Bureaucratic Reputation Research Articles

Procedural politicking for what? Bureaucratic reputation and democratic governance

Abstract As the bureaucratic policymaking process has frequently deviated from conventional procedures contemplated by administrative law statutes, recent research suggests that bureaucrats strategically use rulemaking procedures to pursue their own goals and circumvent political interventions. However, the literature has often neglected implementation issues that bureaucrats confront in the policymaking process. Building on a bureaucratic reputation perspective that explicitly recognizes bureaucrats’ concern for implementation failure and reputational damage, this study examines when and why U.S. federal agencies issue rules without prior notice and comment instead of proposing rules through the conventional notice-and-comment process. Using logistic regressions with fixed effects, based on over 16,000 rules published between 2000 and 2020, we find that agencies are more likely to solicit prior public comment when making more complex and stringent rules. However, they tend to bypass it when making new rules and joint rules with other agencies. This study also shows that the positive effect of rule stringency on agencies’ use of the conventional notice-and-comment process tends to be more pronounced in agencies with higher proportions of professional bureaucrats. Overall, our findings indicate that bureaucrats’ choices of rulemaking procedures might be shaped by their incentives to prevent implementation failure and preserve agency reputation, which can be compatible with the norms of democratic governance.

Reputational pragmatism at the European Central Bank: preserving reputation(s) amidst widening climate interventions

ABSTRACT Amidst climate change, central banks’ roles have broadened, encompassing new responsibilities beyond tradition through widening interventions. This expansion offers institutional prospects yet could entail reputational risks in reconciling long-standing and evolving responsibilities. Despite widening interventions’ reputational risks, a comprehensive understanding of how these shape banks’ behaviour – preserving existing reputations, fostering new ones, or achieving a compatible integration of both – is lacking. To obtain a better understanding of these dynamics, we draw on bureaucratic reputation theory to examine the climate engagement of the European Central Bank (ECB). Utilising a three-fold frame analysis, we examine the ECB’s communication about its greening agenda, complemented by interview data from stakeholders. Our analysis indicates that the reputation management strategy of the ECB, amidst widening interventions, encompasses the simultaneous presence of three frames – prudence, promotion, and strategic ambiguity. Leveraging the three frames, the ECB engages in reputational pragmatism to navigate diverse audience expectations, conflicting priorities, and mitigate potential reputational risks.

Does whistleblowing always compromise bureaucratic reputation? Exploring the role of accountability institutions through bureaucratic reputation theory

ABSTRACT Organizational reputation is subject to losses when whistleblowing occurs. Based on ethics management and bureaucratic reputation theories, we examined whether the loss could vary depending on whistleblowing channels, such as official channels of accountability institutions (U.S. Office of Special Counsel and Office of Inspector General), and unofficial channels (media) and the existence of whistleblowing management from official channels. From survey experiments with U.S. citizens, we found reputational loss may occur after whistleblowing, but it could be mitigated when managed properly through accountability institutions. Our findings suggest the importance of governments showing efforts to resolve moral issues from citizens’ views.

Exploring the Demographic Determinants of Integrity in Careerist Senior Civil Servants: Role of Social Norms and Security

Given rising concerns over corruption globally, this research investigates the factors that influence integrity. The study found no statistically significant effect of prior education, geography, or experience on the integrity levels of careerist senior civil servants (CSCS) in India (also known as, Indian administrative service officers), which is infamous for corruption in public administration. We posit that this might be attributed to heightened social security received by CSCS amply aided by social contagion, rigorous training, and network effects, which impact the maintenance of integrity at the individual level. Our study supplements the existing rationale of bureaucratic reputation theory, social contagion theory and public service motivations. We argue that corruption in a democratic government in a lower-middle-income country is often a result of an interconnected network of stakeholders that CSCS may have a limited ability to influence, resulting in a quiet life equilibrium.

