pollution’’ (10). Brubaker criticizes centralization, arguing that it has facilitated the industrialization of agriculture and legalized agricultural pollution. And as the subtitle of the book suggests, she advocates the decentralization of agricultural pollution control. Indeed, Brubaker sees decentralization as an effective tool for building more sustainable agri-food systems. The book is divided into seven chapters. Academic researchers looking for a theory chapter will be disappointed. This is a book written not for social theorists but for concerned citizens and policy makers. The first chapter introduces the reader to the problem of centralization. The second is a useful review of how Canadian courts have interpreted the common law of private nuisance. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters describe how Canadian provinces have shielded agricultural operations from nuisance lawsuits. The sixth chapter is about how provinces have stripped municipal governments of their authority to regulate agricultural operations more stringently than they are regulated by the federal government and the provinces. Finally, the seventh chapter makes the case for decentralization. In the rest of this review I will describe Brubaker’s case against centralization and her case for decentralization. I will also point out two problems with her vision of decentralization. In Chap. 2, Brubaker explains how the law of private nuisance can protect both individual property rights and the broader environment. Using the law of nuisance, a landowner can sue an agricultural operation for engaging in activities that deprive the landowner of the use or enjoyment of his or her land. Canadian courts typically order operations to stop creating a nuisance. In some cases, however, courts allow the nuisance to continue, so long as the operation pays the landowner for having to endure it. In the United States the law of public nuisance differs from that of private nuisance. Whereas the law of private nuisance is used to protect individual private property rights, the law of public nuisance is often used to protect the J. L. Clark (&) Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA e-mail: jlc256@psu.edu

The Impact of Political Variables on Budgets and Social Outcomes in a Context of Decentralization: The Case of Colombia

We examine the case of decentralization in Colombia in order to explore its effects on poverty indicators, and on public sector responsiveness to real local demands. We first summarize economic data on the effects of decentralization. Colombian municipalities increased investment significantly as decentralization deepened, while running costs fell. Investment shifted from economic production and infrastructure to social services and human capital formation. We then explore the determinants of local public investment via a series of econometric models. Political and electoral variables prove to be decisively important.

Political Institutions and Income Inequality: The Case of Decentralization

Politische Macht wird uber territoriale Grenzen hinaus neu verteilt. Traditionell zentralisierte Lander haben sich bereits dezentralisiert oder sind auf dem Wege der Dezentralisierung. Zusatzlich befinden sich die europaischen Nationen in einem Prozess des Aufbaus eines gemeinsamen Regelwerkes, das einerseits ihre eigenen Besonderheiten respektieren soll und andererseits mit diesen Besonderheiten vereinbar zu sein hat. Das Ergebnis ist eine Zunahme von politischen Gebilden, in denen sich mehrere Regierungsebenen einen gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraum teilen. Dieser Artikel analysiert die Interaktion dieses Prozesses mit Verteilungspolitik sowie Ungleichheit und argumentiert dabei wie folgt: Im Gegensatz zur ublichen Sichtweise fuhrt Dezentralisierung nicht notwendigerweise zu hoheren (oder niedrigeren) Einkommensungleichheiten. Was immer die Auswirkung von Dezentralisierung auf Einkommensverteilung auch sein mag, so ist letztere zu einem grosen Teil das Ergebnis der internen Ungleichheitsstrukturen von Regionen und deren verschiedenen Kombinationen. Und zweitens, wenn Dezentralisierung zu verschiedenen Verteilungsergebnissen fuhrt, dann ware zu vermuten, dass Konflikte uber die institutionelle Ausgestaltung von Verteilungspolitik innerhalb eines Mehrebenensystems eigentlich Meinungsverschiedenheiten uber die Frage des „Wer-bekommt-was“ sind. Auf Grund eines politischen Prozesses, der die territoriale Ungleichheit mit den Praferenzen bezuglich der institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Umverteilung zusammenschaltet, werden derartige Konflikte uber die Dezentralisierung zu einem endogenen Problem der territorialen Struktur von Ungleichheit. Der erste Teil des Artikels befasst sich mit den eben genannten Argumenten. Der zweite Teil testet deren wesentlichen Implikationen anhand eines Datensatzes von 15 OECD-Landern uber den Zeitraum 1980 – 1997.

