Canadian-American Relations Research Articles

Canada and the Search for World Order

IN LAUNCHING THE FIRST ANNUAL John W. Holmes issue, the editors of International Journal are paying tribute to the contribution that Holmes made to the practice of Canadian foreign policy-both during his service with the Department of External Affairs in the 1940s and 1950s, and also during his time as director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) and professor at the University of Toronto after his resignation from External Affairs in 1960. But invoking Holmes's memory is also a means of questioning contemporary foreign policy-by asking what Holmes might have thought of Canadian statecraft today.I must admit that I accepted the invitation of the editors to explore how Holmes might have regarded contemporary foreign policy challenges faced by the Canadian government with considerable hesitation. For there is something quite presumptuous-and thus entirely impudent-in speculating about what John Holmes might have said about Canadian foreign policy in the mid-2000s, some 16 years after his death in 1988. After all, such exercises in reconstruction take people out of a particular time and place, fast-forward them into circumstances that surely will have changed since their deaths, and refashion their views and analysis for the present. Moreover, such ruminations tend to be highly political: all too often critics of contemporary policy invoke the putative views of the dead, safe in the knowledge that those who are said to be spinning in their graves are not able to offer either contradiction or clarification.But there is value in reflecting on what Holmes thought of his world, and his life and times, as a means of drawing lessons for the contemporary period in Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, as Denis Stairs has noted, Holmes had essentially pedagogical purposes in his writings,1 and this provides us with an opportunity to draw lessons for contemporary policy. In this essay, I explore two of Holmes's abiding concerns-the management of global conflict and Canadian relations with the United States-to see whether there might be lessons to be learned from his writings for the contemporary challenges for the Canadian government in foreign policy.ILike all those whose lives spanned the 20th century, John Holmes was deeply affected by global conflict. Born in 1910, his formative years were shaped by the long-term consequences of the Great War-the Great Depression and the onset of the global war that began with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and had spread by 1941 to engulf all of Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. As an officer in the Department of External Affairs in the 1940s and 1950s, Holmes experienced both the second World War and the onset of the Cold War. As head of the CIIA and as a professor at the University of Toronto in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, he lived through the Vietnam War and the Cold War rivalries between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. Given his times, and his life as a Canadian diplomat and then as a scholar of Canadian foreign policy, it is perhaps not at all surprising that a central concern for Holmes was the issue of global conflict. But it is important to recognize that he approached the issue of political conflict at a global level from a very particular perspective.Although Holmes taught Canadian foreign policy at the University of Toronto for nearly two decades, he was rarely explicitly theoretical about his views on the world of world politics. In his writings he did not participate in any of the long-running debates in the discipline of international relations about how best to characterize world politics. Yet there is little doubt that his approach to international relations was informed by a particular normative and empirical understanding of politics. A reading of the four books Holmes wrote-two collections of essays, an exploration of Canadian-American relations, and his two-volume history of post-1945 Canadian foreign policy2-suggests that his views on world politics come closest to the perspective of the socalled English school of international relations-a perspective that enjoyed some currency among students of world politics in the period that Holmes was teaching. …

Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies

Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies

Defining the “Undefended”: Canadians, Americans, and the Multiple Meanings of Border during Prohibition

Canada is a border nation. With over 75 percent of its population living within a hundred miles of boundary, border is a reality of virtually every Canadian's daily life. (1) Not only does it define citizenship, it contributes to how Canadians think, what they believe, and how they work. It should come as no surprise then that border is tied very closely to Canada's national identity, defining of which Seymour Martin Lipset calls the quintessential Canadian issue. (2) Even Canadian nationalists, quick to out that being Canadian means much more than simply being (and it does), concur that border plays an important role in shaping their identity. One of English-Canadian writers with greatest national and international reputation in 1920s was humorist Stephen Leacock who, not coincidentally, found much of his material in border and Canada's relationship with United States. He once observed, an odd chance forty-ninth parallel, an astronomical line, turned out to mean something. (3) But what? This question is not unimportant, even beyond ways in which it informs Canadian national identity, for it also helps to explain relationship between Canadians and Americans more generally. To that relationship border is central. Never was this more true than during America's noble experiment. Between 1920 and 1933, no issue in Canadian-American relations proved more contentious or more intractable than liquor problem. When Eighteenth Amendment took effect in January 1920, no longer could Americans make, sell, transport, or import any intoxicating beverage that contained more than 0.5 percent alcohol. They could, however, legally drink it, and thus it was left to Amendment's enforcement mechanism, Volstead Act, to insure that they didn't have access to it. Predictably, from Pacific to Atlantic, American dollars promptly headed north, and (usually) pure, unadulterated Canadian whisky, south. Canadian distillers, brewers, export houses, rumrunners, and bootleggers were more than happy to assuage parched throats of their American brethren. However, what was a boon to Canadian economy was bane to American diplomats and enforcement officials who sought help from their Canadian counterparts in stemming this illegal torrent of booze. Part of focus of this essay is to explore this problem and reasons for its intractability. Few decades were as important in shaping character of Canadian-American relationship than 1920s, for at least two reasons closely related toprohibition. First, beginning in 1920s, Canadian external affairs underwent a significant transformation. During William Lyon Mackenzie King administration, newly created Department of External Affairs made a concerted effort to define a Canadian foreign policy independent of British Foreign and Colonial offices. To do so meant Dominion had to face United States alone, without compromising its sovereignty. As a consequence diplomatic relationship between Canada and United States entered a new, formative stage. The second reason is increasing degree to which Canadians and Americans began to interact with each other in this period. The undefended border had always been a porous one. Yet during 1920s there was an extraordinary increase in pace and scope of what Marcus Lee Hansen referred to as mingling of Canadian and American peoples. (4) Its chief cause was automobile and ease with which travelers were able to cross border. By end of decade, four million American cars and twenty million Americans crossed border each year. The effect, according to one historian, was a turning point in cultural history of Canada, as Americans--in pursuit of liquor, scenery, and other things Canadian--brought with them other (sometimes less desirable) aspects of American culture. …

