Bush Campaign Research Articles

The Gendered Political Consequences of Racialized Sexual Threats

Narratives of racialized sexual violence—specifically, where a dominant-group woman faces harm by a man outside the dominant group—have long been a staple of American political communication. Past scholarship has examined how these threats prime racial resentment among White Americans; less is known about their gendered effects. I present an original survey experiment comparing racialized sexual threats with racialized threats that are not gendered or sexual. Both evoke racial resentment. Compared with solely racial threats, however, racialized sexual threats also make benevolent sexism salient for a range of democratic outcomes. Moreover, I find distinct effects by respondent race and gender, as men and women of different racial identities are situated differently vis a vis racialized sexual threats. To demonstrate that the gendered/sexualized impact of these appeals extends to real-world campaigns, I conclude with an analysis of candidate support in the 1988 presidential election. The 1988 race saw one of the most notorious examples of racialized sexual threat in modern American politics in the “Willie Horton” ad, aired on behalf of the Bush campaign. Even with the limited measures available in that year, I find that sexism played an important role in shaping Americans’ political views.

Gradual and Sudden Shifts in Political Perceptions: Impressions of Negativity in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Campaign

How do citizens’ perceptions of a political campaign change over the course of the campaign? To find out, we probed the dynamics of the perceived difference in the negativity of the Bush and Gore campaigns in the 2000 U.S. presidential election. The analysis revealed a major turning point in these perceptions shortly after the first campaign debate; beyond that major one-time shift, the tone of what the candidates said during the campaign had no significant effect on the public’s impressions of the tone of the campaign. These results are interesting in and of themselves, and the analysis that produced them holds out considerable promise for future research on the dynamics of election campaigns.

The Aggregate Dynamics of Campaigns

AbstractDaily interactions between partisan elites, the media, and citizens are the driving dynamic of election campaigns and the central determinant of their outcomes. Accordingly, we develop a theory of campaign dynamics that departs from previous top-down models of campaign effects in its emphasis on the reciprocal campaign interactions between these actors. We examine these interactions with daily data on campaign expenditures, media coverage, and voter support in the 2000 presidential campaign. We find that partisan elites, the media, and citizens each played critical and interdependent roles in creating the dynamics of the campaign and producing the closest election in decades. We also find that the Gore campaign was hindered by its delayed responsiveness to the Bush campaign and its unwillingness to reinforce positive media coverage of Gore with increased campaign expenditures.

The right to be wrong

Nothing holds science back longer than clinging to what should not be clung to, and all too often it’s fear, fear of the consequences of having made a mistake, that keeps ideas around long past their expiration date.

SECOND-LEVEL AGENDA SETTING AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING

This study examines the agenda-setting function of televised political advertisements during the 2004 US presidential election. Adding to the growing research on second-level agenda setting, we examined how the advertising agendas of the Bush and Kerry campaigns may have impacted the public evaluations of the two candidates. Our results provide support for the agenda-setting hypothesis as well as mixed support for the second-level hypothesis. Research findings are discussed in terms of the larger context of agenda-setting research and theory.

The Politics of the Pitch: Claiming and Contesting Democracy Through the Iraqi National Soccer Team

Sport was among the many cultural resources that George W. Bush used to justify rhetorically the need for war in Iraq. Specifically, he sought to capitalize on the unexpected success of the Iraqi national soccer team during the 2004 Summer Olympics. The Bush campaign produced a commercial that aired during the two weeks of Olympic coverage, in which Bush was credited with spreading freedom and democracy throughout the world. Simultaneously, the president claimed that Iraq's participation in the Games was possible only because of American-led action that had toppled Saddam Hussein. Rather than accept this narrative, many Iraqi athletes and citizens responded with anger and resentment towards the United States. This analysis demonstrates the extent to which sport metaphors are implicated in the contests over democracy. Moreover, it suggests that critics must engage the discourses of sport as they articulate with politics in an effort to recover the democratic potential of each.

Images, issues, and attacks: television advertising by incumbents and challengers in presidential elections

Chapter 1 Introduction and General Overview Chapter 2 Elections with Strong Incumbents: 1984 to 1996 Chapter 3 Elections with Weak Incumbents: 1980 and 1992 Chapter 4 Elections with Surrogate Incumbents: 1988 to 2000 Chapter 5 The 2004 Election: Nomination Campaigns Chapter 6 The 2004 Election: The Bush Campaign Chapter 7 The 2004 Election: The Kerry Campaign Chapter 8 Summary and Interpretations

Detecting the Effects of Deceptive Presidential Advertisements in the Spring of 2004

Long before the political conventions of 2004, the Kerry and Bush campaigns and their surrogates were laying the groundwork for the fall campaign with heavy ad buys. Some of the assertions made on each side were misleading. Here we explore three misleading claims made on each side in the weeks following the effective end of the 2004 primary season and ask, Did they work? If so, with whom? Results from the National Annenberg Election Survey show that some of these misleading claims about George W. Bush and John Kerry were believed by a majority of citizens. Democrats were more likely to believe deceptive claims about Bush, whereas Republicans were more likely to embrace deceptive claims about Kerry. The claim that “George W. Bush favors sending American jobs overseas” gained traction in battleground states, even when demographic variables and party identification were taken into consideration.

Criteria for evaluating political campaign webpages

Political candidate Web pages have become de rigeur in presidential campaigns. However, no set of standards have emerged for analysis and evaluation of this new and increasingly important electronic medium for political communication. We articulate a set of design criteria that address both the function (political communication: issues, character) and form (e.g., navigation aids, Web page layout) of these messages. These criteria are then applied to the Internet pages of the Bush and Gore campaigns two weeks prior to the 2000 election. Gore's site was more cluttered and less well‐designed than Bush's. The criteria could be used to analyze and evaluate other campaign Web pages.

Sex, Cars and Shopping: Meditations on Social Disabilities

Can a community suffer from disability? Is it possible to define the behaviour of a society as dysfunctional? As I write this, George W. Bush has been re-elected president of the United States. If the polls are to be trusted, this outcome should baffle the majority of Canadians (and, I’d venture to guess, an even bigger majority of CTR readers). In the wake of the election result, much of the analysis in the media has focused on how the Bush campaign was able to exploit key “hot button” issues, including a sense of fear in the United States about the rest of the world. It would seem that for many Americans concepts such conciliation and consensus building (not to mention an ability to speak French) are seen as signs of weakness, perhaps even effeminacy. It is clear that many Americans define themselves through a military framework – their heroes are soldiers – a very alien concept to a demilitarized nation such as Canada. Can a culture that can be so easily moved to fear, isolationism and wilful ignorance be considered mentally balanced?

Bush, Kerry Take Stand On Key Mental Health Issues

Bush, Kerry Take Stand On Key Mental Health Issues

Audiences, metaphors, and the Persian Gulf war

This paper examines George Bush's Persian Gulf war addresses as a representative anecdote of Bush's campaign to build an international military coalition. The paper argues that in war rhetoric international audiences should be considered. A theorization of the international audience is offered. George Bush's public speeches are then analyzed as they use two metaphoric clusters. The SAVAGE cluster is used to justify a response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The CIVILIZATION cluster is used to justify an American‐led military response. The metaphoric clusters are shown to be persuasive to the international audience as they are adopted and recirculated by this audience. Conclusions and implications of the interaction of these two metaphoric clusters for future war rhetoric are offered.

Pakistan: at the crosscurrent of history

This controversial book seeks to explain how Pakistan became the centre of contemporary terrorism. Tracing the development of the country from its birth in 1947 to the present day, Ziring explores how a country once envisaged as a secular model for the Muslim world has been gripped by a form of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Focusing on the links between what is going on within Pakistan and its relationships with key foreign powers such as the US, this account portrays an unstable nation locked in a myriad of struggles - between democracy and military law, secularism and religious fanaticism - just as it finds itself as the centre of Bush's campaign to manage the Axis of Evil.

Elections: Voter Support and Partisans’ (Mis)Perceptions of Presidential Candidates’ Abortion Views in 2000

Although the 2000 Republican and Democratic national party platforms show the parties at opposite poles on abortion policy, Governor George W. Bush publicly supported a vaguely defined “culture of life,” rather than the constitutional amendment barring abortion that was advocated by his party. In light of Bush's campaign strategy, this article uses national survey data to examine the accuracy of citizens’ knowledge of the candidates’ abortion policy positions. Interestingly, pro‐choice Republican voters were much less likely to defect from their party in 2000 than in 1996, suggesting that the Bush campaign's efforts to avoid public opposition to his abortion position were successful.

Tony Blair, Iraq and the Special Relationship

SINCE 1945, IN A VAIN ATTEMPT to retain great power status, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London has encouraged British prime ministers, of whatever party, to nurture a special with the United States. Some, like Tony Blair, also claim to serve as a bridge between the United States and Europe.(1) An effective bridging policy implies that Britain should never have to choose between the United States and Europe. In 2002-2003, however, by supporting George Bush's campaign against Iraq, Tony Blair chose allegiance to Washington at the expense of relations with Britain's major European allies, a decision that was deeply unpopular in Britain as Blair made the case for war and became more so as conditions in Iraq deteriorated throughout 2003.(2)Part 1 of this article traces Blair's relations with Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush since he became prime minister in May 1997, with a particular focus on policy toward Iraq and the decision to go to war in March 2003. Part 2 examines Blair's case for war--the imminent threat to Britain from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction--which most Britons, including several members of Blair's own Cabinet, found unconvincing. Part 3 assesses the costs to Britain of participating in Bush's war, not so much the obvious costs with respect to loss of life but the opportunities lost to participate fully in the multilateral campaign against terrorism and to contribute to a settlement in the Middle East, as well as the costs of complicity in the bumbling incompetence of post-war planning in Iraq.1: BLAIR'S SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH CLINTON AND BUSHFrom 1997 to 2000 Tony Blair forged a close working relationship with President Clinton but was also proactive in European affairs, even to the point of proposing a defence identity for the EU in 1998. Indeed, in this period, despite Blair's decision in June 1997 not to join the euro immediately, other European leaders found francophone Blair the most articulate and pro-EU British prime minister they had ever known, although some did resent his arrogance.(3) Tony Blair and Bill Clinton were soulmates of the centre-left with respect to market economic and social welfare reform. They also held similar views on the Balkans, an issue on which the Clinton and Major governments had been at odds. Nevertheless Blair and Robin Cook, Blair's first foreign secretary, were more proactive on intervening to curb the excesses of Slobodan Milo[Symbol Not Transcribed]sevi[Symbol Not Transcribed] and in co-operating with the International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia than the Clinton administration. Blair was more inclined than Clinton to use force if he felt there was an ethical justification to do so.(4) In 1999 Blair was impatient with Clinton's dithering over when and how to deal with human rights abuses in Kosovo. Once NATO had decided to use force against Serbia, Blair pressed Clinton for a commitment to put US troops on the ground, but failed.(5) Perhaps the only American who appreciated Blair's enthusiasm for ground troops was General Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander in Europe, who told Blair in April 1999 that he could not guarantee a NATO victory over Milo[Symbol Not Transcribed]sevi[Symbol Not Transcribed] with air power alone.(6) In his second term (1997-2001), President Clinton, much weakened, had to deal not only with a Republican-controlled House and Senate but also with a new right-wing pressure group, the Project for the New American Century, under the chairmanship of William Kristol. This group included several neo-conservatives (including Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and John Bolton) who would later serve in the administration of George W. Bush. Out of office they lobbied effectively for regime change in Iraq and a permanent US military presence in the Gulf region. One result was the Iraq Liberation Act, passed in 1998, which committed the United States to regime change in Iraq and also required the Clinton administration to finance several Iraqi opposition groups. …

The Bush and Gore Presidential Campaign Web Sites: Identifying with Hispanic Voters during the 2000 Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire Primary

This study examines presidential campaign discourse addressed to Hispanic voters during the 2000 Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary. Burke's concept of identification is used to determine how candidates identified with Hispanics through (1) common association, (2) antithesis, and (3) subtlety or cunning. Results reveal that George W. Bush invested more in his Spanish Web site and differentiated more among distinct Hispanic populations to create identification with specific subgroups, while Al Gore presented a pan-Latino message. Overall, only four of the thirty-one analyzed messages focused specifically on mobilizing voters during the primary/caucus season.

What a Difference a Definition Makes

On January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which The Washington Post referred to as the broadest rewriting of federal education policy in decades and Washington's top bipartisan achievement of 2001 (Milbank, 2002). In other news stories and editorials, the bill has been referred to as a triumph--the culmination of exhaustive efforts by both houses of Congress and concessions from both political parties (Robelen, 2002). Called the No Child Left Behind Act, the bill pays homage to Bush's campaign focus on education (Broder, 2001). The revised ESEA significantly increases both the federal role in precollegiate education and the overall amount of federal dollars earmarked for this purpose. The bill, which directly targets poor students and struggling schools by shifting funding formulas, requires mandatory annual testing of students from third through eighth grade and makes schools accountable by tracking test results, reporting to parents, and disaggregating results by race, gender, and other factors. Although the bill's supporters claim it represents unprecedented consensus, it has also raised concerns. A September letter from the National Conference of State Legislatures to Congress, for example, called the bill an egregious example of a top-down, one-size-fits-all federal reform (Education Week, 2001), sharply questioning that annual statewide testing in multiple subjects is necessary for effective state accountability system. Others are concerned that the heavy-handed emphasis on testing will lead to manipulation of the system and narrowing of the curriculum. Commenting that the bill ought to be called the No Child Left Untested Act, Robert Schaeffer of FairTest argued that mandatory testing will not show schools where to invest resources but will, on the contrary, take money away from initiatives not directly tested and will penalize (not help) struggling students (Toppo, 2002). Policy analysts have raised questions about the bill as a lever for state education reform, pointing out that although a number of states are still not in compliance with 1994 ESEA requirements, Title I funds have never been withheld from a state for noncompliance (Robelen, 2001). Other concerns include the bill's imbalance between mandates and funding and its inadequate attention to special education as well as the possibility of stigmatizing poor and minority students, the incapacity of the testing industry to keep up with the mandatory testing program, and the new layers of federal regulations that are likely to duplicate state efforts. Of particular interest to the teacher education community is the bill's provision that every state ensure that all teachers are and are receiving high-quality professional (Section 1119). Highly qualified teachers are defined as those who have obtained full state certification (including through alternate routes) or have passed a state teacher licensing exam (Section 9101). It is worth noting that this provision of the bill implies that college- and university-based teacher education is neither the sole nor required mode of preparation for teaching, cementing into this new federal legislation the legitimacy of current alternate routes that bypass traditional SCDE preparation in more than 40 states (Zeichner & Shulte, 2001). According to ESEA definitions, high-quality professional development may involve partnerships with higher education institutions that give teachers the opportunity to work with experienced teachers and college faculty but must, by definition, improve teachers' subject matter knowledge, align with state standards, and improve teachers' understanding of instructional strategies on scientifically based research (Section 9101). Again this definition leaves ambiguous (and perhaps makes superfluous) the role of colleges and universities in the preparation of highly qualified teachers at the same time that it elevates scientifically based research. …