Representative bureaucracy and organizational attractiveness: An experimental study of symbolic representation of the US and UK police

AbstractDrawing upon representative bureaucracy theory, this study investigates the relationship between passive and symbolic representation by examining the extent to which a more passively representative public organization would be attractive as an employer. The study involved a randomized survey experiment of members of the public in the US and UK. Overall, and contrary to the theory of representative bureaucracy, results show that women found a male‐dominated police department more attractive. The explanation for the results of the study may lie in bureaucratic reputation as a boundary condition of symbolic representation.

Legislative capacity, bureaucratic reputation, and delegation from a trust perspective: A survey experiment

AbstractChallenging the assumptions of the principal‐agent theory, the recent bureaucratic politics literature contends that politicians do not necessarily have weaker capacities and bureaucrats are not necessarily bad apples. What this means for the delegation decision remains underexplored, particularly regarding how legislative capacity and bureaucratic reputation jointly affect delegation. We examine this issue with a trust perspective and a survey experiment of city mayors. Treating bureaucratic reputation as individual trustworthiness and perceived legislative capacity as institutional trustworthiness, we find they interact in complex ways in influencing delegation. When bureaucratic reputation is high, perceived legislative capacity is not associated with delegation. Perceived legislative capacity matters only when bureaucratic reputation is low, and high capacity relates to greater delegation willingness than when capacity is not considered. The findings have implications for studies on delegation, discretion, and bureaucratic reputation.

Conceptualizing and Measuring (Public) Reputation Management

AbstractThis article develops and empirically validates a conceptualization of reputation management in a public sector context. We define reputation management as management behaviors intended to identify and affect how external audiences perceive an organization, including their perceptions of what the organization is, what it strives to be, and the organization’s positive impact on society more broadly. Such behaviors include strategically communicating the organization’s vision to its most important external audiences. The empirical analysis is based on survey responses from 499 employees and 59 managers from three Danish agencies. The analysis yields support for our measure of reputation management. We conclude with a future research agenda on how our conceptualization and scale can be used to further develop Bureaucratic Reputation Theory, as well as public management research aimed at investigating the simultaneous use as well as simultaneous external and internal effects of different types of public management and leadership behaviors.

Sector-Switching, Bureaucratic Reputation, and Citizen Evaluation of Performance: Evidence From a Large-Scale Experiment in India

Amid crises of trust in government, the legitimacy of public organizations has never been more important. In this context, access to performance information ensures democratic control and thus legitimacy. However, performance evaluation is hindered by transaction costs in accessing and cognitive biases in interpreting performance. We examine two antecedents of citizen evaluations of performance: sector and bureaucratic reputation. Utilizing two experiments on a representative sample of Indian citizens, we situate our paper amid the increasing privatization of public services, and reputation management strategies used to influence performance evaluations. We discuss our findings and their implications for public management theory and practice.

Trust in public performance information: The effect of data accessibility and data source

AbstractBuilding on transparency literature, we theorize that information characteristics such as accessibility of raw data and data source provision influence citizens' trust in public performance information. Next to the question of whether providing a data source matters, we argue that information provision from a non‐government actor can compensate for the information asymmetry between citizens and public sector organizations due to a stronger symmetric data exchange relationship. Integrating and elaborating these theoretical assumptions of principal‐agent theory with bureaucratic reputation theory, the organization's reputation, rather than the stakeholder group the information provider is belonging to, may explain varying trust. We conduct eight online experiments in large‐N data collections in Austria and Germany and find that data accessibility and source provision increase trust in performance information. Whereas citizens have more trust in government‐provided data compared to data provided by other citizens, source reputation matters dominantly for building trust in performance information.

Putting on the Blitz: Urgency and Department of Defense Communications in Times of Budget Shortfall

The existing theories of interaction between Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) focus on elite-level principle-actor problems. However, the Department, as one of the most popular institutions in the United States, also has significant public appeal and maintains an active public affairs arm. This article builds on theories of bureaucratic reputation to argue that the DOD uses its public communications to advocate for its own budget. I leverage computerized text analysis to examine over 40,000 public facing documents published by the DOD since 2005. I find evidence that the DOD changed both the timing and the content of its public-facing communications to strategically argue for its budget. This is true during large budgetary shifts (like the U.S. budget sequester) and during the period of the year that the budget is under debate.