Securing the "Ontario-Vermont Border": Myths and Realities in Post-9/11 Canadian-American Security Relations

Question: Mr. President, why did you block the reimportation of safer and inexpensive drugs from Canada which would have cut 40 to 60 percent off of the cost?Bush: I haven't yet. Just want to make sure they're safe. When a drug comes in from Canada, I want to make sure it cures you and doesn't kill you....I've got an obligation to make sure our government does everything we can to protect you. And what my worry is, is that, you know, it looks like it's from Canada, and it might be from a third world.1SHORTLY AFTER THE EVENTS OF 9/11, the TV drama series The West Wing presented a episode in which the fictional White House of liberal Democratic president Josiah Bartlett was held in a terror alert lockdown caused by a dangerous terrorist who had entered the US illegally via the Ontario-Vermont All the details in the show were designed to emulate reality. The writers and producers apparently assumed that the natural place for a terrorist to enter the US was from Canada, while nobody noticed, or cared, that Ontario and Vermont are not in fact contiguous.There is no reason, of course, why a fictional White House could not feature a fictional border, but I have chosen this blooper as my title for good reason. Post-9/11 Canadian-American security relations are about the realities of terrorist threats, but they are also about myths. America's northern border as a risk to its homeland security is part reality and part myth. The realities are found in sober intelligence analysis and responsible security planning, on both sides of the border. The myths are constructed at the juncture where reckless media, politicized intelligence, and opportunistic politicians feed off one another. Unfortunately for Canada, myths as well as realities have very real consequences, counted in Canadian economic losses and insecurity, negative effects also felt in the US but in proportionally less painful doses and more readily shrugged off in a wartime atmosphere in which fighting terrorism is not just one priority, but the only priority.Worse from the Canadian perspective is that the combination of reality and myth, and the exaggeration of reality when cloaked in myth, threatens serious long-term damage to Canadian sovereignty, as much from within as from without. Influential forces in Canadian economy and society are poised to sell ideas of deepened continental integration on a variety offrants. They cite the post-9/11 security environment as necessitating such big ideas, and as a window of opportunity to achieve their realization. As facilitators, there is a carrot and a stick. The carrot is the economic promise of a fully integrated North American free market, finally freed from the remaining vestiges of post-NAFTA protectionism. The stick is the threat of US displeasure and retaliation in the form of border closures and exclusionary policies directed towards Canadian businesses. The big idea advocates declare that post-9/11 offers the opportunity to negotiate economic security for Canada in exchange for national security for the US.Big idea advocates are articulate, and their voices, funded from very deep pockets, are resonant and influential. They are also mistaken in many of their assumptions, misleading in some of their arguments, and dangerous in their policy prescriptions. There could scarcely be a less propitious time to negotiate deeper continental integration, whether on security or on economic matters, than an historical moment in which the US-the Bush White House, certainly, but congress under either party-is determined to assert American national sovereignty without any qualification by foreigners. Any deeper integration could not hope to bring along with it a Europeanstyle political superstructure in which Canadian representation and a Canadian voice are built in. Harmonization of policies clearly means Canadian acceptance of American standards, even where these are inappropriate to Canadian realities. …

Shaping the Upper Canadian Frontier: Environment, Society, and Culture in the Trent Valley. By Neil S. Forkey. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies. By John M. Findlay and Ken S. Coates, eds. Maps, index

<i>Shaping the Upper Canadian Frontier: Environment, Society, and Culture in the Trent Valley</i>. By Neil S. Forkey. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index <i>Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies</i>. By John M. Findlay and Ken S. Coates, eds. Maps, index

An inside look at external affairs during the Trudeau Years: the memoirs of Mark MacGuigan

Between these covers, you will read about the life of an individual - Mark MacGuigan - who dedicated his life to bettering Canada. From his fascination with the law to his interest in politics and international affairs, Mark made a lasting impact on virtually every area to which he turned his efforts. - Paul C. Martin, from the Foreword Mark MacGuigan was appointed Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs in a tumultuous period of renewed East-West tensions, challenging Canadian-American relations, and regional conflict in the early 1980s. In this perceptive melange of autobiography and study of foreign policy under Pierre Elliott Trudeau, MacGuigan surveys a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues, weaves together an intriguing cast of national and international characters, and offers important insights into the making of foreign policy from a ministerial perspective. In chronicling the events in which he participated, MacGuigan describes his motivations, reactions, and decisions which illuminate Trudeau's approach to foreign policy and governance. An Inside Look at External Affairs during the Trudeau Years reflects on the interplay between domestic and international agendas and individual personalities in caucus that ultimately shape foreign policy.

Canada-United States Relations

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU in the 1970s, no foreign policy issue was more important, or more elusive, than relations with the United States. Previous governments had tried to tackle that thorny relationship, most recently in the Merchant-Heeney Report of 1965 (named for the two diplomats who wrote it), which stimulated more heat than light when it suggested that 'quiet diplomacy' was the best way to deal with differences between the two. Prudently, Trudeau's white paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, did not deal systematically with relations with the United States, and Mitchell Sharp, his secretary of state for external affairs, was left to explain weakly that the United States was so omnipresent in the study that a separate treatment was unnecessary.Canadian politicians liked to talk of Canadian-American relations as if they were shaped by Canada alone. The reverse was more often the case, although American initiatives were as often as not unconscious. For example, in the mid-1960s Congress set out to amend long-standing injustices in American immigration law. The revised act ended discrimination against whole areas and, therefore, whole races.(1) A side-effect, largely unnoticed in Canada, was that free admission of Canadians (among other North and South Americans) to the United States came to an end. Free passage of emigrants, which predated confederation, suddenly vanished, and Canada for the foreseeable future would be treated just like any other foreign country.Trudeau was less influenced by the United States, its politics or its values, than any other twentieth-century Canadian prime minister. Attempts to get him to pay attention to contemporary American phenomena, like sport, failed. 'The only American media he bothered following was American movies,' his campaign manager once lamented.(2) (And movie stars: Trudeau did date Barbra Streisand, among others.) In any case, he was not unduly worried about American influence. The United States was a great power, and great powers had their interests, including the security of their neighbourhood. Canada was necessarily affected; that was a fact of life. Americans might have been reassured by the fact that he did not see the United States as especially malignant - except that he extended the same consideration to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a great power like the United States, and, like the United States, it believed that its sphere of influence guaranteed its own security. That explained, though it did not entirely excuse, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It also explained the West's almost purely symbolic response. The strictly limited reaction of the West in effect recognized that what the Soviet Union did behind the Iron Curtain was primarily its own affair.Trudeau visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1971. There was little of substance on the Canadian-Russian agenda to make the visit memorable. Certain remarks by Trudeau, however, were memorable, especially his public discussion of the 'overwhelming presence' of the United States in Canadian life. American diplomats winced. So, too, did Canada's ambassador to Moscow, Robert Ford, for whom Trudeau's statement and his choice of words were revealing: 'I am... certain that it was a psychological lapse, since it reflected a deep-seated distrust of the United States and a friendly feeling toward the Soviet Union on the part of the prime minister.'(3)The American reaction was carefully hidden, occasionally mistrustful, and usually nuanced. President Richard Nixon reacted with irritation. His national security adviser and foreign policy guru, Henry Kissinger, an ex-Harvard professor, was shrewder. Canada, he believed, acted in counterpoint to the United States. 'We are so powerful,' he argued in 1974: 'whatever identity they have, they get in opposition to us.' As for Trudeau, Kissinger considered him 'intelligent, foppish and a momma's boy.' It was not a bad impression as far as it went, though later Kissinger would gild it for his memoirs. …

John Bartlet Brebner: The Private Man Behind the Professional Historian

The Siamese Twins of and North Atlantic Triangle are terms coined by Canadian historian John Bartlet and now anchored in any study of Canada and Canadian-American relations. Carl Berger, in his 1976 seminal work The Writing of Canadian History, included among those who completely transformed Canadian historiography, but omitted a chapter specifically devoted to Brebner. G.A. Rawlyk, in his review article two years later, detailed Brebner's contributions, especially in Maritime history and geography. This constituted a start on missing chapter. Like those emphasized by Berger, George Wrong, Adam Shortt, Chester Martin, Harold Innis, Arthur Lower, Frank Underhill, Donald Creighton, and William L. Morton, Brebner ought to have been included.., among so-called 'major figures.' (1) Since 1970s, has remained a Canadian historian noted in works on Canada and Canadian-American relations by both those who knew him well and those who referenced his works. But he has been overlooked in historiographic works in these fields. For example, in Karl Bicha's recent article, Five Canadian Historians and U.S.A., was mentioned as he was passed over. (2) Others have sought to redress Brebner's omission; Rohit Aggarwala's article 'Non-Resident Me:' John Bartler and Canadian Historical Profession is one such article. Aggarwala contests Brebner' s marginalization by Canadian historical community. His article seeks to elevate in Canadian hisroriography and place him in his rightful place as one of Canada's significant historians. (3) Past works on have focused on professional historian. It is inherently difficult to write biography based primarily on public papers, and there is always potential of formulating erroneous inferences and conclusions from this public record. Private papers, of course, go a long way to illuminate decision-making process that might have been hidden from public eye. This article is a historical narrative that utilizes Brebner's private papers and letters. By adding private man to professional historian, a clearer and fuller picture emerges. Additionally, as twenty-first century dawns and concerns over Canadian sovereignty continue unabated, Brebner's belief that Canada and United States are inseparable within American triangle still resonates. merits a deeper examination of man and his contributions to Canadian and Canadian-American historical communities. was British by heritage, Canadian by birth, and educated in Canada, Great Britain, and United States. While other Canadian historians, such as C.P. Stacey, were also educated in these three English-speaking nations, was unusual in that he remained a Canadian scholar while living outside country of his birth. He was an educator stationed in United States who also taught in Britain and Canada at various times in his life and who had a lifetime association with individuals and professional associations in all three nations. Historian and Cambridge colleague Ronald Robinson believed that [t]hrough his work three nations which had helped to make could understand each other better. And, as Rawlyk notes, was '[o]n creative edge' of Canadian historical writing [and]... one of few Canadian historians with a genuine international reputation. (4) Brebner's voluminous works, spanning a twenty-two-year period, included monographs on solely British and Canadian topics, as well as books and articles on bilateral continental relationship and triangular relationship. As relevant today as it was in his day, consistently strove to bring Canada and its history Out of shadows and into light for American and British audiences. Even as Canada and United States were to the Siamese Twins of America who cannot separate and live, he realized that their history could not be written without Britain. …

