Cartel Policy Research Articles

Computer Packages and Statistics Outputs: A Note of Caution

A RECENT ARTICLE in this journal presents factor analytic results reflecting a common error with the reporting of factor matrices. In OPEC Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy, Charles F. Doran reports the percentage of variance explained by each of four factors.' A cursory examination of the loadings in the four factor arrays suggests nearly equal levels of explanation by the first three factors. This is the more apparent if the factor loadings are ordered by their absolute size as shown in Table 1. Doran's reported values, however, are 30.1, 26.6, 14.7, and 12.4

OPEC Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy

T HE NATURE OF OPEC structure and cohesion continues to divide and elude analysts. On one hand is view espoused by M. A. Adelman that, No single nation can do any harm to consumer interests; If a single seller breaks away, or a few minor ones, cartel breaks down in a stampede for exit.' On contrary, many analysts agree with Robert Mabro that the ultimate monopoly power is indeed invested in a single state, Saudi Arabia.2 Saudi Arabia alone is able to cause serious disruption of organizational unity, or to sustain that unity by changing rate of growth in its output. The other producers could achieve similar results, in Mabro's view, only by curtailing level of production, an action they are not likely to take because of revenue needs. Nor are they likely to

Three models of OPEC leadership and policy in the aftermath of Iran

Collapse of the Shah's regime has transformed Iran's attitude regarding oil production policy. The nature of OPEC leadership is changing as well. Three models examine the nature of this leadership inside OPEC: (1) the conventional price leadership model, (2) a model emphasizing a concept of egalitarian leadership, and (3) a team model composed of coalitions. The three models establish the limits within which OPEC leadership is exercised. A composite model drawing upon all three sets of results suggests that Saudi Arabia shapes cartel policy not by itself, but through a dominant coalition of states. For most of the period 1969–1978 this coalition has been stable. Following the unsettling changes of 1973, cooptation of Iran into the dominant coalition in 1974 was an important step in achieving a new level of stability. But during the turbulence of regime transformation in Iran, the nature of the governing coalition appears to have changed. One consequence may be that in the future Saudi Arabia will yield more willingly to arguments heard within OPEC on behalf of upwards price pressure, especially in an atmosphere of growing political isolation and overall tight supply.

Cartel and Monopoly Policy in Imperial Germany. The Power of the Market in the German Reichstag between 1879 and 1914

Cartel and Monopoly Policy in Imperial Germany. The Power of the Market in the German Reichstag between 1879 and 1914

The Cartel Policy of the EEC Commission, 1962-1967

The Cartel Policy of the EEC Commission, 1962-1967

Cartel Policy and the Common Market. Political & Economic Planning

Cartel Policy and the Common Market. Political & Economic Planning

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations.

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations.

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations

A Cartel Policy for the United Nations