Byzantine Army Research Articles

Se il centurione parla arabo. Arte e propaganda a Bisanzio tra X e XI secolo

This paper focuses on the mosaic of the Crucifixion in the Church of Nea Monì, Chios, providing an iconographic reading of the Centurion. As has been repeatedly pointed out, with his dark hair and his turban, the Centurion has the distinctive looks of an Arab. Although the turban is often confused with the scarf soldiers used to wear under their helmet, or else with the Jewish tallit, the centurion’s turban seems to be actually inspired by Arabic fashion, as the comparison with the Madrid Skylitzes shows well enough. Connections with eastern costume are further reinforced by the preudo-cufic ornaments embellishing the Centurion’s socks, as well as and by his round shield, which shows the same decoration as the σκουτάρια ραπτά commonly used by the Byzantine army during the Macedonian and Comnenian empire. Thus, the Centurion can be construed as an alter ego of the non-Christians who embraced the orthodox religion after acknowledging the divine identity of Christ. He conveys the same message as the Arab aristocrat depicted under the column of Saint Symeon the Elder in the Menologion of Basil II in the Vatican Library. Macedonian art, I argue, aimed to translate into images the imperial policy directed to the Arabs settled in Constantinople and on the eastern borders, who had been “byzantinized” by the power of law. Not only were they baptized and given Christian names; what is more, they also became part of Byzantine iconography, as shown by our Crucifixion scene.

Harald Sigurdsson and the Russo-Byzantine War of 1043

The present article analyzes Kekaumenos’ commentary on the service of Harald Sigurdsson in the Byzantine army. Special attention is given to the composition of Consilia et Narrationes and the historiographic perception of this text. It then discusses Kekaumenos’ commentary in light of Harald’s adventures in the Haralds saga Siguðarsonar and the story about the attacks of Rus’ in the Byzantine literature. The author attempts to show that Constantine IX Monomachos tried to leave the large groups of mercenaries in Constantinople. Furthermore, the emperor’s attitude to Harald and his warriors was related to the events of Russo-Byzantine war in 1043. Constantine IX Monomachos dispersed these mercenaries into the themes. John Scylitzes wrote that the emperor put a guard over them to prevent them from inciting a rebellion. These arrests could explain Harald’s mysterious detention in the reign of Constantine IX Monomachos. It is possible to conclude that Harald’s detention was caused by the Russo-Byzantine war in 1043.

Distributed Inference with Byzantine Data: State-of-the-Art Review on Data Falsification Attacks

In 1982, Lamport et al. presented the so-called Byzantine generals problem as follows: a group of generals of the Byzantine army camped with their troops around an enemy city. Communicating only by messenger, the generals must agree upon a common battle plan. However, one or more of them may be traitors who will try to confuse the others. The problem is to find an algorithm to ensure that the loyal generals will reach agreement. The authors gave a sharp characterization of the power of the Byzantine generals. It was shown that if the fraction of Byzantine generals is less than 1/3, there is a way for the loyal generals to reach a consensus agreement, regardless of what the Byzantine generals do. If the fraction is above 1/3, consensus can no longer be guaranteed. This article examines the Byzantine generals problem in the context of distributed inference, where data collected from remote locations are sent to a fusion center (FC) for processing and inference. The assumption is that the data are potentially tampered or falsified by some internal adversary who has the knowledge about the algorithm used at the FC. We refer to the problem considered as distributed inference with Byzantine data.

Al-Kahina: The Last Ally of the Roman-Byzantines in the Maghreb Against the Muslim Arab Conquest?

ABSTRACTThis article re-examines the sources on al-Kahina, the famous Berber leader and prophetess of the Aures Mountains, as well as the Byzantine military and political situation in the Maghreb in the late 7th Century C.E. in order to determine the Kahina's relationship with the Byzantines during her resistance war against the conquering Arabs. Historical facts have been separated from legends and traditions. It thus becomes clear that the Kahina, as a Christian, allied herself to the Roman- Byzantines. She did so in her capacity as a Berber Queen. From a Byzantine point of view, and within the context of the political theory as well as reality of the Roman-Byzantine ideology and military tradition, she belonged to the Afro-Byzantine symmachoi. The ‘conversion’ of her sons to Islam on her orders is possible but not certain.