The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001: Overview and Assessment of Effects on Taxpayers

During the 2000 presidential campaign, then–Governor George W. Bush promised that, if elected, he would cut marginal tax rates, reduce marriage penalties, expand the child tax credit, and eliminate the estate tax. In May 2001, Congress enacted the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), which contains many elements of the original Bush campaign proposal. This paper provides a brief summary of the key provisions in EGTRRA. It also contains estimates and discussion of EGTRRA’s most significant effects on taxpayers. EGTRRA differs from recent tax legislation in several key regards. First, most of the major provisions in EGTRRA directly or indirectly reduce marginal tax rates. Second, individuals’—not corporations—are the direct beneficiaries of most of the Act’s tax cuts. Third, EGTRRA’s major provisions are phased in over a longer time period than in previous bills. Finally, the entire Act “sunsets” at the beginning of 2011, meaning that the tax system reverts to prior law on January 1, 2011. A sunset provision was included to avoid a “budget point–of–order” in the Senate, which would have been triggered by the legislation if it lost revenue in the years beyond the budget period (after 2011). Most of the estimates contained in the paper are derived using the Treasury Department Individual Tax Model (ITM) and are based on “fully phased–in law.” The ten–year budget period traditionally is used as a proxy for fully phased–in law. During 2001, the end of the period was 2011. To be consistent with that norm, the estimates of the fully phased–in effects of EGTRRA are done for 2011, notwithstanding the fact that the Act’s provisions sunset at the beginning of that year. Projected 2002 income and population levels (rather than 2011 levels) are used to provide estimates that are more easily interpreted, given their similarity to current income and population levels. Not all of the estimates in the paper are done in this manner. In particular, the estimates showing the effects of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) show the effects each year, and are based on actual law and projected income and population levels for each year. Each set of estimates in the paper is accompanied by a brief discussion of the assumptions underlying them. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001: Overview and Assessment of Effects on Taxpayers

How the Bush and Gore Campaigns Conceptualized and Used the Internet in 2000

Political scientists and campaign professionals have been intrigued by the potential of the Internet as a tool for accessing and conveying political information since the mass marketing of the first Web browser in 1993. Optimists have pointed to the possibility for more expansive participation and more substantive, in-depth issue discussions. Pessimists have countered that universal access to the Internet is still years down the road, pointing out there is little reason to believe campaigns will use the Internet either to spice up or to elevate the national political conversation. Such long-term assessments are premature, but we can offer preliminary assessments of how candidates conceptualize and use the Internet. Relying on surveys of online registered voters and interviews with campaign operatives and Webmasters, I examine how the online electorate was perceived and approached by the Bush and Gore campaigns in 2000.1 find that (1) voters were unlikely to seek political information from candidate or party Web sites, (2) voters were skeptical of information presented on these sites, and (3) the campaigns understood this and therefore saw the Internet primarily as a vehicle for internal communication and grassroots activation.

TechnoDistortions and Effects of the 2000 Political Advertising

This study assesses the effects of the 2000 presidential spots of Gore and Bush. Findings from a national experimental study suggest that Bush benefited more from the ads, even among female voters who have traditionally favored Democrats. The study also examined the effects of technological distortions by testing the famous Bush “RATS” ad. However, the presence of the so-called subliminal technique used by the Bush campaign did not affect voter response to the ad.