Cary Coglianese Research Articles

Transformational leadership in AICTE: lessons for organizational excellence

Supplementary materials Abelha et al. (2018). “Transformational Leadership and Job Satisfaction: Assessing the influence of Organizational Contextual factors and Individual Characteristics” Review of Business Management, Volume 20 No 4, pp. 516–532. Avolio, B. J., Zhu, W., Koh, W. and Bhatia, P. (2004). Transformational leadership and organizational commitment: Mediating role of psychological empowerment and moderating role of structural distance. Journal of Organizational Behavior: The International Journal of Industrial, Occupational and Organizational Psychology and Behavior, 25(8), pp. 951–968. John M Alexander and Jane Buckingham, “Common good leadership in Business Management: an ethical model from Indian tradition”, Blackwell Publishing, 2011, UK and USA. Angus Corbett (2016). A systems approach to regulatory excellence (pp. 255–270), Achieving Regulatory Excellence, Brookings Institution Press, retrieved from http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/PBRLit/Corbett.pdf. Cary Coglianese (2015), Listening, Learning, Leading- a framework for regulatory excellence, Penn Program on Regulation, sourced from https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Listening-Learning-Leading_Coglianese-1.pdf Learning outcomes First, skills: to help students to apply their knowledge in transformational leadership; to help students to apply their understanding of impact of transformational leadership on organizational excellence in not-for-profit organizations. Second, knowledge enhancement: to understand the various components of transformational leadership; to enable the students to understand the different components of organizational excellence with a special focus on not-for-profit organizations and government regulators; to enable the students to understand the process of impact of transformational leadership on organizational excellence and its relevance in emerging markets context. Third, attitude development: students should understand the importance of leadership and its impact in emerging markets. Case overview / synopsis The case elucidates the transformational leadership style of AICTE Chairman and his key attributes of humility, high ethical standards, openness to ideas and suggestions and problem-solving attitude. The case also highlights how the transformational leadership style of AICTE Chairman heralded the journey of Organizational Excellence of AICTE – an Indian Technical Education regulator. The case maps the change of AICTE from an inward-looking, controlling, opaque organization to a forward-looking, enabling, transparent organization. Complexity academic level This case can be used in leadership classes for Management in Business Administration (MBA) students and participants in executive development programs. The case focuses on transformational leadership and its impact on organizational excellence in context of emerging markets The case also outlines the various components of organizational excellence in not-for-profit organizations and government regulators and hence provides a fresh perspective for measuring organizational excellence. Subject code CSS: 10: Public Sector Management.

Regulatory Analysis the Modern Concept of Law: A Response

Regulatory analysis, which includes cost-benefit calculations, is based on a modern conception of law. It can only be understood—and certainly can only be improved—if that conception is fully recognized. In the pre-modern era, law was conceived as a set of normatively-based limits on human behavior designed to maintain public order. In the administrative state, law is treated as a means of implementing consciously-chosen policies designed to achieve public welfare. Regulatory analysis is based on this administrative conception of law. It does not address questions about whether an enactment is a correct interpretation of principle, but rather whether the enactment is likely to achieve some intended public welfare improvement. Professor Cary Coglianese has proposed that two elements of regulatory analysis, namely cost-benefit analysis and evaluation of regulatory consequences, be imposed by statute on independent agencies. This is an excellent suggestion, but the modern concept of law on which it is based suggests that we should go further, for both independent and executive agencies. We should not only require agencies to conduct cost benefit analysis, a component of policy analysis, but also require that they follow, and document, the whole policy analysis approach. We should not only require them to evaluate their regulations, but we should also incorporate funding for evaluation into virtually all budgetary allocations and fund the agency to experiment with different versions of a regulation as part of that evaluative process.

Book Review of Achieving Regulatory Excellence

Book review of Achieving Regulatory Excellence (Cary Coglianese, ed., Brookings Institution Press, 2017). The review criticizes the authors, particularly the chapter by John Braithwaite, for not considering the concept of opportunity namely the idea that regulators who are doing one thing with their time and resources are not devoting them to something else that they might be doing instead. It also criticizes the diffuse chapters for eschewing quantitative measures of regulatory success, and for failing to consider the alternative measure of regulatory success as achieving the goals set by the legislature at a minimum of social cost, as suggested by Peter Schuck and others.

Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation. Edited by Cary Coglianese. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 304p. $49.95.

Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation. Edited by Cary Coglianese. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 304p. $49.95.