Managing bureaucratic reputation in the face of crises: An experimental examination of the effect of strategic communication

AbstractResearch on bureaucratic reputation has found that public organizations respond strategically to reputational threats. To understand better the way public organizations should communicate with their external audiences, upon which they depend for necessary resources and democratic legitimacy, this study examines the effectiveness of various communication strategies that agencies often use in response to a crisis. The results of a series of vignette experiments involving US adults show that an agency's communication strategy in response to crises does indeed influence citizens' reputation judgments. Specifically, compared with remaining silent, organizations that offer the public explanations of crises mitigate their reputational losses more effectively. Further, this study finds that people's prior reputation judgments and the nature of the crisis itself are important factors involved in the formation of reputation judgments, although these findings contradict communication theories. The implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Reputation Management and Administrative Reorganization: How Different Media Reputation Dimensions Matter for Agency Termination

AbstractStudies on public organization reform have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of media salience for administrative reorganization. However, an understanding of how different media reputation dimensions influence government decisions to terminate administrative agencies is required. This study combined insights from bureaucratic reputation and agency termination theories to determine if media reputation dimensions (performative, moral, procedural, and technical) increase the probability of agency survival. These findings were based on advanced machine learning coding of 4,95,384 articles on 449 central agencies in China published in the People’s Daily from 1949 to 2019. Event history analyses and piecewise constant exponential models revealed that media salience significantly and negatively influenced agency termination probability. The procedural dimension consistently mitigated agency termination risk, and the moral and performative dimensions only periodically mitigated agency termination risk. The findings suggested that the appearance in the media and specific reputation dimensions were critical for agency survival. In addition, agencies should strategically manage their media reputation to meet the expectations of multifaceted audiences and decrease the risk of agency termination.

Cautious communicators: Strategic communication of European Union commissioners in regulatory decision-making

The bureaucratic reputation literature stipulates that bureaucracies strategically aim to maximize reputational benefits and minimize reputational damages through targeted communication strategies. Departing from this assumption and using an extensive dataset on the media coverage of 54 legislative acts, we examine the conditions under which commissioners appear in the news and which communication strategies they pursue. Our analyses show that commissioners are more likely to appear in news coverage in the context of technically complex issues. We find that if a regulation is less politically conflictual, they are more likely to promote the commission's policy preferences, whereas they adopt a more passive style of communication in the face of political conflict. The findings further our understanding of regulatory policymaking by explaining bureaucratic behaviour through a communicational lens.

A Dynamic Measure of Bureaucratic Reputation: New Data for New Theory

AbstractBureaucratic reputation is one of the most important concepts used to understand the behavior of administrative agencies and their interactions with multiple audiences. Despite a rich theoretical literature discussing reputation, we do not have a comparable measure across agencies, between countries, and over time. I present a new strategy to measure bureaucratic reputation from legislative speeches with word‐embedding techniques. I introduce an original dataset on the reputation of 465 bureaucratic bodies over a period of 40 years, and across two countries—the U.S. and the U.K. I perform several validation tests and present an application of this method to investigate whether partisanship and agency politicization matter for reputation. I find that agencies enjoy a better reputation among the members of the party in government, with partisan differences less pronounced for independent bodies. Finally, I discuss how this measurement strategy can contribute to classical and new questions about political–administrative interactions.

Cultivated ties and strategic communication: do international environmental secretariats tailor information to increase their bureaucratic reputation?

