Repurchase Announcements Research Articles

Share buy-backs for a selection of JSE listed companies: An exploratory study

This study undertook to derive share repurchase trends from a small sample of JSE-listed companies over the nine years, 1999 – 2008. The study also draws attention to the particular obstacles to be overcome when conducting research into the unique South African share repurchases environment.The study finds that 33 companies made 71 repurchase announcements (47 general and 24 specific) via the Securities Exchange News Service (SENS) over the period July 1999 until financial year-end in 2008. On average, 59,0% of the total number of shares (and 49,3% of the total value) repurchased under a general authority is not included in the 3% SENS announcements. General share repurchases represent 47,9% of total repurchases in volume (and 60,5% in terms of value). The total number of shares repurchased (excluding share trust purchases) by the 33 companies shows that 56,8% were repurchased by subsidiaries and 17,1% were subsequent repurchases by companies from subsidiaries. (In value, these repurchases represent 53,7% and 17,2%, respectively.)This study therefore concludes that research based on only the 3% SENS announcements of general share buy-backs results in significant understating of actual total share buy-back activities, and that the South African share repurchase environment presents unique challenges. The main obstacle for future South African research in this field however is the lack of comprehensive and accurate share repurchase data as supplied by South African financial data sources.This material is based upon work supported financially by the National Research Foundation. Any opinion, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and therefore the NRF does not accept any liability in regard thereto.

Can Price Movement Toward Equilibrium Overshoot? Evidence from Share Repurchases and Subsidiary Selling

If a firm repurchases its own shares to signal that they are undervalued then the stock price should increase to its intrinsic level. However, it is not clear whether the price should monotonically increase to its intrinsic level or instead could reach equilibrium through a more dynamic process by which the price fluctuates around the intrinsic level and approaches that level gradually. Using unique data from the Taiwanese stock market, which allows firms to buy and sell their own shares through subsidiaries, we find strong evidence supporting the view that a price rebound does overshoot for at least some firms and the stock becomes overvalued after a repurchase announcement. Our work complements the literature regarding both seasoned equity offerings and share repurchases. Our study supports the view of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) that intermediate-term price drift is caused by investor overconfidence, which then results in market overreaction.

Informed Traders: Linking Legal Insider Trading and Share Repurchases

Logic suggests a link might exist between insider trades and share repurchases for their potential to signal mispricing when market prices deviate from fair value; both events emanate from essentially the same set of decision makers. A rich set of literatures suggests that executives have timing ability with respect to both events. However, several researchers view this collective evidence with suspicion and discount the notion that the evidence reflects fundamental mispricing or managerial timing. We address this debate by considering these two transactions jointly in the context of portfolios which better reflect trading in realtime and also using performance metrics commonly adopted in practice. For value buyback firms where mispricing is a more pragmatic economic motivation, insider trading does indeed provide a strong compliment to the repurchase signal. We find that that mispricing appears to be a key factor motivating at least some repurchase announcements and that managers do exhibit some degree of timing ability.

A comprehensive examination of the wealth effects of recent stock repurchase announcements

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the wealth effect of stock repurchase announcements using a sample of 11,862 repurchase programs announced during 1994–2007. The results of several recent industry surveys indicate that managerial motivations for repurchasing shares may have changed in recent years. To better understand the reasons for repurchasing shares we classify our sample in various ways—by year, by the method used for repurchasing shares, and by the stated purpose of the program. We find that the median size of firms repurchasing shares has increased dramatically recently, and concomitantly, the announcement returns have declined. Signaling undervaluation of share prices appears to become less important than previously assumed. While smaller firms signal undervaluation using open market repurchases, tender offers are chosen to enhance shareholder values by other means.

Short-term wealth effects from debt buyback announcements

This study provides evidence that, as with stock buyback announcements, investors believe that debt buyback announcements signal good news about the future cash flows of the announcing firm. This information is contained in the stock price reaction on the announcement date. On average, the firms sampled experienced an average 5.51% increase in their stock price on the day their plans to repurchase debt were announced in the financial media.

