Canadian Aid Research Articles

Le Canada et le régime international de l’aide

This article examines the conditions of production for Canadian policy in development and. Traditionally, analysis of Canadian aid has followed either a pluralistic, statist or neo-marxist theoretical approach. Noting the inadequacy of these forms of explanation, the author proposes an interpretation of Canadian aid based on the concept of « international community. » This concept can be defined as being the totality of decision-making principles, norms, rules and procedures that structure the expectations and behaviours of those involved in areas dealing with international relations. By resorting to this notion of international community, this study intends to demonstrate that the conditions of production for Canadian aid encompass two kinds of determinism. First, on the systemic level Canadian policy can be perceived as the result of external pressures to put in place an international aid community that contributes to regulating North-South relations. Second, on the national level Canadian aid can be seen as the product of internal power relationships which translate into pressures on the State to modify its participation in the international aid community so as to ensure the promotion of specific political interests.

Intérêts nationaux et coopération multilatérale : le Canada et les banques de développement

This article examines the place held by multilateral development banks in Canada's policy of external cooperation. It seeks to show how, in keeping with the overall logic of its aid policy, Canada's participation in these international financial institutions has resulted from a many-sided configuration of political, development al, and economic interests. The purpose of this article finds it s justification first of all in the fact that, by focusing mainly on bilateral assistance programs, the literature on Canadian aid has largely neglected the study of the many channels for distributing multilateral assistance.

Essai sur l’étude de la coopération bilatérale entre le Canada et l’Afrique francophone 1961-1981

We have divided the evolution of bilateral cooperation between Canada and the French-speaking countries of Africa into three major phases. During the first phase, which lasted from 1961 to 1968, Canadian aid was slight and discontinuous. The second phase, from 1969 to 1975, was characterized by a remarkable increase of the CIDA 's activities. That period was specially influenced, on the one had, by the rudeau and Chevrier missions and, on the other hand, by the reconsideration of Canada's foreign policy during the 1970's. The third phase, from 1975 to 1981, was arked, among other things, by what one could call industrial cooperation, that is cooperation between « project-countries » and « program-countries ». We have tried to analyse the main characteristics of each of those three phases, while striving to « link » them to the socio-economic and political context of Canada and the French-speaking countries of Africa.

La pénétration économique en Amérique latine

In 1970, Canada decided to develop its relations with Latin America, especially in the economic sector. Adhesion to the Interamerican Bank of Development and the status of observator in the Organisation of American States was a good institutional basis for increasing these relations. However, the absence of objectives on refugee and immigration questions prevented adoption of a clear policy towards Chilian and Haitian refugees. Generally Canada had met the 1970 objectives. Trade increased substantially, partly as a result of Canadian policies, but also because of the development of the main countries: Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela and the increase in oil prices. It could be more important if vigourous policies were implemented. Canada has important investments in Latin America, especially in Brazil. In percentage of total Canadian aid, aid to Latin America declined from 1970. Relations with Latin America will increase during the 1980's, but they would be more important if Canada adopted a more coherent policy.

Unfolding Canada-Bangladesh Relations

Canada has been a strong supporter of Bangladesh since the latter's Independence in 1971. Though bilateral trade relations have yet to blossom, Bangladesh was the top Asian recipient of Canadian aid in 1999–2000. Nevertheless, Bangladesh, with little diplomatic weight, generally loses bargaining power in bilateralism, as it has with Canada, whose aid significantly benefits Canadian economic interests.

Determinants of Canadian bilateral aid allocations: humanitarian, commercial or political?

Abstract. In this paper we examine the determinants of the allocation of Canadian bilateral aid over the period 1984–2000. We draw on models of donor behaviour that allow us to incorporate humanitarian, commercial and political considerations – the ‘trinity of mixed motives’– that affect Canadian aid. We find that allocations are moderately altruistic. Recipient country human rights and membership in the Commonwealth and La Francophonie also affect aid flows. Most strikingly, our results suggest that Canadian aid flows became less altruistic over this period and commercial motives became increasingly important. JEL Classification: H50, O10

Creating social spaces for transnational feminist advocacy: the Canadian International Development Agency, the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women and Philippine women's NGOs

The postauthoritarian democratisation process in the Philippines saw the rise of ‘state feminism’, which emphasised gender mainstreaming in government development planning. Various international development agencies, particularly the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), played an important role in harnessing the social capital of women's movements and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) for gender and development (GAD) programs in the post‐Marcos era (1986–2002). This period was marked by a decline in the CIDA's direct assistance to women's NGOs in the Philippines and its shift to institutional capability‐building of government agencies, particularly the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW). The article examines how local women's organisations have interpreted, engaged and negotiated transnational discursive practices on ‘development’, ‘social capital’, ‘capacity‐building’ and ‘gender mainstreaming.’ The CIDA‐funded Women NGOs Umbrella Project and Canadian aid to the Negros Occidental province are used as case studies to illustrate issues and problems in transnational linkages between Philippine women NGOs, national and local governments and Canadian development agencies. Such transnational linkages, embodied in the interesting mix of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘critical engagement’ between states, donor agencies and women NGOs, show the interpenetration of the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ and the blurring of boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘civil’ societies in the course of gender advocacy. At the same time, transnational processes and demands may concurrently create better understanding, as well as conflicts and tensions between state machinery, NGOs and social movements, thus defeating the original intentions of development projects sponsored by international donor agencies.

Capacity building for policy management through twinning: lessons from a Dutch–Namibian case

AbstractThree previous articles of Public Administration and Development carried a debate on the contribution of twinning to capacity building in developing countries. Evidence was adduced to show that twinning could be a reliable vehicle for building and sustaining relevant capacity. On the other hand, some other sources contend that twinning is more of a metaphor than an actual strategy for building capacity. As an actual strategy it may be costly and unsustainable. These cases were part of Swedish, Norwegian and Canadian aid programmes. This article adds insights from a project which was instituted at the instance of the government of Namibia with a Dutch development institution. The focus is in‐country training in policy management for senior public officials and is complemented by off‐the‐job training and programmed visits by both northern and southern partners. The project has four 20‐month cycles and is currently into its second cycle as plans for the third cycle are being finalised. It is generally regarded as successful although this article takes a critical look at the potential of this project to fulfil its original mission of building two types of institutional capacities: high‐quality policy managers within the government and the capacity for policy management training at the country's only national university. It highlights the importance of demand‐drivenness, ownership and partnership, effective integration of theory with practice, mutual respect among partners without jeopardising quality. It also suggests possible strategies for tackling some of the emerging problems. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Tracking Change in Canadian ODA

IN MARCH 1999, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and a group of over thirty prominent Canadians urged Prime Minister Jean Chretien to make the goal of ending global poverty the central, and not merely the rhetorical, purpose of Canadian aid. In August of that year the government appointed Maria Minna as minister for international co-operation and, two months later, Len Good as president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Both appointments were important signals for the future of Canada's aid programme. Both bring new energy and vision to their positions. Minna was a committed Canadian social activist involved with the rights of immigrants in Canada; Good was a Canadian executive director to the World Bank from 1994 to 1998 when James Wolfenson, the president of the Bank, launched his reform initiatives.These appointments were greeted with high expectations by Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) looking for a deeper commitment to poverty reduction in Canada's development co-operation efforts. But have those expectations been fulfilled?Two years later the outlook is cautiously optimistic, but a definitive answer will have to wait for a number of years. Leadership and decisions that demonstrate the efficacy of new approaches for focusing Canada's aid resources and interventions on the elimination poverty will determine change, but some directions can be discerned by looking at some important benchmarks and aspects of a poverty focus in Canadian aid, arising from Canadian NGO assessments of over 30 years of development practice, and by analyzing the 'tracks of change for CIDA,' as articulated by Minna and Good.ASSESSING A POVERTY FOCUS IN CANADIAN ODACanadian NGOs and others have been strongly critical of the use successive Canadian governments have made of Canadian aid resources for a wide array of foreign and domestic policy concerns. The goal of ending poverty has never been the sole focus of Canadian aid; indeed, it usually runs a poor third to Canadian investment and commercial interests. This confusion of purpose, combined with a bureaucratic 'culture of compromise' and CIDA's need to demonstrate measurable 'results,' has resulted in an aid programme that is spread thinly across countries and over many sectors. Both the diffusion of efforts and the concern over results has led to the micro-management of a large number of projects undertaken by a variety of Canadian institutional or 'stakeholder' interests (the private sector, Canadian NGOs, and other Canadian institutions). At the same time, financial resources have declined sharply.Since the early 1990s, Canadian official development assistance (ODA) has been the victim of shrinking funds. Despite modest increases in the federal budget for 2000, it remains at a 30 year low. For fiscal year 2000-1 the projected amount is approximately $2.5 billion or 0.26 per cent of gross national product (GNP).(f.1) Aid has been cut in real terms (removing the impact of inflation) by more than 34 per cent since its peak of $3.5 billion, or 0.49 per cent of GNP, in FY1991/92, significantly closer to the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent.Among the 21 countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Canada had dropped to 12th position by 1999, down from 7th earlier in the decade. Only Finland and Italy cut deeper in the 1990s, while 13 countries increased their aid (only four countries consistently exceed the UN target). Canadian NGOs and others have argued that significant increases - at least $350 million per year in Canadian aid resources are necessary if ministerial efforts for new aid priorities and Canada's commitment to the UN social development targets - one of which is to half the proportion of people living in absolute poverty by 2015 - are to become anything more than rhetoric.(f.2)Despite the massive cuts and the urgent need for reinvestment in international co-operation, the quality of Canadian aid - its mixed and confusing purposes and its impact on reducing poverty - is just as important for NGOs and others who want to reform Canadian aid practices. …

Ethical Values and Canadian Foreign Policy

IT IS WIDELY EXPECTED THAT SOMETIME IN 2001 there will be a review of Canadian foreign aid policies. In anticipation, Canadian non-government organizations (NGOs) are mobilizing to do what they can to ensure that there is no substantial retreat from the putative humanitarian objectives of Canadian aid. Now is perhaps a good time to ask how much success civil society groups have had in the past in promoting a more ethically responsible Canadian foreign policy. A partial answer can be found by looking at their sustained efforts over several decades to influence Canadian policies on two major foreign policy issues in which one might expect that ethical considerations would play a significant role - Canadian policies toward apartheid South Africa and toward foreign aid.In recent years, two theoretical approaches have dominated the scholarly literature on Canadian foreign policy: statist and dominant class.(f.1) Neither approach suggests that ethical considerations have been a significant component of the dominant world view of senior Canadian foreign policy decision-makers or that lobbying from within Canadian civil society has forced the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to become more engaged with issues such as sustained oppression and severe poverty beyond Canada's borders. Both approaches reckon that such 'soft' policy objectives as promoting human rights or helping the world's poorest peoples are filtered out within the decision-making process. Dominant class theorists emphasize the role of the dominant ideology within Canadian decision-making circles in sifting out such objectives, while statist theorists identify the interests that act as the sieve in less ideological and more narrowly bureaucratic terms. However, both clearly imply that civil society efforts to promote more ethical foreign policies have had little impact.A closer look at the development of Canadian foreign aid policies and Canadian policy towards apartheid South Africa, two policies that have long been the focus of sustained ethical lobbying by the Canadian churches, the NGO community, and many other civil society public interest groups, indicates a need for a more nuanced reading of civil society efforts to secure a more ethically responsive Canadian foreign policy.ETHICAL VALUES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN AID(f.2)The literature on the determinants of Canadian aid policies mentions a surprisingly wide range of influences, including, among others, the politics of the cold war, the example and influence of other major donors, the importance attached by the Canadian government to Canada's primary alliances, Canada's historic links with the Commonwealth and la francophonie, bureaucratic politics within the Canadian government, and the government's particular responsiveness to Canadian trade and investment interests. Canadian ethical values, in contrast, are rarely emphasized.(f.3)At its inception, Canadian development assistance was very much a product of cold war alliance politics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, only the United States, France, and Britain had significant foreign aid programmes. Because the purpose of the aid was to counter the expansion of Soviet influence, the United States pressed its allies to assume part of the burden. Canadian aid thus began, timidly and somewhat begrudgingly, as an obligation arising from its major alliances rather than directly from the ethical values of Canadian society.An exceptional confluence of factors and events over the next ten years, at most, produced a rapid expansion of the aid programme and a sustained effort to ensure that it reached and helped the poorest people and countries. The most fundamental factor was the upsurge of deep rooted public support for strong social welfare programmes in Canada.(f.4) This essentially ethical development within Canadian public philosophy created an intellectual and ideological environment in Canada that made foreign aid seem a particularly appropriate way to contain communism. …

Educational Aid for French Africa

IN JANUARY 1968, TO THE DISMAY of the federal government of Canada, the government of Quebec accepted an invitation to send provincial representatives to a meeting in Libreville, Gabon, of education ministers of France and the French African states. After centuries of relative isolation, the French Canadian people had begun to take an interest in other French-speaking peoples around the world, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s that interest grew. At the same time, the government of Quebec began to assert its right to represent French Canadians internationally, thereby challenging federal exclusivity in foreign affairs and, in the federal view, posing a threat to Canada's national unity. Quebec's aspirations forced the federal government to defend its own interests, touching off an intense struggle over responsibility for foreign affairs that lasted throughout the 1960s, complicated by support from France for Quebec's aspirations, and peaked in the years after Charles de Gaulle, president of France, made his famous 'Vive le Quebec libre' speech in July 1967.The literature addressing Quebec's attempts to foster an international identity for itself in the 1960s focuses overwhelmingly on relations between Quebec and France and the effect they had on Canadian foreign policy and on relations between the federal and provincial governments.(f.1) Little importance is attached to the competition between the federal government and Quebec over contacts with the French- speaking countries of Africa in this early period. The literature overlooks the fact that Quebec's aggressiveness in pursuit of membership in la francophonie in the late 1960s was motivated in part by its failed attempts to establish direct relations with French African countries earlier in the decade.(f.2)In April 1961, the federal government announced funding of $300,000 for a programme to provide educational assistance to the countries of French Africa. For most of the 1960s the programme was Canada's principal form of contact with the newly independent French African states. It was also a programme that the government of Quebec felt entitled to direct and for which it was willing to assume large responsibilities. Because education is the preserve of the provinces under the Canadian constitution, officials in Quebec thought that Quebec should bear the responsibility and take the credit for educational assistance to French Africa. Believing that the government of Quebec was the 'national' government of Canada's French Canadians, these officials thought Quebec had a special interest in relations with other French- speaking states, and the educational assistance programme became the vehicle through which to establish initial international contacts. Quebec's desire for a prominent role in the programme, however, challenged federal responsibility for foreign affairs and the ability of the federal government to represent all Canadians internationally. The conflict that resulted was the first skirmish in a long battle between the federal and provincial governments over relations with the international French-speaking community known as la francophonie.The origins of the Canadian educational aid programme for French Africa lay in the gifts the government of Canada planned to give to the various states of the French community on the occasion of their independence from France in 1960 and 1961. Until then, Canadian external aid had been overwhelmingly devoted to the developing countries of the British Commonwealth. By the early 1960s, however, Canadian officials were beginning to recognize Canada's interest in helping to maintain the Western orientation of the new states of French Africa. They also began to listen to the many French Canadians who were openly critical of the focus of Canadian aid on the Commonwealth. External aid to French Africa came to be seen as a means for the Canadian government to demonstrate its commitment to keeping communism at bay while simultaneously responding to the needs of French Canadians. …

The impact of ethical values on Canadian foreign aid policy

Canadians have, since the early 1960s, supported foreign aid primarily for humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, except for a ten year period from about 1966 to 1976, commercial and international political objectives rather than humanitarian objectives have tended to shape Canadian aid policies. Since 1994, to legitimate this dominant trend the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, opposed by the NGO community and those elements within CIDA who remain committed to earlier humane internationalist values, has striven to increase its influence over the shaping of Canadian aid policies and to stress different and more nationally self‐interested rationales for this aid. An analysis is offered of the underlying determinants of this declining influence of ethical values on Canadian foreign aid policies.

Sinews of War and Peace

Canadians have become accustomed to a relatively high level of national income, largely sustained by Canada's trade with the rest of the world. The foundations for that economic activity were laid during and after the Second World War, when memories of the Great Depression and its dire consequences for the Canadian economy were still vivid. Exports in wartime and after were seen as vital to Canada's recovery, to its contribution to victory, and to its plans for the postwar world. Scholarly attention has tended to focus on the options in commercial policy.(f.1) And there is no doubt that bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and commitments framed the choices and influenced the results. Perhaps understandably, less heed has been paid to the extraordinary financial aid advanced by the Canadian government in wartime and after, which underwrote the shipment overseas of Canadian goods. Yet, especially in the vital period of war and reconstruction, funding for Canadian exports, whether war goods or peacetime products, had a much more immediate and comprehensive impact on Canada's international trade. The prospects for access to overseas markets after the war also became increasingly important in reckoning the assistance Canada would provide to its allies and how it would be distributed. Enlightened self-interest shaped the unprecedented programme of postwar lending, initiated in wartime, whereby Canada underwrote its exports in a time of economic instability and uncertainty. In the calculations of Canadian largesse, the critical and often problematic destination for Canadian production was the principal recipient of Canadian aid, the United Kingdom.The Second World War stimulated an economic boom in Canada. In response to British and other allied demands for munitions, food, raw materials, and other supplies, Canada's economy expanded dramatically; its gross national product more than doubled in six years. As a direct consequence of its war production, Canada became the fourth industrial power of the wartime alliance and the second largest exporting nation. But the question of payment complicated the picture. Though Canada went to war, as Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King put it, 'at the side of Britain,'(f.2) it was a dollar Dominion in a sterling Empire and Commonwealth. Little more than a year after war began, Britain's reserves of hard currency had been spent. Thus, Canadian output for the common cause depended on Ottawa's willingness and ability to finance British requirements in Canada. That assistance took various forms -- repatriation of British holdings of Canadian securities in the early months, loans and grants later, and finally Mutual Aid -- and amounted to considerably more than $5,000 million for British needs in wartime.Although Canada eventually became an 'arsenal for the British Empire' as envisaged at the 1937 Imperial Conference,(f.3) the beginnings were inauspicious. When Canada declared war on 10 September 1939, only one factory was producing munitions for the United Kingdom and no arrangements had been made to pay for British orders in Canada. However insufficient its preparations and tentative its prewar commitments, the Canadian government was determined to support Britain against Germany, when war became unavoidable. In late August 1939, cabinet considered 'the extent of participation,' not the fact. Ernest Lapointe, the justice minister, asserted that Canada would assist its European allies to 'the limit of our resources.' The definition of that 'limit' would come to preoccupy Canadian authorities. Moreover, Lapointe cautiously added that 'we should say and do nothing that would divide the country.' National unity was likewise an obsession of the prime minister.(f.4)In the first nine months of war, politics and economy were challenged only occasionally by military events. With uncertainty about the implications of the conflict and the part Canada was expected to play in it, 'limited liability' became a watchword in Ottawa. …

Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance

ETHICAL VALUES AND CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEAfter 1945, a cosmopolitan dimension gradually became a feature of the political cultures of most industrialized societies as they came to accept that they had obligations to promote basic human rights beyond their borders and to aid the development of the world's poorest peoples and countries. However, the attachment of most governments to these obligations has never been other than fragile,(f.1) and their impact on public policy has often been overshadowed by national interest imperatives, both economic and political. Nevertheless, from a human perspective, the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic that asserts in particular an international obligation to advance basic human rights and to promote the development needs of the poorest is a significant development.(f.2)By the mid-1960s, Canada had begun to respond more than minimally to these newer obligations, and, until quite recently, the official rhetoric of the Canadian government located the objective of its development assistance squarely within the emerging cosmopolitan ethic. Both major cabinet-endorsed policy statements on Canadian aid between 1975 and 1993 defined the primary objective of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in humanitarian rather than commercial, political, or security terms.(f.3) This was also the judgment of Canadian parliamentarians on the four important occasions between 1980 and 1994 when committees of parliament gave detailed consideration to Canadian aid policies.(f.4) During the same period, public opinion overwhelmingly held to the view that the primary purpose of aid programmes should be to help the development efforts of the poorest countries and peoples.(f.5) A recent professionally sophisticated poll demonstrates that public support for development assistance remains surprisingly strong, and for essentially ethical reasons.(f.6)Those who embrace the humane internationalist perspective have always recognized, indeed stressed, that development assistance was in Canada's long-term political and economic interest. Foreign aid can reasonably be expected to contribute to a healthy global economy and to a less strife-riven world, both of which are clearly to Canada's advantage. Nevertheless, the primary motive behind foreign aid was and should remain humanitarian rather than the pursuit of any national interests, economic, political, or security. Mitchell Sharp made the point over 25 years ago: 'if the purpose of aid is to help ourselves rather than to help others, we shall probably receive in return what we deserve and a good deal less than we expect.(f.7)DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON CIDA POLICIESThe emergence of a substantial Canadian aid programme did not happen in isolation from domestic politics in Canada. The programme simultaneously reflected the major shift in social values that had, in the same era, led to the development of extensive social welfare programmes in Canada without, however, challenging that particular responsiveness of public policy to corporate interests which is a feature of the Canadian political system.(f.8) The interaction of these influences meant that transplanting liberal welfare values to foreign policy through an expanded aid programme quickly encountered powerful pressures from within government and from the corporate sector for the aid programme to promote other foreign policy objectives, including, in particular, the advancement of Canadian trade interests. Thus from its early years, CIDA was, in the words which open the most comprehensive parliamentary review of Canadian aid policies ever undertaken, 'beset by a confusion of purpose.(f.9)For many years there has been a struggle inside government between those who want to ensure that CIDA is ever more responsive to trade and other foreign policy objectives and those, primarily within CIDA, who want to limit the erosion of CIDA's putative primary focus on helping the poorest peoples and countries. …