The past few years have witnessed a growing interest among scholars and policy-makers in the interplay of international bureaucracies with civil society organizations, other non-profit entities, and the private sector. This article extends the state of research by investigating whether and how secretariats try to strengthen their reputation within their respective policy regimes through information provision and alliance building. Based on reputation theory, the article argues that ties cultivated with stakeholders as well as appearance and presentation of information are decisive in this regard. Methodologically, the study implements a mixed-methods design that combines a quantitative survey with social network analysis and qualitative content analysis of interviews with stakeholders within the climate and biodiversity regime. We show that the secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) maintain relationships with a wide range of state and non-state actors to enhance their reputation. Moreover, different types of actors receive different types of information from the two secretariats studied. Our findings reveal that both secretariats use their limited resources for investing strategically into networks with different types of actors (in the broader transnational policy network), either via the tailored provision of information or through strategic networking with multipliers. They also indicate that reputation does not simply depend on characteristics of bureaucracies, but also on framework conditions and different communication strategies.

Regulator Reputation and Stakeholder Participation: A Case Study of the UK’s Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech

This article contributes to the discussion about managing the risks and uncertainties of emerging technologies through increased stakeholder participation. Authorities have increasingly invited stakeholders from high-technology sectors to participate in assessing the risks of, and designing responses to, new technologies. Yet authorities often struggle to attract stakeholders from such sectors to participate; a critical challenge identified but still undertheorised in the literature. Responding to this gap, this article presents a case study of the UK’s regulatory sandbox for financial technologies, applying a document study, questionnaire and interviews to explore fintech firm motivations and apprehensions about participation. Drawing on the bureaucratic reputation literature, the study finds that fintech firms have a range of practical, reputational and normative motivations to participate, and these motivations are inextricably tied to the regulator’s strong reputation with the sector as procedurally correct, high-performing and morally committed to facilitating innovation. On this basis, recommendations for practitioners and hypotheses for future research into the drivers of stakeholder participation in regulatory decision-making surrounding emerging technologies are proposed.

Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses

AbstractA key claim in bureaucratic reputation literature is that reputation has several dimensions. This presents agencies with a difficult choice concerning which dimension(s) they should emphasize in the management of their reputation. This paper analyzes how regulatory agencies manage their reputation through communicative responses to public judgments, based on a single‐case study of the German financial regulator BaFin. Our theoretical argument underscores the importance of different reputational dimensions for regulatory agencies that simultaneously considers their distinct reputation reserves. Our main finding was that BaFin prioritizes responses to public judgments targeting reputational dimensions that are central to its mission and for which the agency has a weak reputation, as opposed to judgments targeting dimensions that are central to its mission and for which it has a strong reputation, or judgments targeting peripheral dimensions. The paper demonstrates the importance of agency missions for reputation management and suggests directions for further research.

Representation, reputation and expectations towards bureaucracy: experimental findings from a favela in Brazil

ABSTRACT Symbolic representation and bureaucratic reputation both refer to perceptions of government agencies, but few studies have examined how these concepts interact. We employed a survey experiment in a Brazilian favela, a unique audience of vulnerable citizens defined by the intersectionality race, class, and spatial segregation, to probe how citizens perceive agencies with differing reputations (police versus public schools) when the agency leader is more or less representative of the favelados. We find representation enhances procedural justice expectations of the less reputable local police. Our findings highlight the relevance of representation when detrimental citizen-state encounters produce negative reputations for vulnerable citizens.

Correction to: Crafting anti-corruption agencies’ bureaucratic reputation: an uphill battle

Correction to: Crafting anti-corruption agencies’ bureaucratic reputation: an uphill battle

Caught up or Protected by the Past? How Reputational Histories Matter for Agencies’ Media Reputations

Abstract Reputation scholars have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of understanding the behavior of government agencies as motivated by reputational concerns. Yet we must still expand our understanding of how agency audiences pass reputational judgments. Combining insights from bureaucratic reputation theory with psychological theories (motivated reasoning and attribution theory), this article theorizes and tests whether agencies’ reputational histories increase the likelihood of receiving positive or negative newspaper coverage. Our findings are based on an extensive coding of 11,041 newspaper articles over a 10-year period in Denmark and Flanders (Belgium) regarding 40 agencies. We introduce a measure of reputational history from communication studies. The analysis identifies that both negative and positive reputational histories are related to the valence of newspaper coverage, suggesting that the past reputations of agencies are part of the cognitive basis upon which audiences form reputational judgment.