Periodic Revival or Continuation of the Ancient Military Tradition? Another Look at the Question of the KATÁFRAKTOI in the Byzantine Army

This article discusses the question of origin and identity of katáfraktoi – heavy-armoured cavalry in Byzantium. In the specialist literature on the subject, there is a widespread opinion that the heavily-armoured elitist cavalry, defined as catafracti and clibanarii had existed from the Hellenistic period until the end of Late Antiquity. Whereas a comparison of the construction, material and use of the individual elements of weapons and armour used by the Byzantine heavy cavalry from the sixth century and the first half of the seventh century with those of the ancient catafracti and clibanarii, allows us to draw the conclusion that the Byzantine heavily armed cavalry was its continuation, not necessarily in respect of the identity of the formations and their tactics, but more so in respect of the used arms and other elements of equipment. The term catafracti was not used at that time. Classifying the Byzantine cavalry from this period as catafracti, despite the fact that it is not usually defined in this way is based on the opinion of emperor Leo VI, expressed in Tactica, in accordance with which the chief element which distinguished catafracti and clibanarii units from other types of cavalry, was the complete armour of both the horse and rider. In spite of the fact, that the Romans, in response to the Sasanid heavy horsemen created their own mailed cavalry described by names catafracti or clibanarii, the influence of the Steppe people (principally the Huns and Avars) was more pronounced in the next centuries. Their weapons and tactics completely transformed the Byzantine way of war. In particular, this development concerned the cavalry – the main striking force of Byzantine army at this time. As we have seen, a disappearance of the ancient terms catafracti and clibanarii and their tactics (fighting in wedge-column order) was linked with this process of change. In the 10th century, in contemporary military treatises the term katáfraktoi appeared once again, a fact that can be connected with a usage typical for the “Macedonian renaissance”. At this time, the elitist formations of this type constituted a force marginal as compared to other cavalry units making up the Byzantine forces. However, the appearance of the 10th century katáfraktoi were a practical effect of the revival of ancient traditions in the Byzantine culture: they were not a formation which was only modeled on its ancient predecessor, but its constituted a continuation of the ancient patterns. The horsemen were equipped with similar protective armour as their ancient forerunners. They also applied the same tactics, for instance by fighting in the wedge-column order, which is ascribed to the ancient cavalry of this type. Sources mentioned above indicates, that this kind of battle array was reintroduced at this time. Moreover, the katáfraktoi were also present as a main striking cavalry force in the Comnenian army, which indicates, that heavy-armoured cavalry was still necessary. There is no reason to accept the opinion that there was no continuous tradition of heavy-armoured cavalry in the Byzantine Empire.

Modelling medieval military logistics: an agent-based simulation of a Byzantine army on the march

Although historical studies are frequently perceived as clear narratives defined by a series of fixed events; in reality, even where critical historical events may be identified, historic documentation frequently lacks corroborative detail to support verifiable interpretation. Consequently, interpretation rarely rises above the level of unproven assertion and is rarely tested against a range of evidence. Agent-based simulation can provide an opportunity to break these cycles of academic claim and counter-claim. This paper discusses the development of an agent-based simulation designed to investigate medieval military logistics so that new evidence may be generated to supplement existing historical analysis. It uses as a use-case the Byzantine army’s march to the battle of Manzikert (AD 1071), a key event in medieval history. The paper focuses primarily on the design of the agents and the environment they interact with, as well as how the agent-based simulation as a whole can be used to generate new parameters with which historical evidence can be situated.

Byzantine Military Pragmatism vs. Imperial Prejudice: Possible Reasons for Omitting the Armenians from the List of Hostiles in Maurice’s “Strategikon”

Strategikon which is ascribed to Maurice Emperor (582‒602) was an important strategic and tactical manual designed for the Byzantine Military. The work contains a special chapter which, as the author claims, analyses the tactics and features of the peoples who are able to harm the Byzantine Empire. Persians, Scythians, i.e. Avars, Turks and other fair-haired peoples, including Franks, Lombards and Slavic nations are mentioned in the chapter. Each of the ethnically different nations is given an objective and sometimes a rather high evaluation of their military abilities and features on the one hand and in proportion to its empirical prejudice, on the other hand. Surprisingly, Armenians, who had fought against the Byzantine troops on numerous occasions both independently and more often as an ally of Iran or its subordinate forces, were not included in the list of the enemy nations or potential opponent nations in Strategikon. The present article examines the Armenian–Byzantine relations in the time period and suggests possible reasons for removing Armenians from the list of the potential enemies.

Warriors from the East. Skeletal evidence of warfare from a Lombard-Avar cemetery in Central Italy (Campochiaro, Molise, 6th–8th Century AD)

The early mediaeval cemetery of Campochiaro is located in Molise (Central Italy) and dates to the 6th–8th centuries AD. It consists of two inhumation areas: one at Morrione and the other at Vicenne. This site is important because of the contemporary presence of locals, Lombards and Avars of the steppes. Campochiaro was probably an outpost against the Byzantine army settled in southern Italy. Since no signs of a stable settlement or built-up area have been found, it seems the cemetery can be attributed to a semi-nomadic group. Many graves contained a man and his horse with the harness complex and typical Avar stirrups. The military nature of this settlement is shown by ostearchaeological evidence of warfare and violence on three skeletal individuals: n. 20, n. 102 and n. 108. Two of them exhibit lesions of the cranial vault probably produced by shock weapons in the fashion of the Byzantine armies: a spiked mace and a battle-axe. The cicatrisation of the wounds and the bony neo-formation suggest that the individuals survived these injuries for a long time. The third individual suffered from leprosy. He shows a long perpendicular cut in the left section of the frontal bone. The wound is clean and, because it is without traces of bony neo-formation, was probably a peri-mortem blow landed with a sharp weapon. The wound was not mortal, because it was very slight and probably produced only a slash. As ritual or magical practises and/or damage produced during the excavation or by the action of roots in the earth can be excluded, this individual was perhaps really a leper warrior who died in combat.

Byzantine Responses to the Battlefield Tactics of the Armies of the Turkoman Principalities: The Battle of Pelekanos (1329)

Abstract This article examines the Byzantine responses to the battlefield tactics followed by the armies of the Turkoman chiefdoms during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The most characteristic example reflecting the difficulties faced by the Byzantine army when confronted by the Turkomans is the battle of Pelekanos, in the gulf of Nikomedia. It was fought in 1329 between the Byzantines under the command of the emperor Andronikos III (1328–1341), and the Ottomans whose leader was Orhan (1326–1362). The outcome of this battle typifies the inability of the late Byzantine armies to deal effectively with the Turkoman cavalry archers, despite the instructions given by the military treatises which were compiled in the earlier periods of Byzantine history, despite the experience of fighting against enemies of similar nature in the past, and despite the fact that generals such as Kantakouzenos possessed a good knowledge of the fighting methods of the Turkomans. This article argues that the inability of the Byzantines to adjust to the demands of the battlefield tactics of the Turkoman warriors was a combination of many factors. The loss of Asia Minor deprived Byzantium of its main source of competent archers. The Byzantines relied on heavy cavalry which, although it proved ineffective against the Turkomans, was the symbol of exalted status of members of the aristocracy. Moreover, stereotyped views about the Turkomans affected the performance of the Byzantines on the battlefield. It seems that Byzantine generals, even if they knew the fighting methods of the Turkomans, very often could not fully understand the strength of their armies. This article concludes that the failure to react successfully to the battlefield tactics of the Turkomans could be partly described as a failure of cultural adaptation, reinforced by stereotypes about ‘barbarians.’

Η πολεµική τέχνη των πρώιµων Σλάβων (ΣΤ΄-Ζ΄ αι.)

<p style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt" class="MsoNormal"><span class="A1"><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><font size="3">TH</font></span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 8pt">E ART OF </span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 11.5pt">W</span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 8pt">AR OF THE EARLY SLAVS </span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 11.5pt">(6</span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 8pt">TH</span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 11.5pt">-7</span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 8pt">THC</span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 11.5pt">. </span></span><span class="A1"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 11.5pt">A. D.)</span></span></p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'"> </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'"> </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">This study deals with the development of warfare among the early Slavs during </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">the 6th and 7th c. A. D. Its main focus is based on the equipment, the tactic, the </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">art of ship building, the use of the horse, the art of siege and the fortifications. The </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">testimony of sources is critically viewed with respect to the above questions, while </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">with regard to the equipment a number of archaeological data is also added. The </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">conclusions reached, attribute to a large degree the development of the early Slav </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">warfare to contacts with nomadic tribes, and the Avars in particular, with whom </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">they conducted common attacks in Byzantine territory. In certain cases, the </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">extensive use of the horse by the Slavs is attested, as against the traditional view </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">that they usually fought as foot soldiers, and the absence of fortifications among </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">the Slavs of the Lower Danube. The use of the Slavic light spear by the Byzantine </p><p style="margin: 0px; font: 12px 'MgOldTimes UC Pol'">army is also noticed. <span style="font: 12px 'Times New Roman'"> </span></p><div><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 12px" class="Apple-style-span"><br /></span></div>

The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century (review)

The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century (review)

The horsemen of Karbala

This article analyzes a fresco from the ninth or tenth century preserved in a sepulchre church at Guzelyurt (ancient Karbala) in Cappadocia. Two officers of the Byzantine army, Leon, a skribon, who is buried there, and Michael, a turmarch, are depicted on horseback, in keeping with the iconographic scheme of representing holy horsemen. They are attacking an infantryman depicted between them. The infantryman has driven his dagger into the breast of Michael's horse. The text provides a historical background and an iconographic interpretation of the composition. It is a commemorative representation of two soldiers who probably died in battle. Compositions celebrating military activities and justifying the killings committed in war were of special importance in the region at a time when the military played a major role in defending the empire. .

“Win but do not overwin” – The History of a Proverb from the Sententiae Menandri, and a Classical Allusion in St. Paul′s Epistle to the Romans

Abstract This paper traces the history and meaning of the Greek proverb “Win but do not overwin”, first documented in Maurice′s Strategicon (590s) and cited thereafter in various contexts in Byzantine military and historical literature. The earliest manifestation of this proverb is identified as a verse of iambic trimeters preserved in the Γνῶμαι Μενάνδρου or Sententiae Menandri, witnessed in both the manuscript tradition and a fragmentary specimen inscribed on a fifth-/sixth-century ostracon. Older scholarship denied the antiquity of this monostichos on linguistic and metrical grounds, but it is shown that there is no impediment to a possible origin in Attic drama, even if date and authorship remain elusive. Recognition of an additional prose variant in Socrates′ Historia Ecclesiastica points to a wider proverbial currency by the beginning of the fifth century at the latest. The study concludes with the conjecture that St. Paul may have had this proverb in mind when he wrote Epistle to the Romans, adducing arguments based on eccentric vocabulary and evidence for Paul′s limited acquaintance with moralising pagan literature.

The 'History' of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century by Alice-Mary s> Talbot Dennis F. Sullivan (review)

346 SEER, 85, 2, 2007 Beumers succeeds, therefore,in not only providinga thorough exploration of Mikhalkov's work, but also in getting to the heart of Mikhalkov as a filmmaker (if not exactly a thinker).In quoting both foreign and domest.ic reviewsof his films, she quietlydebunkshis self-appointedstatusas saviourof the nation. This is, therefore, an excellent study of one of Russia'smajor filmmakers, and provides not only a clear-eyed analysis of Mikhalkov's themes and preoccupations,but also castsmuch revelatorylight on Soviet and post-Soviet film production. There are also some entertainingconclusions about Russian intellectual snobbery, especially with regard to the critical rejection of his films:'it [Burnt bytheSun]is not made for an elite audience, and thereforeit is despised by the Russian intelligentsia'(p. II4).A few factual errorsmay jar (theformerPrimeMinisterStepashinis referredto as Stepanov,and it was the Supreme Soviet of the RussianFederation,not the Duma, that was disbanded by El'tsin in 1993), but they take nothing away from what is otherwise an exemplary study. Department ofEuropean Studies andModern Languages DAVID GILLESPIE University ofBath The 'Histoy'of LeotheDeacon: Byzantine Militay Expansion in theTenthCentury. Introduction, translation and annotations by Alice-Mary Talbot and Dennis F. Sullivan with the assistance of George T. Dennis and StamatinaMcGrath. Dumbarton Oaks ResearchLibraryand Collection, Washington,D.C., 2005. xix + 264 pp. Notes. Genealogicaltables.Maps. Bibliography.Indexes. $45.00. HISTORIANS of the Middle Byzantine period have long been aware of the importance of the Histogy of Leo the Deacon, probably written towards the end of the tenth centuryand dealingwith the reignsof Romanos 11(959-963). Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) and John I Tzimiskes (969-976) with digressions into the early part of the reign of Basil II (976-iO25). This admirable new English translation makes this source available to a much wider audience and it will be used with great profit not just by students of Byzantium, but by those interested in the contemporary history of its neighboursin the Slav and Muslim worlds. The Introductionwhich, with its clear and approachable discussion of Leo's life and times might profitably be read by researchersand undergraduatestudentsalike, contains an outline of the military and political events of the late tenth century, discussions of Byzantinemilitaryhistoryincludingextremelyusefuldiscussionsof tacticsand equipment contributedby the expert hands of George T. Dennis and Dennis F. Sullivan, a short summary of all that is known of Leo the Deacon and a substantial section on Leo as a historian. This last is of particular interest since, as the editors clearly show, Leo, although familiarwith the style and approachof earlierauthors(particularly Agathiasand Prokopios),is one of the firstByzantine historiansto centre his history on the deeds of individuals,as opposed to writing a continuous chronological narrative. In fact, the figure REVIEWS 347 of the 'exemplary warrior'dominates his work and makes his assessmentof Nikephoros PhokasandJohn Tzimiskes both highly successfulgenerals particularlyinteresting.In addition,Leo providesan interestingearlyexample of what Roger Scott has characterizedas the 'intrusionof the author'spersonality ' into the writing of history. Thus we gain interestinginsightsinto Leo's views of the events taking place around and the personalitiesmost active in them. Cliched these may well be, as the editors point out, but nonetheless they provide a fascinatingglimpse of the opinions and outlook of a late tenthcentury , educated court functionary. The translation team have rendered Leo's Greek into clear and elegant English and have provided detailed notes which help to elucidate some of the most challenging aspects of his work: sortingout some of the confusionsbroughtinto the text by the punctuationof the edition of C. B. Hase, debatingthe possibleuse of a lost sourcefavourable to Nikphoros Phokas (which would help to explain why Leo is able to speak well of both this emperor andhis murderer,John Tzimiskes!),clarifyinghis sometimes confusing chronology and identifying the plethora of places and names in a history whose geographical scope stretches from the Danube to Syria.Talbot and her team are to be congratulatedin bringingthisfascinating text to a wider audience. Those alreadyfamiliarwith it will find a host of new insights and interpretationsto consider; those without Greek will find an accessible and instructiveintroduction to a work which well deserves to be better known. Department ofHistogy ROSEMARYMORRIS University of York Czaplicka, John (ed.). Lviv:A Ci in...

