Bureaucratic Politics Model Research Articles

The EU's Autonomous Sanctions Against Russia in 2014 Versus 2022: How Does the Bureaucratic Politics Model Bring in the Institutional ‘Balance of Power’ Within the EU?

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has been more incensed over Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2022, when compared to Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. This article questions this shift by looking at the EU's sanctions towards Russia. It argues that the relative unwillingness of the European Commission, and accordingly the imbalance or lopsided distribution of power within and amongst the relevant EU institutions, was one of the factors internal to the EU that prevented an effective response in 2014. Although external and contextual factors have been crucial, the EU has adopted harsher sanctions against Russia since 2022 because the Commission is not unwilling to act as it was in 2014, and dissenting members have found it difficult to obstruct the process in the Council of the EU. This article also extends the analytical repertoire of the bureaucratic politics model by demonstrating that it retains explanatory power even when the traditional parameters remain constant over time.

Bureaucratic Politics and Informality in Foreign Policy-making: The Case of Indonesia-China Relations

ABSTRACT How do governments respond to bilateral relationships characterised by growing economic cooperation on one side and concerns about national security on the other? The existing literature has mainly employed systemic, domestic and individual levels of analysis, but has failed to scrutinise the important bureaucratic aspect of policy-making. By focusing on Indonesia’s policy towards the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS), we examine the role of the ‘curator’, an official tasked with ensuring successful policy outcomes by often bypassing formal institutions in the policy-making process. Arguably, the main reason Indonesia maintained a relatively coherent policy can be attributed to the role of the curator, who worked within an informal space to coordinate maritime policies enacted by a bureaucratic apparatus that was deemed to be hindering the president’s approach. By incorporating informality as a mode of coordination, this analysis of Indonesia-China relations advances the bureaucratic politics model in FPA.

A Long War and a Short Temper: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Trump Administration’s Policy in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made clear that he loathed the nation-building missions that previous administrations had initiated and continued; chief among them was the then 15-year-old war in Afghanistan. Despite his oft-stated desire to end the war, during his first year in office, Trump decided to maintain the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and added thousands more soldiers to the conflict. Later in his term, the U.S. signed a peace agreement with the Taliban and began a phased withdrawal in 2020. However, when Trump left office in January 2021, 2,500 U.S. soldiers remained in Afghanistan. To explain the gap between the President’s clearly stated preferences and U.S. policy, I employ the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy analysis. I examine two crucial intra-administration debates over the future of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The first occurred in 2017 when the new President ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The second covers the period from 2018–2020, when the Administration pivoted to seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict and debated the pace of U.S. withdrawals. In both instances, I find that members of the President’s national security team successfully persuaded the President that the political and strategic risks of a total withdrawal from Afghanistan were prohibitively high.

The Presidential Security and Foreign Policies Council as an Example of a Bureaucratic Politics Model in the Context of Foreign Policy Decision- Making Models

Dış politikada karar verme süreçleri zaman içeresinde önemli değişimler geçirmiştir. Dış politika bir dönemler krallar/imparatorlar tarafından belirlerken, demokratik yönetim anlayışının yaygınlaşmasıyla birlikte parlamentolar, devletin yetkili organları ve ilgili görevlileri tarafından belirlenmeye başlanmıştır. Özellikle soğuk savaş yıllarında realist yaklaşımın etkisi söz konusu iken, soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle realist yaklaşım yetersiz kalmış, dış politikada karar verme sürecine birçok faktörün etki ettiği görülmüştür. Bunu yanı sıra konjonktürel değişimler, iletişim teknolojilerinde yaşanan hızlı gelişmeler, devletlerin ve toplumların hızlı ve sürekli etkileşim halinde olmaları, karşılıklı bağımlılığın artması devletlerin dış politika yapım süreçlerinin geliştirilmesini çeşitlendirilmesini zorunlu hale getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda dış politika analizi ve karar verme odaklı çalışmalar geliştirilmiş, özellikle küresel değişimlere bağlı olarak dış politikada karar verme süreçlerini etkileyen faktörler ve dinamikler incelenmeye başlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’de 2017 yılında yapılan anayasa değişikliğiyle, karar vericilere dış politika önerileri geliştirmek amacıyla oluşturulan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Güvenlik ve Dış Politikalar Kurulu bu çalışmada ele alınmıştır. Tek bir aktörden ziyade çok sayıda aktör esasına dayanan bürokratik politika modeli çerçevesinde karar verme sürecinde nasıl bir role sahip olduğunu ortaya koymaya çalışılmıştır.

Incentive Structures for the Adoption of Crowdsourcing in Public Policy: A Bureaucratic Politics Model

Collective intelligence paradigms have been increasingly embraced by the public sector as a way to address complex policy challenges. The field is limited, however, by our little, comparative understanding of the political economy factors that create incentives around the adoption of certain types of collective intelligence over others in different organizational settings. This article uses a typology of citizen-sourced open innovation models based on the work of Daren Brabham as well as insights from Elinor Ostrom and Archon Fung, in order to produce a theoretical model of the determinants of crowdsourcing adoption decisions in the public sector. The model derives a political economy analysis that matches various administrative scenarios to different collective intelligence modalities and developments. The insights are illustrated through a number of crowdsourcing initiatives and provide important lessons to practitioners designing such collective challenges.

The National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State in the Obama Administration: Thomas Donilon and Hillary Clinton

This article analyzes the relative influence of National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Obama administration. Specifically, using national security advisor typologies and the bureaucratic politics model, the article argues that although Donilon entered the president’s inner circle, Clinton turned out to be a relatively powerful actor, not least in the 2011 Libya intervention. Examining how advisors interact with one another, their status in the advisory group, and the manner in which presidents solicit information from advisors will further our understanding of how, when, and under what conditions national security-level leaders make decisions.

Explaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach

The core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision‐making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources.

China’s rise in Africa and the response of the EU: a theoretical analysis of the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation policy initiative

This article explores and explains the drivers of the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. In order to do so a qualitative assessment was made of how well the various hypotheses flowing from three candidate theories neorealism, institutionalism and the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) fit this policy initiative. It specifically tests them across three distinct stages of the policy cycle, including issue identification, decision-making and policy implementation. Cutting the dependent variable into policy stages allows us to see if the independent variables truly are powerful. This study demonstrates that institutionalism contributes to a better understanding of every distinct stage of the policy process regarding the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. Aspects of neorealism illuminate some stages of the policy process as well, while BPM is only applicable to a limited degree.

Bureaucratic Politics and the Implementation of Liberalization Reforms in Nigeria: A Study of the Unbundling and Reorganization of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

This study investigates the motivations and activities of some bureaucratic agencies and their managers in the systematic derailing of the decision to unbundle the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and privatize some of its subsidiaries. The study applies the bureaucratic politics model to explain implementation politics as it relates to inter‐agency interests. I find that key officials of bureaucratic agencies in the petroleum sector have worked to enhance their various agencies' sphere of influence and maintain critical tasks, thereby derailing and delaying institutional reforms and reorganization of the petroleum sector in line with the liberalization agenda. The study expands the scope of bureaucratic politics in understanding policy outcomes, contributes to literature on inter‐agency relationships and interests in policy implementation. It suggests consideration of inter‐agency relationships in the design and implementation of policies, the need for clearer definition of agency responsibilities in the establishing law in a developing country environment.Related Articles Lamb, Charles M., and Eric M. Wilk. 2009. “.” Politics & Policy 37 (): 127‐149. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00164.x/full Dahill‐Brown, Sara E., and Lesley Lavery. 2012. “.” Politics & Policy 40 (): 557‐592. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00368.x/full Khodr, Hiba, and Isabella Ruble. 2013. “.” Politics & Policy 41 (): 656‐689. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12033/full Related Media . 2015. “Nigeria's Oil Sector: Improving Governance and Addressing Corruption.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAu1XOaHcCM Eboh, Michael. 2016. “.” Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/05/petroleum-industry-motion-no-progress/ Nuhu‐Koko, Abubakar A. 2007. “The Restructuring of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC): Some Pertinent Observations.” http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7380.htm

“Delegation and Then Intervention”: The 2009 Decision to Create the New Rural Pension

AbstractThis article reviews the decision-making process behind the creation of a new rural pension between the early 2000s and 2009. It finds that although policymaking was initially delegated to the bureaucratic level and hence involved a protracted bureaucratic struggle, the issue was resolved by a fiat imposed by top leaders rather than by bureaucratic compromise as a bureaucratic politics model would suggest. I call this policymaking process “delegation and then intervention.” Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) persistently argued in favour of creating the new rural pension, the Ministry of Finance obstinately objected to it. This study finds that when bureaucratic organizations are in conflict because of their core beliefs, rather than resource allocation, they are less likely to reach a consensus. Faced with a prolonged bureaucratic deadlock, top leaders decided in favour of the MOLSS policy initiative, thereby adopting a progressive measure that would provide a completely subsidized basic pension for the rural elderly.

When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)

The study of the role played by bureaucracies contributed substantively to the analysis of the domestic determinants of foreign policy outcomes, particularly by softening the premise of the state as a unitary-rational actor. However, the potential of focusing on bureaucracies to analyse US trade policy outcomes has been severely underestimated by the most recent IPE scholarship, which tends to focus on the Congress and interest groups, and to consider the Executive a unitary actor. Based on elements of the bureaucratic politics model, this article uses evidence from the US trade policy during Clinton’s administration (1993–2001) in order to present arguments regarding how and when bureaucratic conflicts matter the most, and highlight the relevance of these conflicts in the trade decision-making process.