A trading nation: Canadian trade policy from colonialism to globalization

CANADACanadian trade policy from colonialism to globalizationMichael HartVancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002, xv, 556pp, $85.00 cloth (ISBN 0-7748-0894-2), $29.95 paper (ISBN 0-7748-0895-0)The work of historians and bureaucrats ought to be complementary; in practice there is not enough dialogue between them. Michael Hart bridges the scholarly and policy-making communities with ease. In his latest book, A Trading Nation, Hart has written an authoritative and comprehensive history of Canadian trade policy. His account is essential reading for anyone interested in Canadian political, diplomatic, and economic history, American and British trade policy, Canadian-American relations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the history of international trade and economic thought, or the policy-making process. The book is accessible to the non-specialist, detailed without being tedious, far-reaching in its relevance, chock-a-block with definite opinions, and full of provocative prescriptions.A Trading Nation sets a high standard for those writing about Canadian external policy. Hart situates trade policy within the larger contexts in which it is both formulated and implemented: economic, political, and diplomatic, as well as domestic and international (North American, North Atlantic, and global). Consequently, this work tells us much about Canada's evolution as a nation, in particular the emergence of a distinct North American identity, as well as Canada's place in the world as an active, sometimes effective, if nonetheless small, player. The method Hart employs is genuinely international; he examines American and British trade history in their own right and over many centuries. When he analyzes the relations, reactions, and interconnections that influenced Canadian trade policy he does so with a clear understanding of the points of view, interests, and objectives of Canada's principal trading partners and allies. In fact, in parts of the book, the analysis of the Uruguay round of the GATT, Canada barely figures, perhaps implicitly making the point that Canada is one small part of a global economy. The result is a work that speaks to an international audience, not just a Canadian one.As a seasoned policy-maker himself, it is not surprising that Hart traces the tension between bureaucrats and their political masters. He argues that politicians, by introducing emotional and political factors into the policy-making process, lead trade policy astray. However, when trade policy is the product of rational and focused bureaucratic deliberation, the political will to implement it can be absent. Professionals must have political support, and politicians require a trade policy that meets the needs of their constituents. Hart understands the political imperative, but his sympathy is with the professional policy-makers whose task is to solve specific problems. …

Collaborative Independence: Canadian-American Relations in Afghanistan

Collaborative Independence: Canadian-American Relations in Afghanistan

Canadian-American relations

Canadian-American relations

The Further Shore

IN CANADA THE VIETNAM WAR is primarily remembered as an episode in domestic politics - riots, protests, dissent - or as a peculiarly unfortunate period in Canadian-American relations. In some ways, this is appropriate. The war was, above all, a public phenomenon, in which diplomacy came up against the force of public opinion and lost. 'Quiet diplomacy,' as far as Canadian-American relations were concerned, was a lost cause, as politicians desperately tried to shore up their standing with an aroused and irritable public opinion. There was no policy choice except expedience and no alternative but surrender to the loud demands of many Canadians. It was, in some respects, the well-intentioned diplomat's worst nightmare.That story is true enough, as far as it goes, but it applies mostly to the second half of Canada's involvement with Vietnam, from 1965 until the fall of Saigon to the communists in 1975. It does not describe the first half of the Canadian experience in Southeast Asia, from 1954 to 1965. That episode was just as interesting because it, too, brought together contradictory elements in Canada's external policy. On the one hand was Western solidarity, surely the touchstone of Canadian foreign relations from the 1940s through the 1990s, and perhaps still. On the other was the sense of a world beyond the cold war - the emerging nations of Asia and later Africa - and that the Western position in the cold war might be damaged or imperilled unless the interests of the poor and populous countries of Asia were taken into account.Professor of History, University of Toronto. The author is at present working on histories of Canadian foreign relations and of the impact of the Vietnam experience on Canada.The 1950s thus witnessed the first serious engagement of the Canadian government in Asia. The Liberal government of Louis St Laurent and his foreign policy advisers was not indifferent to the logic of population statistics. China and India and the countries in between accounted for half of humanity, and they were steadily growing. With China overcome by chaos and then communism, it made sense to pay attention to India. Canada was linked to India through the shared history of the politics and culture of the British Empire and through the British Commonwealth.The story of that early experience is depressing as well. In 1954 Canada undertook to help clean up the aftermath of a colonial war that seemed to pit East against West, North against South, communism against democracy, and the emergent nationalism of the Third World against the colonial hangovers of European imperialism. The Canadian government of the day, Liberal in politics and liberal in temperament, was a firm member of the Western alliance. Yet it also defined itself as untainted by European - even British - colonialism and as unmoved by the sometimes hysterical and always strident anti-communism that in the 1950s disfigured American public life. At the time, these qualities were considered moral assets, and they were deployed in 1954 in formerly French Indochina. But vision and good intentions took policy only so far, for experience in Vietnam showed that Canadian-Indian differences were far greater than convergences.ORIGINSCanada's involvement in Indochina and its tangled diplomacy dated back to the collapse of French power in World War Two. Canadian policy during that war and after was to sustain French resistance and then restore France as a major component in the international system. As Canadian diplomats discovered, that meant accepting what the French government believed to be necessary for the restoration of French power. That in turn meant coming to terms with French policy in Indochina.(f.1)Indochina was the jewel of the French colonial system. Before the Second World War, it was exotic, isolated, and remote, and the French governed it with an iron hand. Its three components, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, were ruled either directly by French proconsuls or indirectly through local, powerless, monarchs. …

Canadian-American Relations: Time for Cassandra?

Oh come on! You're such a Cassandra. am not 'such a Cassandra.' I AM Cassandra! --Woody Allen, Mighty Aphrodite Articles in which state of Canadian-American relations is analyzed appear regularly in books and journals like Canada among Nations, Etudes internationales, and The American Review of Canadian Studies. Current events and authors' basic premises determine whether tone of these summing up and crystal-gazing papers radiates optimism or pessimism. Beginning in 1995, a consensus developed among commentators assessing relations between Chretien government and Clinton administration: all is well indeed! (1) In 1996, Joseph Jockel asserted that the relationship has entered into a period of enduring calm. (2) Nothing has happened since to contradict that statement: most of exchanges between Canada and United States occur without snags, leaders appear to be on good terms, and they have managed to cooperate and harmonize their positions on a significant number of international issues. Of course, a number of recurrent problems tend to annoy Canadian and American officials when they flare up--for example, never-ending disputes over softwood lumber and fishing rights, or preservation of Canada's cultural identity--but these are of minor importance and they do not all occur at same time, making them easier to manage. Better still, a number of these problems have been resolved, even if only on a temporary basis. The task of analyst under these circumstances is both simple and complex. Generally, political pundits are problem solvers, at their best commenting on problematic situations. (3) Realistically, however, little can be said about a relationship between governments imbued with that much harmony, beyond identifying its causes and looking for those elements that might ensure its longevity. This essay will thus follow traditional summing up and crystal-gazing format. Along with most observers, I agree that Canadian-American relations are generally very good. We would do well, then, to identify structural and situational factors that have brought about this degree of harmony. However, changes could occur in coming months to alter dynamics of this relationship, and certain problems looming on horizon could, in medium-to-long term, well spoil party. This pessimistic outlook, a Cassandra-like prediction, (4) carries little risk: things are going so well at moment that any changes at all are bound to be for worse! Some authors have recently yielded to temptation and adopted such an approach. In an article published in 1996, Charles Doran underscored climate of uncertainty that colored relations dominated by near miss of October 1995 referendum on sovereignty of Quebec, recurring trade conflicts, and instability in international system. (5) If circumstances over last few years have rendered first two factors less urgent, third remains ever present. Indeed, given current state of affairs, instability in international system is likely to contribute to important differences of opinion that will arise. Admittedly, conflicts like those over trade and environment will not go away--differences over fish and forest products have strained commercial relations between two nations since 1870--but challenges to Canadian-American relations in next few years will probably be in areas without established guiding principles and where views of one side are diametrically opposed to those of other, as they are in fields of security and of culture. This essay is divided into three parts: first is an overview of structural and situational factors that may have an impact on dynamics of relations between two governments; in second, influence of some of these factors on actual state of Canadian-American relations will be examined; and finally, in third, certain considerations that support a more pessimistic view of future will be discussed. …

NAFTA, the Information Revolution, and Canada-U.S. Relations: An Ontario Perspective

Introduction The pervasiveness and the relentless onslaught of globalization and the knowledge/information revolution--henceforth, GIR--are transforming economies and societies everywhere. This emerging global order is variously referred to as the information revolution, the techno-economic paradigm or, as noted, GIR. However defined, among the key features of this dawning era are: that it is altering the nature of the nation-state--especially the federal nation-state; that it will do for human capital what the industrial revolution did for physical capital; that it is rewarding individuals as the principal beneficiaries of the information revolution; that it is fundamentally altering the nature of capitalism, since a corporation's key assets now go home every night; and that, at a more general level, the information revolution is serving to reduce economic, cultural, and geographical distance and to collapse economic time. Small wonder, then, that this profound constellation of forces is likely to have a similarly profound effect on small, economies like Canada, where the reference to small and open is synonymous with being a price-taker in terms of the global order. While the theme of this volume relates to thinking in Canadian-American relations, what follows is more along the lines of new directions in policy for the northern half of North America in light of the implications of the global era. Actually, the analysis is more constrained still, since it addresses GIR largely from a provincial--Ontario--perspective. The analysis proceeds as follows. The first section presents an overview of GIR as it relates to governments, and enterprise, including speculation about what this ought to imply for Canadian governance in the millennium. Part two then examines those aspects of the above analysis that impinge more directly on Canadian-American relations. In particular, the analysis will detail the emergence of Ontario as a North American region-state. The final section then focuses selectively on some implications for Canadian governance and Canada-U.S. relations. The Anatomy of the Information Era Drawing from Courchene (2000a and 2000b), Figure 1 embodies a framework for assessing the implications of GIR first on markets, and governments (the rectangular blocks), then on the citizen-market, citizen-government, and market-government interfaces (the circles in Figure 1), where the ultimate objective is to focus on the resulting challenges for Canadian policy, for institutional design, and for governance. Proceeding in terms of the entries in Figure 1, the implications of GIR can be summarized along the following lines. GIR and Governments - Powers are being transferred upwards and downwards from central governments of nation-states, especially federal nation-states. - In terms of the former, the rationale is straightforward: economic space is transcending political space, with the result that countries are transferring power to supranational structures and regulatory bodies (for example, NAFTA, EU, the European Central Bank). - Powers are also being passed downward to markets (through privatization, contracting out, and deregulation), to lower levels of government (for example, transferring forestry, mining, tourism, and training to the provinces) and to citizens (via the information revolution). [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] - A convenient description for this process is glocalization (the combination of global and localization). GIR and Citizens - GIR enfranchises individuals as consumers. Indeed, Ohmae (1990) actually defines globalization as consumer sovereignty. - But globalization also tends to disenfranchise individuals as citizens, in the sense that some key policy decisions are increasingly taken in forums where citizens have no direct representation. …

The International Politics of National Missile Defence: A Response to the Critics

INTRODUCTIONTo encourage more informed discussion of national missile defence (NMD) and to widen a dangerously narrow public debate on the subject, this article challenges critics of NMD to confront the logical and factual errors in their arguments against deployment. Because the American programme has important implications for Canadian foreign and security policies (and Canadian-American relations more generally), critics should be prepared to defend their positions beyond simply reiterating the same superficial criticisms. The Canadian public should expect nothing less from the academic community (not to mention our elected officials) than a sophisticated exchange of ideas on such an important issue.The first four sections of this article deal with the four core arguments most often used by critics to describe the aftermath of NMD deployment - impending demise of arms control agreements(1); nuclear proliferation by Russia and China; technological limitations of interceptor technology; and financial costs. Section five addresses the implications for Canadian security and defence policies.'Critic' throughout this article refers to individuals (or groups) who offer any one of the critiques evaluated below. Although there is extensive overlap in the positions of those opposed to NMD, all critics do not share precisely the same views or assign equal weight to the various arguments - there is no homogeneous position, nor is one likely to emerge in such a complex issue. Among opponents of NMD are experts and practitioners in the fields of foreign, security, and defence policies; currently serving and retired military officers; and scientists and engineers (including recipients of the Nobel Prize) with extensive knowledge of NMD and the physics of interceptor technology. Any critic, but especially those with impressive credentials, should be prepared to confront the weaknesses in the position he or she puts forward. Many critics will disagree with some or all of the points I raise.(2) But the fact remains that we desperately need a meaningful and substantive debate on the topic. Without it, the discussion (and attendant policy prescriptions) will continue to be driven entirely by political agendas and stifled by efforts to protect the intellectual capital invested in defending simplistic (and largely outdated) assertions about the dangers of defending people against ballistic missiles.THE DEMISE OF THE NPT AND ABMThe most common criticisms of NMD are associated with warnings about the demise of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Signed in 1968 and 1972, respectively, these treaties are the two pillars of nuclear disarmament and arms control that, according to proponents, were responsible for slowing the pace of proliferation during the cold war and stabilizing the longest nuclear rivalry in history. Because they continue to be essential for controlling proliferation and maintaining a stable nuclear environment, it is imperative that their underlying principles and fundamental logic should not be undermined.What critics fail to point out is that the worst abuses of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology occurred after the treaties were signed. Regardless of the indicator used to track nuclear proliferation - overall nuclear stockpiles, numbers of strategic warheads in submarine launched ballistic missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers,(3) production and stockpiles of weapons' grade plutonium, thefts of fissile material, trade in dual use technology tied to the atomic energy industry, trade in ballistic missile technology, and so on - the evidence of an increase in the pace of proliferation is clear. Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are but the latest illustration of the same pattern. To claim that the NPT and the ABM treaty are essential parts of the international arms control structure doesn't say much for the treaties or for the prospects for serious arms control and disarmament in the future. …

Still Unresolved after Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946–1998

Introduction sailor dream of five centuries: The Near Way to Far East is North.(1) Canadians have a near-mystical bond to their Arctic, a frigid vastness that has sparked Canadian imagination, inspired and shaped a Canadian national identity, and fomented debate over perceived and real challenges to Canadian sovereignty in region. approach to Arctic is overtly nationalistic,(2) and arctic sovereignty is of paramount importance, to be protected and preserved. However, for United States, Arctic is first and foremost linked to national security which, due to interplay of geography, array of Cold War Soviet threats, and even current technological innovations and military hardware, is understood in this context to mean continental defense. In United States' effort to maintain continental security, Canadian sovereignty sensitivities have, at times, been slighted, but intention has not been to deny Canadian arctic sovereignty. In postwar period, Canada's attempts to grapple with its emotional attachment to North, and considerable expense required to occupy and defend it, have been a recurring issue. Nowhere is poignancy of this dilemma more acute than with Northwest Passage, that series of waterways connecting Atlantic and Pacific Oceans north of mainland Canada. The issues and emotions surrounding Passage remain same after more than fifty years. Sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory.(3) It is one thing to claim authority and have it be recognized as legitimate, and another to maintain power and means to protect and enforce claim. The former is de jure sovereignty, latter de facto sovereignty.(4) Canadian de jure sovereignty over its arctic land and islands was internationally recognized by 1930s. But case of arctic waters, specifically both de jure and de facto sovereignty of Northwest Passage, remains unresolved even today. Canada has never proclaimed its intention to exercise exclusive use or presence in Northwest Passage. But process of reaching present Canadian position that of Canadian Arctic Archipelago, including Northwest Passage, are historical internal waters with no right of passages(5) has been anything but direct and swift.(6) In addition, Canada has rarely allocated or committed funds, personnel, or equipment to monitor, defend, or protect Passage. The United States maintains that Passage is an international strait with right of transit passage(7) and largely immune from jurisdiction of contiguous state. Challenges, real or perceived, have proven to be a periodic thorn in Canadian-American relations. In 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, declared that Northwest Passage was the `one pure sovereignty issue of truly major proportions.'(8) But what is status of Northwest Passage in this long-running and still controversial saga in U.S.-Canadian relations? Can there be resolution or will Canada's tentative, underfunded approach and America's unyielding adherence to freedom of navigation perpetuate piecemeal solutions? Is issue any different today from what it was fifty years ago? While both history of and claims to Northwest Passage have been explored,(9) this paper argues that now is time to conclude heretofore elusive settlement. While not minimizing complexity of situation, this paper argues that by evaluating history of and claims to Passage, it can be concluded that it is in best interests of both nations to find a practical, bilateral, narrowly defined solution that recognizes Canada's sovereignty claims, while at same time addressing United States' continental security concerns. The basis of this conclusion lies in four factors: Canada's place as a paramount ally and continental partner of United States, history of bilateral cooperation for more than fifty years, geographically unique nature of Northwest Passage that precludes any arrangement becoming precedent-setting with regard to other straits, and fact that Passage is not considered a vital choke point by United States military. …