The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century (review)

The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century. Introduction, translation, and annotations by Alice-Mary Talbot and Denis F. Sullivan with the assistance of George T. Dennis and Staniatina McGrath. [Dumbarton Oaks Studies, XLI.] (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks. 2005. Pp. xx, 264.) Byzantine civilization has left a rich and varied body of historical writings. The assortment of chronicles, histories, and memoirs provides an almost unbroken narrative of the empire's history from the sixth to the fifteenth century. The early chronicles offer thin gruel to modern historians trying to form a coherent account of the dark seventh and eighth centuries, but by the tenth century the growing maturity and scope of Byzantine historiography aEow for a more developed understanding of the dominant events and people of the time. The History of Leo the Deacon, focussing mainly on the reigns of the two great soldier emperors Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) and John I Tzimiskes (969-976), has long been recognized as the most important source for the military and dynastic policies that shaped the course of events in the later tenth century. Strangely, however, Leo's history has long languished in an outdated edition, without an English translation, and has until now remained inaccessible to all but specialists. The appearance of this fine, meticulously annotated, translation by Alice-Mary Talbot and Denis Sullivan will be welcomed not only by Byzantinists, but perhaps even more so by students and scholars in the related fields of western medieval and Islamic history. The History of Leo the Deacon bears aE the hallmarks of the genre. The author writes in an archaic Greek full of recondite vocabulary and allusions to earlier models, particularly Procopius and Agathias. He employs rhetorical devices, notably the set speech and the excursus, to dramatize the narrative. He intends to present an orderly, connected record but often strays from his chronological line and occasionally conflates events. Leo was also writing the history of his own time, stating when he was an eyewitness or participant in the events he describes. This gives his work an authoritative immediacy and firsthand perspective; yet Leo also displays the fantastic conception the Byzantines had of the outer world, its workings and peoples. Throughout his work the classical idea of Chance and the Christian agency of Providence operate side by side, reminding readers of the uncertainty of this life and reinforcing the moralizing, instructive value not just of this history but of History itself. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Leo's history is the insight it offers into the mind of an educated Byzantine of middling social rank-what he knew, what he made of the world around him, and what he deemed useful or necessary for his and later generations to know. …

The Armenians in Bulgaria: a community portrait

The settlement of Armenians on Bulgarian territory dates back to Armenians in the service of the Byzantine army, later to numerous settlements of Armenian military, and the growth of Paulicianism, a heresy created mainly by Armenians and Syrians. Mass immigration started in the beginning of the 17th century, when an economic and political crisis developed in Ottoman Armenia. After Bulgaria's 1878 Liberation from Ottoman rule, there were 4,000 Armenians in the Principality of Bulgaria and 1,300 in Eastern Rumelia, according to an 1884 census. Waves of refugees fled to Bulgaria after the 1896 and 1915 genocides. During the rule of Kemal Atatürk and after the 1919–1922 Greco-Turkish War, the Armenians were compelled to seek refuge beyond Turkey. On the orders of the Alexander Stamboliiski government, Bulgaria opened its borders to refugees in 1922, and approximately 25,000 Armenians settled in the country. Today there are 13,000 Armenians in Bulgaria, with their own churches, schools, newspapers and cultural life in many cities such as Plovdiv, Sofia, Shumen, etc.