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization

The decentralization of fiscal authority to lower level jurisdictions contributes to the efficient delivery of public services, but conflicts with national objectives. This paper argues that the system of fiscal relations, including both the grant structure and institutions for policy coordination, are necessary for achieving the full benefits of fiscal decentralization while preserving national efficiency and equity objectives. The case for decentralization is recounted, along with the ways it can impinge upon efficiency and equity in the national economy. These adverse effects can be mitigated by appropriate fiscal transfers, both equalizing and conditional, and suitable measures of policy harmonization.

"THE DANGERS OF DECENTRALIZATION" ACCORDING TO PRUD'HOMME: SOME FURTHER ASPECTS

The article by Remy Prud'homme in the August 1995 issue of the research observer presents his views on the dangers of decentralization from the viewpoints of redistribution, stabilization, and allocation (p. 201). The author found it quite appropriate that subnational governments should participate in redistribution, as done. The author suggests that subnational governments are best suited to perform some types of interregional redistribution. Some participation by subnational governments in stabilization policy is also sensible. Finally, the case for decentralization is fundamentally based on efficiency considerations, and the author sees no reason to accept the paradoxical proposition that central governments will be more efficient in providing such local services.

Executive agencies: Leading change from the outside‐in

Writers on ‘New Public Management’ seek to establish a mixed parentage, namely one set of ideas about markets and competition and a second set of ideas about decentralization and empowerment. UK policy‐makers and practitioners in the public sector tend to discuss the two sets of ideas interchangeably, yet they can lead to very different policy and organizational outcomes. This article argues that the Executive Agency initiative is primarily concerned with decentralization rather than markets. However, the majority of Agency leaders or Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are ill‐placed to argue strongly the case for decentralization, they have a life‐long civil service career to protect and a lifetime of hierarchical relationships with more senior managers from whom they are now expected to wrest control. The observations and experiences of six CEOs recruited from outside the public sector are used to demonstrate the competencies necessary for many Agencies. While private sector CEOs seem well‐placed to challe...

Future directions in development studies: The case of decentralization

The study of decentralization is used as a case study to illustrate three current conceptual and operational problems in development studies as a whole: the use of language; the relationship between theory and practice; and the legitimacy of “development” as a separate field of study. The conclusion is that future studies of decentralization — and possibly other dimensions of development studies — should include detailed empirical studies, adopt a “contingency” approach to policy evaluation and utilize “developmentalist” approaches in both the so-called developed and developing nations.

Conflicts between National Aims in Papua New Guinea: The Case of Decentralization and Equality

On September 16, 1975 Papua New Guinea, a country the size of Thailand but with a population of under 3 million people, became politically independent from Australia. Although large parts of the country, which lies immediately north of Australia and east of Indonesia, had been effectively administered by foreigners only in the previous 2 or 3 decades, other parts had known colonial rule under Germany, Britain, and Australia for almost a century. In the 1880s Germany assumed control over New Guinea, and soon after Britain, under pressure from settlers in Australia who feared German expansion, annexed the southern part known as Papua. In 1906 this control was handed to Australia, and after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, New Guinea became a mandated territory, also to Australia. It was not, however, until 1946 that the two areas were administered as one. During the decade prior to independence, political events moved at a greater speed than had been thought possible, or even desirable, by many Australians, Papuans, and New Guineans. The first House of Assembly was elected in 1964, and by 1972 a coalition of pro-independence parties had formed a majority. A combination of pressures from this coalition and from sections of the Australian Labour party led to selfgovernment being granted in December 1973 and full independence 2 years later. Since the achievement of self-government the explicitly stated objectives of the Papua New Guinea government, as incorporated in the Eight National Aims, have emphasized increased self-reliance, greater interpersonal and interregional equality, and a decentralization of government