Candidate's Chances Research Articles

The Image and the Vote: The Effect of Candidate Presentation on Voter Preference

It is generally assumed that a political candidate's appearance and style have an impact on voters and the choices they make on -election day. Little research, however, has been done to investigate this claim. Here, the authors examine the role that these nonverbal aspects of candidate presentation play in the process of political communication. In the course of two related studies, the impact of candidate photographs appearing on campaign flyers is assessed. The results suggest that these photographs influence voters' perceptions of a candidate and this significantly affects their vote. How a political candidate looks and speaks has a significant impact on that candidate's chances of being elected-style shapes image and image affects the vote. These claims are political truisms of the television era. Election commentary invariably focuses on candidates' images and their image-making strategies. A good example of this is provided by the news commentary on the 1984 Democratic presidential primaries. Attention centered on the role of image-the strength of Gary Hart's image and the weakness of the images of the initially more prominent Alan Cranston and John Glenn. Although the importance of a candidate's appearance and style is taken for granted by politicians, campaign consultants, and news commentators, there is little systematic research to support this assumption. Political scientists have not addressed the issue. In the research reported here, we provide a first step in the study of this nonverbal dimension of political communication and its impact on voter preference. We offer evidence which suggests that (1) a candidate's physical appearance produces a clear image of that candidate's character and fitness for public office and (2) this nonverbally communicated image has a significant impact on the vote.

Political Finance in the United States: A Survey of Research

Previous articleNext article No AccessSurvey ArticlesPolitical Finance in the United States: A Survey of ResearchCharles R. BeitzCharles R. Beitz Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 95, Number 1Oct., 1984 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292605 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1984 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Evaluative Voting Behavior: an Experimental Examination

JOHN ANDERSON'S third-party candidacy for the presidency in 1980 has re-kindled interest in the behavior of the American voter when faced with more than two candidates. When more than two candidates are present, voters are forced from their normal pattern of straight preference voting to a more complex decision-making process. This process employs both the voters' preference ranking of the candidates and the voters' perception of each candidate's chance of winning. Furthermore, in multi-candidate races voters must contend not only with who they would like to see elected, but also with who they would not like to see elected. With three or more candidates present the voter cannot simply vote for his most preferred candidate particularly if this action in any way increases the likelihood of his least preferred candidate being elected.

Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956—1972

This analysis shows, in contrast to previously published work, that a divisive primary hurts a senatorial candidate's chances for success in the general election. The relationship between divisiveness and lack of success continues to hold when incumbency and state party orientations are controlled. This relationship has an important implication regarding representation. The fact that divisive primaries do hurt strengthens the representation of weak and minor state parties in the U.S. Senate.

Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956—1972

This analysis shows, in contrast to previously published work, that a divisive primary hurts a senatorial candidate's chances for success in the general election. The relationship between divisiveness and lack of success continues to hold when incumbency and state party orientations are controlled. This relationship has an important implication regarding representation. The fact that divisive primaries do hurt strengthens the representation of weak and minor state parties in the U.S. Senate.

Comment on “Changing the Rules Changes the Game”

Since the bright summer and dark fall of 1972, Democrats have been disputing whether the McGovern-Fraser commission's reforms were a triumph for justice and democracy or a recipe for electoral disaster. Party-watching political scientists, however, must surely agree that they provide us a veritable mother lode of research material. The dispute reminds us forcefully that however unimportant party rules and processes may seem to some academics, most of the people who operate our political system's inner circles believe the stakes of intraparty fights are well worth fighting for and recognize party rules as a major factor determining their outcomes. The reforms demonstrate that the parties' rules and structures are not fixed forever beyond the power of human volition, and thus teach us that henceforth we must be more sensitive to the possibilities of change and more concerned with its probable consequences. As a former commission member who freely accepts one twenty-eighth of whatever praise or blame our reforms deserve, I have read with fascination Mr. Cavala's account of California's delegate slatemaking rules and practices 1972. I recall that California concerned us more than any other state: our Guideline C-6 was written and adopted mainly to up its closed slate-making processes; our Guideline B-6 was an effort to persuade California and a few other states to repeal the winner-take-all provisions of their presidential primary laws; and most of us hailed as a great triumph the new slate-making procedures worked out through long and often painful negotiations between the California party and the national commission's chairmen and staff. As a political scientist who has come to believe that impact studies offer the most promising way our discipline can make a scholarly contribution to the formation and evaluation of public policies, I welcome Cavala's focus on the interpretation, application, and consequences of California's new slatemaking rules. I regret that his data consist so largely of his own undocumented participant-observer's impressions, but perhaps that is the best one can do so soon after the fact. I should add that his observations are quite consistent with those I have seen newspaper accounts and heard from other participants, including those who worked for candidates other than Cavala's. Accepting his account as essentially accurate, then, what does it tell us about the reforms' impact? Cavala's central conclusion is that the new rules were intended to serve new purposes and that the efforts of the candidate organizations to bend them to the old purposes failed miserably. In 1968 and before, he tells us, the typical presidential candidate organization California put together its delegate slate for the primary so as to broaden its appeal and thus improve its candidate's chances of winning. After the primary the winning organization sought to increase the party's chances of carrying the November by adding prominent party leaders and contributors who had supported losing candidates or no candidate the primary. The main object of the old closed procedures was thus to maximize what might be called combat effectiveness, first for the primary and then for the general election. There was no nonsense about open access: if the slatemakers thought you would help them win, you were in; if not, you were out. Cavala relates how the leaders of the candidate organizations 1972 (including McGovern's, which Cavala held a high position) hoped to serve these same purposes under the new rules and even take advantage of them to jettison some deadwood. But the rules routed them. Guideline C-6's requirements for access resulted district caucuses dominated (he do.s not say packed) by people with little or no past service to the party or feelings of obligation to its leaders. Consequently, he reports, they were less likely than the slatemakers of earlier years to pick delegates for the purpose of enhancing their candidate's chances of winning the primary, and even less likely to step aside after the primary to make room for party notables. And the injunction Guidelines A-1 and A-2 that the delegation should include women, young people, and members of minority groups in reasonable relationship to their presence the population of the state became a prime criterion at each district caucus as well. Moreover, Cavala reports that most of the people attending the

Relationship between the Attractiveness of a Competitor and His Chances of Winning the Race

Before the election, 112 voters rated Nixon and McGovern on a 7-point attraction scale and evaluated the two men's chances of winning. After the election, the same voters were asked to re-rate the candidates. It was found that Ss expressed a greater liking for the candidate they were going to vote for if they thought he had relatively less chances of winning (the “underdog effect”). Voters also overestimated their candidate's chances of winning. Contrary to the hypothesis, those persons who had voted for McGovern did not find him less attractive after the election. Possibly because he was held responsible for his failure, his voters did not need to derogate him in order to maintain the concept of a just world.

Does a “Divisive” Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances?

It is a rare election year when the nation's attention is not focussed on at least one party primary where the struggle for the nomination is highly competitive and the result a matter of doubt until the last precincts are reported. In many such cases the other party has settled on its own standard-bearer and thus sits back contentedly while the opposition wages its internecine battle before a rapt public. In recent years as varied personages as Estes Kefauver, Richard Nixon, and Charles Percy found themselves engaged in a hard-fought primary campaign to secure their nomination or renomination for state office.