Cartel Party Research Articles

Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking

This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as a ‘bounded oligarchy’. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms.

Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House

We explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel, as theorized by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), to determine how majority‐party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership's use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement. First, we identify formally the group of majority‐party members who are net policy losers. We find that those members occupying the initial 30% of the space within the majority‐party blockout zone—that space closest to the floor median—are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel arrangement. Second, we find that members in this “30% zone” are rewarded disproportionately by majority‐party leaders (relative to members in other intervals on the same side of the floor median) via side payments in the form of campaign contributions. In addition, majority‐party members within the 30% zone receive side payments commensurate with their particular policy loss.

Party cartels beyond Western Europe

The article applies and develops Katz and Mair’s ‘cartel party’ thesis to the Russian case. Challenging the accepted characterization of the Russian party system as ‘hegemonic’, the article contends that this underplays the systemic importance of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its collusion with pro-Kremlin parties in the fields of electoral and party reform. By applying the concepts of cartelization to the Russian case, it appears that the intersection of state and party goes beyond simply the ‘top-down’ establishment of political parties towards a party system in which there is inter-party collusion around a strong state-based regime.

The Preparation and Use of Election Manifestos: Learning from the Irish Case

Election manifestos are important documents, but very little is known about the way parties create their manifestos and how they use them. This is unfortunate, because such knowledge can inform both the academic study of party politics and political practice. This article presents original results from interviews with actors who played a key role in creating the 2007 national election manifesto for the major Irish parties. It describes the sequence of actions in developing the manifesto, and how those involved in the preparation perceive its functions. The results suggest that preparation processes are similar to those found a decade ago, but a trend towards giving party activists a larger say seems to be emerging. This finding is at odds with the prediction of the cartel party model that party leaders seek to reduce the influence of activists. Another finding is that manifestos are not only used to address voters, but also are tools for intra-party coordination, for communication with interest groups, and are especially important in the government formation process. Students of party competition should take this multi-purpose nature of the documents and variation in preparation modes into account. Finally, if there is a lack of policy debate in Irish election campaigns, the reason does not lie in a lack of policy material on the side of the parties.

Czy w Polsce istnieje kartel partii politycznych?

This paper concentrates on the Polish party system and the concept of cartel party. Its purpose is, on the one hand, to estimate the degree of dependency between the Polish parties and the state and, on the other hand, to analyse the development of the Polish parties in the light of the concept of cartel party. The author argues that the Polish party system is too unstable to recognize the emergence of a cartel. The author also maintains that the Polish parties have adjusted the structure of the state to suit their own needs. They have also accepted the fact that only the presently ruling parties can derive benefits from administration. Whereas the remaining parties, having secured their own financing from the state Budget (having secured their survival), can only wait to gain a chance of takeover. This article focuses on describing the establishment of the concept of cartel party and it also analyses this concept in the light of the following aspects: the political parties’ public financing system, the Polish electoral system (described along with the changes in the parliamentary electoral law introduced by political parties), and last but not least, the extent of political patronage.

Parties, interest groups and cartels

A recurring problem in comparative politics is determining the extent to which models derived in one setting can be transferred directly to other settings. The original cartel party thesis was meant to account for developments that were beginning to be observed in the established democracies of western Europe in the 1990s. Many of the contemporary conditions that appeared to be driving those developments are to be found in other places, but of course preceded by quite different historical trajectories. The articles on parties and interest groups that are published in this special issue of Party Politics provide an important window on the question of how much historical processes can be compressed, or indeed of whether institutions and practices like the cartel party can be adopted (or to what extent they can be adapted) to new settings, irrespective of historical differences.

A broken Mexico: allegations of collusion between the Sinaloa cartel and Mexican political parties

The Mexican drug war, in full swing since December 2006, has now claimed more than 40,000 lives. Dozens of high-level cartel operatives have been captured or killed, yet the leadership of one cartel, from Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico, has remained apparently untouched. The apparent lack of a crackdown on the Sinaloa Cartel has spurred criticisms of the Calderón administration, as well as US authorities aiding in the drug fight – some critics contend that the Sinaloa Cartel has enjoyed protection from the authorities. The Sinaloa Cartel's history of protection and collusion by authorities goes back a long way – during the reign of the PRI from 1929 to 2000, Sinaloa's drug traffickers were allowed to operate with near-total impunity. But mounting evidence – captures and deaths of high-level operatives from Sinaloa as well as arrests of relatives of the leadership – suggests that the claims of collusion against the current Mexican administration are false.

The Henry Tax Review, Cartel Parties and the Reform Capacity of the Australian State

The Henry Tax Review is a work in progress, but it has already advanced sufficiently to constitute an important case study of state capacity in Australia. Using the Henry Tax Review as a case study, this paper sheds light on the question of whether the national political system is capable of devising and implementing long-term reforms. Whilst specific policy failures inevitably have a contingent dimension in the form of poor strategy and leadership or unfavourable economic conditions, the paper discusses the erosion of institutional and relational structures which, arguably, has diminished systemic political capacity. This is tantamount to a structural weakening of state capacity in Australia, a development which has the potential to erode the potential of any government to enact significant strategic policy change.

Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test

Identifying policy status quo locations is a precondition for testing key predictions of many spatial models of legislative politics, but such measures have proved to be extremely difficult to construct. This study applies a novel technique that measures policy locations in relation to legislators’ preferences. The resulting status quo estimates allow for a direct test of the policy consequences predicted by pivotal politics and party cartel theories of legislative politics. The empirical tests indicate that parties interact with pivotal politics to contribute to policy gridlock and shape policy change. By bringing pressure to bear on pivotal politics “pivots” and by blocking policy changes that would “roll” the party, parties increase the range of policies subject to gridlock in the American political system.

Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study

This paper analyzes the use of ideal point estimates for testing pivot theories of lawmaking such as Krehbiel's (1998, Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago) pivotal politics and Cox and McCubbins's (2005, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representations. New York: Cambridge University Press) party cartel model. Among the prediction of pivot theories is that all pivotal legislators will vote identically on all successful legislation. Clinton (2007, Lawmaking and roll calls. Journal of Politics 69:455–67) argues that the estimated ideal points of the pivotal legislators are therefore predicted to be statistically indistinguishable and false when estimated from the set of successful final passage roll call votes, which implies that ideal point estimates cannot logically be used to test pivot theories. I show using Monte Carlo simulation that when pivot theories are augmented with probabilistic voting, Clinton's prediction only holds in small samples when voting is near perfect. I furthermore show that the predicted bias is unlikely to be consequential with U.S. Congressional voting data. My analysis suggests that the methodology of estimating ideal points to compute theoretically relevant quantities for empirical tests is not inherently flawed in the case of pivot theories.

Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty

This article develops two new tests of partisan and nonpartisan theories of lawmaking based on cutpoint estimates and measures of uncertainty about ideal point estimates. Theories of congressional organization make explicit predictions about the absence of cutpoints in certain intervals of the policy space. We test these theories with new cutpoint estimates and exploit the fact that the ideal points of members located far from the density of cutpoints are necessarily estimated with less precision. We validate our empirical approach through simulations, and we test three models of congressional organization using House roll call data from the 86th through the 110th Congresses (1959–2008). We find strong evidence of partisan agenda control. Our findings exhibit modest differences from the results predicted by Cox and McCubbins's party cartel theory: negative agenda control increases over time and is negatively correlated with the size of the blockout region.

The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement

We restate and clarify the idea of the “cartel party,” a concept that has found considerable traction in studies of parties throughout the democratic world, including those far from the original research site and data on which the cartel model was based. The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success. The thesis has been subject to varied empirical testing and to substantial theoretical evaluation and criticism. Against this background, we look again at the cartel party thesis in order to clarify ambiguities in and misinterpretations of the original argument. We also suggest further refinements, specifications and extensions of the argument. Following a background review of the original thesis, we break it down into its core components, and then clarify the terms in which it makes sense to speak of cartelization and collusion. We then go on to explore some of the implications of the thesis for our understanding of contemporary democracies and patterns of party organization and party competition and we identify a possible agenda for future research in party scholarship.

Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and Opposition

This article assesses the internal dynamics of the cartel party model. It argues that a party's endeavour to increase its societal reach by opening membership boundaries while keeping candidate selection local (two tendencies ascribed to this model), and the general need to maintain party unity, are difficult to reconcile. Therefore a fully fledged cartel party is organisationally vulnerable, which reinforces its resort to selective benefits (i.e. political appointments, patronage) whenever in government to satisfy organisational demands, a trigger intensifying party–state relations which is usually overlooked. Further, the dominant view of the ascendancy of parties' ‘public face’ needs to be qualified: the Irish Fianna Fáil, with its permeable boundaries and local candidate selection, reflects the cartel party model without a cartel at the party system level. Majoritarian dynamics have forced Fianna Fáil repeatedly into opposition which reveals the following: Fianna Fáil as a cartel party can afford to neglect its infrastructure on the ground as long as it is controlling government resources. In opposition its leadership initiates reforms to reinvigorate the party's infrastructure since it is pressed to generate organisational support through other means than distributing benefits.

Har den interna demokratin i politiska partier försämrats över tid?

Has intra-party democracy deteriorated over time?A widely held view in contemporary party research is that intra-party democracy, especially in traditional mass parties, has deteriorated in the age of the cartel party. This common assessment, however, relies on insufficient empirical evidence, and is scrutinized in the article. The notion of a gradual progress towards the cartel party implicitly shares common characteristics with the classic theory of Michels. In order to investigate the actual fate of intra-party democracy, central aspects of Michels theory are explored over time in a critical case, namely the Swedish SAP. If intra-party democracy is declining, this tendency should be most likely to be observed in this case. Two internal decision-making processes, surrounding two major pension reforms – one expansion in the 1950’s and one retrenchment in the 1990’s – are compared based on criteria deducted from Michels. Instead of finding a decline in intraparty democracy, the results conclusively demonstrate major improvements.