Decision-Making in the Public Sector: Miaoli County Dapu Farmland Expropriation Case Study*

Decision-making is the study of identifying and choosing alternatives based on the values and preferences of the decision-maker. Decision-making is also the process of sufficiently reducing uncertainty and doubt about alternatives to allow a reasonable choice to be made Research methods used in this study include naturalistic (unobtrusive) observation and case study. The Miaoli County Government (MCG) carried out an urban planning which intended to expand the Jhunan base of Hsinchu Science Park and designated areas on the periphery of the Jhunan base; hence, they needed to confiscate the land by zone expropriation. The Innolux Corporation requested the MCG to expand 4.98 hectares of land allocation at March 13, 2008, therefore, MCG formulated the Hsinchu Science Park Chunan base area around a specific area expand plan . However, Taichung High Administrative Court (THAC) issues a judgment that the demolition of 4 houses by the MCG on July 17, 2013 is illegal. Therefore, THAC sentenced the 4 house owners won and their land expropriation must be revoked; other 20 house owners’ appeal was dismissed. But the Chang pharmacy and 22 householders delegated a lawyer to appeal at January 29, 2014. This appeal causes the Dapu land expropriation case undetermined yet and the judicial process must go through all over again. Comparing the decision-making theories and the Miaoli Dapu farmland expropriation case shows that the organization process model and bureaucratic politics model by Alison (1971) explain largely the decision-making in the Dapu farmland expropriation. The organizational SOPs and power do matter, and most decisions in Dapu farmland expropriation are made based on organizational process and political power rather than rationality.

China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea: Bureaucratic Politics with Chinese Characteristics

ABSTRACTThis article sheds light on developing a hybrid analytical construct by combining Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory and modifications tailored to the case of China. It employs the bureaucratic politics model to China’s decision making during the China–Vietnam standoff in 2014 and adjusts the traditional model with intervening variable – the party ranking system and Democratic Centralism doctrine. I argue that the bargaining game among different actors who have diverse agendas led to the shift in China’s strategy. It would concurrently advance FPA studies while developing a future avenue for research on foreign policy formulation of China.

Bureaucratic Roles and Positions: Explaining the United States Libya Decision

ABSTRACTThis analysis examines the decision-making process of the Barack Obama Administration that led to the American decision in March 2011 to intervene in Libya. Its focus is whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision-making can accurately explain the situation. In this case, finding mixed empirical support for the explanatory power of bureaucratic politics, it contributes to the further development of the model for foreign policy decision-making.

Two types of intelligence community accountability: turf wars and identity narratives

Most academic writing on accountability in intelligence organizations presents a bureaucratic politics model which describes investigations and hearings as turf wars between competing organizations and interests. However, within public administration, a second model of organizational accountability exists. In this model, hearings and investigations are not wars over resources, but rather attempts to clarify the organization’s mission and identity. In analyzing transcripts from the 1975 Church Committee Hearings, we can find evidence that the investigation in fact included both types of accountability exercises. Hearings sought both to discipline wayward agencies and to help all parties understand the events which occurred and what these events meant for the identities of the agencies involved, within the context of a democratic society.

Breaking Miles' Law: The Curious Case of Hillary Clinton the Hawk

The bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making is predicated in large part by Miles' Law, which states that “where you stand depends upon where you sit.” That is, an actor's policy preferences can be predicted from his or her governmental position or role within the bureaucracy. Consequently, secretaries of state in the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process are then presumed to favor policy options emphasizing diplomacy and civilian efforts. However, Hillary Clinton has proved to be a consistent hawk during her tenure as secretary of state. Specifically, she was one of the strongest advocates of the use of military force in both Afghanistan and Libya. This paper examines Clinton's policy preferences in the context of the Afghanistan troop surge and the U.S. role in the international military operation in Libya to probe whether the secretary's failure to conform to Miles' Law is an anomaly or presents important questions regarding the possible disjunction between institutional and individual interests and their respective influences on actors' policy preferences.

Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War

This study examines the decision-making process leading to President Barack Obama's decision to order a troop surge in Afghanistan in December 2009. I analyze the decision-making process according to the precepts of the bureaucratic politics model and conclude that the bureaucratic politics model provides a compelling and descriptively accurate account of the Afghanistan surge decision-making process. Actors' policy preferences were influenced by consideration of bureaucratic role and position within government, significant examples of political activity occurred throughout the strategy review, and the ultimate decision was a political compromise.

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.

The Intersection of War and Politics

This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making.

‘No more Hoares to Paris’: British foreign policymaking and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935

AbstractItaly's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 prompted a major European crisis. This article applies the main theories of foreign policy analysis to the British Government's handling of this crisis. It argues that bureaucratic politics existed, but had little impact on outcomes. Domestic politics had more influence, but did not provide detailed instructions on how to act. The perceptions of key actors, informed by reasoned judgement, determined this. Fears of the threat posed by rival states coalesced with concerns about Britain's own military weakness, leading decision-makers to emphasise the need to act in tandem with France. British policy was therefore motivated by the tension between the public's desire to see action against Italy and the Government's wish to minimise any breach with her allies. These findings highlight the weaknesses of the bureaucratic politics model and show how domestic politics can affect foreign policy outcomes. They also demonstrate the interaction between rational analysis defined in terms of reasoned judgement, and actors' perceptions. It is thus argued that benefits are to be gleaned from combining these theories.