This issue of the Policy Studies Journal focuses on advice, influence and control as they bear on public policy and governance. Our first pair of articles considers the matter of neutral competence in the provision of advice to policy makers. Since the seminal work of such scholars as Herbert Kaufman and Hugh Heclo, the possibility and efficacy of neutral policy analysis and advice has been widely discussed. Some have argued that in practice analysis is merely a fig leaf to cover naked political interest. Others counter that neutral analysis can (and should be) achieved through appropriate institutional design and inculcation of proper norms. In this issue, David Weimer makes the case that development of neutral competence in policy analysis is more readily achieved in legislative than executive agencies. In parliamentary systems, where legislative and executive functions are combined, a variety of “tools” are offered to foster neutral competence. William West, in our second article, is less optimistic that neutral competence can be achieved and sustained. Retracing the intellectual debate, West identifies the challenges to neutrality and argues that being effective requires giving up some degree of neutrality. We expect to see more on this debate in future issues of the Journal. The third paper tackles the thorny problem of shaping and sustaining difficult reform initiatives in public agencies. How is it that stakeholders reach conclusions about the kind of reform that should be pursued? What kinds of conditions or resources foster sustained efforts to achieve reform? Melissa Marschall and Paru Shah focus on the implications of variation in “civic capacity” within stakeholder communities for continued reform efforts in school systems, and find—among other conclusions—that mayoral leadership may be essential in achieving reasonable levels of stakeholder consensus on appropriate reforms. Chris Weible and Paul Sabatier focus on networks within policy subsystems, and the degree to which networks defined by alliances, coordination and informing/advising overlap. Using the case of California marine life protection issue as a case, Weible and Sabatier find that there is substantial overlap across ally and coordination networks. Not only are these networks more tightly linked, they are also better predicted by “core beliefs” of the policy subsystem players. The remainder of this issue consists of a set of four papers all of which address the problem of “public governance.” These papers were submitted to the PSJ as a set, though of course (as is true of all papers published in this journal) each survived rigorous, independent peer review. While each stands on its own, collectively they provide an impressive demonstration of cutting edge of scholarship on the mechanisms by which governments control the behaviors of public agencies. The scope of the papers is reflected in the countries (Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the US), agencies (prisons, local building administration, and the US Coast Guard), and methods (case study, statistical, and formal approaches) employed. The set is prefaced by a summary paper by Hill et al evaluating the state of the literature on governance mechanisms in the US and EU, and sketching a “logic of governance” by which assessments of governance is facilitated. Public governance is defined to mean “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly-supported goods and services.” As editors, we are particularly pleased with this set in that although each paper stands along in making a substantive contribution, the value of the collection is nevertheless much greater than that of the sum of the parts.
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