ヨハンネス2世のシリア遠征とザンギーの南進策

The Byzantine emperor John II made Syrian expeditions twice, in the 1130s and 1140s. From the beginning of the twelfth century, the Syrian cities and the Crusader States preserved the balance of power through economic agreements and military alliances. However, Zangi, ruler of Aleppo, refused to maintain this balance-of-power policy and started to advance southward in Syria to recover lost territories from the Crusaders and obtain farmland which was under Damascus' rule. John carried out his expedition at this time.John compelled Raymond of Poitiers, the consort of the heiress of Antioch, to become his liege vassal. John and Raymond agreed that Raymond would hand Antioch over to John in return for cities, currently in Muslim hands, which John would capture leading a joint Byzantine-Crusader army. But Raymond had John attack cities whose power Raymond himself wanted to reduce. Also, as the nobility of Antioch, who had come from south Italy, had influence over Raymond, John could not appoint a Greek Orthodox cleric as patriarch of Antioch. Furthermore, an encyclical issued by Pope Innocent II stating that all Latins serving in the Byzantine army were forbidden to attack Christians in Crusader States, forced John to reduce his claims on Antioch, being conscious of the West's eyes. John even sent messengers to Zangi investigating the possibility of forming an alliance with him if the nobility of Antioch rejected him.John's Syrian expeditions largely changed the balance of power in Syria and made Zangi's advance in southern Syria easy. Zangi recaptured his lost territories, just after John retreated from besieging Shaizar, where Zangi had confronted him. The Byzantine threat and the reputation which Zangi gained as a strong leader made Damascus yield him Hims, which would be a base for his further advance southward in Syria.

Standardized Numbers in the Byzantine Army

Many of the statistics that appear in sources for Byzantine armies and their pay show a pattern of roundness and uniformity. While some scholars have taken this as evidence that the statistics are unreliable, the consistency of the pattern indicates that the Byzantine army, like the Roman army, deliberately preferred standardized numbers. Such standardization offered great advantages in mustering, deploying, and paying a large and well-organized force without the help of modern methods of record keeping. Other medieval armies, and the Byzantine army after the eleventh century, did without such standardization because they were smaller and more loosely organized.

Blessures et chirurgie de guerre au Moyen Âge en Occident

Wounds and wartime surgery in the West during the Middle-Ages ; The study of war wounds in the Middle Ages drawn from the accounts of the chroniclers and from chivalric novels suggests that about 50 per cent of wounds affected the head or neck, those to the limbs and the chest coming in second and third place, in about equal proportions. Medical surgery was carried out in Byzantine armies from the VIth century onwards, but the great Greek surgeons disappeared in about the XIth century. In the Latin West a lack of evidence makes it impossible to conjecture the fate of ordinary soldiers wounded in the VIth and VIIth centuries, but it seems likely that only kings and aristocrats benefited from medical care in that period. In contrast, accounts attest that from the VIIth Century the wounded men of victorious armies received medical attention on the battlefield, more often by religious personnel or civilians than by surgeons. From the XIIth Century the presence of surgeons on the battlefield became more noticeable, rank-and-file soldiers fairly regularly enjoying the benefit of their care. From the XIIIth Century the presence of surgeons and doctors with armies grew more commonplace, becoming more or less the norm during the XIVth and XVth centuries. The XIIIth and XIVth centuries were characterised by the existence of formally qualified surgeons of exceptional calibre and competence, whose disappearance is related to the Church’s prohibiting the clergy coming close to any blood. In the second half of the XIVth and XVth centuries it was thus the ‘barber-surgeons’ who carried out surgery on fighting troops ; their initial ignorance gave way in time to an undeniable practical competence and to a certain degree of theoretical knowledge that could gain them the vaunted qualification of barber-surgeon.

A contribution to the study of lamellar armors

The work is based on the finds of lamellar armors from the Early Byzantine site Svetinja at Viminacium. In addition to the analysis of the finds we presented also the analogies from Early Byzantine, Germanic and Avar contexts and we also paid attention to the so far insufficiently known find from Selenca. Along the armors we also analyzed the related lamellar helmets. The work includes discussion of the genesis of lamellar armor types - their Oriental origin and their continuance after the 6th century, i.e. the final years of the 6th and the beginning of the 7th century, when lamellar armors were introduced in the Byzantine army and among Germans and Avars as a result of changes in warfare techniques. Finally, we suggest conclusions resulting from the precisely defined context of the Svetinja find.