The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's Premier Fish Market

Legal scholars have long emphasized the corrosive impact of conflict on long-term commercial and interpersonal relationships. To minimize the negative consequences of such conflict, members of close-knit groups who anticipate future interactions create ways to resolve their disputes using internal group norms rather than state-enforced legal rules. From farmers Copyright © 2006 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications. t Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Funding for the research and writing of this Article was provided by a Fulbright Scholarship from the Japan-U.S. Educational Commission and by the University of Pennsylvania Law School's Summer Research Fund. This Article has greatly benefited from the critical comments of Regina Austin, Cary Coglianese, Robert Ellickson, Marc Galanter, John 0. Haley, Edward Janger, Robert B. Leflar, Kristin Madison, Curtis Milhaupt, Gideon Parchornovsky, Mark Ramseyer, Edward Rock, Chris Sanchirico, Frank Upham, and Mark West, as well as participants at faculty workshops at the University of Pennsylvania, New York University/New York Law School, the University of Connecticut, and Hokkaido University. The staff of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, including Maruyama Hiroshi, Nakatani K6ji, Tanaka Norihiko, and especially Takasaki Akinori, spent hours answering my questions and allowed me access to their data. Yanase Toshi of the Ginrinkai [Silver Scales Society] welcomed me to the Tsukiji library. Nozue Makoko of the Omono Gy6kai [Tuna and Swordfish Buyers Association] made sure that I did not leave his office until I had a better understanding of the tuna trade. Among the many buyers and sellers who shared their busy mornings with me, Matsuzaki Hidehiko was particularly helpful. At the Honolulu Fish Exchange, the hospitality of Assistant General Manager Brooks Takenaka and General Manager Frank Goto, and the access they afforded me, exceeded all reasonable expectations. I am grateful to Harry Scheiber of School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), for inviting me to present an early version of this paper at the 2005 Sho Sato Conference on Japanese Studies, and to the participants at that gathering for their comments, particularly Malcolm Feeley, David Johnson, Robert Kagan, and Tanase Takao. The law faculty at Waseda University, particularly Asako Hiroshi, Kamata Kaoru, Kurumisawa Yoshiki, Miyazawa Setsuo, and Shimizu Akio were gracious and intellectually engaging hosts during my time in Japan. Kojima Yukinaga of Mori Hamada & Matsumoto shared his insights on the Commercial Code and other legal issues, Ii Takayuki was an exceptional research assistant in Tokyo, Adam Brenneman provided invaluable help with the collation, presentation, and analysis of data, and the staff of Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania, especially Alvin Dong and Merle Slyhoff, researched and recovered innumerable essential documents. I dedicate this paper to Inoue Takao, a gifted chef, creative mind, and generous

Import safety: Regulatory governance in the global economy edited by Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and David Zaring

Import safety: Regulatory governance in the global economy edited by Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and David Zaring

Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy, edited by Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel and David Zaring. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 224 pp., $42.50s, Cloth.

Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy, edited by Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel and David Zaring. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 224 pp., $42.50s, Cloth. - Volume 1 Issue 2

Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy. Edited by CARY COGLIANESE, ADAM M. FINKEL and DAVID ZARING.

Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy. Edited by CARY COGLIANESE, ADAM M. FINKEL and DAVID ZARING.

Change and challenge in regulation and governance

Change and challenge in regulation and governance

Is Incoherence Outrageous?

For their valuable comments, we are most grateful to Cary Coglianese,l Mark Kelman,2 and the team of Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Martin Wells (hereafter ERW that Coglianese has elaborated helpfully on the problem of achieving coherence in civil penalties; and that Kelman's basic arguments should not be taken to dispute our claims, which are less different from his own than a reader of his commentary might infer. Apart from these points, which we elaborate below, we offer a more general suggestion, one that is perhaps insufficiently emphasized in our main paper: Even if it is demonstrated, incoherence usually is not taken to be outrageous. The persistence of incoherence, in many domains of the law, is closely connected with this psychological fact.

Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, eds. 2001. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 272 pp. $22.95 paperback.

Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, eds. 2001. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 272 pp. $22.95 paperback.

Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking

Negotiated rulemaking is a process in which representatives of the interests that would be substantially affected by a rule ? including the agency responsible for issuing the rule ? negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on a proposed rule. It has proven enormously successful in developing agreements in highly polarized situations. Agencies have therefore turned to it to help resolve particularly difficult, contentious issues that have eluded closure by means of traditional rulemaking procedures. Criticism has recently been leveled at negotiated rulemaking on the ground that it has failed to achieve its instrumental goals of saving time and reducing litigation. Professor Cary Coglianese sought to measure whether negotiated rulemaking in fact saved time and reduced litigation by analyzing negotiated rulemaking at EPA, and he found it wanting in both dimensions. He argues that there has been an insignificant savings of time for rules developed through reg neg, and he concluded that rules developed through it are actually challenged more frequently than rules developed by traditional means. Unfortunately, however, Coglianese's research is significantly flawed and hence misleading concerning the actual experience with negotiated rulemaking. First, he misapplies his own methodology by including a rule as a completed reg neg when it should not have been. Given the dynamics of the particular rule and Coglianese's methodology, its erroneous inclusion had a significant effect on the ultimate conclusion. Second, his methodology measures the wrong thing: it fails to account for what the agency was actually trying to accomplish, and hence his results are skewed since the agency achieved its objective long before Coglianese calculations indicated. Third, he does not differentiate a substantive judicial challenge to a rule that was issued substantially as the committee agreed from either those instances in which the agency itself significantly changed the rule after the committee reached consensus and those petitions for review that were filed while the petitioner and EPA worked out minor details. Properly understood negotiated rulemaking has been remarkably successful in fulfilling its promise. In particular, EPA's experience has been that reg neg has cut the time for rulemaking by a third, knocking a full year off the typical schedule. Moreover, no rule that implements a consensus reached by the committee in which the parties agree not to challenge it has ever been the subject of a substantive judicial review ? even though they tend to be far more controversial and complex than average rules. And, finally, as described by a serious empirical study, the participants and those otherwise affected by rules find a range of values in negotiated rulemakings as opposed to those developed traditionally.

ADR and the Courts: An Update

For well over a decade now, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and all its variations' have been hailed in rhetoric and anecdote as the Prince Charming to a court system in distress.2 Professor Cary Coglianese challenges that claim in the case of negotiated regulations, one form of ADR.3 Aside from providing a brief commentary on his thesis, however, this Article will discuss ADR from a broader perspective, assessing its effect on the quantity and quality of the work of the courts--primarily the federal courts, where I work. I want to briefly examine three kinds of ADR programs: those that take place inside the court (which are sometimes called court-annexed programs), those that occur inside the administrative agency (or agency-annexed programs, only a small portion of whose product may come before the courts), and negotiated regulations, some of which (despite all good efforts) continue to be challenged on review--often in my own D.C. Circuit Court.4

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity