THE CREATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT IN 1965 was the most important landmark in the evolution of the contemporary Commonwealth. It is worth considering why it happened when it did and how Canada contributed.All previous proposals for a central secretariat had come up against Whitehall's tenacious guarding of its powers and Canadian/South African fears about any attenuation of dominion autonomy. Australian proposals in 1907, 1924, 1932, and 1944 had come to nothing, as had New Zealand ideas about a central council in 1909 and 1956.(f.1) By 1964 the climate had changed. The reason must be sought in the impact of decolonization, especially its marked acceleration after 1960.Although Canada's response differed from Britain's, there were misgivings in both countries about the effect of decolonization on the Commonwealth. The British Commonwealth of Nations, as it had emerged in the 1920s, was a unique structure. Britain and the six dominions agreed to treat each other as equal for the purpose of political relations. After 1931 they were constitutionally equal - as independent as they wished under a common allegiance to the Crown. Even when the Irish adopted a republican constitution and stayed neutral in war, they remained a dominion in external association with the Commonwealth. The most frequently used sobriquet for this grouping was 'a club,' a description exemplified by the periodic prime ministers' meetings (PMM) held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street from 1944. This club atmosphere seemed threatened by decolonization. Serious questions were asked: Were all newly independent ex-dependencies clubbable? Should they become equal members of the Commonwealth? At each stage of the decolonization process after the Second World War, these questions arose. Many elements of the British elite balked at the prospect of new members. In the end, virtue was always made a necessity, and the Commonwealth was transformed.In 1947, as the Raj in the Indian subcontinent foundered, the viceroy contemplated a military-style withdrawal, the Indian National Congress demanded an independent sovereign republic, and the Moslem provinces wanted a separate state of Pakistan. Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, sought a flexible Commonwealth, but clung to some sort of unity under the Crown. Many argued that a republic in the Commonwealth would not be possible - that the example of Ireland was not promising. There was talk of a 'two-tier' Commonwealth of monarchical and non-monarchical members. Through the patient statesmanship of Attlee and Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian National Congress leader, India and Pakistan were granted independence quickly as dominions, India's desire to remain a member as a republic was arranged smoothly in 1949, and India accepted the king as head of the Commonwealth.(f.2) There was much self-congratulation, but the 'club' had changed. Frankness gave way to a certain politeness; strategic information derived from American sources was not shared equally. A de facto 'two-tier' system of consultation emerged, especially in defence matters.In 1951 the club received another jolt. Kwameh Nkrumah, who was called to lead the first African-majority government, immediately demanded dominion status for the Gold Coast. There was alarm round the Commonwealth, especially in Pretoria and Salisbury, at the prospect of a black prime minister going to No 10. The British tried to find some 'mezzanine status' to provide independence without Commonwealth membership. The concept of 'statehood' was mooted during contemporaneous discussions about the future of Malta, but Nkrumah would not settle for anything less than full membership. The governor of the colony warned that, if the Gold Coast was denied membership, Africa would be lost. Thus Ghana became the first African member in 1957. Malaya followed the same year and Nigeria in 1960. The club now had eleven members.An even more serious predicament presented itself when the British negotiated with Greece and Turkey to guarantee the independence of Cyprus. …