Canada, the United States, and the Organization of American States

Insufficient scholarly attention has been accorded Canada's relationship with the Organization of American States (OAS), notwithstanding the fact that it has been a full-fledged member for almost ten years now. Not surprisingly, then, even less attention has focused on the nature and extent of the Canada-U.S. dynamic within the hemispheric bode.(1) Furthermore, this important and complex relationship, especially within a body long considered to be dominated by the United States (even more so than the United Nations), goes to the heart of much of the literature on Canadian foreign policy. And given the importance of this bilateral relationship for Canada, not to mention its often-controversial nature and its sensitivity to most Canadians, one would have expected otherwise. This is all the more striking in light of the fact that most of the opposition to Canada's decision to join the Organization was premised on a belief that it would unnecessarily harm and complicate Canada's overall relations with its superpower neighbor. There is no doubt that the issues on the OAS policy agenda create a number of potential opportunities for sharp disagreement--as well as cooperation and collaboration--between the two countries. In fact, with difficult and integral hemispheric questions about democracy, human rights, hemispheric free trade and the environment, there is certainly no shortage of possible policy areas in which to increase bilateral tension. The thorny question of Cuba (particularly in light of the Helms-Burton law) and the early 1990s constitutional crisis in Haiti stand out as two obvious examples, which clearly had (and continue to have) negative implications for the wider Canada-U.S. relationship.(2) Having said that, there also exist a number of issues areas in which both countries tend to share a common approach and similar objectives, while perhaps disagreeing over the appropriate mix of tactics and strategy to achieve these same inter-American goals. One needs to be careful, of course, about drawing too many firm conclusions about Canadian sovereignty or national independence from any evaluation of its behavior or record of performance within the OAS. In fact, how Canada has conducted itself within the body--including a tendency to take similar positions to that of the United States--may tell us very little about Canada's political independence, or lack thereof. Similarly, when Canada has adopted an opposite or different position from that of Washington, one should not automatically assume that this is a sure sign of autonomy or foreign policy independence. Still, few can question the fact that the United States plays a central role (an understandably so) in the formulation of Canada's overall foreign policy thrust--and this is no different in the case of Canada's conduct within the OAS. What is important to remember, however, is not the inescapable presence of the United States (and thus an important foreign policy or external determinant), but how and why Canadian officials--given the centrality of the U.S. factor--arrive at their policy decisions and positions within the hemispheric body. Accordingly, this article sets out to examine the Canada-U.S. dynamic within the context of the OAS--an area of Canadian foreign policy virtually ignored by the academic community. By doing so, it attempts to make a meaningful contribution to the extant literature on Canadian-American relations by grappling with two important questions. First, what exactly is the nature and extent of interaction between officials from both countries within the OAS? Secondly, and more important, has Canada's behavior or actions within the hemispheric body reflected policy independence or subservience vis-a-vis the United States? Thus, this article seeks to build upon previous ground-breaking research by Kal J. Holsti on diplomatic culture and adds a new and interesting layer of empirical analysis by focusing on the Canada-U. …