Credibility of corporate announcements and market reaction: evidence from Canadian share repurchase programs

AbstractDo market participants evaluate the credibility of a firm's share repurchase announcement based on the firm's share repurchase history? Using a sample of 1,507 share repurchase programs for firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2005, we find that 69% of firms fail to acquire the target number of shares specified at announcement and many firms fail to repurchase any shares. We develop credibility indices and find a positive relationship between current announcement abnormal returns and completion credibility of previous announcements. We conclude that the market prices completion credibility of past share repurchase announcements in reacting to current repurchase announcements. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Does Better Corporate Governance Lend Credibility to Open-Market Share Repurchase Announcements?

I examine the role of corporate governance in explaining the wealth effect of firms’ announcing open-market share repurchases and managerial actual buyback decisions subsequent to the announcements. Using exploratory principal component analysis, I identify five factors to proxy corporate governance: centralization, supervision, business risk, objectivity, and dependency. I further construct a governance index for Taiwan to obtain a comprehensive effect from a corporate governance mechanism. I find that the capital market reaction to share repurchases announced for the purpose of signaling undervaluation is more favorable among those firms with better corporate governance. However, the actual share repurchase decision of management subsequent to repurchase announcements is independent of the firms’ extent of corporate governance. My results suggest that small size, the Big 4 accounting firms auditing and high listing requirements are determinants of actual buyback shares while management executes repurchase programs. In addition, the required pre-set execution price range before a repurchase announcement explains part of the completion of repurchase programs. This study supports the notion that a better corporate governance mechanism lends credibility to firms’ open-market share repurchase announcements and is noteworthy in assessing the wealth effect of open-market share repurchase announcements on shareholders’ value.

An empirical analysis of European stock repurchases

In this paper, we examine the share price effects and determinants of share repurchase programs for French, German, Italian, and British firms. Like US firms, we find that German and Italian share repurchases are met with a positive and significant share price response. However, British repurchase announcements exhibit small positive abnormal returns, and abnormal returns for French share repurchases are insignificantly different from zero, both results being quite different from results found in studies of US firms. We also investigate the determinants of the size of the share repurchase program. Our results indicate support for the Undervaluation Hypothesis and the Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis, and provide partial support for the National Investment Opportunity Set Hypothesis. Our results from our analysis of cumulative abnormal returns are also consistent with the Undervaluation, Takeover Deterrence, and National Investment Opportunity Set Hypotheses. However, we do not find support for the Excess Capital Hypothesis, the Intangibility Hypothesis or the Optimal Leverage Ratio Hypothesis.

The effects of bank relations on stock repurchases: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the effects that bank relations have on stock repurchases in Japan. Similar to US evidence, we find that stock repurchase announcements in Japan have positive announcement period returns. Announcement returns are positively related to equity ownership by main banks, but are negatively related to nonbank debt ratios. In contrast, bank debt ratios do not have such a negative relation. Announcement returns are also negatively related to future growth opportunities, suggesting that repurchase announcements are greeted more positively by investors when repurchasing firms have lower growth opportunities. We also find that firms with high leverage are less likely to repurchase stocks, whereas firms with high equity ownership by main banks are more likely to do so. Overall, these results are consistent with the views that banks, particularly main banks, are effective monitors of agency costs and financial distress risk, and that their presence as dual stakeholders are value-enhancing.

Stock repurchases and fundamental analysis: an empirical study of the brazilian market in the period from 1994 to 2006

This study examines whether there is a relation between stock repurchase announcements and abnormal returns of companies classified as winners and losers. The classification as winners or losers followed the method suggested by Piotroski (2000), as adapted to the Brazilian market by Lopes & Galdi (2007). The data were obtained from the Economática database, referring to companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) in the period from 1994 to 2006. The hypotheses were tested through regression with panel data. The results show no abnormal returns for both winners and losers that announced share repurchases in the entire study period, without specifying whether this was before or after issuance in 1999 of Instruction 299 by the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM), which enhanced protection of minority shareholders in public tender offers. After segregating the study period into two sub-periods, before and after the new rules, we found a negative relation with abnormal returns for losers that announced repurchases in the earlier period (1994 to 1999), while there was no statistically significant relation for winners. For the 2000-2006 period, however, there was a positive relation with abnormal returns for both winners and losers.

Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch‐auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch‐auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements.