DFAIT's takeover bid of CIDA: The institutional future of the Canadian international development agency

The tension between effective foreign aid programs and a policy structure dominated by domestic and political objectives has conditioned the functioning of the Canadian International Development Agency since its creation in 1968. As Cranford Pratt details current arguments for a complete subordination of CIDA to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade have their source within this tension, noting that the official rationale of bureaucratic efficiency is less likely a motive than is the strengthening of policy capabilities within DFAIT. Although efforts to tie Canadian aid to Canadian interests abroad, as opposed to helping “the poorest countries to help themselves,” have come to dominate the Agency's agenda at the behest of its masters within DFAIT, Pratt notes that critics feel the Agency does not serve either purpose with any degree of efficiency. While greater subordination to DFAIT might in the end result in greater coherence of foreign policy and aid objectives, Pratt argues that an independent CIDA must be preserved if the less self‐interested forms of international assistance are to survive. The author concludes that an ultimate solution will require altogether new initiatives that will restructure relations both within and between CIDA and DFAIT.

Untied Aid and Exports: Do Untied Aid Disbursements Create Goodwill for Donor Exports?

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether untied aid inflows cause donor exports to increase, reflecting creation of goodwill by the donor in a recipient country. The causation could, however, be in the opposite direction, i.e. it could be that donors with strong export performance choose to give high aid, or it could proceed in both directions simultaneously. Using time-series data on Canadian aid and exports to 35 developing countries we investigate the direction and sign of the causal relations. We conclude that they are not all of one type. Results vary across the samples based on region, income, and ties to Canada.

The Effects of Structural Adjustment on Civil Society in Zimbabwe: Implications for Canadian Aid Policy

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effects of structural adjustment on social programmes and conditions in Zimbabwe. It argues that efforts by external aid agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency to reduce the negative consequences of adjustment are unlikely to be successful because current policies tend to support economistic neoliberal ideology rather than human resource development.

Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid to Africa

Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid to Africa

Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid to Africa

This article examines the development of Canadian foreign aid policy to Africa, particularly since 1980. We argue that the principles and rules governing Canadian assistance to Africa are increasingly defined at the systemic level, by and among the community of aid donors, rather than at the domestic level, by Canadian decision-makers. In short, Canadian aid policy to Africa is increasingly influenced by the international aid regime. We do not deny the continuing importance of domestic factors. However, when the pattern of change is placed in historical perspective, it becomes clear that the role of domestic determinants has gradually given way to systemic determinants. Moreover, while one should not read too much into a single case study, our argument illustrates important aspects of the changing global dynamic of aid to the Third World in general and Africa in particular. More specifically, it illustrates the growing intensity and coherence of 'global governance' in this area.1

Canadian international development assistance policies: an appraisal

Topics covered include Canadian food aid and the varied factors that have determined its use, the complex relationship between CIDA and Canadian non-governmental organizations, and CIDA assistance to the major multilateral institutions. There is also detailed discussion of CIDA's choice of recipient countries; its use of aid for trade promotion, human rights and development assistance; issues relating to the administration of the aid program; its recent support for the International Monetary Fund and World Bank leverage on the economic policies of the recipient countries; and two case studies, one of public policy dialogue on aid policies in Central America and the second of Canadian aid for development in Asia. In the final chapters the work of CIDA is assessed from a comparative international perspective and the editor, Cranford Pratt, reviews the main determinants of Canadian aid policy and explains why there has been such a significant erosion in CIDA's declared objective of helping the world's poor. This timely and important book contains contributions by Tim Brodhead, Marcia Burdette, Mark Charlton, Tim Draimin, David Gillies, Terence Keenleyside, David Morrison, Katharine Pearson, Cranford Pratt, David Protheroe, Phillip Rawkins, Martin Rudner, and Jean Philippe Therien.