Where Are the Disgruntled Voters?

Katz and Mair’s provocative Cartel Party argument continues to create fertile ground for debate. This article contributes to under-explored areas of this debate by enhancing the theoretical and empirical understanding of the change in the relationship between parties and voters resulting from the introduction of the cartelizing condition of public funding. To this end, the article examines vote stability empirically, changes in turnout and individual public opinion data, before and after public funding was instituted. By disconfirming the hypothesized expectations of deteriorating voter—party relationships as a result of funding, the empirical analysis pinpoints a number of contradictions in current understanding of party system change. The article concludes by suggesting that still bound financially to voters at large, parties provide a good that is valued by constituents. If, however, these last ties are severed, rather than being at the cusp of a post-cartel system, the future of party systems is more akin to the elite systems of old.

Continuity or Discontinuity in the Recent History of the Australian Labor Party?

Recent characterisations of the Australian Labor Party as a ‘cartel party’ suggest that there was, after the 1970s, a fundamental discontinuity in Labor's history. We assess this contention not only in terms of the ALP's policies but also the mechanisms which link it with different classes and social groups: Labor's electoral support, membership and local branches, the backgrounds of the Party's parliamentarians and leaders, the role of trade unions inside the ALP, and its sources of funding. While there have been some quantitative changes in these characteristics, we conclude that Labor remains, on balance, a ‘capitalist workers party.’

Coping with a two‐dimensional political space: Party mobilisation in referendums on European integration

AbstractEuropean Union referendums invite national electorates to vote on transnational cooperation and regional integration, thereby creating tension between transnational ballot issues and domestic electoral mobilisation. Because of the tension, domestic political parties are forced to confront a two‐dimensional political space in EU referendums. In the referendum‐generated political space, unless integration issues are more salient than domestic concerns, intra‐divided and inter‐converged mainstream parties tend strategically to abstain from the campaigns. Yet, explicit inter‐party collusion may allow the pro‐integration mainstream to form a party cartel in EU referendums. Suggestive evidence is drawn from a case study of the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. Based on a party‐candidate survey, Irish parties are mapped onto a latent two‐dimensional political space. The findings shed new light on the initial abstention of Irish mainstream parties in the first Nice campaign and their subsequent mobilisation in the second referendum.

The Italian parties and their programmatic platforms: How alternative?

In the last decade, in spite of a large number of parties taking part in elections, the Italian party system has shown an increasing simplification in the programmatic supply, with two large coalitions showing a process of convergence of their policy platforms. This article shows that on the crucial themes characterising the confrontation between neo-liberalism versus regulated capitalism, the distance between the two coalitions has progressively reduced. The theory of the cartel party has predicted convergence in the policy positions of parties. Thus, the article will attempt to test the validity of this theory and of the predicted consequences on the Italian case. For this purpose, a longitudinal analysis will be presented grounded on party manifestos for the Italian general elections.

The Cartel Party and the Italian Case1

Cartel party literature has generated three lines of research investigating the transformation of party organizations, the party system, and policy output. The third line of research, which could be defined as the political economy of the cartel party, has shown that party systems resemble oligopolistic markets in two respects: the policy output has changed and voters have the impression that changes in political supply did not represent adjustments to the transformation of voters' demands. Yet literature on this subject has not provided any evidence to sustain the claim that parties' behavior resembles the behavior of oligopolistic firms in a cartel. The purpose of the present article is to show that the legislative behavior of Italian parties gives the impression that Italian parties are engaged in collusive practices and that, for this reason, it is appropriate to regard the Italian party system not only as oligopolistic but also as a cartel.

State Regulation and the Internal Organisation of Political Parties: The Impact of Party Law in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the extent to which party law influences the internal organisation of parties in four Commonwealth common law states: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The research engages with recent comparative party literature that emphasises the increasingly close relationship between political parties and the state, in particular the cartel party thesis. My findings indicate that over the last few decades parties have become subject to greater legal regulation, which supports the claim that parties are now managed more closely by the state. However, it is important to distinguish between legislative and common law (judicial) regulation, as each has a different impact on the organisational autonomy of the cartel party. I argue that parties (as autonomous actors and the authors of parliamentary decrees) have been able to shape legislative regulation to their advantage by eliciting significant financial support from the state, yet minimising the corresponding degree of legislative intrusion into their internal activities. However, cartel parties have not been able to prevent judicial scrutiny of their internal workings, and have lost a significant degree of organisational independence as principles of administrative law (usually reserved for state bodies) are being increasingly applied to their structure and behaviour.