The Determinants of Share Repurchases in Europe

In this research paper we employ a logit model methodology in order to identify the determinants of a firm’s decision to announce a share repurchase. In the models, we incorporate firm specific financial characteristics and measures of share price performance. Hence, we are able to estimate the probability of open market share repurchase announcements across Europe. The robustness of the proposed models is investigated across different dimensions of sample construction methods and with a boot-strap technique. We find that leverage, size, and ownership concentration, have a significant impact on the announcement of share repurchases in all three countries under study. Finally, we construct a number of models with strong predicting ability of a firm’s likelihood to announce a share repurchase.

The Operating Performance of REITs Conducting Open-Market Repurchases

Executive Summary. This study examines whether theoperating performance improves following real estate investmenttrust (REIT) open-market stock repurchase announcements.Based on REIT repurchases announcedover the 1991–2001 period, we do not find any evidencethat the operating performance of REITs improves in thefour years following the repurchase announcement. Furthermore,we do not find any evidence that the size of arepurchase program is positively related to future operatingperformance. Consequently, the announcement ofopen-market stock repurchases by REITs does not containany positive information about the long-term futureprospect of REITs.

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.

Does prior record matter in the wealth effect of open-market share repurchase announcements?

This study investigates whether prior experience of share repurchases matters in the market reactions to the subsequent repurchase announcements. Specifically, we study the prior record on actual buybacks and post-announcement stock performance. We find that upon the announcement of share repurchases, stock markets not only respond more positively to those made by firms that have better record on actual buyback following their previous repurchase plan announcements, but also experience a stronger reaction for announcing firms with better stock performance after prior repurchase announcements. These results hold even after controlling for other variables that are found important in influencing the market reactions to repurchase announcements.

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.

Abnormal Stock Returns and Share Repurchases Following Increases in R&D Expenditures

This study assumes that firms with significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures have more information asymmetry between managers and investors. These firms may have greater difficulty in reflecting intrinsic firm value than other firms, and may have incentive to repurchase outstanding shares. Consequently, this study examines the relations among R&D, abnormal stock returns, and share repurchases. The empirical results demonstrate that firms that economically significantly increase in R&D exhibit abnormal stock returns. Such firms are more likely to make share repurchases, and abnormal stock returns are associated with positive repurchase announcements. Keywords: Abnormal Stock Return, Research and Development, Intangible Assets, Share Repurchases, Information Asymmetry

Managerial Responses to Initial Market Reactions on Share Repurchases

While most papers in finance literature investigate how the stock market reacts to announcements of corporate events, very few study the opposite, how namely, the manager responds to the information from outside investors. In this paper, we examine this issue, using open market share repurchases. Open market share repurchase offers flexibility for the manager to decide whether or not to buy back shares. Therefore, the manager may refer to the opinions of outside investors and make the decision, based on actual buyback activities. We propose learning, over-confidence and timing hypotheses to interpret the behavior of the managerial response to initial market reaction on the share repurchase announcement. Empirically, if a repurchase announcement abnormal return is low, then the manager tends to achieve the repurchase announced ratio by purchasing more shares. In addition, the investor will positively react to this repurchase in the long run. These empirical findings are consistent with the market timing hypothesis, which implies that managers know the true value of their firms better than the market at the moment of the share repurchase announcement.

Share Repurchases, the Clustering Problem, and the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis

We examine the market reaction to announcements of actual share repurchases, events that cluster both within and across firms. Using a multivariate regression model, we find that the market reacts positively to the events, indicating that these announcements provide additional information to that contained in the initial repurchase intention announcements. Further, the market response is especially favorable for firms with overinvestment problems as measured by Tobin's q, and is not related to signaling costs as measured by the size of the repurchase. Our findings generally support the hypothesis that share repurchases reduce the agency costs of excessive free cash flow.

The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in Europe. A Cross Country Analysis

We analyse a uniquely constructed data set of share repurchases in France, Germany and the UK. We find significant differences across the three countries in the popularity of this strategy, in the market reaction and its determinants, and in the likelihood of subsequent share repurchase announcements. We show that in the UK, fundamental factors such as initial announcement, size, past returns, ownership concentration, and changes in regulations during our sample period explain the market reaction to the announcement of intention to repurchase shares. In the remaining countries, the excess returns are not persistent in the post-event period, and the fundamental factors do not consistently explain the market reaction and the probability of subsequent repurchases announcements. Our results suggest that institutional settings affect the value creation of share repurchases.