B RITISH AND AMERICAN SCHOLARS have generally taken Edmund Burke for utilitarian and an empiricist with keen sense of historical development, qualified by certain religious prepossessions which inclined him to conservatism. In nineteenth century, to mention but two examples, Leslie Stephen understood Burke as rejecting metaphysics in favor of utilitarian principles derived solely from experience,1 and John Morley took it as obvious that Burke's norm of political morality the standard of convenience, of interest of greatest number, of utility and expediency.2 In present century late Harold Laski described Burke as a utilitarian who convinced that what old valuable by mere fact of its arrival at maturity. According to Laski, political philosophy for Burke was nothing . . . but accurate generalization from experience. . . . Nothing more alien ifrom Burke's temper than deductive thinking in politics. only safeguard he could find in empiricism.3 Laski, like several other writers, traced Burke's empiricism to what he considered to be its roots in critical theories of David Hume. The metaphysics of he said, so far as one may use term he would himself have repudiated, are largely those of Hume.4 An American, Victor Hamm, surmised that Burke, in revolt against decadent nominalism which he had studied in Trinity College, Dublin, had turned, not to Hume, but to similar epistemological theory of David Hartley.5 More recently Morton Frisch has advanced thesis that Burke agreed with Aristotle in regard to practice but parted company with him, by rejecting supremacy of theory. Rather, he says, Burke adopted position taken by Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature and maintained that passions, and not reason, form natural
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