The ability of governments to discern and solve different types of crisis situations is a topic of long-standing academic interest (see, for example, Pal 1985; Pollit et al. 1990; Dimock 1991; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996; Roe 2001). In particular, we have the protracted debates surrounding Graham Allison's (1971) analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis (see also Allison and Zelikow 1999). In conceptual terms, Allison's (1971) original monograph provided theoreticians not only with general typological categories (Models I, II, and III) but also with connections between what had been up until that time disparate ideas. In this contribution to the forum, Allison's schema is instructive in three ways. First, it treats the Missile Crisis as a committee process—a topic well-known to management scholars, academics, and practitioners alike. Second, it provides an excellent starting point for students of comparative government to explore how cabinet governments work—an issue sometimes overlooked or minimized by scholars of Western parliamentary systems (Jarman and Kouzmin 1993). Third, it gives us insights regarding how the various players involved in cabinets and committees interact in crisis situations. The intention here is not to intrude presumptively into the intriguing and long-standing Cuban Missile Crisis debate. The objective is much less ambitious but perhaps more relevant: to study “crisis management” as a multifaceted topic in which crises are acknowledged as critical to a system's survival as well as in which crises are contrived so as to gain strategic or tactical advantage, or both (Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin, and Kakabadse 2002). Moreover, we are more interested here in exploring policy advice as political process than with administrative output or social outcomes, and we are more concerned with model building (as contingency theory) than with historic irony, paradox, nuance, or policymaking success at the top echelons of cabinet governments. Of interest …