Canadian-American Agricultural Trade Relations: A Brief History

Introduction Although in recent years some specialized work has been done on the agricultural trade relationship between Canada and the United States, relatively little historical work has been devoted to this subject. This is true despite a voluminous literature--most of which, admittedly, has been written from a Canadian point-of-view--on the history of Canadian-American relations generally. But, here again, the subject of agricultural trade rarely appears, and then usually only to illustrate a more general problem or conflict. There are a number of likely reasons for this, most prominently the fact that agricultural trade has been on a long-term decline relative to other forms of commodity trade within the world's largest bilateral trading and investment relationship; that is, Canada-U.S. trade has been dominated by manufactured goods for most of the postwar era, leaving agriculture a negligible position. Nonetheless, understanding the history of Canadian-American agricultural trade relations remains important for a number of reasons. First, economic disputes between the two countries have shaped the very nature of the bilateral relationship and, until the 1960s, agricultural trade, along with the fisheries, consistently took top prize as the subject matter of these disputes. Since the early 1960s, disputes over automobiles (rules of origin), culture (Canadian content regulations), and softwood lumber have joined, but not supplanted, these sectoral problem areas, as the recent disputes over salmon and wheat testify. Second, as Table 1 illustrates, bilateral agricultural exports have been more important than the percentage of total trade between the two countries would appear to indicate. An $18 billion annual trade in agricultural commodities (1996) is sizeable by almost any absolute measure, and the historical importance of this trade was proportionately much greater. During the postwar era, the United States has become Canada's main agricultural trading partner, in both exports and imports, while Canada has remained one of the United States' main partners--since the 1970s, the second largest exporter (after the European Community)to the U.S., and among the top four importers of American agricultural goods. Moreover, because of the very regional nature of this trade, it has had, and continues to have, a disproportionate impact on the lives of Canadians and Americans in regions of both countries including the fruit and vegetable growers of California, the cattle ranchers of Alberta, and the durum wheat growers of Saskatchewan, to cite only a few examples (Cohn 1990, 13-14). [Part 1 of 2] Table 1: Agricultural Exports as a Percentage of Total Bilateral Trade in the United States and Canada, 1992-1996 (million of dollars) CANADA 1992 1993 1994 1. Agricultural Exports to the U.S. (1) 6,942 7,367 8,104 2. Total Exports to the U.S. 123,377 149,006 180,837 3. % of Ag. Exports to Total Exports 5.63% 4.94% 4.48% 4. Agricultural Exports to the World 30,679 32,789 37,749 5. Total Exports to the World 163,467 190,383 227,892 6. % of Ag. Exports to Total Exports 18.77% 17.22% 16.56% UNITED STATES 7. Agricultural Exports to Canada (2) 5,980 6,417 7,155 8. Total Exports to Canada 110,379 130,714 156,342 9. % of Ag. Exports to Total Exports 5.42% 4.91% 4.58% 10. Agricultural Exports to the World 42,238 41,938 44,936 11. Total Exports to the World 448,164 465,091 512,626 12. % of Ag. Exports to Total Exports 9.42% 9.02% 8.77% [Part 2 of 2] Table 1: Agricultural Exports as a Percentage of Total Bilateral Trade in the United States and Canada, 1992-1996 (million of dollars) CANADA 1995 1996 1. Agricultural Exports to the U. …

A Continental Philosophy

The prevailing interpretation of Canadian-American relations in the 1960s emphasizes the fundamental differences that came to divide these close cold war allies during a decade of rapid change. For most historians, relations under Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and President Lyndon Johnson were typified by mutual hostility, the product of Canadian nationalism and profound differences over the war in Vietnam.(f.1)But this is only part of the story. At a time when economic nationalists began to flex their muscle in Ottawa, Canada and the United States developed a framework for economic co-operation that drew the two countries more closely together than ever. A series of working agreements and official-level committees emerged during the decade to oversee financial relations between the two countries. During the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which opened in May 1964, bilateral negotiations reduced or removed tariffs on $3 billion-worth of North American trade.(f.2) In January 1965, the two countries signed the Canada-United States Agreement on Automotive Products, or autopact, a conditional free trade arrangement that tried to come to terms with the implications of the highly interdependent economic relationship that had developed since the 1940s. The autopact is a particularly important example of Canadian-American interaction, and its evolution casts a very different light on relations between Canada and the United States in the mid-1960s.The United States was a tolerant ally, responding to the economic nationalism that underlay unilateral Canadian efforts to deal with its perennial trade deficit in automotive products in an imaginative and thoughtful manner. Although it was determined not to sacrifice its legitimate interests for the sake of bilateral harmony, the United States was ready to seek an equitable arrangement for sharing the North American automotive industry in a way which acknowledged the unique conditions confronting Canada, the smaller neighbour of an economic giant. Washington tried hard to persuade Ottawa to resolve their differences over automotive products in a co-operative manner that stressed their common economic interests. In doing so, it posed a fundamental question for Pearson's government: should Canada agree to the further integration of the two North American economies in exchange for the benefits that greater access to the United States market would make possible?The issue divided the cabinet and pitted so-called continentalists against economic nationalists. One wing, led by the nationalist minister of finance, Walter Gordon, hesitated to endorse any measure that would lead to closer economic relations with the United States. A second faction, represented by Mitchell Sharp, the minister of trade and commerce, reflected more traditional liberal views: as a country whose prosperity depended on international commerce, Canada should encourage those developments that promised to reduce tariffs and expand trade. In late 1964, the debate came to a head. In accepting proposals for a closely integrated continental automotive industry, Pearson's cabinet confirmed and strengthened the North American orientation of the Canadian economy.The autopact's origins lie in Canadian efforts to overcome the limitations imposed on the growth of the automotive industry by the nature of its development in Canada. Erected behind the high tariff walls of Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy, the industry was dominated by American branch plants, principally the subsidiaries of Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors. During the 1930s, British Commonwealth preferences encouraged a substantial export trade to Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. This trade declined at the end of the Second World War as American manufacturers established production facilities overseas and the major Canadian automotive producers concentrated on supplying the domestic market, importing many of the vehicles necessary to round out their narrow Canadian product range. …

Studying Canadian-American Relations: Differing Perspectives, Differing Contributions

Studying Canadian-American Relations: Differing Perspectives, Differing Contributions