ed as political. For this reason, we would expect that such political actions would be clearly related to the normative and behavioral character of bureaucracy. For example, it might be noted that exercises of personal political power are highly differentiated in interpersonal exchanges taking place in the organizational setting. Or one might ask whether the values of creative citizenship are fostered or hindered by man's involvement in rigorous and impersonalized institutional forms such as that typically presented by bureaucracy? In any case, to determine in which ways the organizational influences tend to mold the political processes in bureaucratic settings should prove a revealing enterprise. Such an inquiry might, of course, be broadened to comment on the broad interaction of organizational and political values, especially with respect to the learning process. For example, socialization research relating to such matters as political authority might well be extended to include some consideration of the learning of organizational authority as well. A significant question might be the extent to which somewhat parallel socialization experiences tend to reinforce or contradict one another. That is, we might ask whether a strengthened orientation toward bureaucratic authority might carry over into a deepened respect for regime authority.41 In a similar vein, one might well ask whether the inculcation of bureaucratic norms, especially those associated with elitism and hierarchy, acts to subvert the learning of more democratic political forms. There is every indication that organizational involvement and political participation are closely related, yet there has been little study of the personal factors capable of explaining this relationship. Finally, assuming the relevance of organizational norms to those of politics, the political theorist must ask how notions such as pluralism or even democracy itself are affected by various types of nongovernmental institutional structures. So far this question has been approached by political scientists largely from the standpoint of specifying environmental influences on the governmental process. That is, this field has been dominated by such concerns as the impact of the group on the political structure or the role of the large organization in shaping public policy.42 What has been neglected has been the political status of the active individual in relation to others, to relevant organizations, and eventually to the state. To explore such topics, it may be necessary to expand notions of political order and especially democratic citizenship to nontraditional areas. That is, theories of democracy may have to be broadened in such a way as to include aspects of power and decisionmaking in organizations as well as in the state. In relation to their members, corporations and other large organizations might then be considered direct contributors to the political process and therefore subject to critique on the grounds of democratic theory as well as organizational efficiency.43 Only under these circum For an intriguing commentary on this problem, see Robert A. LeVine, Internatization of Political Values in Stateless Societies, Human Organization, 19 (Summer 1960), 51-58. See also Denhardt, Bureaucratic Socialization, loc. cit. 42 For example, see David A. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951). ' Peter Bachrach has written, would be ludicrous to argue that the highly complex, mammoth, industrial corporate structure should or could be organized with the sole objective of conforming to democratic norms. It would be equally ludicrous to contend that economic efficiency should be the sole criterion by which to judge the performance This content downloaded from 157.55.39.177 on Tue, 15 Nov 2016 04:02:53 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 686 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY stances would we be led to such evaluative questions as whether a system containing a predominance of elitist institutions in capable of complete democracy or how the citizenship role may be expanded in light of changing institutional restrictions. Through all of this, however, we must realize that there are inherent differences in the perspectives provided by the organizational and the political, that each works from the basis of its own special interest and is directed and limited by it adherence to this pattern. of a politico-economic institution. Peter Bachrach, Corporate Authority and Democratic Theory, in David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 269. See also Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), esp. pp. 101-6. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.177 on Tue, 15 Nov 2016 04:02:53 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms